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This study of rural local government in Botswana - from 1966
to 1974, with special reference to the Central, North East and
Southern (originally Ngwaketse) District Councils - focusses especially
upon two aspects: party politics and "development". The former entailed
an in-depth analysis of elections, motions and questions in the Council,
and party organisation outside, while the latter is reflected in the
special attention paid in the dissertation to the determination of
priorities and the allocation of resources within the Council and,
outside, to a study of "self-help" and Village Development Committees
in nine villages, three in each of the above Districts.
A variety of methods was used: extensive interviewing, participant
observation and, above all, reliance on the very full documentation
which was made available. Such cross-checking is essential to
determine the degree of generalisation which is permissible concerning
the complexities of a system which was new, which varied considerably
in practice from place to place and which was characterised by a
small scale of operations.
Thus the party "system" is in general of little value in predicting
policy positions, although crucial for understanding elections: Councils
are not composed of Independents. Moreover there are differences
between the two Opposition parties studied (the National Front and the
People's Party>.
Clear trends are discernible in the relations between the central
Government and the Councils. Starting with the premise that "democratic
local government" should replace the rule of the Chiefs, the
Government transferred a number of functions to local authorities,
but subsequently resorted to new hybrid bodies - the Land Boards and
District Development Committees - to deal with certain District-level
functions. The future for District Councils therefore remained
problematical at the end of the period studied. In summary the
choice to be made by the ruling Democratic Party lies between
strengthening the "pyramid of democratic institutions" stressed in
the Government's rhetoric, or relying increasingly on a purely
administrative approach.
This is to certify that this thesis was composed
by myself and is the result of my own work.
Edinburgh
17th January 1978 W. J. Allan Macartney
SUMMARY
This dissertation is concerned primarily with the institutions
of rural local government: their internal workings; their relationship
with other institutions at village, district and national level; and
their two-way relationship with the political ecology of the country.
Special attention is paid within the study to the question of rural
development and its relationship with institutional factors as well
as with wider socio-economic forces. A special attraction of Botswana
was the fact that it was, and is, a member of a very exclusive club
of African multi-party democracies, one in which fundamental freedoms
are respected. The relatively open nature of the political and
administrative process thus allows a social scientist maximum scope
for obtaining data, investigating phenomena and checking conclusions.
Apart from the Introductory and Concluding chapters (Chapters 1
and 10), the study is divided into three parts. Part I deals with
the district level, Part II the grassroots, and Part III the national
level. The reason for this somewhat unorthodox order is that the
main focus is on the District Councils. Accordingly an attempt is
made in Part I not only to analyse the political processes within the
three Councils selected for this study but also to see the political
system as a whole from the perspective of the Districts. This approach
is then followed through in the subsequent parts; an understanding
of the Councils themselves i$ a prerequisite for appreciating their
relations with other bodies and forces.
Chapter 2 thus starts with an analysis of the behaviour of
Councillors within the institution. Their role as representatives,
the most salient issues raised, the significance of voting, and
their managerial function are dealt with. Particular attention is
paid to the variables of party allegiance and geography (in the case
of elected Councillors), from which the conclusion emerges that the
former is of central importance for committee elections but little
else, while the latter bears a relationship with the matters brought
to the Council, and also to committee membership.
Finally in this chapter the position of the non-elected Councillors
is examined. This category includes Chiefs and also a variable number
of political nominees. Some of the expectations about the leadership
role of this group are borne out, but it is noted that, overall, the
elected Councillors came increasingly to assert themselves.
For various reasons there are clearly limitations on the useful¬
ness of the aggregate data analysed in Chapter 2. Some of this is
due to the low incidence of party caucussing, and its parallel, the
high degree of informality and individualism in full Council and
committees; in other words the party "system" is of little value as
a predictive device. Another reason is the fact that where patterns
can be traced from aggregation these are usually unperceived, even
by well-placed observers at District Headquarters, because of the
lack of conscious or obvious pursuit of objectives by Councillors.
Even this generalisation has to be qualified as significant differences
can be discerned among the three selected Districts. These variants
are in part attributable to the socio-economic ecology peculiar to
each District, but are also an inevitable concomitant of the small
scale of operations - in other words the influence of individuals can
be clearly discerned. (Nevertheless one must beware of going to the
opposite extreme and discounting party as a variable altogether: most
Councillors are elected on the basis of their allegiance to a
political party, however weak that party may be in terms of ideology
or even clearcut programme. The Councils are not collections of
Independents.)
Accordingly the flavour of politics in each of the three District
Councils is examined in turn, in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Each chapter
opens with an account of the way the Council conducted its business.
The crucial relationship between the Council bureaucracy (headed and
personified by the Council Secretary as chief executive) and the
Councillors is explored here. The facilities available to Councillors
and the question of allowances are discussed from the viewpoint of
the Councillors.
There follows an examination of the most important issues which
occupied the attention of the Council, including those which gave rise
to controversy. From this somewhat intricate account emerge some ideas
of the attitudes - corporate or partisan as the case may be - to
important and/or sensitive issues. Here some of the differences among
the different Councils can be extracted from the largely pragmatic
approach which generally characterised the decision-making process
in the Councils. Councillors' interests are dealt with insofar as
these impinge upon Council business.
Arguably the most important matter to determine from an analysis
of the internal workings of the Councils is the allocation of resources.
In particular, given Botswana's increasing devotion to rolling five-
year plans, this section deals with planning and the determination
of priorities. In practice the key aspect here is the extent to which
Councillors are able and willing- to challenge and alter the plans
drawn up by Council officials (many of them expatriate volunteer
"technocrats"). Variations among the three Councils are again a
notable factor.
In the study of two Councils a number of special issues require
separate treatment as case studies: the position of Chief Bathoen in
the Southern District, and, for the Central District, the question
of decentralisation and the position of the Education Secretary.
The central position of District Councils in the rural administ¬
rative and political system demands an examination of the Councils1
relations in two, or perhaps three, directions: in diagrammatic terms,
downwards to the villages, where village deve1opment/Ipelegeng and
the role of Councillors are examined; outwards/downwards to the
traditional administration; outwards to the District Administration
and (later) the District Development Committee and the Land Boards;
and upwards to the central Government, MPs and even foreign donors.
Most of these relationships are picked up again in other chapters
from the other end of the relationship; at this stage it is the
Council viewpoint which is portrayed.
Finally in each of these three case study chapters the District
is analysed as a political arena. The three variables/aspects which
are singled out for particular treatment are: ethnic factors (so
important in most African polities and frequently referred to in
connexion with the Batswana political parties); elections; and
lastly a summary of policy cleavages (such as they are) between
parties.
In Part II the focus moves to the grassroots, where the two
most important institutions are the Village Development Committees
and the political parties. Chapter 6 deals with the VDCs in nine
villages (three from each district). Following a similar format to
Chapters 3 to 5, the constitutions and internal workings of the VDCs
are examined, with an attempt to distil some kind of constitutional
theory from the mass of sometimes contradictory practice in the nine
villages. Die determination of priorities is analysed and this is
seen to link up with the next section, the VDC and other forces in the
village (i.e. the horizontal relationship, notably with those recognised
with an ex officio position on the VDC - Councillors, Headmen and CDAs -
and other village organisations). Next follows the all-important
relationship with the people of the village, where the crucial
importance of the kgotla as the channel for communications and
influence between the VDC and the people is brought out. Also on the
"vertical" plane, but in the other direction, attention is then
directed upwards to the District Council (and other district-level
organisations, mainly the District Administration). Diis section
pays special attention to the concept of the "broker" or "middleman".
It is found that the increasing bureaucratisation of communications
leaves limited scope for such a role - which can however be pursued
effectively by some individuals with imagination and political/
administrative ability. Such individuals are drawn from various
categories, and by no means only the elected politicians (Councillors
or MPs).
Diroughout the chapter the wide variation as among the various
villages studied is brought out clearly. Die VDCs in the nine villages
are therefore briefly described seriatim and some conclusions on the
VDCs end the chapter.
The other chapter within the "grassroots" section deals with
the organisation of the political parties. As they are primarily
vehicles for election (to the National Assembly and the Councils),
the recruitment of candidates is given special attention. Finally
the question of party and VDCs is examined. It is found that, despite
Government stress on the "non-political" nature of the VDC, many
party members are to be found on these committees.
In Part III the focus is on the national level. In Chapter 8
is found an account of the relations between the Central Government
and the District Councils. it is presented chronologically since
the most striking fact about the relationship is its dynamics,
culminating in the post-1970 "Tordoff" reforms establishing a
District Development Committee coordinating and planning system,
which is considered in the last part of the chapter.
Chapter 9 deals with Members of Parliament and their attitudes
towards and relationship with local government. It is found that the
institutional links are weak and that MPs much prefer to stress the
direct link with the people involved in the concept of representative.
The MPs representing the nine villages studied in Chapter 6 come in
for special scrutiny, from which contrasting levels and styles of
activity clearly emerge. But their role as brokers or middlemen is
in general largely discounted.
The final chapter attempts to bring together a number of themes
which have emerged from the study, finishing with some observations
about the trends observable to date, and some speculation about the
future of democratic local government in Botswana.
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over a period of several years, for my research. It made possible
not only the extensive travelling involved in this study but also
such things as enrolment in a crash course in Setswana. I am also
grateful to the Open University for a grant towards the costs of
producing the thesis. To the Botswana Government, particularly the
Office of the President, I would like to express my appreciation
of their assistance in smoothing the way for the research.
My thanks are due to several individuals for setting me on the
path of this piece of research: to Tom Price (formerly the African
Studies Department of Glasgow University) for advising me to "stay
for at least five years and learn the language"; to Clara Taukobong
(formerly of Radio Botswana) for making me aware of my ignorance,
in 1969, of grassroots politics in Botswana; to Professor Harry Hanham
(then of the Politics Department, University of Edinburgh) for
encouraging me to consider doing a doctorate at Edinburgh; to his
successor, Professor James Cornford, for assisting in the selection
of a topic and in many other ways; to my original supervisor,
Jabez langley, for his advice at the outset; and to his successor,
Chris Allen, who as my supervisor did a painstaking job of reading
all the draft and suggested many improvements.
As regards the field work, I owe an immense debt of gratitude
to all the people who freely gave of their time and knowledge. Ihey
include former colleagues at UBLS; Ministers and other Members of
Parliament; Councillors; VDC members; party activists; Chiefs and
Headmen; District Development Committee members; civil servants,
particularly of the Ministry of Local Government & Lands; Council
staff; District Administration staff; UBLS students; and numerous
citizens of Botswana who provided me - as did many of the above -
with generous and unfailing hospitality. All those above-mentioned
helped to make my voyage of discovery both absorbing and enjoyable.
A special word of thanks is due to those who undertook the time-
consuming task of reading and commenting on chapters in draft.
Finally I would like to acknowledge the invaluable help of my
wife, Anne, as both research assistant and typist.
With all the assistance I received there are few excuses for
any errors of fact. 1 am alone responsible for any which may have
occurred, as for the opinions expressed in this dissertation.
Edinburgh
January 1978
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I have tried to follow the modern and progressive usage in
Botswana in matters of terminology, but older forms survive,
particularly in documents cited. For example, in place of the
word "tribe" I have used "clan", as the closest approximation to
the Setswana word morafe. "Traditional", "customary" or "clan"
have replaced "tribal" (formerly "African", and before that
"Native") in referring to law and administration.
Place names have been revised by the Place Names Commission,
with a series of reports from 1969 onwards; the most obvious is
Gaborone, the capital, which replaced the anglicised "Gaberones".
Some of the old names, e.g. of constituencies, appear in their
historical context. As there are no accepted English versions
of the locative forms of clan territories I have used the Setswana
forms: Gamangwato = the territory of the Bangwato; Gangwaketse -
the territory of the Bangwaketse, and Borolong = the territory of
the Barolong Cin Botswana).
Probably the most important point to note is the use of words
derived from the root Tswana, since a linguistic map would show
Setswana as spoken in parts of South Africa but not all of Botswana.
Thus all citizens of Botswana are called Batswana (singular;
Motswana), but not all are Tswanas, a term which also includes
over a million people across the border. The language of the
Tswanas is Setswana. The Setswana-speaking population is divided
vii
into merafe (clans), which use the prefixes Ba- and Mo- (plural
and singular), e.g. the Bakwena, a Mokwena. For non-Tswana people
usage varies: thus "the Basarwa" (or Bushmen) but "the Kalanga(s)".
(Northern place-names must be treated with care since some use the
Setswana orthography but other Kalanga or other names.)
As a brief guide to Setswana pronunciation, the following
points can be made: g = ch as in German or Gaelic "loch"
(it always has this quality, except after "n")
ng r ng as in "singer"
ph = p as in "Clapham"
th = t as in "Streatham"
ts = ts as in "that's it"
tsh = tsh as in "it's his"
tSh = ch as in "chair"
The old orthography (surviving in proper names) included:
I
kh = modern kg
c = ts
n = ng
o before a vowel = w
Syllables almost invariably end in a vowel, and the stress normally
falls on the penultimate syllable (but terminal ng_ counts as a
syllable and lengthens the preceding vowel).
GLOSSARY
The following words have been used, without accompanying
translation, in the text:
bogosi - the institution of Chieftainship
dikgafela - tribute, first fruits, harvest thanksgiving (see p. 127)
Domkrag - Democratic Party (see p. x)
Ipelegeng - Self-help (see pp. 38-39)
kgosana - (plural, dikgosana) - Headman
kgosi - Chief, Lord
viii
kgotla (plural, dikgotla) - traditional council, court,
general meeting (see pp. 281-282)
matimgla - stray livestock (see p. 54)
she [Kalanga] - Chief, Sub-chief, Headman (see p. 92)
ABBREVIATIONS
The following abbreviations appear, particularly in
footnotes:
ACDO Assistant Community Development Officer
AD Agricultural Demonstrator
ARDP Accelerated Rural Development Programme
B II (ex-)Chief Bathoefi II
BCW Botswana Council of Women
BDN Botswana Daily News
BDP Botswana Democratic Party (formerly Bechuanaland
Democratic Party)
BIP Botswana Independence Party
BNF Botswana National Front
BN&R Botswana Notes and Records
BPP Botswana People's Party (formerly Bechuanaland People's
Party)
CDA Community Development Assistant
CDC Central District Council
CDDC Central District Development Committee
C&ED Community & Economic Development Committee
DDC District Development Committee
DEMS Division of Extra-Mural Services
EA (Census) Enumerator Area
F&GP Finance & General Purposes Committee
GP General Purposes Committee
GP&D General Purposes &, Development Committee
H&W Health & Works Committee
KYTC Kanye Youth Training Centre
LegCo Legislative Council
MTG&L Ministry of Local Government &, Lands (formerly Ministry
of Local Government)
NEDC North East District Council
NEDDC North East District Development Committee
PTA Parent-Teacher Association
SDC Southern District Council
SDDC Southern District Development Committee
TANU Tanganyika African National Union
TLC Trade Licensing Committee
UBLS University of Botswana Lesotho and Swaziland
UCCSA Congregational Church
ULGS Unified Local Government Service
UNIP United National Independence Party [Zambia]
VDC Village Development Committee
YWCA Young Women's Christian Association
ix
MISCELLANEOUS
The currency used in the period studied was the South African
Rand. In 1966 R2 was equal to £1 sterling-, but devaluation of
sterling altered the position. Now Botswana has its own independent
Pula, which started at par with the Rand.
"Councillor" has been used to mean a member of a District or
Town Council; it is not to be confused with "counsellors" in the
traditional system.
For convenience I have referred to the period between two sets
of local government elections as a "Session"; a Session in this
sense has since 1969 been the equivalent of "a Parliament".
The sources for electoral data are the Reports of the Supervisor
of Elections, listed in the Bibliography, the Mafeking Mail, the
Daily News, the Government Gazette, annual Statistical Abstract,
and Ministry of Local Government & Lands files.
The term "Ngwaketse District" meant, prior to 1970, what is
now the Southern District, which confusingly still includes, for
census and some other purposes, the Ngwaketse and Rolong (census)
districts. For simplicity the Council is generally referred to in
this thesis as the Southern District Council CSDC) throughout the
period 1966-1974.
The widely-used nickname for the Democratic Party, Domkrag,
arose from a misunderstanding of the word "Democratic", which one
anonymous villager took to be the Afrikaans word "domkrag", which
means a vehicle jack. The BDP's opponents delightedly punned that
it meant "dom krag" (i.e. literally, stupid power); the BDP however
adopted the symbol of the jack as the "power to raise the level"
of the country.
x
The University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (UBLS) has
since split into two. There is now a University of Botswana and
Swaziland with a constituent University College in Gaborone and one
in Swaziland.
"Ward" can mean two things - a traditional unit of administration
or a local government Polling District. Unless otherwise indicated
it is the latter which is meant in this dissertation.
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THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1965
CONSTITUENCY
1 Maun/Chobe 12 Madinare 22 Molepolole North
2 Okavango 13 Bobirwa 23 Molepolole South
3 Ngami 14 Serowe North 24 Kweneng South
4 Ghanzi 15 Serowe South 25 Kweneng West
5 Kgalagadi 16 Tswapong North 26 Gaberone s/Ramou tsa
6 Tati West 17 Tswapong South 27 Moshupa
7 Francistown/Tati East 18 Shoshong 28 Kanye South
8 Sebina/Gweta 19 Mahalapye 29 Kanye North
9 Nkange 20 Kgatleng/Tlokweng 30 Ngwake tse/Kgalagadi
















































































SOURCE FOR MAPS 5, 6 and 7: Republic of Botswana, The National





The decision to embark on a study of local government in Botswana
was prompted by a number of factors, practical and methodological on
the one hand and theoretical on the other. In practical terms the
position held by the writer in the University of Botswana, Lesotho
and Swaziland gave physical access to the three countries served by
the University as well as the neighbouring countries. The choice of
Botswana was influenced strongly by the open democratic political
process in Botswana at the national and local levels - unique in
Southern Africa - and the welcome given by the authorities and the
people in Botswana to social scientists engaged in research.
The selection of the District Councils as the main focus of con-
1
cern was influenced by a number of writers who had focussed attention
1 The writers and works from which inspiration and ideas were drawn
include notably the following:- G. A. Almond, "Determinacy-Choice,
Stability-Change: some thoughts on a contemporary polemic in political
theory," Government & Opposition, V, 1 (1970); D. Apter, Ghana in
Transition (1963) and The Political Kingdom in Uganda (1961);
F„ G. Bailey, Stratagems and Spoils (1969); J. Barber, Imperial
Frontier (1968); H. Bienen, Tanzania (1970); J. M. Blaut, "The Theory
of Development," Antipode, V, 2 (1973); J. C. Charlesworth (Ed.),
Contemporary Political Analysis (1968); J. S. Coleman, Nigeria (1960);
K. W. Deutsch, "On communication models in the Social Sciences,"
Public Opinion Quarterly, XVI (1952); S. E. Finer, "Almond's Concept
of 'The Political System': a textual critique," Government & Opposition,
V, 1 (1970); J„ S. Furnivall, Colonial policy and Practice (1948);
Gutkind & Wallerstein (Eds.), The Political Economy of Contemporary
Africa (1976); G. A. Heeger, The Politics of Underdevelopment (1974)j
Go Hyd£n, Political Development in Rural Tanzania (1969); H. G. Johnson (Ed,),
Economic Nationalism in Old and New States (1968); M. Kilson, Political
1
2
on the need to study the political process amongst the rural majority
of Africa as a corrective to the studies of national politics with
their sometimes uncritical acceptance of the rhetoric of national
leaders. At the other end of the spectrum there was a long tradition
of anthropological study of small communities. What was lacking in
Botswana, as in many other African states, was an understanding of
the relationship between the centre and the periphery of the new polity.
In. the case of Botswana the intermediate level has been dominated
since 1966 by the District Councils, which link up with both national
politics and the grassroots.
A particular interest of local government arose from the need
for a much better understanding of Botswana's political parties, and
the assumption that Councillors, elected overwhelmingly on a party
ticket, would in their approach to decision-making throw much light
♦
on the elusive differences between the four parties in Botswana.
There was an enigma concerning party policies; on the one hand dif¬
ferences of approach appeared to exist at the national level - as
revealed in Parliamentary debates and election campaigning - but in
the Council context, on the other hand, a frequently recurring answer
to questions concerning party differences was that there were no real
Change in a West African State (1966); G. Lamb, Peasant Politics (1974);
J. G„ LaPalombara (Ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development (1967);
C. Leys, Politicians and Policies (1967) and (Ed.), Politics and Change
in Developing Countries (1969); G. Myrdal, Economic theory and
Underdeveloped Regions (1957) and Asian Drama (1968); P. Nettl,
Political Mobilisation (1967); F. W. Riggs, Administration in
Developing Countries (1964); R. Sklar, "Political Science and National
Integration," Journal of Modern African Studies, V, 1 (1967);
M. Staniland, "The Rhetoric of Centre-Periphery Relations," Journal
of Modern African Studies, VIII, 4 (1970); M. J. Swartz (Ed.),
Local-level Politics (1969); A. Zolberg, Creating Political Order
(1966) and "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States
of Tropical Africa," American Political Science Review, LXII, 1 (1968)
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differences. A political scientist finds that sort of statement
difficult to accept without further investigation; hence the in-
depth study of Councillors' behaviour which follows later in this
work. Moreover the - for a one-party dominant system - relatively
strong position of Opposition parties in local government, and the
fact that the boundaries of most of the District Councils followed
ethnic lines, seemed to provide a good laboratory for studing the
interaction of these two factors.
The relevance of rural development as a subject for study by
now needs little justification. Hence the study of the political
process as it affected the lives of the rural populace was undertaken
with particular reference to the question of "development'] with
particular concentration on the self-help or Ipelegeng principle.
Moreover should it turn out that there were in fact no, or few,
significant inter-party cleavages it would still be possible to
produce some worthwhile findings about District Council politics,
and the politics of the districts in question. Hence the focus on
the decision-making process with particular reference to the alloc¬
ation of resources.
The attention directed to centre-periphery relations by a
number of writers ties in neatly with the rhetoric of the Botswana
Government, which made increasingly frequent and explicit reference
to what may be termed the "chain of democracy" or "pyramid" of
1
democratic and planning institutions, and urged Members of Parliament
1 See speeches by the Vice-President in Hansard, 45, p. 113 (29 MAY 73)
and No. 27, p. 45 (18 MAR 69)
4
in particular to be active two-way communicators with the District
1 ,
Councils, the Village Development Committees and the people.
Thus the study encompasses Deutsch's horizontal and vertical
planes of communications and tests the official position against
2
the reality. In particular the concept of the middleman or broker
f
is examined in the context of Botswana. The conditions for the
playing of a middleman role would appear to be favourable, since
discontinuities in communication - or in the vivid phrase of one
3
writer "the prevalence of muddle" - are readily apparent. It can be
put conversely: "Perfect communication will mean that the middleman
4
is out of a job," since brokers "transmit, direct, filter, receive,
5
code, decode and interpret messages." The distinction between
0
middlemen and "patrons" is also explored, particularly in Chapter 6.
METHODS AND SOURCES
To narrow the field to manageable proportions a sample of three
District Councils was selected Cafter a tour of the whole country),
In the end the districts chosen were the Central District, by far
the largest and the political base of the ruling Botswana Democratic
Party; the North East District, a stronghold of the Opposition
Botswana People's Party and the centre of the most significant
minority tribe; and the Southern District, which made an abrupt
transition in 1969 from being 100% BDP to dividing roughly equally
between the BDP and the more recently formed Botswana National
Front. In geographical terms the sample thus included a spread of
1 Ibid.
2 For a critique see Staniland, op. cit.
3 S. J. Tennent, Report on Community Development (1974), p. 20
4 Bailey, op. cit., p. 169
5 J. Boissevain, "The Place of Non-Groups in the Social Sciences,"
Man, III, 4 (1968), p. 549
6 See Staniland, op. cit., for a discussion of this.
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Councils in the Eastern part of Botswana where 80% of the population
live. In party terms, three out of Botswana's four parties were
represented, while the sample included two major Tswana clans and
one minor one, as well as the Kalangas of the North East.
Within each district a group of three villages was selected.
The selection was to some extent arbitrary but included villages
supporting both BDP and the two Opposition parties; most were
around the 1,000 population mark but one was a considerably bigger
"large village". In all cases a necessary condition was the avail¬
ability of Village Development Committee records.
Thus although it cannot be claimed on any scientific grounds
that all the findings about the three districts and nine villages
necessarily apply to the whole of rural Botswana at least the more
obvious danger of generalising from the particular should have been
avoided; a further check was the less structured information about
other areas derived from a variety of sources including the Botswana
Daily News.
Three methods of conducting research were employed, deriving
from the strong conviction that concentration on only one method, in
a polity like Botswana, runs the very real hazard of egregious error -
error which can be readily detected by informed Batswana, however
plausible arguments may appear to outside observers. Thus reliance
1
on interviews alone risks the uncritical acceptance of recollections
and interpretations which may be no less inaccurate for being honest.
Interviews were conducted on an open-ended and multiple basis, since
1 Vengroff is right to warn that "The greatest apparent weakness of
much analysis of local level politics in Africa is the heavy reliance
on highly impressionistic data." R. Vengroff, "Networks and
Leadership in a Development Institution: the District Council in
Botswana," Political Anthropology, I, 2 (JUL 75), p. 170
6
it was necessary in the first place to be flexible: what the researcher
assumes to be important may turn out to be secondary to other factors.
As Ranger has put it:
to grasp the reality . . . was not an easy or straight¬
forward thing to do, and . . . illuminations often came from
very unexpected sources and from following up interests which
at first sight seemed peripheral.1
Secondly the desirability of multiple interviews arises not only
from the need to cross-check but also from the importance of establishing
a basis of rapport and trust between researcher and interviewee. It
is for this reason that it was made plain to respondents that infor¬
mation given would be treated in confidence and not attributed to
individuals, who obviously would have been inhibited had they known
that statements made by them would subsequently be attributed to them
2
in writing. Accordingly it is only very rarely in the course of
this work that an interview source is given. Nevertheless it should
be recorded that the writer was well placed over a period of several
years of residence in Gaborone to collect information and views not
only in Gaborone and on field trips but from visitors from the districts
to the capital, and this became cumulatively more valuable as a composite
picture was built up.
Interviewing was supplemented by attendance at meetings of the
National Assembly, the House of Chiefs, District Councils, District
Development Committees and a variety of conferences, seminars and
training sessions. In the villages (each of which was visited more
than once) Village Development Committee and other leaders were
interviewed and one or two kgotla meetings attended (see Appendix "C").
1 T„ 0. Ranger, Dance and Society in Eastern Africa (1975), p. vii.
Three subjects can be mentioned as warranting future research by
political scientists: football, drink and religion.
2 For a useful summary of this methodological problem see W. Foltz,
From French West Africa to Mali Federation (1965), p. viii.
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The necessary assistance of interpreters was invariably forthcoming.
As well as assisting in acquiring a general "feel" for the institutions
studied, participant observation made it possible to check the
records of meetings for reliability against personal notes and it is
important to note that the degree of accuracy was high.
This is important when one considers the third source of infor¬
mation, and by far the most neglected as far as local political
institutions are concerned, namely written records. In 1967 an
official complained that
The Council minutes I have seen appear to be in the nature
of a junior Hansard with verbatim reporting. Perhaps you
could talk to the Council Secretary about this and see if
an improvement could be effected.1
Luckily for the researcher the position had not altered by the time
Chambers and Feldman conducted their study in 1972, since they
remarked that "the blow by blow accounts in some minutes make
2
fascinating reading." Accordingly reference is frequently made to
these voluminous Council minutes as well as those of District
3
Development Committees, Village Development Committees, etc, the
verbatim record contained in Hansard and the equivalent Official
Report of the House of Chiefs. The Daily News, while giving fair
space to Opposition politicians (particularly MPs) and good coverage
of Ministerial speeches, is an unreliable source of district news.
This is not because of deliberate bias but a reflection of the sporadic
way in which the Government's Information Assistants send in reports
to Gaborone. Incidentally, one advantage arising from the shortage of
1 Permanent Secretary, MLG&.L, to District Commissioner, Kanye,
4 SEP 67
2 Chambers & Feldman, Report on Rural Development (1973), p. 211
3 The style and length of VDC minutes varies greatly but in most
cases recorded the main contributions to meetings and not just decisions.
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staff in the Department of Information is that the Radio Botswana
news is virtually an oral version of the Daily News. Apart from the
Daily News the only newspaper is the weekly Mafeking Mail &. Botswana
1 2
Guardian, two local weekly newspapers having foundered after a few
3
years' activity; the same is true of the party press, discussed below.
The Department of Information's monthly magazine Kutlwano has occasional
articles of political interest; its impartiality was established,
paradoxically, after a pre-election pro-BDP editorial led to a public
4
reprimand for the Editor by the Government.
The final point to make with regard to the reliability of data
concerns elections, statistics from which recur throughout the
dissertation. It is important to acknowledge the fundamental fact
that elections to date have been fair and free, and been seen to be
so. Moreover the prerequisites of meaningful free elections have
been forthcoming in a relatively genuine and generous spirit, These
underpinnings of democracy include freedom of speech (including
Opposition party political broadcasting at election times and fair
coverage by the Botswana Daily News and Radio Botswana) and assembly
5
and a generally relaxed and tolerant ethos which owes much to the
0
liberal strand in the BDP but is equally an expression of that
1 Formerly the Mafeking Mail &, Protectorate Guardian
2 Mmegi wa Dikgang (Serowe) and Puisano (Selebi-Phikwe)
3 In Chapter 7
4 See Hansard, 30, p. 329 (26 NOV 69)
5 See J. A. Wiseman, "Multipartyism in Africa; the case of Botswana,"
African Affairs, LXXVI, 302 (JAN 77), esp. p. 78
6 A more ambivalent attitude is exemplified by the following remarks made
in the National Assembly by the Minister of Information & Broadcasting,
E. M. K. Kgabo: "some members of the Opposition parties are just points of
friction. They are really good for nothing. ... It is only because we
are terribly democratic that we keep them and we feel we should continue
to have those Opposition parties. And my advice to them would be to be
educated to know what is expected of them, namely to offer alternative
policies." Hansard, 45, pp. 144-145 (30 MAY 73). See also Appendix A
below.
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elusive but fundamental factor, the political culture* of the
Batswana. Rooted in the customs of the kgotla, the council which
lies at the heart of the clan system, this tradition has found a
modern equivalent in the "Freedom Squares" where party political
meeting's are held. It is not for nothing that Government spokesmen
are fond of boasting that there are no political refugees from
Botswana.
To sum up: the paucity of secondary material in Botswana (slowly
being rectified) is balanced by the availability of good primary
documents which have been neglected hitherto. The exhaustive analysis
of this written material has however been supplemented in this study
by participant observation and by the extensive interviewing so
essential for an understanding of a small nation such as Botswana
where the personal interaction of members of the political and
administrative 6lite plays an important part.
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
One characteristic of Botswana which is very welcome to social
scientists is the impressive volume and quality of statistics readily
2
available in a variety of Government publications. What is essayed
here then is but a brief outline of the most salient aspects of the
3
ecology of the political political system.
Recent events in southern and central Africa have publicised
the strategic importance of Botswana, wedged between South Africa,
1 See J. D. Parson, "Aspects of Political Culture in Botswana, " in
Cohen & Parson (Eds.), Politics and Society in Botswana (1976)
2 Notably successive National Development Plans; the Report on the
Population Census 1971 (1972); the Rural Income Distribution Survey
1974/75 (1976); and the Guide to the Villages of Botswana (1973).
Another useful source, despite its obtrusive editorial bias, is
P. Smit, Botswana: Resources and Development (1970)
3 A readable introduction to the political ecology can be found in
P. J. Rollings, An introduction to Botswana (1974)
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Namibia and Rhodesia but with the tiny Zambezi/Chobe river boundary
with Zambia providing- a vital outlet to the "Free North". In size
Botswana is impressive, at 220,000 square miles (518,000 square kilo¬
metres J comparing with France and Kenya, but with a very small popula¬
tion of 660,000. The crude population density of 3 per square mile
(1.3 per square kilometre) is however very misleading: the Kalahari
(or Kgalagadi) Desert dominates the country, and four-fifths of the
population live in a somewhat better watered belt along the eastern
1
border. Thus it happens that the bulk of the population live within
easy reach of the railway line which is a reminder of the raison
A 2
d'etre of the Bechuanaland Protectorate: a railway corridor to link
Rhodes's central and southern African interests, forming an essential
part of the Cape-to-Cairo imperial dream.
Demographic features
3
The population of Botswana possesses a number of features charac¬
teristic of the third world: predominantly young (46% under the age
of 15, only 10% over 55), fast growing (at an estimated annual rate
of natural increase of 3.1%). It is predominantly rural, more than
half the people being resident in small villages and the less permanent
settlements known as "lands" dewllings (i.e. at the arable fields)
4
or cattleposts, some distance from the nucleated Tswana villages.
Figures 1.1 to 1.3 illustrate.
1 For a delimitation of "Eastern Botswana" see Smit, op. cit., p. 53.
2 See Sillery, Founding a Protectorate, (1965)
3 Unless otherwise indicated, the illustrations in this section are
taken from Census 1971, the popular version of the Census, and the
basic data from the Report on the Population Census of 1971 (op. cit.)
4 The Tswana pattern is not universal, the non-Setswana speaking
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FIGURE 1o 3
DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION
BY SIZE OF SETTLEMENT
Migration has for so long been a feature of Botswana that it
has almost ceased to have any dynamic connotation, being regarded as
a fact of life. This is due in part to the nature of the two types
of traditional migration - one the seasonal agricultural pattern
characteristic of the Tswana, the other the near universal search
for cash employment in South Africa. For a long time the assumption
has been that the migration was temporary, the migrant returning to
his/her place of origin (home village) at the end of it. But in
recent times the migration of population within Botswana has had a
more lasting character, and has led to the growth of the four urban
centres and the "lands", at the expense in particular of the Tswana
clan capitals. The map (Figure 1.4) below gives some indication of
the scale of this migration: as Census 1971 puts it, "there must have
been massive internal migrations within the last twenty or thirty years.
The Batswana nation is on the move in other ways too. A good
indicator of this is the proportion of people who have received formal
education, which correlates (albeit in a rather imprecise way) with
literacy. Ihe national statistic of 68% with no education conceals
the contrast between the 89% figure for the over-55s and that of 58%
for those aged 25-39; roughly half the children of school age are
reckoned to be attending or have attended school. Figures 1.5 and
1.6 bring out these features.
Between them, the distribution of population and the literacy
rate indicate two major problems of communication, which is at the
heart of understanding the political process. But since the advent
of the radio has opened up the possibility of more direct communication




























from Government to governed, two other factors, apart from the
logistical problems of transmission, need to be considered. The
first is language. Although Botswana is not as unified linguistically
as its sister countries Lesotho and Swaziland, nevertheless the
Setswana language is spoken and understood by something over 80% of
2
the population. The Government's resistance to repeated attempts
to have Kalanga broadcast is due basically to its belief in the
3
advantages of the lingua franca as a politically unifying factor.
More will be said about the communal structure of Botswana's society
below.
FIGURE 1,5 FIGURE 1,6
EDUCATION; the 25-39 age group EDUCATION: the 55+ age group
1 Two recent mass Radio Learning Campaigns have been mounted with
considerable success, not least in the mass response from listening
groups. See Colclough & Crowley, The People and the Plan (3 Vols)
(1974 and forthcoming), especially Vol. Ill by M. Colclough; An
Analysis of Participant Feedback (forthcoming)
2 Since there were no questions in the 1971 census on language or
on ethnic affiliation the figure is a guestimate. See I. Schapera,
The Ethnic Composition of Tswana Tribes (1952).
3 The official line is that the number of minority languages, each
spoken by small numbers, does not warrant the expense' of arranging
for their use in transmission. The policy has been the subject of
Parliamentary debate since the Legislative Assembly was established
in 1965; see Hansard, 14, pp. 148 ff. (13-14 JUL 65)
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Economic factors
The other relevant factor concerning: the Government's use of
Radio Botswana is economic: the cost of a radio is beyond many families.
The recent Rural Income Distribution Survey found that one-quarter
of a small pilot survey (946 questionnaires returned) of households
had a radio set in working: order and that a very high proportion of
those listened to Radio Botswana (virtually to the exclusion of any-
1
thing else). The same survey gave a median annual income per house¬
hold of R630, the mean being Rl,068. This survey also revealed the
extent of rural poverty (45% below the rural poverty datum line) and
the skew distribution of income: the top 10% had incomes of over
R2,094 while the bottom 10% had less than R233; three-quarters of
2
rural households were below the mean.
These stark figures on the rural standard of living have to be
borne in mind and set against the much more widely known facts of
Botswana's rags-to-riches story in terms of central Government
3
revenues, and the remarkable figure of economic growth in the early
4
seventies of 15% to 18% in real terms.
5
Table 1.7 gives the statistics of Government recurrent
expenditure and development expenditure from Independence to date.
1 The Rural Income Distribution Survey in Botswana 1974/75, op. cit.
pp. 267-270.
2 Figures all from ibid, pp. (vi), (vii). The "Gini coefficient", a
measure of how much income is concentrated, was 52%.
3 For a convenient summary see R. W. Tomlinson "Botswana - from Dust
to Diamonds," Geography, LX, 4 (1975).
4 See E. P. Morgan, "Botswana: democratic politics and development"
in Carter & O'Meara (Eds.), Southern African in Crisis (1977)
5 Source: H. Dahl, "Tables Describing the Nature and Characteristics
of the Society and Economy of Botswana," in Cohen & Parson (Eds.),
Politics and Society in Botswana (1976), pp. 288-291
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TABLE 1.7
GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE (R million)
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
/67 /68 /69 /70 /71 /72 /73 /74 /75 /76* /ll**
Total Domestic
Recurrent Rev.
6.1 5.7 6.8 10.6 11.4 17.1 26.9 40.7 60.7 72.7 64.4
Total Recurrent
Expenditure





-4.2 -9.3 -5.2 -1.8 -3.5 -1.0 5.9 14.2 22.4 26.1 7.2
3.7 3.8 3.3 4.9 8.5 12.3 29.9 30.3 32.8 33.1 56.3
* Preliminary figures
** Estimates
The Botswana Government has thus acquired considerable financial
resources, which, it has been suggested, have allowed it to spend its
way out of political trouble,1 or rather potential political trouble
since the ruling party has benefited from the inept Opposition challenge
(of which more anon) and the fact that expectations were in any case
relatively low. The unsolved economic problems are twofold: the creation
2
of cash employment for an ever-growing domestic labour force, and the
controlled development of agriculture, especially animal husbandry, so
as to conserve the fertility of the land and also redistribute it in a
more egalitarian way. Tie magnitude of the task is illustrated by
figures 1.8, 1.9 and 1.10 which indicate the relative importance of
various sources of income and employment.
1 Speed & Stevens, "Multipartism in Africa: the case of Botswana
Revisited," African Affairs, LXXVI, 304 (JUL 77) p. 386.






TYPES OF AGRICULTURAL HOLDINGS
CS = Cattle and smallstock, no lands
CL = Cattle and lands, no smallstock
LS = Lands and smallstock, no cattle
Total number of agricultural holdings = 64 000
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The lack of wage employment within the country is the major reason
for the regular migration of Batswana men - about a quarter of the
adult male labour force - for short-term contract work in South Africa,
and exemplifies an aspect of the dilemma concerning the South African
1
connexion. On the one hand the income is vital for 50,000 families;
but their interest in retaining access to the neighbouring state is
a political factor enabling South Africa to exert tacit pressure on
2
Botswana. The question of how to deal with this relationship, and
the general dependency syndrome of which it is part, is capable of
varying answers, as the contrasting policies pursued by Botswana,
3
Lesotho and Swaziland show. Another aspect of the syndrome is the
Customs and Monetary Union. Here Botswana has benefited from the
renegotiation of the former (leading to a substantial increase in
4
revenue accruing to Botswana) but has deemed it worthwhile to break
away from the latter and establish a new, independent currency, the
Pula. The price Botswana has to pay in exchange for an increasingly
5
independent line - strict neutrality in the civil wars (actual or
incipient) in Rhodesia and South Africa - is in reality little hard¬
ship, since the vulnerability of Botswana to any armed forces makes
the presence on its soil of military bases of any kind a distasteful
alternative.
1 Botswana's relations with South Africa have attracted much outside
attention, from the early Independence Day articles such as p. Giniewski,
"Deux nouvelles ind^pendances africaines: Lesotho et Botswana," Politique
£trang£re. XXXI, 4 (1966> to the detailed work of Richard Dale, as in
his Botswana and its Southern neighbor (1970}.
2 For an earlier example of rather more overt use of the economic weapon
see S. Ettinger, "South Africa's Weight Restrictions on Cattle Exports
from Bechuanaland, 1924-1941," BN&R, IV (1972).
3 For an analysis of the contrasting approaches of Botswana and Lesotho
see L. P. Frank, "Khama and Jonathan: a study of authority and leadership
in Southern Africa" (1974).
4 See P. M. Landell-Mills, "The 1969 Southern African Customs Union
Agreement," Journal of Modern African Studies, IX, 2 (1971)




The South African connexion is one factor in accounting' for the
development of political parties in Botswana, as will be seen; the
other major influence was the policies pursued by the British administ¬
ration, which, it must be remembered, had been invited into Bechuanaland
to protect the Batswana against the more pressing danger of Afrikaner
2
imperialism. After the fading of the original British idea of trans-
3
ferring Bechuanaland to South Africa and the consequent abandonment,
in effect, of the peculiar "dual interest" system of administration
reflected in the title "High Commission Territories," the decision
to decolonise virtually invited the formation of political parties
to compete for the power that was, on past experience, highly likely
to be transferred to any party which could demonstrate popular support
4
at the polls. Disregarding the ephemeral and conservative Bechuanaland
Protectorate Federal Party and the even less substantial Liberal Party,
the first serious party to be founded was the Bechuanaland People's
Party, which fits into the mainstream of Pan-Africanist, nationalist
parties, and had close parallels in the earlier-established Basutoland
1 Principal written sources: R. P. Stevens, Lesotho, Botswana and
Swaziland (1966); J. Halpern, South Africa's Hostages (1965); B. A. Young,
Bechuanaland (1966); S. M. Gabatshwane, Seretse Khama and Botswana (1966);
R. H. Edwards, "Political and Constitutional Change in the Bechuanaland
Protectorate," in Butler and Castagno, Boston University Papers on
Africa: transition in African politics (1967); A. Sillery, Botswana^
a short political history (1974); E. S. Munger, Bechuanaland: Pan-
African outpost or Bantu homeland? (1965).
2 See S. M. Gabatshwane, Introduction to the Bechuanaland Protectorate
History and Administration (1957) Ch. 4; A. Sillery, The Bechuanaland
Protectorate (1952) Part I and Founding a Protectorate (1965).
3 For the most detailed account of this question see J. E. Spence,
"British Policy Towards the High Commission Territories," Journal of
Modern African Studies, II, 2 (1964). See also Hailey, The Republic
of South Africa and the High Commission Territories (1963)
4 Of the people of the three High Commission Territories, only the
Basotho had organised parties before there was any prospect of general
elections. See Stevens, op. cit., Ch. 4 and Halpern, op. cit.,
Chs. 7 and 8.
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Congress Party and the Swaziland Progressive Party. Unfortunately
for the BPP it - like its counterparts - faced two threats which were
to prove fatal to its chances of ever forming a government. The
first of these was the internal stress which arose (partly on grounds
of personality) between the intellectual founder of the party, the
late K. T. Motsete, his demagogic lieutenant, F. G„ Matante and the
more ideological Secretary-General Motsamai Mpho. Over a period of
three years the party split three ways. Mpho eventually renamed his
faction the Botswana Independence Party, leaving the Matante faction
in possession of the name Bechuanaland People's Party, while Motsete's
following dwindled rapidly until it had become a one-candidate
"BPP-Motsete" in the 1965 General Election. Apart from irreconcilable
personality clashes, exacerbated by the vexed question of money and
vehicles from Accra, the BPP-BIP split reflected the deep division
in South Africa between the Pan-African Congress (PAC) and the
African National Congress (ANC) - which was hardly surprising in the
light of the South African political apprenticeship which Mpho and
Matante, and many other BPP activists, had served in the 1950s.
The BPP leaders - all commoners - were able to mobilise
1
unprecedented support in the two "modern" towns of the Protectorate,
Francistown and Lobatse, in particular organising demonstrations in
favour of universal franchise to replace the racially-based reforms
of 1960/61 and against the racial discrimination blatantly practised
by European traders and farmers. It was not long before the 1960/61
constitution, featuring the familiar colonial Executive Council (ExCo)
and Legislative Council (LegCo), multi-racial but with separate
electorates, was being urgently reviewed by the colonial regime.
1 In Setswana, ditoropo
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As the BPP held the initiative it rapidly became clear that
the threat it posed was felt even more acutely by the leading lights
on the Legislative Council than by the British administration. Accord-
1
ingly, the former began to organise a political counterweight to
the People's Party. Here the key figures of Seretse Khama and Quett
2
Masire soon emerged and formed a formidable alliance of traditional
status and modernising approach.
By this time Seretse Khama was in an enviable position which
was all the more remarkable when contrasted with the situation in
which he found himself in the late 'forties and early 'fifties. The
well-known and "very disreputable transaction" (as Churchill castigated
3
it when in Opposition), whereby the British (labour) Government
tricked Seretse, heir to the most important traditional position in
Bechuanaland,into leaving the Protectorate and then kept him in exile,
made him a martyr in the eyes of the Batswana. The fact that his
"crime" was that of marrying a white woman, a marriage criticised by
white Rhodesian and South African politicians, made him a hero in
the eyes of liberals eve^where. Seretse's renunciation of his claim
to the Chieftainship of the Bangwato meant little in terms of his
traditional status but left him free to engage in open politics after
his return from abroad. Furthermore his banishment gave him insights
into British politics and many useful contacts. It is ironic that
these benefits were all unintentially conferred upon him by a British
Government bowing to racialist pressure. Thus it became inevitable
that Seretse would lead the conservative party which was founded to
counter the rise of the BPP.
1 Eight of the fourteen founders of the BDP were LegCo members.
2 Edwards (op. cit.. pp. 151-156) describes the personalities
particularly well,
3 See Halpern, op. cit., Ch. 9; M. Benson,Tshekedi Khama (1960);
and E. Robins, White Queen in Africa; the story of Ruth and Seretse (1967)
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The label "conservative" although justified in terms of the
contrast with the People's Party is misleading if taken too literally.
The name "Democratic Party" reflected the liberal stand within the
BDP leadership. In the Southern African context it relates particularly
to Seretse's detestation of racial segregation and his faith in British-
1
style liberal democracy. To this day the two tendances - conservative
and liberal - can be discerned within the BDP. The two converge over
the question of bogosi - the chieftainship. Thus the powers of the
Chiefs have been whittled down by a party which itself contains many
members of the traditional ruling families (some of whom continue
to exercise a function in both the traditional administration and
the modern state). It is a combination which is as effective as it
is daunting to its opponents to left and right.
The First General Election
At this point the discussion of the nature of the parties must
be broken off to consider the decisive event of modern Batswana
political history, the 1965 General Election. Owing to the telescoping
of the timetable for Independence, this election was at one and the
same time the first to be held under universal adult suffrage and the
last before Independence. Its importance is reflected in the 75%
turnout of voters and the number of candidates entered by the two
sides. The BDP contested all 31 seats, the BPP 26, and the BIP 24.
The result was a shattering defeat for the once-confident BPP, which
emerged with only three seats to the Democratic Party's 28. Table 1.11
2
and Map No. 2 give the data.
1 See Frank (op. cit.), passim, for a thorough analysis of this factor.




THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION OF 1 MARCH 65
BDP BPP* BIP Others** Total
Seats won 28 3 - 31
Share of votes 80.4% 14.2% 4.6% 0.8% 100%
Candidates 31 26 24 2 83
* BPP-Matante
** BPP-Motsete and Independent
With 80.4% of the votes cast in its favour, the BDP appeared
then - as now - in an impregnable electoral position. Yet the heady
confidence of March 1965 was to be shaken more than once in the five
years that followed - five years of poverty, it must be recalled, a
fact which is in danger of being forgotten from the perspective of
the Wirtschaftswunder of the '70s. The first blow to fall was the
Ngami by-election in September 1965: although the BDP managed to hold
on to the seat, it did so with a minority of the votes and saw its
1
vote fall from 2054 to 667 in the face of a strong BIP challenge.
What worried the BDP was that Ngami was one of its apparently safest
seats in the 1965 General Election.
Accordingly the local government elections of June 1966 (three
months before Independence) were an event of national importance, both
as a national political barometer and as setting the scene in the
local political arenas, both town and district, In the event the BDP
had an easy ride, facing opposition in only 82 of the 166 seats at
1 Ngami results
By-election SEP 65 General Election MAR 65
Votes Share of poll Votes Share of poll
BDP 667 49.2% 2,054 97.4%
BIP 636 46.9% — —
BPP 53 3.9% 54 2.6%
BDP Ma.i. 31 2.3% 2,000 94.9%
Source: Mafeking Mail & Protectorate Guardian, 1 OCT 65
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stake, since the losing- party in 1965 was disinclined in many areas
to risk a repetition of defeat. The BDP ended up with elected
majorities in all but two of the twelve Councils, and significant
opposition in only two more. Moreover the newly founded opposition
Botswana National Front did badly in the seven contests it entered.
The Botswana National Front
Nevertheless it was the Front which was to cause the ruling party
the most anxiety. The BNF had its origins in the attempt to forge
a "United Front" of Opposition parties, a move led by the romantic
Leninist Dr Kenneth Koma, an original adherent of the BIP. Perhaps
"naive Machiavellian" would be a more apt descritpion of Dr Koma,
since the celebrated Pamphlet No 1 of the BNF, which he drafted,
contained the much quoted dictum, underlined in this passage:
. . . the shifts and turns in our tactical readjustments
should be dictated by our strategy and our objective. We
must not be afraid of temporary alliance even with groups
which it is our ultimate patriotic duty to annihilate ....
Making alliance with some elements from the corrupt section
of the bourgeoisie or from traditional feudals at specific
period for a specific purpose does not change the fact that
we mean to paralyse, if not oppose resolutely all the agents
of colonialism.*
While the effect on the BPP and BIP was to scare them away from
any alliance with Koma, the Marxist language of the Front alarmed the
BDP, which produced an anti-BNF pamphlet, basically a critique of
2
BNF Pamphlet No 1, entitled "Beware of wolves in sheepskins." More
was to follow, in the form of a prosecution on sedition charges
3
against five office-bearers of the BNF. The charges arose in part
1 BNF, Pamphlet No 1: the Botswana National Front, its character and
tasks (n.d. ), p. 24
2 Full title: Beware of wolves in sheepskins/Maloma tsebe a Domkrag
kgori e bonye mae lorapo ga e lo bone (n.d.)
3 Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 21 DEC 67; and the Mahalapye Court
Charge Sheet (n.d.) (mimeographed and circulated subsequently); also
BNF, Statement issued by the Central Committee of the Botswana National
Front party in December, 1967, to the Botswana nation and to the peoples
of the world.
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from attacks on the "ruling white clique," appearing in the Party
organ Puo Phaa [straight Talk], which was effectively banned as the
Party1s reprographic equipment was impounded. Although the charges
were eventually dropped, the psychological effects lingered on and
Puo Phaa never resumed regular publication.
The Puo Phaa case, while making difficulties for the Front, did
nothing to stop its visible progress in the towns of Lobatse and
Gaborone, where it appealed to the unemployed, the young and the lower
ranks of the civil service. It seemed very likely that it would win
the two Parliamentary seats containing these two towns as well as a
majority of the Town Council seats. What was much less clear was the
extent of its impact on the districts. One or two facts indicated
localised strength - the presence of Dr Koma in Mahalapye (Central
District), evidence of a serious attempt to contest all seats on the
Kweneng District Council (to the alarm of the Minister of Local
1
Government 86 Lands, E. M. K. Kgabo, a Mokwena), and the attraction
of the BNF for individual politicians from the other two Opposition
2 3 4
parties. The active leadership as President of D. K. Kwele, a
Kalanga, gave many observers the idea that the Kalanga base of support
for the People's Party in the northern Central District and the North
East might switch to the BNF from the atrophying BPP. The fact that
1 See Vengroff, "Local-Central Linkages and Political Development in
Botswana" CI972), passim, for a discussion of the rivalry between BDP
and BNF in this district.
2 For details see Macartney, "The General Election of 1969," Botswana
Notes and Records, III (1971).
3 Kwele undertook extensive speaking tours for the party. See for
example BDN, 7 JUL 67, 9 APR 69, 25 APR 69, 23 JUN 69.
4 For his later role of North East District Council Secretary see
Chapter 5 below, especially pp. 216-219.
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Kwele was a Kalanga also had repercussions on the so-called "Kalanga
M1scare."
These calculations about the likely impact of the BNF were thrown
into confusion by the sudden announcement that the veteran Chief Bathoen II
of the Bangwaketse - the longest-serving Chief of one of the three
largest clans in Botswana - had joined the Front and indeed would be
2
the Presidential candidate in the elections due by March 1970. The
effects of this move were incalculable owing to the wide gulf of out¬
look which existed between the Chief and the left wing of the party
personified by Dr Koma. At one extreme of speculation, the BNF would
put together a winning coalition of urban discontent and rural tradi¬
tionalism; at the other, it would fall neatly and heavily between two
stools. At any event a mood of great uncertainty gripped politicians,
not least those in the Cabinet.
In the circumstances President Khama decided to call a snap
General Election (Parliamentary and Local Government, since both were
1 An explanation must be given of the strange episode known as the
"Kalanga coup scare," which in its impact on the election resembled
the Zinoviev letter in the UK in 1923. Rumours circulated wildly that
a group of Kalanga-speakers - who were over-represented in the civil
service thanks to their relatively greater thirst for education - were
plotting to overthrow the Government and that the police had seized
a cache of some rifles. One result was the abrupt cancellation of plans
to appoint Richard Mannathoko (a Kalanga) to London as High Commissioner;
instead he became Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Local Government &
Lands. Ihe facts behind the case remain obscure Csee Hansard, 29,
pp. 100, 126 [l5 AUG 69]) but it was certainly a bonus for the BDP, as
leading members, like M. P. K. Nwako, were quick to realise the advantage
of a Tswana backlash, since Setswana-speakers were such an overwhelming
proportion of the electorate. The fact that Kwele was a Kalanga was
then used against the BNF; the BPP was already identified with the
Kalanga language cause. Possibly Bathoen's nomination as Presidential
candidate instead of Kwele was the BNF's attempt to contain the damage.
(See Therisanyo/Consultation. VII, 11 [NOV 69] and VIII, 4 [JUN 70].)
2 The Front announced that, if they won the election, Bathoen would
become a ceremonial President while Kwele would be made Prime Minister.




now synchronised) to try and minimise the chances for the BNF, clearly
the main threat to his position, to organise.
This move may have been tactically wise but strategically it is
open to question since 1969 represented the lowest point in the
electoral fortunes of the BDP: from mid-1970 onwards its position
steadily strengthened, as two factors came into play. One was the
serious splits in and defections from the BNF, the other the steady
growth in prosperity and the noticeable rise in government revenues.
The 1969 General Election
2
At the 1969 election however the BDP lost four seats but held
narrowly on to some of those at risk, notably Maun & Chobe in the
North West, and the partly urban constituencies of Gaborone & Ramotswa
and Lobatse/Barolong.
TABIE 1.12
THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION OF 18 OCTOBER 69
BDP BIP BNF BPP Others Total
Seats won 24 1 3 3 — 31
Gain/loss from f65 -4 +1 (+3) - - -
Share of votes 68.6% 6. Q% 13.5% 11.9% - 100%
Gain/loss from *65 -11.8 +1.4 (+13.5) -2.3 (-0.8 ) -
Candidates 31 9 21 15 0 76
The biggest blow was Vice-President Masire's heavy defeat at the
hands of ex-Chief Bathoen in Kanye South, and the BDP's loss of
two other Bangwaketse seats. It was these Southern District results,
more than the victory of Mpho (a Moyei) in his Okavango home
1 The Local Council (Date of Election) Bill 1969 was strongly opposed
by the Opposition BPP who accused the Government of running away from
the verdict of the people by postponing the Local Government poll, due
in June 1969. Hansard, 28, pp. 55 ff. (13 MAY 69)
2 See Macartney, "Botswana Goes to the Polls," Africa Report, XIV,
8 (DEC 69) [also XIV, 2 (FEB 71)].
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1
constituency, which led the BDP to blame their losses on "tribalism".
Map No 3 shows the scatter of Opposition victories round the perimeter
of the country.
The results of the local government elections of October 1969
were in some respects even more interesting than the parliamentary
poll, since the BDP, despite its strong position nationally, ended
up with elected majorities on only seven of the twelve Councils,
and in three of these it faced a sizeable Opposition. To some extent
thus it can be argued that the institution of local government
universally provides a natural base for opposition to the national
ruling party. But this tendency was accentuated by the peculiarities
of district boundaries. Basing these on the traditional units of
administration meant that the large Bangwato heartland of BDP support
shows up Cin Table 1.13) as only one Council, while each of the other
Tswana clans either had a Council coterminous with its territory or
in two cases (Southern and South East Districts) shared it with other
2
small clans. (This is further discussed below.)
TABLE 1.13
STRENGTH OF BDP IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS
(3 Town and 9 District Councils)
MAJORITY TIED RESULT MINORITY
100% Ove rwhelm ing Narrow
1966 4 4 2 0 2
1969 0 4 3 3 2
Nationally the BDP lost 24 Council seats to Oppostion and Independent
candidates, although retaining 112 (68%) - 46 of them unopposed.
1 See "The 1969 Elections - a Postmortem," Therisanyo/Consultation
VII, 11 (NOV 69) and Hansard, 30, pp. 398-413 (27 NOV 69)
2 On pp. 35-36
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These elections set the tone for the local Councils studied: the
early dominance of the BDP coming under challenge, a challenge which
could not be said conclusively to have faded until the verdict of the
1
electorate was given in the 1974 elections, summarised in Tables 1.14
and 1.15.
TABLE 1.14

























STRENGTH OF BDP IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS, OCTOBER 1974
(4 Town and 9 District Councils)
MAJORITY TIED RESULT MINORITY
100% Overwhelming Narrow
6 4 2 0 1
The main points to be made about the results are the gain in
the number of seats and share of the vote by the ruling party. The
former is qualified by the fact that there were more seats at
stake in toto, owing to Parliamentary redistribution of seats and,
_2
in Local Government, to the emergence of an elected Town Council in
the mining centre of Selebi-Fhikwe. The share of the poll refers to a
smaller number of votes cast due to fewer contests and a general drop
3
in voter turnout.
1 For full discussion see Macartney,"The Success of Seretse," Africa
Report, XIX, 6 (1974); J. D. Parson, "A note on the 1974 General
Election in Botswana," BN&R, VII (1975)





So far the parties have been discussed primarily in terms of
their reactions to each other, as this is arguably the Wesen of the
parties in Botswana: they make more sense when seen in terms of their
1
opponents. There are of course official policy positions. In the
2
early days these were to be found in the various party periodicals.
After they ceased publication the best source of information has been
the debates in the National Assembly (since the 1969 General Election
when all four parties gained representation). Election manifestoes
have been sporadic in their appearance, only the BDP having produced
one for the Local Government elections in 1966 as well as all three
3
Parliamentary General Elections. The Opposition manifestoes before
1974 contained remarkably little by way of policies on rural development
or local government, but concentrated on attacks on the Government's
record, plus a list of desirable objectives. The BDP Manifestoes by
contrast show the polish which one might expect of the Party's expat¬
riate advisers and civil servants who wrote the drafts: the manifestoes
display the unmistakable tenor of a confident ruling party - a con-
4
fidence which has been justified by the three pillars of Domkrag rule,
viz. growing prosperity, an increasingly independent foreign policy,
and a generally inept Opposition challenge.
1 Attempts to portray them in terms of world ideological alignment
are highly misleading. See "United Front Tactics in Africa," African
Review, SEP 67.
2 See Chapter 7 for an account of them, and of other aspects of party
organisation.
3 Copies of manifestoes of BDP, BNF and BPP are to be found in
Macartney (Ed.), Readings in Boleswa Government (1971), Vol. I.
4 Domkrag is the widely-used nickname of the Democratic Party. How
it originated is explained in the Editorial Notes which preface this
dissertation.
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The Government*s policies are often expounded in the form of four
unexceptionable national principles - Democracy, Development, Self-
Reliance and Unity, summarised in what is sometimes called the fifth
1
principle, Harmony (kagisano). The opposition tradition does not
dissent from these principles but remains critical of the BDP's commit¬
ment to them and its performance in general. The BDP General Secretary,
Dr Masire, has explicitly stated the pragmatic basis of the Party: as
he put it in Parliament, "the country has elected a Government which
2
does not believe in doctrines but in the development of Botswana."
The Nature of the Parties
When it comes to analysing the nature of the parties there is a
familiar dichotomy between the party constitution and actual party
3 4
behaviour. All four party constitutions fall within Hodgkin's
category of "mass parties" of the "Labour-Party-type, branch-based,
5
model." The real question is the extent to which the parties in
reality are "mass" or "£lite" Cor "patron") parties. This question is
not easy to answer.
On the Opposition side, the BPP and the BIP both aspire to the old
Nkrumahist CPP ideals and organisation, with Mpho as BIP Leader making
the more visible efforts to follow the late Dr Nkrumah's line.6 But both
are handicapped by the lack of funds necessary to overcome the problems
of communication in a large country with a small population and have
1 E.g., Hansard, 46, p. 54 C7 AUG 73) and Kagisano - a policy for
harmony, (Presidential address, BDP Annual Conference, Francistown,
1 APR 72).
2 Hansard, 24, p. 542 (5 APR 68)
3 See T. Hodgkin, African Political Parties (1961), especially pp. 81-82.
4 With the exception of the BIP Constitution (q.v.) the constitutions
of the parties of Botswana are reproduced in Macartney (Ed.), Readings
in Boleswa Government, op. cit., Vol I
5 Hodgkin, op, cit., Ch. 4, especially pp. 68-75.
6 See M. K. Mpho, Open letter to the Secretary-General, Organisation
of African Unity, 4 JUN 72.
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had perforce to rely on their MPs and Councillors to a large extent.
Hie BNF, although equally beset by the sheer logistical problems of
organisation, is different in two respects. In the first place its
organisation aspires to a greater degree of centralisation, with the
Central Committee ostensibly given the key role. Secondly its leader¬
ship is divided with two groups: the urban-intellectual wing, and the
aristocratic. The latter is symbolised by ex-Chief Bathoen, but it is
worth noting also that the BNF's candidates elsewhere have on occasion
included members of local ruling families, e.g. in 1969 in the Sebinas &,
Gweta and Bobirwa constituencies. Accordingly there is as yet uncer¬
tainty about the true nature of the BNF: are the chiefs and headmen
simply being "used" by an unscrupulous mass party, or is the BNF really
an ^lite/patron party led by local notables, some of whom are intellec¬
tuals? With the bulk of the BNF Councillors, as well as their MPs,
drawn from Gangwaketse it is somewhat difficult to draw a firm conclusion,
particularly since successive annual conferences have had unpredictable
effects on the leadership struggle. The task of analysing the BNF is
not made any easier by the fact that some ruling families in its southern
base adhere to the Democratic Party and are opposed locally by ordinary
farmers who adhere to the BNF. The class base which can just be discerned
in the support for the parties in the Tati District is absent in other
areas (except possibly the North West).
The problem of analysis is more important in the case of the BDP,
and yet, despite Hodgkin's view that "the distinction [between "mass"
and "£lite" parties] is fundamental for an understanding of the character
1
and behaviour of African Parties," it is a surprisingly difficult distinc¬
tion to sustain. On the one hand some of its leaders have traditional
1 Hodgkin, op. cit., p. 68. Hodgkin's cogent analysis of course primarily
concerned pre-independence parties. The interesting point is the extent
to which, in multi-party democratic Botswana, the parties make sense in
his categories.
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status; most of them have wealth, typically in cattle and often business.
Of those possessing traditional status, some hold positions in both the
traditional and the "modern" spheres. MPs in particular jealously
guard their leading position in the party's grassroots organisation
but are not generally too concerned if the level of activity of the
BDP "mass" organisation is low. The bulk of funds are raised from the
wealthy. But discipline has been reasonably strong and membership
cards are sold to all willing to join (with variations on a constituency
basis>. Above all there is every prospect that the future leadership
of the BDP will derive its authority from its position within the party,
not from any externally ascribed status, and there is a substantial
body (almost certainly a large majority) of MPs, and others, within the
party who now have a vested interest in preserving the BDP as the
vehicle of power, which has thus cut itself free from the traditional
forces which helped to launch the party in the first place. The
question then is whether the BDP will become a "patron party" using
not traditional status but the power of the state to retain support, or
whether it will - as is the ambition of certain influential members of
the party - not only retain the mass party ideal but expand and
rejuvenate its grassroots activity. The outcome of the tension
between these two tendances will prove a vital question for the future
shape of politics in Botswana.
THE LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK
Historical Basis
Botswana is fortunate in the extensive studies which have been
1
undertaken by anthropologists, notably the prolific Professor I. Schapera,
1 See particularly a Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom (Second Edition,




and by historians, of the traditional politico-administrative system.
The most important points to note about the system are, firstly, the
importance for the Tswana of the eight merafe (clans), each of which
was independent of the others, having no common Paramount Chief but
sharing the Setswana language and the experience of British rule. The
nearest thing to a supreme traditional authority was the collaboration
of the Chiefs of the three largest clans, the Bangwato, Bakwena and
2
Bangwaketse, to seek Queen Victoria's protection. Once the desired
Protectorate was in being (from 1885) the Chiefs continued to rule much
3
as before, albeit with the gradual and sporadic extension of the power
of the colonial government. Most writers characterise the period as
4
one of standard and harmonious indirect rule. There were however
periods of friction. One was caused by the Native Administration
Proclamation and the Native Tribunals Proclamation, both of 1934,
challenged unsuccessfully by two leading Chiefs Tshekedi Khama and
Bathoen II as violations of their treaty rights, inherent in the
establishment of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, insofar as the
Proclamations interfered with tradition and derogated from the Chiefs'
power. A more colourful row occurred in the Bangwato capital of
Serowe which in 1933 received its first ever naval visit (Royal Navy
sailors from Cape Town, complete with field guns) to back up the
1 See T. Tlou, "The Nature of Batswana States: towards a theory of
Batswana traditional government - the Batawana case," BN&R, VI (1974),
and Q. N. Parsons, "Khama III, the Bamangwato, and the British, with
special reference to 1895-1923,u (1973).
2 A. Sillery, The Bechuanaland Protectorate (1952) Part I, especially
Ch 7, and his Botswana: a short political history (1974), Ch IX;
for an eyewitness account of the impact of the Chiefs on Queen Victoria
see V. Mallet (Ed.), Life with Queen Victoria (1968), pp. 69-70
3 For a short but interesting account of the current view of the Chiefs'
earlier mode of rule see "Traditional Society had a Machinery of
Consultation," Botswana Weekly News, 14 JUN 72.
4 See P. G. L. Wass "Community Development in Botswana" (1972), pp. 24-25.
A dissenting voice is L. Marquard, "The Problem of Government" in
J. Mo Davis (Ed.) Modern Industry and the African (1933) p. 252c
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1
banishment of Tshekedi Khama (temporarily as it turned out). This
bizarre episode had a kind of sequel in the exile of Seretse Khama
and his removal from the position of Chief-designate fifteen years
2
later.
A recurrent theme in this study is the interaction between the
3
traditional leaders of the Batswana and the new institutions of Local
Government which aimed at "modernising and democratising" the clan
4
system. Accordingly the legislation concerning the one must inevitably
be considered along with that affecting the other.
5
The Local Government System
The legal framework of local government arose from the report of
the Local Government Committee (established in 1963) to the Legislative
Council6 in 1964. It was axiomatic to the then colonial Government
that an elected system of Local Government be established before
Independence; since that day was by then uncomfortably close,it was
necessary to proceed with some haste to set up the new system. One
consequence was the important decision to recognise the existing clan
system by basing the units of rural local government on the clan
7
territories and by converting the clan administrations into the nucleus
1 See Halpern, op. cit., pp. 268-270
2 See above, p. 21
3 See D. Fig, "The Rise and Demise of a Traditional ]£lite: a political
history of the role and impact of the Botswana Chiefs." (1972)
4 See Chapter 10 below for a fuller discussion of the rationale behind
this.
5 For useful accounts see J. E. S. Griffiths, "A Note on Local
Government," BN&R, II (1970); and W. Tordoff, "Local Administration
in Botswana," (Parts I and II), Journal of Administration Overseas XII,
4 (1973) and XIII, 1 (1974).
6 See Chapter 10, especially pp. 394-395.
7 The pre-1966 clan administrations were very small. See A. J. Beeby et al.
Report on the Structure and Conditions of Service of Tribal Administrations
in the Bechuanaland Protectorate [1963].
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of the new District Council staff. Administrative convenience was
however only part of the reason for this decision: the other was more
directly political. It was deemed politic to disturb the Chiefs as
little as possible and to persuade people that the new system represented
1
a development of the old system rather than its abolition. Only
where clans appeared too small to be viable were they amalgamated for
2
Local Government purposes (this happened to the Balete, Barolong and
Batlokwa, who were originally scheduled to form the South East District);
the non-Tswana groups were dealt with on an ad hoc basis since they
had never enjoyed the same recognition as the eight Tswana clans
("Principal Tribes").
The time factor also meant that the models for legislation were
imported (from Malawi) and adopted with little discussion of alternatives.
The basic statutes were the loi-cadre itself, the Local Government
(District Councils) Law of 1965, the Local Government Tax Law of 1965,
the Chieftainship Law of 1965 and the Townships Proclamation. The
details of the composition of each Council were established by Statutory
3
Instrument.
The basic functions of the District Councils are: primary
4
education, the most important, mandatory function; water; minor roads;
and public health. In addition, Councils are required to collect local
1 As Heeger, inter alia, points out, a common effect of colonial
independence was the institutionalisation of certain particular identities;
this is a case in point. G. A. Heeger, The Politics of Underdevelopment
(1974), pp. 75-94.
2 The Barolong were subsequently placed in the Ngwaketse District,
which became the Southern District. (See Chapter 3.)
3 Laws 35, 20 and 29 of 1965; Cap. 120; Legal Notices 43-50 of 1966,
amended by Nos. 104-111 of 1969.
4 Education Law No. 40 of 1966
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1
government tax - a graduated personal tax with a floor of R3 and a
ceiling of R48 - operate trade licensing and control the making and
selling of traditional beer (bo.jalwa jwa Setswana).
The powers retained by the Chieftainship comprise basically the
exercise of judicial functions and, with the assistance of the Local
Police, a general requirement to maintain order. The traditional right
to summon the people to the kgotla remains unaffected. Other important
functions have however been removed from the Chiefs. Of these, the
collection and disposal of stray livestock (matimela) has been trans-
2
ferred to District Councils, thereby taking away a useful source of
income and patronage from the Chiefs. Even more importantly, the
control of land allocation has been transferred to to a troika Land
Board, consisting of representatives of the traditional administration,
3
the Council and the Government.
The Government's powers over the traditional administration now
extend not only to recognition but appointment, suspension and removal.
The power has been seen in the resignation under pressure of Chief Neale
Sechele of the Bakwena, the one-year suspension of Chief Seepapitso IV
of the Bangwaketse (son of Chief Bathoen,who resigned in 1969), and the
4
recent removal of Chief Besele II of the Barolong.
Not unnaturally, the Chiefs in general have not been very happy
with the trend of events. A member of the District Administration
1 Exemption is granted to those deemed to be destitutes, by Council
committee.
2 The Matimela Act No. 25 1968, The Matimela Regulation of 1969 and
earlier Matimela model bye-laws.
3 The Tribal Land Act No. 54 of 1968 and the Tribal Land (Amendment)
Act No. 48 of 1969.
4 See BDN, 8 SEP 70; and Speed & Stevens, op. cit.. pp. 383-384
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summed up the relationship between District Council and Tribal
Administration by saying that
both institutions existed for the benefit of each other and
that they were serving one community. He went on to say
that Tribal Administration was obsessed by the idea that
everything had been snatched away from them. The Council
was also suffering from inferiority complex in that they
wanted to take everything from Tribal Administration in spite
of the reciprocal nature of their existence.1
The Chiefs' early misgivings about the new Local Government system
were mollified by their appointment, in appropriate Councils, as
Chairmen until this was altered to mere ex officio membership in
2
1969. It is clear that few Chiefs were willing tamely to endorse
the opinion of the late Tshekedi Khama that
Tribalism will die in the natural political growth of
Africa and with it chieftainships as they have died else¬
where. It seems unnecessary ... to attempt to
perpetuate this institution where it has ceased to be
respected.3
Some time previously the Chiefs had had to accept the end of
the old regimental labour system, whereby an age-set would be ordered
to undertake any task, including public works, collection of matimela
and performing services for the Chiefs. In a sense this last function
was inherited, after a gap, by Ipelegeng or Self-help, institutionalised
in Village Development Committees.
4
It is worth expatiating briefly on this subject, since the Self-
help principle is the front line of the Government's attempt to
effect improvements at the grassroots; until the windfall of the
mineral reserves it virtually constituted the whole of the rural
1 Central District Council Minutes, 20-21 MAR 73 (emphasis added).
2 See Appendix A
3 Cited in S. M. Gabatshwane, Tshekedi Khama of Bechuanaland (1961), p. 67.
4 Discussed at some length in Chapter 6
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development policy. The abolition of "regimental" labour was well
understood. The attempt to make Self-help into its voluntary
successor were bedevilled however by the Food-for-Work scheme,
brought about by drought/famine and the conditions on which aid was
given. A key source of confusion was the use of "self-help"
terminology in the Food-for-Work scheme, especially the word
1
"Ipelegeng", as this quotation from a Government press statement
in 1966 unequivocally shows:
IPELEGENG PROGRAMME COMES INTO OPERATION TOMORROW
Today . . . the Bechuanaland Emergency Food Programme for
famine relief comes to an end: and as from tomorrow, July 1,
the Community Development Ipelegeng ("Food For Work")
programme comes into operation.
This means that instead of receiving free, unconditional
issues of rations, the able-bodied will be expected to
work for the rations for themselves and their families.
A critique of the related semantic problems was given, appropriately,
by J. S. MatSheng, a later Director of Community Development. He
wrote
In seTswana, Community Development is 'boipelego'. It
was unfortunate that those who were responsible for
Famine Relief chose to call it 1ipelegeng1 instead of
'mophako'. Many people tend to confuse proper Community
Development and Famine Relief because of the seTswana
translations of the two expressions. The combination of
the two programmes was not in the interest of Community
Development.^
Thus the new system failed to replace exactly the former system of
4
clan regimental labour directed by the Chief.
1 The origins of this term are documented in P. G„ L Wass,
"Community Development in Botswana with Special Reference to the
Evolution of Policy and Organisation 1947-1970," (1972) pp. 2.(0 - 2.lfo
2 Bechuanaland Daily News, 30 JUN 66
3 J. S. Matsheng, "The Community Approach to Rural Development,"
BN&R, III CI971), p. 197
4 See N. Mitchison, "African Lesson in Local Initiative," The
Scotsman. 16 DEC 76
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As the powers of the Chiefs were reduced, the position of the
District Commissioners was enhanced. In 1970 they not only became
ex officio members of District Councils but were given powers of
supervision.1 The culmination came with a Presidential Circular
late in 1970 which set up the District Development Committees, chaired
in each district by the District Commissioner and clerked by one of
his subordinates, the District Officer (Development). The DDCs were
entrusted with the job of co-ordination at district level and with
2
planning in conjunction with the District Councils.
Finance
The resources available to Councils were limited. After exhausting
the funds they inherited from the Tribal Treasuries, they have become
heavily dependent on central Government grants to supplement the Local
Government Tax revenues, and are obliged to spend 80% or more of
3
their income on primary education. Tables 1.16 and 1.17 give examples
of the sums available together with a breakdown of expenditure; the
years chosen are one from each of the two Sessions, i.e. before and
4
after the leap in central Government revenues.
In the light of the growing dependence of the Councils on the
central Government for their income, it is worth asking whether greater
efforts could not have been made by Councils to increase their own
revenues, since - unlike the traditional administration, whose
previous sources of income have been transferred to the Government
and the Councils - Local Authorities do possess this measure of
1 Local Government (District Councils)(Amendment) Act No 14 of 1970
2 See Chapter 8 below, and Tordoff, op. cit. (Part II)
3 See also Appendix L
4 See pp. 15-16 above
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financial independence, in principle at least. One answer is that the
collection of tax has posed problems for the administration as far
1
back as records go. Moreover as it was politically unpopular,
entailing- as it did assessments of livestock holding-s, few Councillors
took an active interest in revenue collection, despite regular
exhortations by Government spokesmen.
TABLE 1.16
INCOME OF THREE SELECTED DISTRICT COUNCILS
In two sample years (thousand Rands)
Govt Grant
LG School Other Total Govt TOTAL _
as % of
Tax Fees Internal Internal Grant INCOME . , ,
CDC 1968 280 174 87 541 115 656 17.5%
1973 400 222 185 807 234 1,040 22.5%
SDC 1968 72 45 18 135 44 180 24.4%
1973 125 49 39 213 74 287 25.8%
NEDC 1968 23 32 7 62 28 90 31.1%
1973 32 36 11 79 72 151 47.7%
TABLE 1. 17
EXPENDITURE OF THREE SELECTED DISTRICT COUNCILS




Education Other TOTAL Surplus
Educ. as
% of total
CDC 1968 95 444 54 593 63 74.9%
1973 120 738 182 1,040 — 71.0%
SDC 1968 25 131 11 166 14 78.9%
1973 54 188 44 287 — 65.2%
NEDC 1968 9 71 7 87 3 81.6%
1973 26 120 5 151 — 79.5%
Note: Figures are rounded in both the above tables.
Sources: Estimates of Expenditure and Income, 3 Town Councils 1968/69
and 9 District Councils 1968; Town and District Councils
Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure: recurrent budget 1973
1 For a graphic account of the difficulties encountered around the turn
of the Century see A. W. H,odson, Trekking the Great Thirst (2nd Edition,
3rd Impression, 1914), Ch. Ill and passim
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Composition and Procedure
The bulk of Council membership was composed of elected members,
with a minority of Government nominees. The latter comprised two
categories: the ex officio members CChief or Chiefs as appropriate,
and after 1970 the District Commissioner) and the political appointees,
the number of which was increased in 1969. The latter category in
practice often included members of the traditional administration.
1
Table 1.18 summarises the composition of the three Councils selected
for study, while Table 1.19 indicates the number of people involved
in each district.
TABLE 1.18
MEMBERSHIP OF THE THREE SELECTED DISTRICT COUNCILS
Elected Ex Officio Nominated TOTAL Chairman
CDC Session 1 32 la 5 38 Ag. Chiefa
Session II 32 2^ 5 39 Elected
Session I 24 4d 4 29 Chief0
Session II 24 3 6 33 Elected
Session I 7 3 10 Elected
Session II 7 I® 5 13 Elected
Notes i a Acting Chief of Bangwato
b Acting Chief + District Commissioner
c Chief of Bangwaketse
d Chiefs of Bangwaketse and Barolong, + District
Commissioner
e District Commissioner










Session I 208 80 56,070 sq ml 2,509
Session II 229 99 (145,221 sq km) 3,102
Session I 82 27 10,518 sq ml 1,130
Session II 91 31 (27,242 sq km) 1,310
Session I 25 8 2,056 sq ml 1,125
Ses sion II 29 9 (5,325 sq km) 1,285
Notes: Population: figures from Censuses of 1964 and 1971
Electorate: figures of registered voters for 1966 and
1974 Local Government elections
Area: Botswana has officially adopted the metric
system (SI units) in full
The first Local Government elections were held on 13 June 1966.
Council elections, originally scheduled to be held every three years,
were changed before the Local Government elections due in June 1969
so that they would be thenceforth synchronised with Parliamentary
General Elections. Thus the second and third Council elections took
place in October 1969 and October 1974. By-elections were held on
instructions from the Ministry of Local Government & Lands, usually
three months after the vacancy had occurred.
1
The Ministry also issued a set of model Standing Orders which
were adopted by most Councils without alteration. They reflect in
2
general the English model from which they were derived and thus
include provision for a fair degree of formality in procedure
(including restrictions on the number and length of speeches,
1 MLG&,L, District Councillors handbook (1966) Part II; and idem,
A Handbook for Chairmen, Secretaries and Members of District (and
Town ) Councils (1968), Part II
2 A number of advisers from English and Welsh local authorities were
engaged to assist in establishing the system.
and requirements of prior notice of questions and motions) and
structurally, the importance of committees (exercising1, in accordance
with stated terms of reference, delegated and advisory functions).
It is stipulated that the official language of minutes is English,
of debates English and Setswana. The quorum was set at over half the
membership, while the chairman has an original and a casting vote.
Meetings were to be held at least quarterly. Councils had the power
to amend their own Standing Orders, More is said about procedure





The significance of Councils as political institutions lies in
their expressions of opinion, the issues that Councillors raise and the
patterns of co-operation or conflict among them which are manifested
in what appeared a new and somewhat strange and artificial arena. So,
even if Councils' powers to take final decisions, e.g. over the
allocation of resources, are limited, their use by Councillors as a
forum in which to articulate demands, to express grievances or propose
policy changes is of definite significance for studying the inputs to
the political system of the District and thus the country as a whole.
The aim therefore is to produce as accurate and authentic a picture as
possible of the politics of the District Councils being studied; in
particular it is hoped that the analysis will isolate factors which
might shed light on the process of allocation of resources within the
Council's gift, and of determining the priorities for and method of
presentation of plans and requests to the central government. To do
this, data will be examined on an aggregate and comparative basis for all
three Councils over the eight-year period, covering two sessions, under
examination. The flavour of politics in, and the particular concerns
of each Council are then examined in turn in the following chapters.
The Parties
The most interesting facet to be explored, and the variable which




parties. With certain minor exceptions all the Councillors in these
Councils were readily identifiable as belonging to one of three parties
2
(out of the four in existence in Botswana), although all four parties
did contest seats in these districts. The provision made by law for
the use of party (as well as individual) symbols and colours for the
guidance of an only partly literate electorate was in fact used by the
vast majority of candidates in the 1966 and 1969 local government
3
elections. Indeed the assumption underlying both the Constitution of
the Republic and the Electoral Act is that voting will be predominantly
by party. An indication of the importance attached to the party label
is provided moreover by the prominence given by the media to carpet-
4
crossing by Councillors (a practice which occurred only twice officially
in the three District Councils studied but happened in several other
Councils in 1970). Indeed the very act of changing party and announcing
it publicly indicates the importance attached to the party label by the
5
Councillors concerned. It is also worthy of note that in the two
politically divided Councils the arrangement of seating tended to bear
a clear relationship with party, particularly in the early meetings
6
after an election,
1 One Independent in Session I, North East District Council, and Chief
Seepapitso IV in Session II of the Southern District Council.
2 The exception is the BIP, which is represented only in the North
West District Council.
3 In 1969 and thereafter, but not 1966, they coincided with a (Parlia¬
mentary and Presidential) General Election.
4 Invariably, as far as Councillors were concerned, to the ruling BDP.
5 Some candidates, including one Councillor and one ex-Councillor,
changed their ticket at an election.
6 For conoisseurs of parliamentary seating arrangements, the BNF in the
Southern District Council sit on the chairman's right; the BPP in the
North East District Council on the opposite side from the BDP.
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Geographical Factors
Seating patterns also reflect another factor which turned out to
be of significance, namely the geographical distribution of Polling
Districts. Thus the tendency is for minutes to list Councillors not
alphabetically but by constituencies and polling districts - a practice
1
which reflects the way people tend to think in geographical terms.
The particular relationship in terms of influence of the district
capital vis-a-vis the outlying areas is analysed to see if the occasional
allegations of domination by Councillors from the district headquarters
are borne out by the behaviour of Councillors.
This point relates further to the question of their role as local
representatives and spokesmen, and whether the initiatives taken by
Councillors are in fact biased towards articulating the demands of their
constituents.
BEHAVIOUR OF COUNCILLORS
Councillors as Ward Representatives
There is little dispute about Councillors* roles as representatives
of the Polling District for which they were elected. This is borne out
consistently in interviews, seminars and training sessions for Councillors.
It is not worth going into the refinements of the old "delegate versus
representative" question, since the distinction is none too clear to
District Councillors, nor is there any kind of machinery in practice for
the enforcement of the views of any group at the ward (i.e. Polling
District) level: reelection is the only opportunity to assert popular
control and that works generally as much as on a party basis in Botswana
as in the English model on which the system was based.
1 This is derived from the official listing of Wards and Constituencies
on a geographical basis.
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What can be tested is the extent to which Councillors raise local
ward matters, i.e. those concerning a particular village or area within
1
the District, at Council meetings. All motions tabled and questions
asked in the three Districts during the first two sessions of their
existence have been analysed to determine the proportion of "initiatives"
(i.e. motions and questions)* which exhibited "ward representative"
2
characteristics. These initiatives total 1264, a little over half
being motions (683) and under half (578) questions. This number is
therefore sufficiently large to justify certain conclusions. A caveat
must be entered in parenthesis, to the effect that the classification
of some questions and motions was inevitably arbitrary. By "motions"
3
is meant substantive, "private Members' motions,"' formally tabled (or
accepted as urgent motions by the meeting and/or Chairman and appearing
either as additional motions or under "Any Other Business"). Procedural
motions are not included nor the informal motions arising in the course
of debate on, for example, committee reports. Only on rare occasions
did such motions raise interesting points, e.g. of party combination.
Table 2,1 sets out the data for all elected councillors in the
three Districts for the two sessions 1966/74.
1 "Tabled" in the British rather than the American sense of the
term.
2 One or two sets of minutes are missing, which would mean an
estimated grand total of perhaps 1300.
3 Most Councillors are under the impression, from reading the




PROPORTION OF INITIATIVES CONCERNED WITH WARD MATTERS (in Percentages)
Questions Motions Combined
Central Session I 55 46 51
District Council Session II 54 46 49
Total 55 46 51
North East Session I 31 50 54
District Council Session II 33 54 46
Total 33 53 45
Southern Session I 58 55 56
District Council Session II 41 54 49
Total 48 55 52
From Table 2.1 it can be seen that approximately half of the
initiatives taken by Councillors concerned ward questions. The only
striking- variant is the questions asked by (elected) Councillors in the
North East. Leaving aside for the moment the question of party (a
majority of elected Councillors belong to the Opposition BPP), one
possible explanation derives from the small size of the District:
information about particular villages etc. was perhaps less required
than in the sizeable Southern District or the vast Central District.
This explanation is however pure conjecture and must take second place
to a party-oriented explanation, to be covered later. In any case it is
noticeable that motions in the North East are closer to the average;
this leads to a possible interpretation along the lines that questions
in the District Councils are much more genuinely "requests for information"
than the typical Parliamentary question in the National Assembly, the
function of which is more obviously political, whether constituency or
1 The figures refer to elected councillors only. Only in the case of
the North East District Council does the impact of nominated Councillors
make a noticeable difference, reducing the percentage of motions concerned
with local matters by 3% and increasing the figure for questions by 2%;
the overall impact is a reduction of 1% in initiatives concerned with
local ("ward") matters.
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general in content. The opposite case could, unfortunately for those
seeking definitive answers, equally well be argued, viz. that constit¬
uency or ward questions are politically "safer" or more neutral, and
thus likely to be more favoured by the ruling party. Evidence for
1
this has been found in another context. This line of interpretation
would accord to the BPP Councillors in the North East a sophisticated
political objective: asking general questions, including matters of
principle, but when it came to motions concentrating far more on
attempting to deliver the goods in terms meaningful to their constituents.
The resolution of this controversy will be left to a later stage when
the question of party behaviour is analysed in all three Councils; and
may indeed be explicable in terms also of the nature of each of the
three parties represented: BNF and BPP need not share any characteristic
other than of being parties (or even groups of Councillors) in
Opposition.
For a general assessment of 'the role of Councillors as "represent¬
atives", the following quotation is valuable. It comes from an unpub¬
lished report written by two Peace Corps members, C. Bauer and J. Licke,
seconded to two District Councils (Kgatleng and Kweneng Districts) as
Council Advisers for two years.
Councillors as Representatives
What is meant by "representative"? Is it one who
decides as best he can what is needed, is it one who speaks
as an individual who is representative of a group, or is it
one who canvasses the opinion of the people in his area and
brings their consensus to the attention of the council? If,
as is suspected, it is intended to be the latter the con¬
clusion must be that not all councillors understand the con¬
cept. This is not surprising. The idea of an "elected
Representative" in the context of the council system is not
universal. Nor, prior to 1961, was this concept in use in
Botswana.
1 W. J. A. Macartney, "African Westminster? The Parliament of Lesotho,"
Parliamentary Affairs, XXIII, 2 CSpring 1970)
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a. A few councillors have clashed with CDAs [Community
Development Assistants] over the leadership of Ipelegeng
[self-help] groups. Sometimes a councillor will order the
people to do something because he is the "representative".
b. Councillors occasionally demand special treatment
because of the position of "representative".
c. Unfortunately many councillors seldom consult the
people before council meetings and equally seldom hold
meetings with the public after council meetings to describe
council activities. They apparently feel they are represent¬
ative of their constituency.*
Some of Bauer and Licke's points reappear in Chapter 6, as do some
of the findings of the survey by Dr. John Holm of Cleveland State
2
University. Suffice it to say that both reports cast considerable
doubt on the degree of consultation which goes on between the Councillor
and the people who elect him. This said, there is an apparent conflict
with the findings of surveys carried out by interview and questionnaire
at conferences and training sessions for Councillors. The universally
stated position of Councillors was that they ought to/usually did
consult people before a Council meeting and informed them after each
meeting concerning Council decisions. When more precision was sought,
most questionnaires produced an average interval between kgotla (public)
3 4
meetings of 2-3 months. A survey of Village Development Committees
showed 40% of VDCs as not having seen their Councillor at any of the
previous five meetings, and only 5% had "perfect attendance".
1 C. Bauer & J. Licke, Local Government in Kgatleng and Kweneng District
Councils (August 1968-November 1970), (1971), p. 11.
2 J. D. Holm, survey, AUG-SEP 1970 (Unpublished preliminary report).
3 UB1S, Division of Extra Mural Services, Report of the Town and District
Councillors Seminar held on Sunday 8th April 1973 at the Francistown
Teacher Training College, UBIS/DEMS Northern Office Francistown, 13 DEC 73
4 A. Etherington, Villagers as Developers, I (1974)
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Personal observation leads to the conclusion that, because
Councillors are public figures and identified as such by the public in
a vague general way, and because they consequently spend quite a bit of
time talking to people about local affairs, the Councillors probably
feel genuinely that they do consult their constituents; the snag is that
the consultation is, with the exception of the occasional kgotla meeting,
unpublicised and unsystematic. The close proximity of the average
Councillor to his constituents is ascertainable from the small size of
Polling District (i.e. local government constituency, sometimes referred
1
to as a wardj^ which make it possible for a Councillor in the Southern
District to be elected with as few as 119 votes; in the North East the
equivalent is 256 and for the larger Central District 356. The highest
number of votes cast for a candidate in these three Councils was 1446 in
Central District. On the other hand low population density in some
Polling Districts makes it extremely difficult for Councillors to make
either frequent or regular contact with many of their constituents.
Concerns
There are thus limits to the extent to which the role of the
individual Councillor as representative (in whatever sense of the word)
of his/her ward can be ascertained. The collective view held by
Councillors can however shed useful light, and in particular indicate
which matters concern Councillors most. Accordingly all motions and
questions (i.e. not just "ward" matters) were analysed in terms of content,
to determine the frequency with which various issues were raised by the
Councillors in each Council. A list of 26 topics was used for analysis.
The top five topics are listed in Table 2.2 for each Council.
1 The use of the word "ward" can however lead to confusion with the







































































* Ipelegeng here means Self-help, Food-for-Work, Famine Relief,
and also references to Village Development Committees and
Parent/Teacher Associations: the whole range of village-level
development activity.
** Matimela are stray cattle, the disposal of which was governed
by tradition and the Chief, but became a Council responsibility.
Note; "Traditional" refers to the traditional system (alias
Tribal Administration) - Chiefs, Headmen etc., but not including
Matimela. "Ethnic" refers to matters pertaining to specific groups
in the population of the district, including racial questions but
also (and principally, in the case of the Southern District) clan
or tribal groups, in particular the Barolong.
Several points stand out clearly from Table 2.2. The first is that
all three Councils included education and water amongst their main con¬
cerns. Both these items are among the four basic services for which
District Councils are responsible: education is by far the biggest item
1
in the budget of all District Councils - hence the remark "Councils are
2
really education authorities" - while water is the most acute problem
1 See p„ 41 above
2 See the Tordoff Report (1970), pc 23j and p. 224 below„
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the Batswana nation. Of the other two main District Council responsibil¬
ities, health and roads, the latter appears (as "communications") on the
priority list of two Councils, while the former appears on only one. The
Chieftainship (or traditional system) appears in the two Councils where
the institution of paramount chief exists - the North East has a more
devolved system, somewhat reminiscent of that of the Igbos of Eastern
Nigeria - and reflects Councillor^ preoccupation, especially strong during
the First Session,with the handover and demarcation of the powers formerly
exercised by the Chief, and the relationship which was to exist at local
level with the unreformed Headman (kgosana) system. The question of
matimela is another aspect of the traditional system, since the Matimela
Act conferred on District Councils powers over stray cattle previously
exercised by the traditional authorities. It is perhaps worth noting in
passing at this stage that other aspects of the reform of district
institutions, specifically land allocation and planning, did appear as
significant items in the Second Session although not meriting a place in
the overall table.
One or two items appear somewhat puzzling at first sight. Why is
it, for instance, that the vast Central District is not as concerned with
communications as the small North East or relatively compact Southern
District? The answer need not rely wholly on a subjective interpretation:
there are in the North East in particular long-standing grievances about
the roads. The concern with revenue raising voiced only by the same
Council, on the other hand, can easily be explained by reference to the
extremely limited financial resources possessed by this district.
1 Councillors at one training conference were asked to list various




Similarly the concern with "ethnic" (or communal) questions in the
Southern (formerly Ngwaketse) District, reflects the particular griev¬
ances felt by the Barolong community. A last unsolved question is the
concern of the Central District with self-help. Was it indeed because
of the District's "model1^behaviour? These questions are examined later
in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.
3
The proposition has been advanced that most of the politicians
holding office at national or district level can be classified as "new
men" - new in the sense of being of non-aristocratic background - whose
income typically comes not only from cattle but also from commerce,
particularly small shops in rural areas. Unfortunately it is not easy
to produce evidence that is at all conclusive from the minutes of
Council meetings to test this hypothesis; the concerns of Councillors
are not clearly related to their personal economic interests. The
question of cattle and other livestock, for instance, concerns very many
people and it is only occasionally possible - e.g. in specific questions
concerning cattle in the Barolong area of Southern District - to trace a
direct connexion.
Councillors do however have one interest in common; that of securing
increases in their remuneration (allowances of various kinds) and
facilities. And, while the number of motions tabled (and questions asked)
on this issue was not large enough to appear in Table 2.2,it is clear
that the question had a degree of priority for Councillors. Details
will be given in the chapters on individual Councils but in general
1 The problem with using the word "communal" in the context of Botswana
is its association with the land tenure system covered by the Tribal Land
Act.
2 A description used to the writer by a civil servant while trying to
persuade him to do research in the Central District.
3 Notably by Mam Kuper in his Kalahari Village Politics (1970), Chapter 3.
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terms two points are worthy of note. One is that Councillors have
frequently used for comparison the allowances available for travel and
subsistence to civil servants and MPs, and the facilities available to
members of the traditional administration - and have been more than sorne-
1
what annoyed to be told that they cannot use telephones in the tribal
administration sub-offices, nor claim for phone calls made in the course
of their ward duties. The same applies to postage. The official line
seems to be that only the facilities available in the District Council
headquarters are "official", despite the disadvantage this doctrine
implies for the (bulk of the) councillors who represent remote polling
districts; in the North East indeed, all councillors are in this
position. The second point to be made here is that motions to increase
allowances are usually a bid for more financial resources to be trans¬
ferred from the centre: i.e. the Council engaging in pressure group
politics. Only one occasion has come to light where Councillors actually
sat down and pruned estimates from other heads in order to increase their
own remuneration.2
Levels of Activity
Cynicism about Councillors' levels of activity and awareness is rife
among the informed or partly-informed public, or rather observers - and
matched only by the ignorance and apathy amongst the electorate at large.
The cynical view would be that Councillors do not do very much, by way
of either initiating moves or informing themselves so as to be able to
take meaningful decisions; and furthermore that Councils are dominated
by certain leading lights, nominated notables or members of the aristoc¬
racy (accustomed to playing a leading role in kgotla debates), whose
1 See below, pp. 157-158
2 See below, p. 219
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advice is generally followed by the typical passive Councillor. Such a
view is extremely difficult to verify or refute with certainty1 and in
reality reveals more of the model in the mind of the critic than about
the facts of the situation. The question of activity and leadership
will be examined in relation to two variables - party and constituency -
and becomes meaningful only in relation to other variables and to the
peculiar features of each Council. In particular the position of the
non-elected Councillors will be analysed. One or two generalisations
may however be permitted and a hypothesis put forward. The first
generalisation is that Councils have gone through at least two phases -
the early phase, marked by a fair degree of activity, in which Councillors
made their mark on behalf of their wards, and tried to have the role and
position of this new institution of District Council defined; and a later
phase of growing complacency, modified to some extent by the widening
of the area of Councils' concern through the district planning procedures
introduced along with the District Development Committees. The second
generalisation, which is derived from the contrasting experience of the
Central and Southern District Councils, is that party competition keeps
up and in fact increases the level of activity, among members of the
ruling party as well as the Opposition party in question. The hypothesis
is that "leading lights", if they exist, will be found to dominate
committee membership and especially chairmanships; and that such members
are less likely (because they have less need> to take initiatives "on the
floor of the house," i.e. in full Council meetings. What is being
postulated, then, is a distinction between "government" and "backbenchers."
1 Especially since the position of the "natural leaders" changed over
the eight years studied. The difficulty arises in extrapolating the
trend as much as from examining the early, "settling down" period.
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Without testing the hypothesis, it can be argued that it ought to
obtain for one good reason, viz. the importance attached to election to
committees and indeed the Chairmanship and Vice-chairmanship. Elections




Few matters are ever formally voted upon in full Council (votes in
committees are almost unheard of>, and, as will be seen from Table 2.3,




Amended/ Amended/ Passed/ Ward




60 12 42 4 1 1 15 45
One-Party
Situation
38 6 26 4 1 1 11 27
Two-Party
Situation
22 6 16 - - - 4 18
From this two conclusions flow: first, that any analysis of voting is
generally a waste of time, and secondly that the ideology of consensual-
ism often posited as a universal feature of decision-making in Africa
is indeed a powerful influence, whether Councils are divided into parties
or not. In passing it may be remarked that "moving the direct negative"
is uncommon as an explicit device but can be taken to exist implicitly,
or alternatively that Chairmen call for a vote if there is obvious
1 Which is further examined later in this chapter.
2 The evidence, from interviews, on this is overwhelming; caucussing on
other matters is the subject of conflicting testimony.
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deadlock in discussion, or an irreconcilable faction opposed to a motion.
In sum, the occasions when motions fail, or are voted upon (whether they
pass or not), are the exception. Most motions are passed without a vote
or sometimes referred straight to committees without a vote. There is
here a conflict with Standing Orders which provide that matters falling
within the remit of a particular committee should be referred to that
committee first and automatically. This rule was however more honoured
in the breach than the observance, and in practice the Chairman decides
whether to apply the Standing Orders; or to allow debate, sometimes
followed by a remission to the committee. One sees here a conflict
between the (traditional) desire to allow a member to have his say, and
the rule book. A compromise solution is thus often adopted.
Another reason why so few motions are opposed is that some resolut¬
ions, usually involving extra expenditure, are passed and "referred to
Government" - i.e. these are matters where the District Council is either
asking for money (or other resources) from the government to enable it
to do something within its powers, or alternatively where the Council is
making representations on behalf of the district on matters which are
strictly speaking ultra vires. Others are referred to the District
Administration (the District Commissioner), or the Chief or (latterly)
1
the band Board. As can be seen from Table 2.4 below, overall almost 11%
of motions are thus passed on to outside bodies. The term "outside"
includes the Chief and Land Board even if they are formally represented
on/responsible to the District Council respectively, and emphasizes the
de facto autonomy, non-integration or at least non-subordination of the
traditional system and land allocation. Overlapping membership is not a
guarantee of anything other than extra allowances, and work, for the
persons involved.
1 In the Southern District, either the Ngwaketse or the Rolong Land Board.
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TABLE 2.4










CDC 5 4 9 1 - 10
NEDC 11 3 14 - - 14
SDC 4 0.5 5 2 2 9
OVERALL 5 2 7 2 1 11
From Table 2.4 two points in particular deserve mention. One is
the greater dependence on the Government felt by the impoverished North
East District Council compared with the others; the other is the greater
importance attached by the Southern District Council to the Chief than
to the District Commissioner, reflecting the poor relationship between
the first Chairman of the Council, the powerful Chief Bathoefi II, and
the District Commissioner.
In more general terms it must be said too that the table understates
the role of Councils as pressure groups, or channels for the articulation
of requests from rural Botswana, in that all Council minutes go automat¬
ically to the Ministry of Local Government and Lands, while other
resolutions may be reflected at a later date in Council estimates.
Again no account is taken at this stage of the newly-established
planning machinery involving District Development Committees. The 7%
of motions thus passed and referred to the government for action are
these specifically identified as such by the Chairman or Secretary and
minuted accordingly: obviously the influence of these two office-holders
is an important influence.
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Councillors as managers
Quite apart from their formal activities at meetings of the full
Council and its committees, Councillors may play a role through direct
contact with the Council staff - what the latter usually describe as
"interfering with the administration," The evidence on this aspect of
Councillors' activities is inconclusive. The writer found few examples
of such intervention by ordinary Councillors, although Chairmen were
much more frequently involved in discussion, occasionally to the extent
1
of earning a reprimand from the Council for their actions. The general
picture which emerged from extensive interviews of Council staff and
others however revealed very little of what could be described as informal
attempts to influence decisions taken administratively. Most personal
visits to the Council offices were to seek information rather than exert
pressure, although obviously checking on the progress of a project is a
form of pressure. This conclusion, however, for the three Councils
2
selected, xs somewhat at variance with the picture of the Kweneng and
3
Kgatleng Districts painted by Bauer and Licke. The two ex-Council
Advisers state: "A few councillors interfere with council staff -
4
ordering them about and undertaking reprimands." This would indicate
a greater degree of interference by Councillors in the Kgatleng and
Kweneng Districts than in the three Councils selected for this study.
1 E. go in the Central District on the question of representation on the
Selebi-Fhikwe licensing body: CDC Minutes, 27-28 SEP 72. A rare example
of "ministerial responsibility" was the resignation of the Education
Committee Chairman of Ghanzi District Council following poor results in
the district's schools, a matter which was also raised in Parliament,
BDN„ 28 FEB 75.





PARTY AS A VARIABLE
A major consideration in selecting the three District Councils
chosen was to examine the behaviour and test the impact of different
parties. All three Councils have, by government policy, a BDP majority.
In the Central District Council the Democratic Party won all but one
1
seat in both elections. The North East District electorate by contrast
returned People's Party majorities in both elections, but with nominated
BDP Councillors making Domkrag rule possible. The Southern (formerly
Ngwaketse) District was solidly BDP in 1966 but in 1969 divided almost
fifty:fifty, the Democratic Party having a bare majority of elected
seats in an election in which the National Front failed to contest all
seats. Consideration will now be given to the question of party
behaviour in the three Councils, with a view to seeing whether there are
significant differences between the three parties, or between BDP
Councillors and Opposition Councillors, and, if differences emerge, in
what way and to what degree.
Ward Representatives
Table 2.5 summarises the analysis of initiatives taken by Councillors.
TABLE 2.5
PERCENTAGE OF INITIATIVES CONCERNED WITH WARD QUESTIONS
Questions Motions Combined
Central District Council
BDP 54 46 49









BPP 36 56 48
1 Mathangwane, which the BPP lost for a time when it failed to nominate





BDP - Session I











BNF - Session II 33 45 40
Notes ; (1) Figures for Central District Council and North East
District Council cover both sessions.
(2) "BDP" means BDP elected Councillors unless otherwise
indicated.
In explanation of the construction of this table, it should be
mentioned first that there are but minor sessional variations in the
figures between Sessions I and II in the Central and North East District
Councils. There remains a point to be made concerning the BDP
Councillors in the North East. While it may appear anomalous to include
the nominated BDP Councillors in this particular table, there are two
justifications for this: first, the bulk of Councillors on the BDP
side are nominees, and, secondly, the nominated ones are in all cases
readily identifiable with a ward. The majority of them were unsuccess¬
ful BDP candidates in local government elections (or in one case,
„ 1
subsequently became one); they are thus "shadow" Councillors, aspiring
to win the seat from the sitting People's Party Councillor. The
remainder are Chiefs - officially termed Sub-Chiefs; the Kalanga term
2 3
is Shfe - who are equally closely identified with a part of the District.
1 One, elected as an Independent (in competition with a BDP candidate)
in 1966, made the transfer via being a nominated Councillor in 1969 to
standing for the Democratic Party in 1974.
2 Sub-Chief is the term employed by the government in the absence of a
(Paramount) Chief in the Tati District.
3 They are in this respect different both from Chief's Representatives
in the Tswana Clan system who can be transferred around the district,
and Headmen who have a lesser status.
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In interpreting the table, it is difficult to see any very definite
conclusions that can be drawn about the impact of party. It is true
that the BDP Councillors are more likely to ask "constituency" questions
than the opposition parties, but with the reservation that this holds
only if we take all BDP Councillors in the case of the North East
District Council. Indeed the record of the elected Democratic Party
Councillors in the North East is very close to that of the People's
Party representatives, and both differ far more from the nominated BDP
Councillors; with the North East the small number of Councillors involved
makes too much generalisation hazardous until data is available over a
much longer period. One other tentative conclusion can however be drawn,
viz. that the effect of party competition is reflected in a relatively
greater concentration on ward matters in motions as compared with
questions. Thus the Central District in both sessions, and the
Southern District in Session I, when there was a virtual absence of
inter-party competition, show more interest in ward questions than
ward motions; but the balance changes dramatically in Session II in the
Southern District, when the BDP Councillors there come to reflect the
greater relative concentration on constituency matters in motions
rather than questions. But this is Ca) on a different base in each case,
and (b) holds only if one looks solely at the elected BDP Councillors
in the case of the North East. So the overall conclusion is that
differences between the parties exist, but do not fit into any simple
explanation, rather depending on a contextual examination within each
separate district.
Party concerns
The issues raised by Councillors in questions and motions in order




CONCERNS OF COUNCILLORS (all motions and questions)
























































What is immediately apparent from Table 2„6 is that while the order of
priority accorded the top five issues varies, there is a very considerable
overlap between BDP and Opposition parties. Indeed no topic raised by
BPP or BNF Councillors in this table fails to appear also as a BDP
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concern. The consensus between the parties in a Council is greater
than among the three Councils taken as entities. The Democratic Party
Councillors on the other hand accord priority to several issues not
regarded as so important by the Opposition parties. In addition to the
question of Ipelegeng (which in this table includes not only self-help
but the famine relief and Food-for-Work programmes) raised in 8% of the
initiatives taken by Central District Councillors, there is the 9% of
BDP initiatives in the North East concerned with the Central Government
(i.e. normally a request for action and/or resources from Gaborone),,
And in the Southern District in the Second Session "Ethnic" (or Communal)
questions and planning matters each account for 11% of initiatives. The
reason for the former will emerge later, but the explanation for the
latter (like the "Central Government" category mentioned in the North
East) is the increasing interest shown in matters involving the allocation
of resources, and in particular the impact of the new district-level
planning system involving the crucial innovation of the District
Development Committees. The specific issues of water, education and
roads however are common to all, which is hardly surprising in an under¬
developed, semi-arid, sparsely populated country like Botswana.
Activity levels
If Councillors of all parties agree substantially on what the main
areas of concern are, are they equally active in raising them? There
are certain difficulties in measuring activity on a comparative basis
among three Councils of such varying size. An additional problem is that,
in addition to the statutory meetings (four per annum), some Councils
have been more ready than others to call extraordinary meetings, the
1
length of which vary. The comparisons, then, are more enlightening
1 In addition one or two sets of minutes were unavailable, which reinforces
the point. It also means that absolute figures are slightly on the low side.
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for intra- than inter-Council purposes. The tables that follow derive an
average activity level per Councillor by taking the number of questions
and motions and dividing by the appropriate number of Councillors and
years so as to produce an average annual rate of taking formal
initiatives in full Council meetings.
TABLE 2.7
ACTIVITY LEVELS
Session I Session II Both Sessions
Central District Council
BDP* 3.8 0.4 1.7
North East District Council
BDP 0.3 0.7 0.6
BPP 2.0 3.2 2.8
Southern District Council
BDP 2.8 1.9 2.3
BNF 3.2
* The sole BPP Councillor who represented Mathangwane ward for
part of Session I was around the average; his successor in
Session II was bottom- of the league.
From Table 2.7 some clear conclusions emerge. The first is that
the absence of meaningful party competition in the Central District
seemed to lead to complacency or at any rate a dramatic drop in the
number of formal initiatives between the first and second sessions.
Central District, often held up as a model to other Councils, appears to
1
have rested on its early-won laurels. By contrast the BDP in the
Southern District, when there was keen inter-party rivalry, slackened off
to a much lesser extent than was the case in the Central District, and
ended up with a more active record than in the BDP in the largest
Council. As far as the North East goes, the thesis is sustained, albeit
in low key: the BDP Councillors became more active in the Second Session
even if the total is not very impressive. It is worth adding that the
1 Note that the BDP in Central District in the First Session have the
highest level of activity.
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activity level of nominated BDP Councillors is on the whole less than
that of their elected colleagues; this lowers the BDP average. The
question of non-elected Councillors will be dealt with later, but it can
be pointed out here that their impact is not what might have been
expected, in this field, on the ruling party.
The second point which emerges quite indisputably is that the
1
opposition Councillors (when they are plural.') are considerably more
active than Councillors of the ruling party. They are between 1.7 and
6 times more active on motions and questions combined, aid in one session
almost 11 times more assiduous in tabling motions. Table 2.8 gives
details.
TABLE 2.8
OPPOSITION MORE ACTIVE THAN BDP BY FACTOR OF:
Questions Motions Combined
North East District Council
(BPP.-BDP)
Session I 3.0 00oTH 6.0
Session II 6.4 3.5 4.3
Both Sessions 5.2 4.4 4.7
Southern District Council
(BNF:BDP)
Session II 1.8 1.6 1.7
To complete the data, Table 2.9 breaks down the figures
Table 2.7 into motions and questions. This again emphasises
are no exceptions (other than the lone BPP Councillor in the




1 See note for Table 2.7
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TABLE 2.9
ACTIVITY LEVELS IN FORMAL INITIATIVES PER COUNCILLOR PER ANNUM
Questions Motions Combined
Central District Council
BDp Session I 2.2 1.6 3.8
Session II 0.2 0.2 0.4
Both Sessions 1.0 0.8 1.7
North East District Council
BDP Session I 0.2 0.1 0.3
Session II 0.2 0.5 0.7
Both Sessions 0.2 0.4 0.6
BPP Session I 0.6 1.4 2.0
Session II 1.4 1.8 3.2
Both Sessions 1.1 1.7 2.8
Southern District Council
BDP Session I 1.1 1.7 2.8
Session II 0.7 1.2 1.9
Both Sessions 0.9 1.4 2.3
BNF Session II 1.3 1.9 3.2
The argument that the Opposition are merely compensating by "back¬
bench initiatives" for their lack of influence on committees and the top
offices of the Council will be examined later; suffice it to point out
that "power sharing" is an established feature of the North East District
Council even if it was a late development in the Southern District
Council. Finally the point about greater Opposition activity holds if
only elected Councillors are taken into account, although the difference
is slightly reduced, due to the lower public activity level of appointed
Councillors.
In assessing the significance of the above conclusions it can be
assumed that the traditional consensus approach to politics gives the
more active Councillors an advantage in getting their initiatives
accepted, whether as matters of policy or of ward concern; this tends
to benefit Opposition Councillors, owing to their generally higher level
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of activity. It is argued moreover that the question of activity levels
is not solely an individual matter but that inter-party competition has
an effect. Putting it the other way round, the absence of party
competition seems to reduce the volume of inputs completely, something
which is not altered by the nomination of additional Councillors who
support the Government of the day„
Two explanations have been offered to account for these twin
phenomena. One is that Councillors started off - and this is argued
particularly for the Central District Council - with rather grandiose
ideas of a mini-parliament with themselves cast in the role of People's
Tribune but gradually realised that the passing of motions which, for
various reasons,were not implemented had limited value: in other words
there was a shift from a quantitative to a qualitative contribution.
While the argument sounds plausible it does not answer the objection
that a similar switch of emphasis ought to have occurred elsewhere, but
did not. Moreover, as is detailed in Chapter 4, the general performance
of Central District Councillors was the subject of continuing criticism
from the Council Secretary, and this continued after his translation to
a Cabinet post. The second - and in fact complementary - explanation is
that BDP Councillors were rather different in their outlook from the
BPP (and to a lesser extent the BNF): almost apolitical beings, who were
spurred into public activity as exhibited in formal initiatives only by
the example of the Opposition Councillors, who generally enjoyed using
the Council as a platform from which to express their "agin the Government"
position. This difference in temperament does not exactly contradict
the "slide towards a qualitative contribution" or "growing of sophistic¬
ation" interpretation but suggests that rather different objectives were
pursued - instinctively, perhaps - by the two sides.
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Solidarity
It will have been noted nevertheless, from what has already been
saidj that Council behaviour cannot be explained solely in terms of the
party factor. One indicator of party cohesion is the support given to
motions: is it predominantly, normally or not particularly the case that
a motion is proposed and seconded by Councillors from the same party?
Moreover do any variants occur according to the party identity of the
prime mover?
TABLE 2.10
SUPPORT FOR MOTIONS (in percentages)
Proposed by Seconded by
same party different party
North East District Council




(Session II) all 68 32
BDP 64 36
BNF 71 29
Note: Table 2.10 gives figures for those motions Croughly two-
thirds)) where both proposer and seconder are minuted.
From Table 2.10 emerges the not surprising finding that motions were
more likely to be seconded by a member of the same party than of the
other party. What is interesting is the fact that solidarity fell far
short of 100%, ranging from 54% to 71%. This means that party is a far
from reliable factor in explaining the fate of motions in the full
Council meetings, and a fortiori for proceedings in committee. In the
categories listed in the table, the BDP Councillors in the North East
seconded 46% of the motions tabled by the BPP Opposition, which is about
as near to consensus politics as one could get. At the other end of the
spectrum and the country, the BDP in the Southern District supported
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only 29% of the BNF motions, indicating- - rather contrary to the
relative policy cleavage between BDP and Opposition in these two Councils
- a greater degree of party-based behaviour. The infrequency of
caucussing by the parties, to which numerous interviewees testified, is
thus borne out by this evidence.
The next point to be investigated is the extent to which party
solidarity is related to the nature of the motions tabled. Putting it
another way, is bipartisan sponsorship of a motion more likely when
"ward" matters are involved in a motion rather than "general" matters,
which are more likely to involve policy questions? The data on this
indicates a different pattern in the North East from the Southern
District, but this comparison is somewhat unreliable owing to the fact
that in the North East a high proportion of "ward" matters have no
recorded seconder; the most likely explanation is that many such motions
were referred to committee or dealt with administratively and hence were
not formally debated. Bearing this proviso in mind, the figures are as
follows:
TABLE 2.11
MOTIONS; PROPORTION (percentage) OF MOTIONS
DEALING WITH "WARD" MATTERS BY SPONSORSHIP
































* includes nominated Councillors
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The conclusion for the North East District is that motions sponsored by
the same party were marginally less likely to be concerned with "ward"
matters. In the Southern District Council, on the other hand, and where
the data is fuller, quite the opposite is the case: motions sponsored
by both parties were much more likely to concern general than ward
matters. The conclusion suggested by the data, viz. that relations
between BDP and Opposition are different in the two Councils, confirms
the postulate of significant differences between the National Front and
the People's Party, or, more accurately, in the BDP Councillors' attitude
towards them.
Success and failure
It has already been noted that votes on motions are rare, and out¬
right rejection likewise. Nevertheless the motions which were rejected
and/or voted upon are worthy of some examination, not least to see
whether the ruling Democratic Party tends to use its majority primarily
against Opposition Councillors or whether party lines are blurred in
this as in other aspects of Council behaviour. Again the North East
District, and Session II of the Southern District, provide the only
strictly relevant data. Taking first unsuccessful motions, Table 2.12
gives the figures.
TABLE 2012
UNSUCCESSFUL MOTIONS (two-party situation)
"Ward"
Total BDP BPP BNF 1
North East District Council matters
(both Sessions) 3 2 1 - nil
Southern District Council
(Session II) 13 4 - 9 31%
Notes: Two of the motions in the North East had a tied vote,
with the Chairman declining to use his casting vote;
two of these had a seconder of another party. In the
Southern District, three motions failed for want of a
seconder; one of the BNF motions had a BDP seconder.
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TABLE 2.13
MOTIONS SUCCESSFUL AFTER A VOTE (two-party situation)
"Ward"
Total BDP BPP Ind ———
matters
North East District Council
(both Sessions) 6321 nil
Southern District Council nil -
Note: Two motions (including- that tabled by the sole Independent)
had a seconder of another party.
The limited evidence recorded in these two tables at least
demonstrates the absence of a hard party line on motions, whether
tabled by the majority party or the Opposition. In this respect there¬
fore the pattern in a two-party situation was not all that different
1
from the position in a one-party Council, which is discussed below.
Committee membership and office
The position is quite different where the question of the Chairman¬
ship or Vice-Chairmanship of the Council, and the membership of committees
are concerned. It is this question which is for most Councillors the key
one for party behaviour, and it is therefore no surprise to find that
caucussing before the annual round of elections is, as far as can be
ascertained, universal. 'There are two main reasons for this, involving
the allocation of two kinds of resources. The primary one is that status
is involved, and this is still seen, in the post-traditional era in
Botswana, as the main goal of local government. Secondly, there is the
financial perquisite of allowances for the Chairman and also for attend¬
ance at committee meetings, as well as related expenses. The function
of committees as policy- or decision-makers is perceived as secondary to
these two features.
1 In this category is included the period when the Central District
Council had one BPP Councillor.
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A dramatic difference is revealed by comparing- data from the
Southern District Council (Session II) with the North East District
Council. The first three annual rounds of committee elections in the
former resulted in 100% BDP membership of the main Council committees
(although from February 1971 onwards some BNF Councillors were elected
1
to "outside" committees on which the Council was represented), and it
was only in the last two years of the Second Session that the BNF had
representation (one member) on each of the main Council committees. In
statistical terms, a "backbench" Democratic Party Councillor had a ten
times better chance of election to a (main) Council committee than a
National Front Councillor. By contrast the People's Party Councillors
in the North East achieved a representation virtually identical with
their share of the Council seats (although not of course reflecting their
clear majority of seats in the Local Government Elections), and was even
successful once in getting a BPP Chairman for the Council; twice a BPP
Councillor was elected Vice-Chairman. The North East pattern was there¬
fore ab initio one of power sharing, with the BDP relying on either or
both the sole Independent Councillor (in the First Session) and the
Chairmanship of committees to give them control if matters came to a
vote. More will be said about the reasons underlying the apparently
co-operative approach prevalent in the North East in a later section.
Finally, it may be noted that in the Central District, which had a lone
BPP Councillor for most of the two sessions, the BDP committee membership
was a BDP monopoly until a year before the Second Session ended, when
the BPP Councillor got a seat on the Community & Economic Development
Committee.
1 And eventually had a majority on an ad hoc committee to investigate
the recovery of bad debts)
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The reasons behind the different levels of Opposition representation
in the three Councils need a brief explanation here. In the early days
of the Central District Council the first BPP Councillor to form the one-
man Opposition declined nomination to committees and resigned mid-way
through the First Session; the BDP then took the seat unopposed. His
BPP successor however wished to serve on committees and in fact protested
that his exclusion was proof of a partisan approach to committee member¬
ship by the BDP; subsequently the majority party relented and elected
him to the Community & Economic Development Committee.
In the North East however the BPP participated fully in elections
in the First Session and was able to ally itself tactically with an
Independent elected Councillor for a while to prevent any steamrollering
by the BDP. At the beginning of the Second Session however the BPP, in
the North East as elsewhere, walked out in protest against the Government's
packing of the Council with extra nominees (most of them defeated
candidates). The BNF did the same at the same juncture in the Southern
District. But whereas the BDP reacted in the South by electing solidly
BDP committees, the BDP in the North East elected BPP Councillors in
absentia to a fair proportion of seats. Here again one sees the difference
in attitude towards the two Opposition parties by the BDP: in the South,
resentful and suspicious of the new challenge (backed by all the
influence of the ex-Paramount Chief of the Bangwaketse), but in the North
East accepting the right of the BPP - which demonstrably had a substantial
majority of the electorate behind it - to a reasonable share of Committee
office. It took some time before a more relaxed attitude began to prevail
in the Southern District as the BNF threat to the BDP appeared to recede.
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THE GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR
If party membership is a less than reliable indicator of Councillors'
behaviour, it might be supposed that geography is a more potent one.
1
Vengroff has detected networks of communications amongst Kweneng Distrzct
Councillors apparently based on geographical groupings of wards. This
section examines the extent to which Councillors combine on a geograph¬
ical basis to achieve certain objectives. In particular the District
Councils are analysed from the perspective of district centre-periphery
relations, to see whether the more remote/disadvantaged areas show signs
of greater dissatisfaction, and also to determine whether in any sense
the "central" Councillors (with special reference to those from the
constituencies including the district headquarters, i.e. Kanye North and
South, and Serowe North and South) are more powerful than those from
more remote parts of the district. Because of the small size of the
North East District (which covers less than two parliamentary constit¬
uencies), this study will confine itself to the Central and Southern
Districts; another reason is that the centre of the North East District
is Francistown, which is not part of the North East District Council
area. The Southern District also provides a useful case in which to
examine the impact of party politics in Session II, and thus make
possible an assessment of the relative importance of the geographical
and party factors.
Ward matters
The hypothesis that Councillors representing remote Polling Districts
are more likely to raise ward questions than those from the centre is
borne out by an analysis of the data, although the correspondence
1 R. Vengroff, "Local-Central Linkages and Political Development in
Botswana" (1972) Ch. Ill
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between degree of remoteness and degree of concern with local issues is
not complete in the case of Central District. In Table 2.14 constit-
1
uencies are ranked in reverse order of remoteness, i.e. starting at
Serowe and Kanye for the Central and Southern Districts respectively.
(There is of course a degree of arbitrariness in the order in which some
constituencies appear, depending in particular on whether the centres of
each constituency are taken or the pattern of communications; the formula
adopted is based mainly on the former, but taking the latter into account
to rank several constituencies the centres of which are approximately
the same distance from the district capital.)
TABLE 2.14
PERCENTAGE OF WARD MATTERS RAISED BY COUNCILLORS,
ranked by constituencies in inverse order of remoteness
quos tions motions combined
Central District Council
(both Sessions)
Serowe South 33 37 36
Serowe North 37 33 36
Tswapong North 57 60 56
Mmadinare 58 50 56
Mahalapye 40 36 37
Shoshong 47 65 56
Tswapong South 40 33 38
Tonota 59 45 51
Bobirwa 82 60 74
Boteti 53 39 49
Nkange 77 33 69
Sebinas & Gweta 68 80 72
Total 55 47 51
Southern District Council
Session I
Kanye South 50 26 32
Kanye North 56 33 39
Moshupa 33 50 49
Ngwaketse/Kgalagadi 0 64 59
Lobatse/Baro1ong* 70 89 83
Total 58 55 56

















































Total 48 55 52
* The Barolong part of the constituency only
The data demonstrates conclusively the much greater degree of
parochialism in the rural areas compared with the centre of district
administration, which in the case of Southern District is exactly
double: 62% of initiatives from rural areas concerned with ward questions
compared with 31% for Kanye. The "metropolitan - provincial" syndrome
is only slightly less marked in the Central District, the comparable
figures being 56% to 36%. There the semi-urban Mahalapye constituency
1
behaves more like Serowe than the truly "rural" parts of the district
while Tswapong South, totally rural, does not fit the pattern, nor -
albeit to a lesser extent - does the remote Boteti constituency. Never¬
theless, the pattern is sufficiently clear for the hypothesis to stand.
Activity levels
Given that the remoter constituencies are more concerned with
ward matters, the next question to be examined is whether they are
relatively more active in Council than their colleagues from the
1 If the Mahalapye figures are deducted from the "rural" areas, the
differential widens to 59%:36%.
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district capital. Table 2.15 ranks the constituencies in order
according- to the number of formal initiatives recorded for each,
divided by the number of Councillors for each constituency (since the
number varies); the constituencies are again listed according to their
proximity to district headquarters.
TABLE 2.15
ACTIVITY LEVELS OF COUNCILLORS BY CONSTITUENCIES




















































































































* The Barolong part of the constituency only
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Two facts emerge from the data on the Southern District. The
first (which is shared with the Central District) is that there is no
obvious connexion between distance from the centre and levels of
activity. The second point is the change between Sessions I and II
(in the Southern District), which reveals a fairly definite connexion
between party and activity levels, as the BNF representation is
predominant in Kanye, strong in Nwaketse/Kgalagadi,* but weak in
Moshupa and non-existent in Lobatse/Barolong. The conclusion therefore
is that, while party is an influential factor on activity levels, the
impact of the geographical factor on levels of activity (as opposed to
the nature of such activity) is slight, and secondary in importance to
individual factors.
Cohesion
It has been shown that Councillors representing peripheral areas
are more concerned with ward questions but not necessarily more active
than their "central" colleagues. The next question to be answered is
whether Councillors frequently combine on a geographical basis to
sponsor motions, whether any variations encountered bear a relationship
to the degree of remoteness from the district capital, and whether such
cohesion is linked to the nature of the motion (i.e. ward or general
matters)„
The figures for the Central and Southern Districts are respectively
23% and 26% of motions sponsored by Councillors from the same constit¬
uency. In the Southern District the breakdown between Sessions I and
II is 33% and 23% respectively. The problem is how to evaluate these
1 The exceptional level of activity of one BDP Councillor (in Ngwaketse/
Kgalagadi) is reflected in the position of that constituency in the
table and illustrates again the impact of an individual.
1
figures. On the one hand they fall far short of the 100% which would
indicate total solidarity on a constituency basis; on the other hand
a purely random pattern of combination, i.e. one in which constituency
was not a factor either way would presumably produce a very low figure
of cohesion, averaging 16% for the Southern District and 5% for the
2
Central District. Thus if constituency exerts any positive influence
the figure would be above the quota just mentioned. Accordingly
Table 2.16 lists constituencies in order of cohesion, indicating also
whether they are above or below average and the quota.
TABLE 2 o16
RANK ORDER OF COHESION IN SPONSORING MOTIONS, BY CONSTITUENCY COLLEAGUES
Session 1 Session II Both Sessions
Southern District Council



















Below quota 4 Kanye North
5 Moshupa
5 Moshupa
1 This figure could never be achieved for Central District Council
owing to occasional vacancies/absences from two-member constituencies.
2 Whereas for party (in the Southern and North East Districts) the
figure would be nearer 50%.
Table 2.16 (cont.)
Session I Session II Both Sessions
Central District Council
Avove average 1 Mahalapye
2 Serowe North
3 Shoshong
Above quota 4 Sebinas & Gweta
5 Bobirwa
6 Boteti






It is apparent then that constituency cohesion varies considerably
(from 61% for Mahalapye, Central District, to zero) and that there is no
clear connexion with distance from the district capital. The figures
for Kanye and the rest of the Southern District are respectively 23%
1
and 28%, for Serowe and the rest of Central District 19% and 24%„
This indicates in both Councils slightly greater cohesion in the out¬
lying constituencies, but it is still considerably less than the
weighting given by the two groups of constituencies to ward matters.
Given the degree of cohesion outlined, the final question to be
determined here is the extent to which constituency sponsorship of
motions was based on the pursuit of local interests. Here the two
Councils provide different answers. In the Southern District, motions
seconded by a Councillor from the same constituency were more concerned
with ward matters than those seconded by a Councillor from a different
2
constituency in four cases (constituencies) out of five, and by a
1 For Session I and II the figures are 20%:39% and 24%:23% respectively.
The former was a single party situation while in the latter there was a
strong BNF minority.
2 Moshupa being the exception.
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1
margin of 66% to 46%. In the Central District, by contrast, the
figures are 36% to 45%: i.e. ward questions were more frequently
contained in motions seconded from a different constituency than the
2
same constituency.' Thus whatever validity Vengroff's "network" theory
has for the Kweneng, it does not appear to hold, as far as the joint
pusuit of local interests goes, for the Central District, where
3
Councillors from only two constituencies combined to raise ward matters
in motions.
Success/failure with motions
The number of motions rejected is, as has been noted, small. This
makes an examination of them interesting but also somewhat risky for









Serowe South 7 0
Mahalapye 7 2
Mnadinare 3 1
Serowe North 2 0
Shoshong 2 1
Sebinas & Gweta 2 1
Tonota 1 1
Boteti 1 0
1 The figures for Session I and II are respectively 79% : 45% and
57% : 46%.
2 Ro Vengroff, op. cit.





Session I Session II Both Sessions
unsucc. ward unsucc. ward unsucc. ward
mot. matters mot. matters mot. matters
Kanye North 7 3 5 1 12 4
Kanye South 5 1 4 1 9 2
Ngwaketse/Kgalagadi 4 3 4 2 8 2
Lobatse/Baro1ong 4 1 0 - 4 1
Moshupa 2 0 0 - 2 0
If any conclusion can be put forward from this table, it is the
negative one that no marked central domination of Council proceedings
is manifest in public rejection of motions concerned with local amenities.
Afore meaningful conclusions must await the chapters on the individual
Councils.
Committee membership
Nevertheless it can be argued that domination of committees enables
the central Councillors to exert an undue amount of influence, and so
this is the next question to be examined. Table 2.18 lists constituencies
by proximity to the centre, and indicates in descending order the number
1
of committee seats per Councillor per annum.
TABLE 2.18
REPRESENTATION ON COMMITTEES:
rank order of Councillors listed by constituencies
in inverse order of remoteness
Central District Council Southern District Council
Both Sessions Both Sessions
Serowe South 1 Kanye South 4
Serowe North 2 Kanye North 5
Tswapong North 5 Moshupa 1
Mmadinare 3 Ngwaketse/Kgalagadi 3







Sebinas & Gweta 11
1 Main (standing) committees only.
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Table 2.18 shows a fairly strong- correspondence between proximity
1
to the centre and representation on committees for the Central District,
with the nearest six constituencies in the top six places in the league
of committee membership: the position in the Southern District on the
other hand appears to indicate a week negative correlation. However the
dramatic change in the geographical distribution of seats in the
Southern District between Sessions I and II shown in Table 2.19 provides
a clear indication of the interplay of different factors.
TABLE 2.19
IMPACT OF PARTY ON GE0GRAFH1CAL REPRESENTATION ON COMMITTEES
Southern District Council
order of proximity , . ... ... Strength of BDPc rder of representation on committees °
to centre ' in constituency
Session I Session II (Session II) :
(one party) (two parties) rank order
Kanye South 2 44




The conclusion then is clear: in the absence of inter-party
competition the centre/periphery distribution of seats on committees
was very similar in Central and Southern Districts, and operated
against the periphery; but as soon as inter-party competition became a
feature (in the Southern District), the party factor became the deter¬
mining one. The factor by which the district capital exceeded the out-
2
lying areas was 2.25 for Central District, which compares with 1.5
for the First Session in Southern District; for Session II the outlying
1 Variations between Session I and II do not affect the overall
pattern significantly.
2 For Session I it was 2.8; it went down in Session II to 2.0.
areas exceeded Kanye's representation by a factor of 3.9. In this
context it must be emphasised that committee membership (and other
office in the Council) is the question which interests Councillors
most.
PARTY AND GEOGRAPHY
To bring the threads together, an attempt must be made to assess
the relative importance of party and geographical factors, as revealed
in the aggregate data. There are considerable difficulties inherent in
this task but. at the risk of oversimplification, a schematic presentation



































The general conclusion is that the importance of the two variables
varies with different aspects of Councillors' behaviour, but that party-
is rather more significant overall. But neither category comes any¬
where near 100% of (potential) cohesion. The clearest test case is
the pattern of sponsorship of motions in the Southern District in
Session II. Table 2.21 indicates the difference between the actual
and expected (on a neutral or random basis) proportion of support by
party and constituency; it should be mentioned that in all but one case
each constituency followed the same general pattern.
TABLE 2.21
SPONSORSHIP OF MOTIONS, SOUTHERN DISTRICT, SESSION II





































In summary, the percentages by which motions seconded by Ca) the
same party, (b) the same constituency exceeded the "neutral" (or
1 N.B. it is of course the party which seconds the motion which thereby
reveals its attitude towards the issue involved and the question of
bi-partisan co-operation.
expected) figure are:










The answer to the question - which is more important, party or
geography? - is that both may affect the pattern simultaneously but
that party is overall of somewhat greater importance. This makes it
extremely difficult to produce any kind of model for the way decisions
concerning the allocation of resources are taken, and gives added
importance to the case studies which are presented in the remainder of
Part One.
NON-ELECTED COUNCILLORS
But first, the role of the non-elected Councillors must be
scrutinised, for various reasons. Firstly, they have generally been
omitted from the treatment of the Central and Southern Districts,
although (for reasons explained earlier) warranting inclusion in
consideration of the North East District Council. Secondly, their
1
appointment has been both an integral part of the original scheme
and their role has indeed been strengthened as time has gone on - as
providing an opportunity for the Government of the day to appoint
talented individuals and traditional leaders, and controversial in
being used to upset election results by giving the national governing
party control of all Councils. The main questions therefore are,
who are the nominated Councillors, how active are they, and how
influential? One has further to distinguish between the traditional
leaders, particularly the (Paramount) Chiefs who were originally ex
officio Chairmen and later ex officio members, of the Council, and the
1 See below, pp. 397-398
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others, who could be described as "political" or "other" nominees. The
political nature of nomination is illustrated by the fact that most
BDP candidates who had stood unsuccessfully in the local government
elections were subsequently rewarded with a seat on the Council to which
they had just failed to be elected: otherwise there is little to
distinguish the type of person nominated by the Government to the three
Councils from BDP candidates other than the distinction between what are
termed aristocratic and "other" or "political" nominees. One feature of
the nominated system as it has worked out over time is the increase in
importance of the non-traditional nominees as against the Chiefs, and
the decline of the contribution made by the nominees (per head) relative
to the elected Councillors. If they were thus seen as a temporary
measure to help Councils on to their feet while less experienced elected
Councillors gained experience their use might be justified; there is
however no sign that they are anything other than a permanent feature of
Councils.
"Ward representatives"
As has been argued earlier, the nominated Councillors in the North
East can be identified with specific wards, whereas this cannot be said
for their opposite numbers in the other two Councils. Table 2.22
indicates the extent to which the nominated Councillors were concerned
with specific local matters.
TABLE 2.22
NEDC: NOMINATED COUNCILLORS (COMPARED WITH ELECTED MEMBERS)-























It is evident from these figures that non-elected Councillors were
more concerned with local matters in questions but less in motions than
their elected colleagues, and overall much less concerned with local
matters. The Shfes (Chiefs or sub-Chiefs) took no formal initiatives
concerning their wards whatsoever. The main concerns of the North
Eastern nominated Councillors were (i) Central Government and
communications (roads and bridges); (ii) education and matimela.
Activity levels
The rationale for the practice of nominating Councillors is that
it enables seats to be given to individuals of higher calibre than the
average elected Councillor, whether experienced traditional leaders or
political or business leaders. If might therefore reasonably be
expected that they would be more active than their elected colleagues.
Democratic theory by contrast might lead one to expect that Councillors
who are not accountable to the electorate, nor dependent on the voters
for their reelection, would be less assiduous in raising questions and
tabling motions on behalf of district inhabitants generally or their
local fellow-citizens in particular. Table 2.23 demonstrates con¬
clusively that the activity level of nominated Councillors taken as a
group - whether traditional or "political" - is below that of elected
Councillors. The figures are of course aggregate: some individual
nominated Councillors were more active than some elected members.
Moreover the activity level of the elected BDP Councillors as a
category is higher than that of the nominated members: it is not




ACTIVITY LEVELS OF NOMINATED COUNCILLORS
expressed as percentage of average activity level of elected Councillors
questions motions combined
Central District Council 0 53 24
North East District Council 22 30 27
Southern District Council
Session I 0 20 12
Session II 36 72 60
Both Sessions 24 47 38
Note: The relatively strong contribution of nominated
Councillors in tabling motions in the Second
Session of the Southern District Council reflects
the prominent part played by two ex-MPs, defeated
in the 1969 General Election, but is still
insufficient to raise the group average to that
of elected Councillors.
How is one to interpret there figures? Two possibilities suggest
themselves: first, the "democratic" explanation advanced above; second,
the "backbench" theory, according to which the leading members of the
Council do not need to take as many formal initiatives because they
are on the inner track. Some support for the latter interpretation is
provided by the lower level of activity in asking questions compared
with the tabling of motions. The next question to be explored there¬
fore is committee membership and the offices of Chairman and Vice-
Chairman of the Council.
Committee membership
The first point to note is that the position of Chairman has
normally been occupied by a nominated member in all three cases. When
Councils were first established, the Chiefs (or to be technical the
1
Tribal Authorities or Acting Tribal Authorities) of the Bangwato and
1 The Setswana term "kgosi" is used generally for all three terms
Chief, Tribal (formerly African) Authority and Acting Tribal Authority.
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1
the Bangwaketse were made ex officio Chairmen of the Central and
Ngwaketse (later renamed Southern) Districts respectively. In the
North East District leading Sub-Chief Ramokate and Mr. G. E. N.
Mannothoko, who was a nominated member in Session II, have between them
held the position of Chairman for most of the time; three elected
Councillors, from both parties, were however successful on one
occasion each. To a lesser extent this was true also of the post of
Vice-Chairman, where nominated Councillors although not dominating the
the post were disproportionately well represented.
Representation on committees was not complicated by ex officio
appointments 5 the position there is thus clearer, and the represent¬
ation of nominated Councillors all the more noteworthy. On the whole
the number of committee seats to which nominated Councillors were
elected was greater per capita than these to which elected Councillors
were elected. Taking both sessions, seats given to nominated Councillors
expressed as a percentage of the seats given to elected Councillors
(per capita) ranged from 142% in Southern District through 111% in the
North East District to only 95% in Central District; the last figure
is a "fair" one given the domination by nominated Councillors of the
position of Council Chairman. These figures however disguise differences
between the levels of representation achieved by "traditional" (aristo¬
cratic) as opposed to other or "political" nominated Councillors, and
further hide the fairly striking trends manifested between the first
and second Sessions. Table 2.24 therefore breaks these figures down.
1 The Chief of the Barolong, the other clan in the Southern District,
was nominated for both Sessions but was never Chairman.
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TABLE 2.24
NUMBER OF SEATS ON COMMITTEES HELD BY NOMINATED COUNCILLORS
EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGE OF SEATS HELD BY ELECTED COUNCILLORS
(per capita, per annum)








































Several observations are prompted by these figures. In the first
place, nominated Councillors as a whole achieved a position of relative
over-representation on committees fcompared with elected Councillors) in
two out of the three Councils, and the aristocratic nominated Councillors
in all three cases achieved greater per capita representation than either
elected Councillors or "political" nominated Councillors. However this
aristocratic dominance fell away sharply in two of the three Councils
(the exception being the North East, where, paradoxically perhaps, the
number of Chiefs on the Council dropped considerably),yet these two
Councils are generally regarded as very traditionally minded. Clearly
the "'new men'takeover" theory holds good here.
To complete the picture as regards the representation of non-
elected Councillors, attention must be directed to the important
positions of Chairman and Vice-Chairman of Councils. Leaving aside the
ex officio representation of the Chief as Chairman of Central and
Southern (then Ngwaketse) Districts in Session I, it is interesting to
note the varied fortunes of aristocratic and political nominated
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Councillors for these elected offices. The position is complicated.
At one extreme, an elected Councillor has never presided over either
Central or Southern District; at the other, no non-elected Councillor
has yet been successful in standing for election to the post of Vice-
Chairman of the Central District. In aggregate and absolute figures,
nominated Councillors held 59% of these two elected posts (for the
three Councils), which if not a clean sweep by the non-elected element
is certainly a very high degree of dominance. Moreover it rises to 88%
for the post of Chairman, compared with 38% for Vice-Chairman. Aristo¬
cratic members accounted for 32% share of the chairmanship, compared with
only 12% for the vice-chairmanship. One could summarise the position
as one of strong leadership by nominated Councillors, both traditional
and political. Table 2.25 gives details for the three Councils taken
together.
TABLE 2.25
CHAIRMANSHIP AND VICE-CHAIRMANSHIP OF COUNCILS:
SHARE BY NOMINATED AND ELECTED COUNCILLORS (percentages)
all
Nominated Councillors Elected Councillors
aristocratic political BDP others all
Chairman* 88 32 56 5 7 12
Vice-Chairman 38 12 26 46 16 62
Both* 59 21 38 29 12 41
* when elective
In concluding on the subject of non-elected Councillors, it can
be said that the data supports the "front-bench v, back-bench"
hypothesis, i.e. that those on the inner track resort to fewer formal
initiatives (especially questions) because they have less need to do
so. Unfortunately for the theory, however, amongst elected Councillors
(and having due regard for the party factor previously analysed) the
case is not proven: there are indications indeed that the opposite may
be the case, i.e. the less active Councillors are less highly regarded
by their colleagues, and thus not particularly successful in standing
for election to committees.
CHAPTER 3
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT COUNCIL1
The Southern District is the second largest in terms of population
of Botswana's nine districts and, although only two hours'drive by
car from the capital, does not normally look to Gaborone for the
provision of services other than those involving the central government.
As the earlier name of the Council implies, it is dominated by the
2
Bangwaketse clan, who make up 87% of the District's population, the
balance being provided by the Barolong with 13%. The area inhabited
by the former - known correctly as Gangwaketse - however, including
as it does a slice of the Kgalagadi (Kalahari) semi-desert, accounts
for 96% of the Southern District while the smaller area, inhabited
3
by the Barolong and known as Borolong or the Barolong Farms, makes
up only 4% of the area. Gangwaketse was originally scheduled to
form a district on its own, the Barolong being assigned to the South
4 5
East District (which also included the Balete and Batlokwa clans).
However, in the words of the first Minister of Local Government,
1 The name "Southern District Council" (SDC) will be used for the whole
period from 1966 to 1074, although the name Ngwaketse District was
invariably used until the end of 1970 and still survives in various
publications.
2 I.e. the population of the Ngwaketse Census District. Within this
area there are a number of septs, including Bakgalagadi and dmigrds
Bakgatla - who are not "nuclear" Bangwaketse but acknowledge the
Bangwaketse Chief as Paramount.
3 The Barolong Census District.
4 Or Bamalete
5 Bechuanaland Protectorate, Report of Local Government Committee,
April 1964, p. 2.
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Following deliberations in the Bangwaketse and Barolong
Tribal kgotlas, and after further discussions with the
chiefs of these two tribes, it became clear that the
logical form of development in this area was to include
the Barolong farms with the Ngwaketse Tribal territory.
. . . There have always been very close ties of friend¬
ship and affinity between the Barolong and Bangwaketse
tribes and I am sure that this new arrangement must be
pleasing to all the people in these areas.1
Perhaps as a concession to the smaller clan, the Barolong Farms ended
up with one more seat than their population would have entitled them to
(four out of twentyfour; three out of twentythree would have been
their exact due).
Barolong-Bangwaketse relations will be dealt with later: it was
nevertheless true that in many respects the Council bearing the name,
initially, of Ngwaketse District Council, meeting usually in Kanye,
the clan seat of the Bangwaketse, in a chamber adorned with a carved
2
wooden crocodile, the emblem of the Bangwaketse, paid little symbolic
attention to the minority clan. The notepaper was an overprinted
version of the Ngwaketse Tribal Administration's letterhead, many
of the officials of the new District Council were from the old Kanye
Tribal Administration, and - most significant of all - the ministerial
proclamation setting up the District Council named as Chairman Chief
3
Bathoen II, CBE, the veteran Chief of the Bangwaketse.
Chief Bathoen is something of a legend in his own life-time, and
his nickname, "B 2", is a household word. One cannot do better than
quote from a 1969 election poster:
Chief for forty-one years. Chairman African Council for
seventeen years. Has served on the following bodies: Moeng
1 Speech by the Hon. T. Tsheko, Minister of Local Government,at the
inaugural Meeting of the Ngwaketse District Council. SDC Minutes,
11-12 JUL 66.
2 Also, incidentally, of the Bakwena: "kwena" means "crocodile".
3 Legal Notice No. 44 of 1966, Government Gazette, 29 APR 66.
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Governing Council; Advisory Board on African Education;
Setswana Orthography Committee; Gaitskell Commission;
Legislative and Executive Council; University of Botswana,
Lesotho and Swaziland; Director Botswana Meat Commission;
Military Pensions Board; Chairman, Botswana Museum; and
many more.*
Equally impressive is the number of entries under his name in Schapera's
classic works - 62 in his Tribal Innovators: Tswana Chiefs and Social
2
Change 1795-1960 alone.
Bathoeft has led the Bangwaketse strongly ever since his inauguration
in 1928, and has not shrunk from challenging the authorities, the most
celebrated case being the challenge the young Chief presented, together
with the late Chief Tshekedi Khama of the Bangwato, to the Native
Administration Proclamation of 1934 and the Native Tribunals Proclamation
3
of 1934. Although they lost their case (in 1936), the effect of
challenge was reflected in subsequent changes in the law relating to
4
local administration. A more modern - and hence for the Government more
ominous - instance was the celebrated motion of no confidence in the
House of Chiefs, moved at its second meeting (16 NOV 65) by Chief
Bathoen,
That the House of Chiefs ... do hereby pass a vote of no
confidence in the existence and functions of this House and
therefore requests: (a) the dissolution of the House of Chiefs
in its present form; (b) that the House be reconstituted to
have some six elected members of standing outside the chief¬
tainship; (c) that a Parliament for Bechuanaland be constituted
with two Houses, namely a House of Chiefs and a House of
Assembly.5
1 Poster reproduced in Appendix H.
2 See also R. P. Stevens, Historical Dictionary of the Republic of
Botswana (1975), p. 23.
3 A. Sillerv. Botswana: a short Political History (1976). pp. 134-5.
4 In 1943: ibid.. p. 145
5 Cited in J. H. Proctor, "The House of Chiefs and the Political
Development of Botswana," Journal of Modern African Studies, VI, 1,
(1968).
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Yet Bathoefi's position was ambivalent: he had earlier accepted the
constitutional proposals (with whatever mental reservations). Either
he subsequently changed his mind, or perhaps had judged it politic not
to join the pan-Africanist Bechuanaland People's Party in outright
opposition to the proposals at that stage.
A significant question in the sphere of local government was
whether the Chief would throw his weight again into the "anti" scales,
1
despite his earlier membership of the Local Government Committee of
1964 whose recommendations formed the basis for the Local Government
Law of 1965, which established the new system. The nearest the
committee came to a minority report was in the following statement:
Fear was expressed by some members during meetings of the
Committee that the proposed arrangements would relegate
the Chiefs to the background and make them nothing more
than figureheads and agents of the district councils. This
view was not however shared by the majority of Committee
members who discussed and approved a number of arrangements
which would ensure than an active and conscientious Chief
would be able to play a progressive and decisive part in
a modern system of local government.2
If, then, there was to be a test case for the new system of rural
local government, the Southern District looked like providing it. It
is possible, indeed not uncommon, to view the introduction of the new
system as providing a battleground for the forces of conservatism or
traditionalism on the one hand and progress or modernisation on the
other. This view however is open to the criticism that it confuses
ends and means, and in particular if by modernisation and progress is
meant some idea of mobilization and widespread participation it is
possible to argue that the leadership of the aristocracy through
familiar institutions could do more to transform the lives of the rural
1 Report of Local Government Committee, op. cit.
2 Ibid., para. 18 (emphasis added).
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populace than the mere institution of direct elections to District
Councils. That certainly represents the views of Bathoefi, who is
described, let it be remarked parenthetically, by the late Dr. Sillery
1
as "an able and progressive chief."
An alternative representation of the clash which was foreseen as
occurring', par excellence in the Southern District, would be in more
directly political terms: the institution of Chieftainship versus the
State (or perhaps the BDP) on the other. This portrayal of the Southern
District as an arena for a power struggle (in which policy issues are
merely the grounds for argument between rival forces) would account
for the considerable degree of interest shown by the Central Government
in the affairs of the District: during the first few months of its
existence the Council had a succession of visits from VIPs, both
ministers and civil servants. Furthermore three of the five parliament-
2
ary seats in the South were held by cabinet ministers. Of these
the most significant is Dr Quett K. J. Mas ire, Vice-President of the
Republic since its inauguration, and Minister of Finance & Development
Planning, the "super ministry". Mas ire is credited with the classic
remark, during the 1965 election campaign, "The Chiefs can tell their
people how to vote but they cannot go into the polling booth with them."
Between Mas ire, a commoner, and his Chief there was little love lost.
The paradox about the Southern District was the fact that
politically it appeared to be a rock-solid Democratic Party stronghold.
In the 1965 General Election 95% of the votes in Gangwaketse went to
the BDP and even in the mixed urban/rural constituency of Lobatse/
1 A. Sillery, The Bechuanaland Protectorate (1952), p. 143
2 Technically, four-and-a-half, since one constituency, Lobatse/
Barolong was only partly in the Southern District; Lobatse has its
own Town Council.
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Barolong the Domkrag share was over 80%. In the 1966 Local Government
Elections the results were a clean sweep for the BDP; in the six
1
Polling- Districts in which the party was opposed it polled 85% of
the votes cast. These figures, however, as was to be seen later,
concealed an underlying potential conflict. Bathoefi traced the
writing on the wall when, during his Chairman's address to the inaugural
meeting of the Council, he
. o . registered a grievance against the manner in which the
last Local Government elections were conducted. There was in
reality no election but Political Party appointments. It
would be wrong for anybody to say that the view of the
O
Banwaketse are fully represented.
For the Government and the Democratic I&rty, then, the Southern District
Council was a challenge: if Bathoefi could be contained within its
structure, there was a strong likelihood that chieftainship would have
been transformed; if however "tribalism" or traditionalism - however
defined - prevailed amongst the Bangwaketse, there was no knowing
which other Paramount Chiefs might not also mount a challenge to the
new state, with the Kgatleng, North West and Kweneng Districts the most
likely candidates but with an ultimate question mark over the massive
Central District.
In the following sections, first the internal workings of the
Southern District Council are examined, then its relationships with
various external bodies, and finally the Southern District as a
political arena.
1 All in Gangwaketse




Procedure may be generally regarded as a boring subject and
1
one which many Councillors never fully mastered, yet its strict
application has the function of protecting minorities and/or opponents
of the Chair. Haphazard procedure, while causing Ministry officials
and District Commissioners to draft lengthy improving tracts and acid
marginal comments, has a rather random effect on decision-making, but
tending towards consensus as a mode of decision-making. What is
clear from studying Council minutes is the way in which the selective
2
application of correct procedure as contained in the Standing Orders
favours the views of the Chair, the only challenge often coming from
the Secretary, and that infrequently. When the Chairman is also a
Chief, the tendency to follow traditional kgotla practice - in
accordance with which everyone has his say and the Chief announces a
conclusion (not necessarily a decision) - is predictable. Both
Chief Bathoen and later Mr B. R. Chibana, MP, on occasion used their
position as Chairman to shelve motions they deemed unwise, without
. 3
any vote.
Another important matter is the reference of motions to relevant
committees. Standing Orders provide for this to be done automatically
1 For an account of some of the difficulties encountered in practice
see UBLS, Division of Extra-Mural Services, Report on Second Seminar
for Councillors from Francistown Town Council and North East District
Council, 23-24 MAR 74, App, D.
2 Of a standardised kind, and based on the Ministry of Local
Government &, Lands, Handbook for Chairmen, Secretaries and Members of
District (and Town) Councils (several versions). (Generally known
as the Councillors' Handbook.)
3 SDC Minutes, 2 AUG 66 and 23 MAY 72
and yet the practice is for many motions to be debated in full
Council; if passed they are then referred to committees for implement-
1
ation. The decision on which motions to debate and which to refer
is left to the Council to decide and frequently the Chairman's
suggestion is accepted as if it were a ruling. However irregular
this procedure may be, it does make the task of the researcher easier,
as does the practice whereby the mover of a motion in full Council
has the right to attend the committee meeting which subsequently
2 . .
discusses it. Thus committees are not necessarily the key decision¬
makers: controversial matters are very often the subject of debate in
full Council - which is perhaps just as well given the party compos¬
ition of committees in Session II. Against this, committee decisions
3
are rarely challenged to the extent of rejection or reference back.
Minor amendments, which are slightly more common, will be mentioned
later when dealing with the Council's planning or resource-allocating
role and procedure.
One reason adduced for the poor understanding of procedure is the
problem of language and the fact that Standing Orders are - if
available at all - in some Councils provided only in English, a
language which for many Councillors is difficult enough in general
without their being expected to be familiar with technical terms of
procedure. At least the Southern District Council - under the leader¬
ship of Chief Bathoen, - did make a greater effort than most to
4
translate minutes and Standing Orders into Setswana.
1 E.g. SDC Minutes, 24-25 FEB 71
2 See, for instance, SDC Report of the Finance & General Purposes
Committee, MAR-MAY 72.
3 A rare example of the latter occurred on the Traditional Beer
(Retail Sales J Model Bye-Laws. SDC Minutes, 1-4 SEP 70.
4 SDC Minutes, 11-12 JUL 66, 13 SEP 66, 1-5 DEC 66; and Minutes of
the General Purposes and Development Committee, 21 FEB 67.
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It is difficult to overestimate the problems caused by the
uneven application of the bilingual policy, but what it amounts to
is that those Councillors who cannot read both English and Setswana
are at a great disadvantage vis-A-vis better educated Councillors
and, even more so, officials, since English is the official language
for documents. A clear example of the problem was the warning by
the Council Chairman, before Councillors proceeded to an election
for the Trade Licensing Committee, that if possible members elected
1
should be bilingual. So, while all debates are in Setswana alone
(which in turn causes difficulties for expatriate staff, including
some of the District Administration), the facts on which many
decisions are based are in English. Chief Bathoefi was one of the
few leaders to attempt to grapple with this whole question, one which
extends far beyond the realm of local government.
Officials
It is widely believed that District Councils are dominated by
their officials and in particular the Council Secretary as chief
executive officer. What is not so apparent is whether it is the post
or the individual that wields such influence; and what the restraints
are upon the Secretary. In the case of the Southern District the
answer is that the post of Secretary is capable of being used by an
able individual as a position of considerable influence. Hie first
2
Secretary, publicly criticised by Councillors for inefficiency,
was not very effective; moreover he was constrained by the powerful
1 SDC Minutes, 25-27 SEP 67
2 SDC Minutes, 25-27 SEP 67 and 24-25 MAR 69. The official
concerned was part of the legacy of the Bangwaketse Tribal
Administration.
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figure of Chief Bathoefi as Chairman. His energetic successor, on
the other hand, was so influential that he was criticised by an
Opposition Councillor for "submitting his own motions"; and on occasion
2
"replied" to motions so that they were in effect dropped. A Peace
Corps Adviser was also recorded as the successful originator of
3
proposals to a committee. More seriously a decision taken by the
Council in 1969 on the policy of engaging casual labour was revealed,
4
five years later, to have been ignored by the administration. More
will be said about the role of officials later, in connexion with
planning. What is clear is that the influence of the Council Secretary,
though considerable, was regarded with some jealousy by Councillors
of both political parties.
Councillors' remuneration
While Council secretaries are widely believed to be the effective
bosses of Council, it is almost as common to hear that Councillors'
main interest is in improving their own remuneration (allowances)
and facilities. Obviously the more frequently (committee) meetings
are held the more members of the committee earn by way of allowances,
and it was specifically suggested by the Council staff in a marginal
comment on a report that meetings were " convened oftener than
1 The question of whether the Chairman was the chief executive
officer was the subject of correspondence between Chief Bathoen and
the District Commissioner (13 JUL 66 and 18 JUL 66). The original
proposal of the Local Government Committee (on which Bathoen served)
had been that "In districts where the Chief is Chairman of the
council, he should also be the council's senior executive officer;
in other words, he should be responsible for the implementation of
council's decisions. In other districts this duty would normally be
performed by the Clerk of the Council." Report of Local Government
Committee, op. cit., p. 4.
2 SDC Minutes, 30 NOV 71 and 22 MAY 73
3 General Purposes Committee Report, JUL-SEP 69.
4 SDC Minutes, 24-25 MAR 69 and 11 JUN 74
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1
necessary(?)." Moreover even in times of financial crisis and
severe cuts in spending the Council made sure there was enough
2
money to pay Councillors their allowances. Against this it was
noticeable that repeated attempts to have official transport provided
for Councillors - which would have particularly benefited the more
3
remote ones - were defeated, and a motion asking for tax exemption
4
for allowances was deferred. The general picture then is of
restraint in requests for improvements in Councillors' terms of
service.
Issues
Water At the risk of emphasising the obvious, water is a key
resource in a country like Botswana which suffers not only from
relatively low rainfall but from the unreliability of rain. The
Southern District while better watered than many districts suffers
from the problem that there is normally no natural surface water.
5
In the absence of artificial storage it is a question of tapping
natural underground storage in the form of river beds ("sand
extraction"), well or springs - all three methods used traditionally -
or the modern method of sinking boreholes. Insofar as the Council
is able to provide and control water supplies (Central Government's
involvement will be discussed later), Councillors' interests in
1 SDC Minutes, 9-10 DEC 69, App. A.
2 SDC Minutes, 22-23 FEB 71
3 Ibid., 1-5 DEC 66; 17-18 SEP 68; 24-25 JUN 69. But the Education
Committee did agree to the proposal "if necessary" on 28 JUL 66.
4 SDC Minutes, 17-18 SEP 74
5 An invaluable discussion of problems associated with introducing
low-cost artificial storage is contained in J. Flood, Report on
Development Projects supported by Botswana Christian Council, (1974),
pp. 268-280 and passim.
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water divides into two spheres. The first is the provision of
domestic water supplies to villages and schools, and was the subject
of a very large number of questions and motions, from Councillors of
both parties. The second concerns policy on borehole allocation and
management and brings in the question of land allocation and cattle.
The principle of communal ownership of land and water is of great
importance in the "clan tenure" or "tribal land" areas (it does not
apply to freehold farms, owned mainly by Europeans, along the
southern border of the Republic and of the District). But this
principle is in practice affected by the policy of stipulating a
minimum distance between boreholes, which in effect gives exclusive,
if unfenced, control of an area of at least five miles in diameter
to the registered owner/user of a borehole. The officially favoured
solution is to allow syndicates of (cattle) farmers to use boreholes
rather than individuals. Thus an application for private ownership
of a borehole was rejected on the grounds that only syndicates may
1
own boreholes, and a motion (by a BNF Councillor) that dams should
be sold to members of the Bangwaketse clan was withdrawn. On the
other hand a single individual was permitted to take over a borehole
"and to form a syndicate" - which seems to recognise the reality
that many "syndicates" which officially control a borehole exist on
paper only and are really one farmer. In another case an application
by one man "to syndicate a borehole" was not rejected outright, the
2
committee instead resolving to inspect the borehole.
1 Constructed by the Government's Dam Building Unit.
2 F&GP, Report, MAR-MAY 72; F&GP Minutes, 6 MAR 73; General




While officially the rules on borehole syndication were clear,
in practice the Southern District Council wavered in its application
of the policy. Thus in 1968 it was agreed that Council boreholes
which had been abandoned be hired out to applicants, but a year later
it was decided that pre-1965 boreholes could be sold to individuals
or syndicates. In 1970 it was resolved (on a BNF motion) to take
over again the boreholes in the Kgalagadi (Kalahari) as syndicates
had been a failure. The most serious indication that the syndicate
system was not working properly came with an allegation that syndicates
were refusing water to local people and it was resolved that the
Secretary should explain to all syndicates their local duty to the
local community, "even if they were not registered members of a
2
syndicate" It was perhaps fitting that the Syndicate Secretary
resigned in 1974 without submitting a final report. The water policy,
therefore, was marked by contradiction, but not based on any consistent
policy division between the two parties.
Cattle marketing As with water, general questions about cattle came
up fairly often from Councillors, particularly Barolong representatives.
But the biggest issue concerning cattle was the question of marketing.
A Ngwaketse Cattle Marketing Scheme had been successfully set up
under the leadership of Chief Bathoen in the days before District
Councils existed and was one of his favourite projects, with a
3
reasonable annual turnover and an accumulating reserve fund. From
about 1962, moreover, according to one Morolong Councillor, it had
been decided to discontinue auction sales in favour of a co-operative
1 GP&D Minutes, 3 NOV 71; Finance & Staff Committee Report, OCT-
NOV 71; F&GP Report, MAR-MAY 73.
2 SDC Minutes, 12-14 MAR 68; General Purposes Committee Report, JUL-
SEP 69; SDC Minutes, 23-25 JUN 70; F&GP Minutes, 6 MAR 73.
3 Report of General Purposes Committee, DEC 66
Ill
sales syndicate. Accordingly an application by one Mr Grobler for
permission to set up auction sales in three places in the district
(with a 2% commission to the Council), which came up for discussion
in 1967, was left in abeyance. The lengthy debate on the matter
throws some light on the decision-making process in committee.
Arguing in favour of the application were the District Commissioner,
the Council Secretary and only one member of the committee, while
the committee Chairman and all but one other Councillor were against;
what is remarkable is not the outcome but the way in which two
officials, not members of the joint committee which was debating
the matter, with the support of only one Councillor, were able to
1
drag out the discussion at such length.
Two years later the Ngwaketse Cattle Marketing Scheme was closed
down by the decision of a committee of Council - and not even
challenged at the next full meeting of the Council. Almost certainly
many Councillors failed to realise what the report of the committee
entailed as they approved it. Four years later the accumulated
surplus - originally intended to be paid out as loans - was trans-
2
ferred to Council development funds. The lesson of this episode
was the way in which decisions, on a matter which interested many
Councillors, went through in a way which a debate in full Council
might well have altered.
Education Education questions certainly occupied a fair amount of
the attention of Councillors, but not nearly as much as the share of
Council budgets devoted to education. The main pressures were for
1 Minutes of [joint Meeting of] Finance & Development and General
Purposes Committees, 21 FEB 67.
2 F&GP Report, MAR-MAY 73; F&GP Minutes, 23 MAR 73.
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schools in villages and settlements without them, and for the expansion
and upgrading of existing schools. The scope of the problem was
admirably summarised by the Education Secretary in his regular reports,*
documenting deficiencies of both quantity and quality in buildings,
staff and equipment. What was peculiar to the Southern District
however was the high proportion of private schools (some registered,
2
some not) compared with the rest of the country, and one of the
problems of the Council was how to deal with them - or, more
accurately, how to persuade the Central Government to allow for
their recognition and gradual incorporation within the public school
system. As the Education Committee put it in 1968:
numerous unregistered schools had been established as a
result of public demand and because there was no local
provision by the Council. ... it would be wise for
central government to be tolerant of these bush schools ^
and not to lay any stringent regulation in respect of them.
By 1973 the Council was preparing to take over three registered
private schools and in 1974 agreed to supply all private schools with
furniture and include the recognised ones in the School Feeding
4
Programme. This example shows the success of a sustained policy in
exerting pressure on the Government to allow a departure from strict
rules. Again no clear party differences appear on this question.
Commerce The activities of the Trade Licensing Committee (which by
law includes non-Councillors) followed a fairly standard pattern:
that is to say, most application for licences were approved provided
1 E.g. appendices to SDC Minutes of 1-5 DEC 66 and 30 NOV 71
2 The problem of private schools was closely linked with the pattern of
migration to the agricultural areas. Why this problem should have been
more acute in the Southern District is obscure.
3 SDC Minutes, 19-20 DEC 68
4 Education Committeee Minutes, 22 JAN 73, 13 FEB 73, 27 AUG 74.
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that the formalities were complied with (advertisement, appearance before
the committee etc.), with the important exception that licences for
hawking were frequently refused on the grounds that to grant such
licences would damage established traders and result in "over-trading;"
on one occasion those grounds were adduced for refusing an application
1
for a Small General Trading licence. In this regard the committee
followed much the same policy as many other Councils - a policy criti¬
cised later at a national conference of District Development
2
Committee representatives. Certainly a few Councillors and ex-
Councillors had their applications for trading licences granted; but
this in itself is hardly surprising. More interestingly, the policy
as regards hawking seems to have been reversed to one of encouragement
3
of competition in 1974; by this time there was BNF representation on
this committee but it is impossible to say whether this had any
bearing on the change of policy. At any rate the kind of party div¬
ision over this topic discernible in the North East District was
not in evidence in the Southern District.
Land allocation In the earlier part of the period studied, land
allocation was still a matter for the Chief; reference to this
aspect of the question is made below in dealing with the "Bathoen
issue". Once land Boards were set up (separately for Gangwaketse
4
and Borolong) the Council's main interest lay in getting the Land
Boards to submit their land allocation policies to the Council for
approval - thus asserting the position that the Boards came under
Council, with the effect that District Council power was extended.
1 Ngwaketse Trade Licensing Committee Report, JUL 69
2 1st National Conference of DDCs, Gaborone, 5 DEC 72
3 TLC Report, JUN-AUG 74
4 On Barolong agriculture see Bc G. Lever, Agricultural Extension
in Botswana (1970), Ch„ 2 and passim.
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The first such demand was made by Council on a motion by EDP ex-MP
1
Councillor Sebotho but had to be repeated, two years later. The
outcome was an important statement of policy, arrived at in a joint
meeting of the Finance 86 General Purposes Committee with the
Ngwaketse and Rolong land Boards. The meeting laid down in particular
a maximum acreage (of 40 acres for a subsistence farmer and 50 for a
commercial farmer), and a normal limit of one borehole per (individual)
farmer (with the possibility of one additional one "under certain
conditions"); the policy of five miles between boreholes was reaffirmed.
This policy, which was to apply to future applications, can be viewed
as fairly egalitarian for new applicants even if it left existing
allocations unaffected. It is significant too, firstly, that no
attempt was made to challenge particular allocations and, secondly,
that once again no obvious party differences emerged on this vital
issue.
Corruption
The general question of corruption is dealt with elsewhere. In
the Southern District Council there was little evidence of any and
little recorded discussion of it. An exception was allegations of
corrupt allocation of land by Chiefs which although not denied were
3
not proven. Bearing in mind VengrofPs allegations of corruption
by Councillors in the award of bursaries in the neighbouring
4
Kweneng District, it is perhaps worth listing the membership of
the Bursaries Sub-Committee of the Southern District Council. It
comprised five Councillors; two Council officials; the District
1 SDC Minutes, 25-26 MAY 71 and 22 MAY 73
2 F86GP Report, MAR-JUN 72
3 SDC Minutes, 16-18 SEP 69
4 R. Vengroff op. cit., pp. 182-183
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Commissioner; and one layman. Thus for awards to be made corruptly
would have required the connivance of the four non-Councillors on
the committee - a possibility which in the Botswana context appears
remote, and was emphatically refuted by all interviewees.
Councillors' Interests
A significant minority of Councillors were active in commerce,
approximately one quarter of the BDP Councillors holding trading
licences, which was true of only one BNF Councillor. Looking for
the possibility of corruption or abuse of position one then asks
whether Councillors have been awarding trading licences to themselves
or to fellow Councillors in any improper way. The evidence is that
they have not been guilty of any impropriety but rather that the
BDP have recruited shopkeepers, or those that way inclined, in
significant numbers as candidates: the party division here is
reminiscent in attenuated form of the position in the North-East
District. That said, it must be noted that two tendencies noted
earlier have operated in favour of both applicants for trading
licences and established commercial interests, viz. the practice of
granting trading licences, provided the formalities have been complied
with, but of refusing hawkers* licences (certainly in the earlier part
2
of the period studied) where these would compete with existing stores.
Another factor of major importance is that the traditional
method of accumulating wealth is to acquire and breed cattle; thus
shopkeeping is essentially an alternative means of amassing wealth
(to be invested in cattle) in this District as in most parts of
Botswana, rather than the main avenue to prosperity. Although it
1 SDC Minutes, 24-25 MfVR 69
2 See p. 113 above
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has proved impossible to ascertain the extent of cattle holdings by
Councillors in the District as a whole, some figures are given else-
1
where.
One example of attempted abuse of position which can be noted
however if anything proves the opposite: when in the First Session
two Councillors attempted to secure supplies of water to points near
their houses, they were publicly criticised for their behaviour, at
2
a meeting of the full Council.
PLANNING AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Until the advent of District Development Committees in 1971
the structure of planning was rather ill-defined. To be sure, there
was in existence from mid-1967 a Planning Committee which might well
3
have served as an alternative model for the DDC which was eventually
set up. The Planning Committee consisted of the Chairmen of standing
committees, the Chairman and Secretary of the Council, and the
4
District Commissioner. But this Committee never developed into a
key institution and planning was left in effect to the General Purposes
& Development Committee (with a more minor role played by the Finance
Committee). The two committees were later combined into the Finance
5
& General Purposes Committee. The ad hoc nature of the formal
structure is further illustrated by the designation of a Five Year
Planning Committee to deal with the District input to the National
1 In Appendices D and G
2 SDC Minutes, 25-27 SEP 67
3 Such a suggestion was in fact made in 1965 at the national level
long before the Tordoff Commission was established. P. G. L. Wass,
"Community Development in Botswana" (1972), pp. 284-286.
4 SDC Minutes, 19 JUN 67
5 Ibid., 30 NOV 71
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Development Plan, and by the use of sub-committees, such as one
established to consider water reticulation to Moshupa; the latter
consisted of the District Commissioner, the Council Secretary, one
1
Councillor and two members of the Village Development Committee.
The attention paid by Councillors to resource allocation however bore
no relation to the formal structure of Council committees.
Examples abound of the rubber stamping by Council of priorities
proposed by officials and adopted by committees with no amendments and
little discussion. These range from the draft Five Year Development
Plan through the retrospective approval of overspent votes on self-
help projects to the list of priorities in school building and equip¬
ment. The estimates likewise were regularly approved without amend-
2
ment or even challenge.
To this rule of passive acceptance of proposals a number of
interesting exceptions can be noted. When Council members actively
intervened in determining the allocation of resources and setting of
priorities this came about for one of three main reasons: village
initiative; backbench initiative; or committee revision of semi¬
official proposals or draft plans. Of the three categories, village
initiatives came off worst. For instance, of several attempts to get
village water supplies only one was agreed because it was "very
urgent"; another village's application for a clinic was rejected on
the grounds that its population was too small, while two other vill¬
ages which applied for Council assistance in getting telephone lines
3
were turned down. More common was the deferment of a decision until
1 SDC Minutes, 10-20 DEC 68
2 Ibid., 12-14 MAR 68; Finance Committee Minutes 22 FEB 67; SDC Min¬
utes 24-25 MAR 69; ibid., 16-18 SEP 69; F&GP Report, JUN-SEP 74.
3 SDC Minutes 16-18 SEP 69; ibid. , 22-23 FEB 72; GP Report^ JUL-SEP 69
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reports had been made; or the reference of the question to a Central
Government agency. In the later phase when the district (and
national) planning machinery was in operation the reason given for
turning down local requests was more commonly that they were not in
the Development Plan; in one case, a committee even reversed a locally
1
initiated development as being inconsistent with the printed plan.
The active involvement of Councillors in resource allocation had
only a marginal effect on the chance of a particular request or
suggestion. Thus one Councillor succeeded in having a particular
village included in the road signs programme, but other motions
sponsored by Councillors on roads and clinics were withdrawn or
deferred on the grounds that they were not in the list of planned
2
development projects. An angry (BDP) Councillor who moved success¬
ively that projects be allocated geographically in accordance with
revenue raised locally, and that projects be implemented in the order
in which they were approved by the Council, saw both his motions
3
defeated. The most successful moves to alter draft plans were made
by committees acting collectively, for instance by adding to the
list of places at which teachers* quarters were to be built. In
another case a suggestion by an official to use savings on one
item to buy materials for a particular village met with strong
opposition from some Councillors and the eventual decision was to
share the sum between two villages (one of them represented by a
member of the committee) on the grounds that the second village
1 Staff and Finance Committee Minutes, 5 APR 68; F&GP Minutes,
23 MAR 73; SDC Minutes 19-20 DEC 68; Education Committee Minutes,
24-25 AUG 71; F&GP Minutes 9 JAN 73.
2 SDC Minutes 16 OCT 69 and 1-4 SEP 70; F&GP Minutes, 23 MAY 72
3 SDC Minutes, 22-23 FEB 72
1
deserved to be rewarded for its zeal in self-help.
The influence of Chairmen and officials is openly revealed in a
number of cases. It was the Chairman of the appropriate committee
who successfully proposed the transfer of the balance from the
Ngwaketse Cattle Marketing- Scheme to the Development Fund. In two
other cases the Council Secretary took the initiative in discussion
of the Development Plan, in one example rejecting- a motion from BNF
2
Councillors on boreholes. Later in the period the District Officer
(Development), the Secretary of the District Development Committee,
was the initiator; one interesting result of one of his initiatives
was the committee decision to leave the selection of priority projects,
to be financed out of R18,000 unallocated funds, to the Council staff.
In another case the Education Secretary's recommendation to hire
project leaders for voluntary projects - an important point of
3
principle - was accepted nem. con..
In another major area planning was determined by external
factors, particularly the Central Government but also including
foreign aid donors. Thus committees accepted without demur suggestions
on how the Food-for-Work programme was to be run, on the transfer of
(U.S. Embassy) funds from laggard villages to those willing to guar¬
antee speedy completion of projects; on financing the completion of
what were supposed to be self-help projects, and the entire Accelerated
1 SDC, Minutes of Education Committee, 22 JAN 73, 13 FEB 73,
27 AUG 74
2 Minutes of Finance &, Development and General Purposes Committees,
21 FEB 67; SDC Minutes, 23 MAY 72; F&GP Minutes, 6 MAR 73
3 F&GP Report, MAR-MAY 73; Project Memorandum Z1 [1972]; Education
Committee Minutes, 18 MAY 71
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1
Rural Development Project list. Most significantly of all the full
Council accepted without discussion the downwards revision of the
estimates, necessitated by Ministry directive, worked out by the staff,
(but approved in toto "only after thorough scrutiny" by the committee
responsible). This financial crisis of 1971 led to the stopping of
rations for destitutes (by committee decision) and the saving of some
2
of the money voted for water supplies (apparently by the staff).
3
Yet there was only oblique criticism of the Government for necessit¬
ating the pruning of estimates by its decision to raise the salaries
4
of teachers employed by the District Councils.
Some of the decisions taken on priorities make interesting reading.
Early on in the Council's history there was a neat example of the
acceptance of bureaucratic priorities; over a two-day period it was
agreed that the proposed new committee structure (involving an increase
in the number of committees) was too expensive, but at the same time
5
to proceed with the plan for new offices. Another decision around
the same time, viz. to vire a sum of money for school buildings to
complete Ipelegeng projects, revealed not a concern with self-help
so much as the desire to cover misunderstandings and errors in
6
budgeting. Evidence of the expendability of development was the
decision taken in 1971 to suspend all development projects; a decision
1 GP Report, APR-JUN 69; Education Committee Minutes, 30 APR-1 MAY 73;
F&GP Report, MAR-JUN 74.
2 SDC Minutes, 30 NOV 71; F&S Report, OCT-NOV 71; SDC Minutes
30 NOV 71.
3 In fact a unilateral decision by the Ministry of Education.
4 F8tS Report, OCT-NOV 71.
5 GP&,D Minutes, 21 FEB 67; Finance Committee Minutes, 22 FEB 67.
6 SDC Minutes 1-5 DEC 66 (Report of General Purposes and Finance
Committees).
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which, tucked away as it was in a committee report which no-one
challenged in full Council, obviously surprised at least one Councillor
1
months later. Another and rather glaring example of the same kind
of priority was the decision to maintain the suspension of the
Destitutes Fund "until the financial position improves" while seeking
a supplementary estimate to cover (retrospectively) Councillors'
2
allowances. Another point of interest was the explicit priority
accorded to the District capital, Kanye, in water supply, school
3
facilities, and health services. These decisions bore no relationship
to the number of committee members from Kanye wards.
EXTERNAL ASPECTS
The external relations of the District Council can be seen as
connecting up in different directions and on different planes :
downwards to the villages, inter alia through the Councillors; outwards
to the traditional system of administration; and upwards to the central
government (and indeed foreign donors).
Village development - "Ipelegeng"
The District Council's approach to its umbrella role vis-&-vis
Village Development Committees and the range of "grassroots" activities
commonly referred to collectively as Ipelegeng can best be characterised
as benevolent but passive: undogmatically helpful rather than actively
encouraging. The implicit assi^jption was that the initiative lay
firmly with the Village Development Committees, whose activities
therefore were normally welcomed, unless they conflicted with existing
plans, e.g. if the building of a school or a clinic were seen as an
1 SDC Minutes, 9-10 SEP 71 and 22-23 FEB 72
2 Ibid., 22-23 FEB 72
3 Ibid., 16-18 SEP 69, 12-14 MAR 68; F&GP Report, JUN-SEP 74
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attempt to commit the Council to recurrent expenditure for which it
had not planned. The concept of the "matching- fund" epitomises the
Council's approach, althoug-h on occasion they were sceptical enough
of a VDC's intentions or capacity to insist on a prior deposit of
money before the Council's balance would be released.' But further
action which was beyond the scope of the VDC to provide, e.g. the
grading of roads constructed by self-help, sometimes waited for long
enough. The benevolent attitude towards the VDCs meant for instance
that when a VDC applied for authorisation to pay a builder - contrary
to the original intention of "boipelego"(self-help) - this was
approved without a murmur. Equally the lengthy delays jn completing
Ipelegeng projects did not normally concern Council greatly: it was
only when delays threatened the release of further funds that Council
1
took action.
The attitude towards the actual institution of the Village
Development Committee was generally positive, the same being true for
Parent-Teacher Associations/School Committees, which in many instances
were engaged in activities similar to those of VDCs. The most extreme
example of such support was a BDP Councillor's motion, adopted by the
Council in an atmosphere of relatively high political feeling just
after the 1969 election, seeking to make participation in Ipelegeng
2
compulsory (through bye-laws). More typical were decisions to
consult the VDC on a private application for a borehole, and (on a
BNF Councillor's motion) to refer the question of the expulsion of
3
school children for not paying fees to the local school committees.
1 F&GP Minutes, 23 MAR 73 and 5 JUN 73; F&GP Report, MAR-MAY 72;
SDC Minutes 5-7 SEP 72; F&GP Report on SDC Development Projects,
JUN 74
2 SDC Minutes, 9-10 DEC 69. This was aimed against the BNF, who
were regularly accused by the BDP of sabotaging self-help.
3 F&GP Minutes, 9 JAN 73; Education Committee Minutes, 9 MAY 72
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The lack of a comprehensive policy on Ipelegeng was made
particularly obvious, ironically, in a lengthy address by the Community
Development, Kanye, to Council in 1970. In his speech he felt obliged
to distinguish between development projects, self-help, Food-for-Work
and Famine Relief - a distinction far from clear in the minds of many
Councillors, let alone the general public. He went on to explain
what VDCs were for, and to berate Councillors for retarding progress
by their political differences, which he stated was not the purpose
for which they were elected. Finally the official expounded the role
of the Community Development Department as co-ordinator of the work
of the District Council, Councillors, the traditional administration
and VDCs; the Community Development Assistants he portrayed as the
key figures in this undertaking. As if to emphasise bureaucratic
supremacy a tour of the District was then announced, with a view to
determining priorities for the Famine Relief Programme, by a party
consisting of the Community Development Officer, the District
Commissioner, the Agricultural Officer, the Veterinary Officer and
1
the Council Secretary. Five months later two Councillors were
elected to serve on the Famine Relief Committee. This Famine Relief
programme cut across earlier efforts to allay discontent in the
villages at the lack of consultation by the Planning Committee of
Council, embodied in a decision to embark on an extensive process
of encouraging the submission by VDCs of plans in 1970 for 1971
projects, followed by a tour of the villages by representatives of
2
the District Council and the District Administration.
1 SDC Minutes, 1-4 SEP 70
2 Ibid., 24-26 FEB 71 and 14 OCT 69
It is little wonder that many Councillors were bemused by the
whole institutional set-up regarding- Ipelegeng to the extent that,
as late as 1974, some Councillors could complain that they had been
told that they were not members of VDCs in their wards, only then to
1
be informed that they were ex officio members. Equally remarkable,
in view of the supposedly party-political nature of Ipelegeng, is the
lack of any clear party line on the subject in the District Council,
The role of Councillors
The official view of the Councillor's role is one familiar to
anyone acquainted with the representative model of local government,
and was much stressed at the inception of the modern system of local
government in Botswana. The classic statement is found in the
Councillors' Handbook, which defines inter alia the Councillor's
role as representative of his ward and his function as a channel of
communication equally in the other direction; reporting back to
2
his electors. The former role was performed with varying degrees
of energy by most Councillors, although one or two made visible and
3
determined efforts only close to elections; the latter was rarely
mentioned.
Mich more vital to the average Councillor than the official
version of his role was his relations with the dikgosana (Headmen)
who were the long-established leaders of the people, and who
exercised their non-judicial power through the same kind of two-way
communication described above, via the vital institution of the
4
village kgotla, which the Headman alone could summon.
1 SDC Minutes, 19-21 FEB 74
2 Councillors' Handbook, paras. 47 and 49 (5)
3 E.g. three motions moved under "Any other business" at the last
meeting before the elections by a hitherto very silent Councillor,
SDC Minutes 17-18 SEP 74.
4 Discussed in Chapter 6
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It is therefore no surprise to find in the Southern District,
as elsewhere in the Republic, regular complaints by Councillors of
non-co-operation from Headmen or Chief's Representatives, or, more
euphemistically, of "confusion" between Headmen and Councillors with
1
regard to their respective roles. Several overt attempts were
made by Councillors to alter the institutional arrangements and
powers traditionally pertaining to dikgosana in their favour. For
instance one Councillor proposed an alteration to the draft matimela
bye-laws so that the finders of stray cattle should report to the
Councillor before reporting to the Headman. Another Councillor
attempted - but was ruled out of order - to have two posts of Headman
abolished, while another motion called unsuccessfully for Councillors
to deputise for Headmen in their absence. In a more conciliatory
spirit, it was agreed that Councillors and dikgosana should act
2
jointly to ensure that the relief programme was being carried out.
It is noticeable however that most of the complaints and moves
against Headmen were made during the First Session, when the system
was new. As time went on the practice grew of encouraging Councillors
to move away from being rather passive public figures concerned with
status towards a more specific organisational function. One such
job was the organisation of local Independence Day celebrations
"through local committees." As annual feasts these celebrations
had a considerable symbolic significance, more than the actual sums
of money involved might indicate. Somewhat belatedly - in 1972 - a
Council committee resolved that Councillors should "become prominent
1 SDC Minutes, 1-5 DEC 66, 25-27 SEP 67, 5-7 SEP 72
2 GP&.D Minutes, 21 FEB 67; SDC Minutes, 26 JUN 68, 17-18 SEP 68,
16-18 SEP 69
3 Ibid., 18-19 NOV 69, 25-26 MAY 71; Education Committee Minutes,
8 FEB 72, 9 MAY 72
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members of organisations which are dealing with developments such as
PTA and VDC" and went on to ask specific Councillors to organise
public meetings (involving VDCs and PTAs as appropriate) together
with the Chief (of the Bangwaketse or Barolong as the case might be)
in each instance to explain the Council's views on particular school
1
development proposals to the villages.
This procedure recognised the position of the (Paramount) Chiefs,
who were in any case Council members, but suggested that the local
Councillor act rather like the village Headman in convening a meeting -
even if the reality was that the Headman would have to make the
announcement; it was of course inconceivable that the Headman could
refuse to convene a meeting to be addressed inter alia by his superior.
It had the additional advantage, from the point of view of the majority
party in the Council, of ensuring participation by Opposition Councillors
in public explanations of Council decisions.
The Traditional Administration
Mention has just been made of Councillors' relations with the
traditional administration at the village level; a later section deals
with the "B II affair", i.e. the clash between Chief Bathoefi II and
the authorities. Here it is the Council's relations with the
traditional (or tribal) administration of the two clans within the
Southern District, the Bangwaketse and the Barolong, which will be
examined. The striking fact is that, despite the dispute with Chief
Bathoen and the lesser rivalries at village level with dikgosana,
by and large the Councillors accepted the traditional administration
as a fact of Batswana life and indeed a useful tool of administration.
1 SDC Minutes, 18-19 NOV 69, 25-26 MAY 71; Education Committee
Minutes, 8 FEB 72, 9 MAY 72
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For example, the District Commissioner's announcement that he
(i.e. the District Administration) would henceforth be responsible
for the registration of births and deaths, since it "had not worked"
under the Tribal Administration, was tempered by the significant
emendation that in smaller villages registration could be done at
1
Sub-Tribal Offices.
Council acknowledged, moreover, the important role of the Local
Police (formerly known as Tribal Police) in enforcing bye-laws, and
repeated demands were made of the Government for more Local Police
to be provided. Similarly when volunteers were required to collect
matimela, the announcement was to be made by the Chief to the kgotla;
the Chief likewise was asked to advise Chief's Representatives to
2
apply the matimela by-laws strictly.
The ceremonial side of the traditional system was likewise
accepted. For instance an early motion calling for dikgafela (a
kind of harvest thanksgiving or tribute) to be used for Ipelegeng
projects was defeated and it was stated that dikgafela - like land,
one might add - were the property of the clan, not of the Chief.
Again, a request from the Barolong for cattle to be slaughtered at
3
the installation of Chief Besele II was approved.
EVen more noteworthy was the passing of a resolution calling
for the revival of the old system of revenue collection which, it was
claimed, was more successful since it involved the Headmen, not
4
salaried revenue collectors.
1 SDC Minutes, 23 MAY 72
2 SDC Minutes, 22-23 FEB 72, 17-18 SEP 68, 24-26 FEB 71, 17-18 SEP 74,
12-14 MAR 68; F&GP Report, MAR-MAY 72
3 SDC Minutes, 31 JUL-2 AUG 67, 11 JUN 74, 9-10 DEC 69
4 Ibid., 31JUL-2 AUG 67. This was more a criticism of the new system
than a serious attempt to revert to the old one.
Against these examples however there were occasions when the
system was challenged. A minor example was the decision to ask the
Government to intervene to override the Bangwaketse Chief's ban on
the use of ox-wagons on a certain hill in Kanye; a more significant
instance was the attempt to institutionalise advice to the Chief
(via a committee of Council) on land allocation, thus foreshadowing
the subsequent establishment of Land Boards.1
Relations with the Central Government
The political significance attached by the Government to the
Southern District is reflected in the relatively large number of
visits by VIPs - both ministers and senior civil servants - to
address the Council, The themes stressed in their addresses included
expositions of the "democratic pyramid" of institutions including
District Councils; the necessity for Councillors to keep in close
touch with their constituents (to avoid electoral defeat); the
importance of co-operation between the Council and the traditional
system of administration at all levels; the desirability for
Councillors to acquaint themselves with Standing Orders; and the
2
perennial question of improving on revenue collection.
Other important matters raised were the transfer of mineral
rights from the two clans in the district to the State and the
major Accelerated Rural Development Programme, which was launched
by the Government early in the election year of 1974 without prior
consultation with the District Councils and which totally bypassed,
or one might say disrupted, district plans. It is also noteworthy
1 GP Minutes, 3 NOV 71; SDC Minutes, 19 JUN 67
2 Ibid., 19-21 FEB 74, 11-12 JUL 66, 23 MAY 72, 19-21 FEB 74
129
that this District Council, like most others, received a Presidential
1
visit shortly before the 1969 General Election. In these official
addresses the Council chamber was treated somewhat like the
traditional kgotla as a forum for important speeches.
From the perspective of the District Council several issues were
of central concern in its relations with the Government. The first
of these was water. Despite its alleged status as "Government's top
2
priority" grave dissatisfaction was expressed by the Council on two
counts: firstly the tardiness of the administration in dealing with
3
urgent problems (reflected in two delegations sent by the Council),
and secondly the exasperating problem of dealing with the Department
of Water Affairs, which operated separately from the Department of
Geological Surveys, which locate borehole sites. The Water Affairs
Department was forced by the Minister responsible to make several
concessions to Council pressure on the water supply for the district
4
capital, Kanye.
Another sensitive issue was the Kanye Youth Training Centre, which
was a significant source of local employment but was run very ineffic¬
iently. The question was taken up vigorously by the District Development
Committee but the Council also made a number of scathing remarks about
the lack of action by the Director of Community Development and the
absence of co-ordination between the Ministries of Local Government
5
& Lands and Agriculture.
1 Ibid., 19 JUN 67, 19-21 FEB 74, 14 OCT 69; See also BDN, 9 OCT 69.
2 SDC Minutes, 12 SEP 66
3 Ibid., 23-25 JUN 70; F&S Report, OCT-NOV 71. Such delegations were
a rare event in Botswana.
4 SDC Minutes, 22-23 FEB 72, 16 MAR 71
5 F&GP Minutes, 6 FEB 73, 6 MAR 73, 13 MAR 73; see below, pp. 362-363.
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In more general terms the Council expressed its concern at the
way in which it was precipitated into financial crisis in the field
of education - the major item of Council expenditure - by the
Government's decisions to increase teachers' pay and to reduce
school fees - the latter leading to the necessity for the employment
1
of extra (unqualified) teachers.
THE BATHOErf AFFAIR
The protracted dispute between Chief BathoeR II and the Southern
District Council was more than an aspect of the Council's relations
with the traditional system: it was arguably the central issue in
Southern District politics. In other words the story of particularly
the First Session of the Council is largely the story of the clash
between B II on the one hand, and the "new men" of the Council, and
the Central Government, on the other - with power moving steadily
towards his opponents.
Bathoen's position as Chairman
A pillar of the new system of local government was the desire
to transform the aristocracy by involving, or enmeshing, the Paramount
Chiefs in the District Councils as ex officio Chairmen. This
process, sometimes described as "democratising" or "modernising" the
Chieftainship, if successful would help to legitimise the new
Councils by making the new Chairmen responsible for decisions
collectively arrived at; hence the decision to make the boundaries
of the old Tribal Administration coincide wherever possible vjith
those of the new Districts.
Chief Bathoen's inaugural speech as Chairman was thus of
considerable interest. He chose the occasion to present a concise
1 F&GP Minutes, 9 JAN 73
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conservative manifesto, stressing- his misgivings at the unrepresent¬
ative nature of elections - "selection by one party"; his concern for
the preservation of Setswana customs; a plea for the pace of development
to be slowed down to avoid its getting out of hand; and his criticism
of the almost exclusive use of English instead of Setswana as the
1
language of official documents. It is worth noting that the
Government's response to the intransigent voice from the south was
2
oblique to the point of being conciliatory.
It was in fact left to the District Commissioner to pull the
Chief up for his excessively strong leadership - or abuse of position -
from the Chair. In the early meetings of the Council Bathoefi
frequently used a "kgotla-type veto" by simply replying to a motion,
declaring it impracticable, or saying that it could not be proceeded
with as it concerned some other body. The ace up his sleeve was his
control of the Bangwaketse kgotla; thus he would postpone an item
3
until the clan had been consulted. Nevertheless this high-handed
Chairmanship of the Council led swiftly to a confrontation with the
District Commissioner, who wrote a letter to Chief Bathoen and the
Government criticising his handling of meetings. In a dramatic move
4
the Chief stalked out of the third meeting in protest. With hind¬
sight it is clear that the District Administration won that round,
and that Chief Bathoefi was engaged in fighting a rearguard action
from then on. It was merely symbolic of his eclipse that a motion
in 1968 to celebrate the 40th anniversary of Bathoen's accession to
the Chieftainship was defeated by 21 votes to 4. On the other
1 SDC Minutes, 11-12 JUL 66
2 Witness the speech by the Minister of Local Government & Lands six
months later, and Chief Bathoefi's response. SDC Minutes, 21-24 FEB 67
3 lb id.,2 AUG 66, 13 SEP 66
4 Ibid.
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hand the Council - and the Government - approved a travelling
allowance for Bathoen - in his capacity as Council Chairman - of
1
R300 per annum at about the same time.
Hie battle between B II and the Council was joined over a
number of specific issues.
Beer
The prohibitionist tradition in Bechuanaland went back a long
way into the history of the Protectorate and even beyond. Christian
missionaries from the time of Livingstone had, where successful in
converting Batswana Chiefs to Christianity, made temperance one of
the planks of their suggestions for social reform. For the Christian
Chiefs, prohibition (of strong liquor) had the additional attraction
2
of, firstly, asserting the Paramount Chief's control over his territory
3
and, secondly, lessening the danger of violent quarrels, some of
which could acquire political significance. BathoeS II, like his
4
predecessors, had banned the sale of strong liquor and was proud
that Gangwaketse was a "dry" area.
Accordingly the moves to permit the sale of manufactured trad¬
itional-style beer (brand name Chibuku, alias "shake-shake") were
seen by Bathoefi as a direct challenge to his authority and the
customs of the Bangwaketse. In parenthesis it should be pointed out
that the initiative came from the manager of the Chibuku brewery
1 SDC Minutes, 12-14 MAR 68; Minutes of [Joint Meeting of] Finance
and Staff Committees, 4 FEB 68
2 See A. Sillery, op. cit., p. 71
3 I. Schapera, Tribal Innovators; Tswana Chiefs and Social Change
(1970), Ch. 9 passim
4 Ibid.
4 1
In Gaborone, Mr Welly Seboni, subsequently a BDP Member of
Parliament, whose venture obviously had the tacit backing of the
2
Government. Bathoen first ruled out of order a motion for the
introduction of Chibuku and later "deferred" the question for
3
consideration in kgotla. However his attempts were in vain and,
although in fact his resignation from the chieftainship came just
before the Council decided to permit the sale of Chibuku, it was clear
that the move by this time was unstoppable.
Matimela (stray animals)
Whereas the question of beer was a policy matter, the second
issue in dispute was rather symbolic. Bathoen, while doubtless
resenting the transfer of control over matimela from the Chief to the
Council, did not challenge it head-on. The dispute was over the
proceeds from the sale of those matimela which had been impounded
prior to the effective assumption of control by the District Council.
When the committee demand for the immediate sale of all matimela for
1965 and 1966 came up for debate in the full Council, the Chairman
"closed the matter," and at a subsequent meeting ruled out of order
an emergency motion on the same subject. It was not until late in
1967 that the matter was resolved. Ironically the Council had to ask
Bathoefi in his capacity as Chief to give an order in kgotla for
4
volunteers to collect matimela - at a cost of R500.
"Council property" and boreholes
Hie dispute still rumbled on in another sphere, even after
Bathoefi had been metamorphosed from Chief Bathoefi II to Mr Bathoen
1 SDC Minutes, 26 JUN 68. Seboni also became Mayor of Gaborone.
2 SDC Minutes 24-25 MAR 69 (marginal notes); and letter from
Permanent Secretary, MIG&L, referred to in SDC Minutes, 19-20 DEC 68.
3 Ibid., 17-18 SEP 68, 24-25 MAR 69
4 Ibid. , 21-24 FEB 67, 31 JUI^-2AUG 67, 25-27 SEP 67; S&F Minutes
5 APR 68
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Gaseitsiwe, MP. It was alleg-ed that he had failed to hand over all
the property of the Bangwaketse Tribal Administration, including
certain boreholes he was using, to the Council.1 Eventually the
Minister responsible intervened personally in a conference of the
parties in dispute and announced that the matter was "settled",
2
although in fact litigation was subsequently initiated by Bathoefi,
and a further two years was to elapse before the use of the boreholes
was finally settled, nominally at least through syndication.
The Outcome
In the end Chief Bathoefi lost out all along the line in terms
of the issues fought over between himself and the Council, with the
central Government playing a restrained but consistent part in
ensuring the desired outcome. But as will be stressed later in this
chapter, his revenge was to come in political terms, with his
launching of the Bangwaketse section of the Botswana National Front,
culminating in his spectacular defeat of the Vice-President of the
Republic in his apparently safe seat of Kanye South in the 1969
General Election.
As a footnote to the "Bathoefi Affair" per se, it should be
pointed out that relations between his son, Chief Seepapitso IV, and
the Government were anything but smooth, and led to Seepapitso's
suspension from the post of Chief for a year by the Government. In
terms of the District Council, however, since Seepapitso was never
elected Chairman (the composition of the Southern District Council
3
having been altered by Statutory Instrument) he was never anything
1 A good summary of this dispute was given by the retiring Secretary,
in SDC Minutes, 1-4 SEP 70.
2 SDC Minutes, 1-4 SEP 70 and 10-12 NOV 70
3 For Minister's statement see Appendix "A".
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other than a "backbencher", albeit a prominent one. But with the
resignation of Bathoen the victory of the "new men" on the Council
was secured.
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT AS POLITICAL ARENA
The Ethnic Factor
Barolong and Bangwaketse It has already been noted that the
Southern District comprises the territories of two legally recognised
clans, the Bangwaketse (who make up 87% of the population) and the
Barolong (13%). Each has a Paramount Chief, a Tribal Land Board and
agDarate Tribal Administration (the funds of each of which were trans¬
ferred to the District Council). The fact that the national census
treated each area separately - itself indicative of official thinking -
allows for ease of comparison of the two groups, and the Southern
District Section of the National Development Plan points out several
contrasts. Whereas 25% of the Bangwaketse (in 1971) lived in villages
of over 1,000 inhabitants and a further 12% in villages of between
500 and 1,000, 100% of the Barolong lived in settlements of less
than 500 persons. Compared with the national mean level of absenteeism
from Botswana of 25% the figures for Borolong and Gangwaketse were
respectively 30% and 40%. This figure reflects the greater opportunity
for earning a cash income from agriculture (including hunting) in
1
Borolong - 57% of cash incomes as against a mere 12% for Gangwaketse.
It is little wonder that Borolong is commonly referred to in English
2
as "the Barolong Farms."
1 Republic of Botswana, National Development Plan 1973-78. Part II:
Development Plan for Local Authorities, Chapter 9, especially
paras 9.1.18, 9.1.22 and Diagrams 1 and la.
2 The area is also characterised by a unique system of land tenure,
neither fully individual, nor exactly comparable with other clans
communal system. For a historical-anthropological study of the Barolong
in general see J. L. Comaroff, "Competition for office and Political
Processes among the Barolong " (1973)
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Hie division of the population into two clans is reflected in
a number of issues which surfaced in the Council. In the first place
there was the question of symbolism. As has been noted, the Council
inherited the Ngwaketse Tribal Administration letterhead (overprinted),
the Bangwaketse totem, the Bangwaketse Paramount Chief as first
Chairman and, above all, the name "Ngwaketse District Council."
Barolong Councillors set about challenging the last feature first.
Despite an early defeat by 13 votes to 11, they persisted in attempts
1
to change the name to "Ngwaketse/Rolong" or "South" District, but it
was not until 1972 that the new name of Southern District - approved
by the Ministry of Local Government &, Lands as well as the Council -
came into undisputed use. It should be noted also that, as a sop to
particularist susceptibilities, the Southern District Council, almost
uniquely, rotates its meetings between Kanye and Good Hope (the Barolong
capital), with the occasional meeting also in Moshupa, the second
largest village in Gangwaketse. Good Hope also, despite its relatively
small population, received the second largest allocation of funds for
the annual Independence Day celebrations.
Another, and more touchy, issue concerned land rights by clansmen
in the other clan's territory. The question was raised in 1972 and
referred to the Chiefs to consult their respective dikgotla. But the
policy apparently remained that an exemption issued by the Minister of
Local Government & Lands was required before such an application
2
could be made,
1 SDC Minutes, 25-27 SEP 67 and 24-25 MAR 69
2 Ibid., 23 MAY 72 and 5-7 SEP 72. This is not the only District
Council to cover more than one clan territory and there is for the
Government the problem of precedent.
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The most serious bone of contention between the Barolong and the
others however concerned the allocation of development projects.
(The case for making: this assertion is considerably strengthened if
the energetic Councillor for Phitshane-Molopo, a village just inside
Gangwaketse but popularly regarded as a Barolong village, is included
with the representatives of the Barolong Farms.) Early on, the
Barolong kgotla made an early request for a sum of money in the
Barolong Tribal Treasury account to be applied to the construction of
teachers quarters, planned under Ipelegeng, in Borolong; the request
1
was turned down. A series of complaints were subsequently made by
Barolong Councillors concerning the "inequitable" distribution of
projects, the District Council's record in Borolong and in outlying
areas, the "favouritism" shown to northern and central parts of the
2
District, etc..
In party political terms the dichotomy between the two parts of
the District was brought out in the 1969 Council Election. The BNF
won a majority of the seats in Gangwaketse (and would probably have
won even more if it had contested all 20), but in Borolong the BDP
retained a firm grasp of the Barolong seats (and Riitshane-Molopo,
incidentally). This certainly reflects the prestige of Bathoen amongst
his fellow-Bangwaketse but lack of appeal to the Barolong. Table 3.1
gives the results:
TABLE 3.1
SOUTHERN DISTRICT COUNCIL ELECTION RESULTS 1969
BDP BNF
won (fought) won (fought)
Gangwaketse 9 (20) 11 (13)
Borolong 4(4) 0(1)
Total (Southern District) 13 (24) 11 (14)
1 SDC Minutes of Education Committee, 28 JUL 66
2 These were countered by allegations of Barolong failure to take
"self-help" initiatives. SDC Minutes, 25-27 SEP 67; 21-24 FEB 67;
31 JUL-2 AUG 67; 1-4 SEP 70; 28 NOV 72.
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1
Thereafter, as has been shown, the share of committee seats going to
Barolong Councillors went up dramatically as the BNF were definitely
under-represented.
The Bakgalagadi The people of the Kalahari (Kgalagadi) area are known
2
as the Bakgalagadi. Those living under the traditional jurisdiction
of the Paramount Chief of the Bangwaketse can therefore be regarded as
3
a sept of the Bangwaketse clan. The reason for singling out this
minority group rather than others (such as the emigre Bakgatla in the
north east of the District, for instance) is that the Bakgalagadi
Councillors were the only other group to make self-conscious demands of
the Council. The big difference between their position and that of the
Barolong Councillors was that the former concentrated exclusively on
resource allocation (the fact that they also divided politically fairly
evenly between BDP and BNF can be discounted). Another difference is
that complaints started coming in from the West much later than from
Borolong and were generally given a sympathetic hearing. Indeed the
4
neglect of the arid Kalahari was openly admitted by Council officials.
The conclusion which can be drawn from the amount of noise made by
minority groups in the Southern District is that an ethnic basis did
seem to provide more strength for complaints, and made solidarity
among Councillors greater, than in areas which were composed of the
dominant (nuclear) clan; but that the legal recognition of a separate
1 See above, Table 2.19
2 The name of the desert in fact is derived from the people.
Sekgalagadi can be classified as a separate language from Setswana, to
which it is nevertheless closely related. Both belong to the Sotho
group of languages.
3 The Bakgalagadi of the Kgalagadi District are, in terms of
traditional administration, independent. The definitive study is
Adam Kuper, op. cit.
4 SDC Minutes, 24-25 MAR 69, 23 MAY 72, 19-21 FEB 74; 24-26 FEB 71,
30 NOV 71
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Barolong identity and customary administration made for more concentr¬
ation on explicit and symbolic attempts to redress what was seen as an
unjust balance.
Elections
Much can be said about the trends in the District and the Council;
but the hardest of all available data is electoral. Several aspects
of elections will be dealt with here (but not the selection of candidates,
which is a subject reserved for Chapter 7). Four parliamentary constit¬
uencies comprise the Bangwaketse part of the District while the Barolong
Farms form part of the Lobatse/Barolong constituency; precise calcul«v>oas.
about the latter are impossible although some reasonable inferences
can be made.
The first Local Government Elections, in June 1966, came 15 months
after the first General Election, and three months before the end of
the Protectorate of Bechuanaland. The first parliamentary and local
government elections both revealed a seemingly impregnable BDP
position. Not only did the party win all the seats; the "Opposition"
moreover was highly fragmented: in the General Election both the
1
Bechuanaland People's Party and the Botswana Independence Party fought
every seat while in the Local Government election five of the seven
non-BDP candidates were Independents; for the record, the only candidate
of the newly formed Botswana National Front in 1966 received only 3%
of the votes in a three-cornered contest where the BPP got 16%. Tables
3.2 and 3.3 give the details of the two pre-Independence elections in
2
the Southern District and Lobatse.
1 I.e. the "official" BPP led by P. G. Matante; K. T. Motsete was sole
candidate for the "BPP-Motsete" in Lobatse/Barolong, when he polled
6.5% of the votes.
2 In those days termed the Ngwaketse District and Lobatsi.
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TABLE 3.2
ELECTORAL DATA, 1965 GENERAL ELECTION - SOUTHERN DISTRICT
Constituencies Percentage share of vote
No Name BDP BIP BPP BPP-Motsete
27 Moshupa 95.8 2.3 1.9 —
28 Kanye South 95.7 2.0 2.3 —
29 Kanye North 95.4 2.8 1.8 —
30 Ngwaketse/Kgalagadi 94.8 1.4 3.8 —
31 Lobatsi/Barolong 80.3 2.8 10.4 6.5
TABLE 3.3
SOUTHERN DISTRICT COUNCIL ELECTION 1966
BDP BNF BPP Ind
Seats contested 24 1 1 5
Seats won 24 0 0 0
Share of votes in seats contested 84. 5% 3% 16% 14.4%
It might have been assumed that a party as well placed as the BDP
in 1965 and 1966 in the Southern District would be able to face the
electorate in 1969 with assurance; yet to observers of the 1969 General
Election this was manifestly not the case. Trepidation characterised
Domkrag as they entered the electoral fray, not least in the South.
The crunch was symbolised by Kanye South. Here ex-Chief Bathoen chose
to take on the prestige of the Republic's engaging and active Vice-
President, Quett Mas ire, in a classic clash between the "new men" and
the ancien regime.
Local Government Elections were, by now, synchronised with the
1
Parliamentary General Election. No doubt when the Government
decided to do this it was counting on the twin advantages of the coat-
tails effect and the avoidance of any mid-term backlash. But, in the
Southern District, whose coat-tails would prove more effective?
1 See above, p. 27
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There seems little doubt, certainly, that the electorate treated the
two elections as one - an attitude assisted by the mechanics of the
electoral system, whereby a coloured disc represented the chosen party
(red or black for BDP and BNF respectively). At any rate the total
votes cast in Gangwaketse in 1974 (when both parties contested every
seat) varied by only a tiny fraction (0.13%), and the parties* share of
those votes varied by only 0.2% between the Parliamentary and Local
Government results. The inference therefore can clearly be drawn that
voters did not split their ticket.
Returning to 1969, the picture was obscured for the political
scientist by the BNF's failure to contest a number of seats, some of
them winnable. This was no accident: one factor which decided President
Khama to hold an election a year early was his realisation of the impact
of Bathoen's joining the National Front and a determination to move
before the Front could organise itself properly. In the Parliamentary
election, the BNF failed to lodge nomination papers in time to contest
Moshupa, which then went to the BDP candidate (a member of the Cabinet,
E. S. Mas isi) unopposed; it would almost certainly have been retained
by Masisi in any case. More serious for the Front was its failure to
put up candidates for the Council at Nyorosi (which they would likely
have won) and Ntlhayatlase (which fell to the BNF in a subsequent by-
election); a seat which with hindsight was highly marginal, Ranaka,
was another one where the BDP got a walkover.
The General Election was a landslide victory for the BNF in the
Southern District. Bathoen won Kanye South from Dr. Miasire with 71.1%
of the vote, while his less illustrious colleagues scored 71.4% in
Kanye North and 60.2% in Ngwaketse/Kgalagadi. Lobatse/Barolong stayed
comfortably Domkrag, despite an anti-BDP swing of 18.3%; as the BNF
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received over half the Town Council election votes in Lobatse, it is
clear that it was the Barolong who saved the constituency for B. C. Thema,
the Minister of Education. Table 3.4 gives details.
TABLE 3.4
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The District Council election results were a shade less satisfactory
for the BNF. In the event they won 11 of the 14 seats they contested,
but failed to gain a majority on the 24-seat Council - a majority which
was within their grasp had they put up three more candidates, even if
BDP control would have been assured by the Government's power to
nominate additional members. Table 3.5 gives details of "B II's
revenge" on the Council.
TABLE 3.5









Share of vote in contested seats
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Hius Bathoen's revenge was only partial and led rather to a
polarisation in the District - a polarisation accentuated moreover in
the Council chamber with ethnic overtones. In these respects the
Southern District election results reflected the national results.
The period between the 1969 and 1974 elections reflected the
continuing tension between the parties. In by-elections which took
place during Session II the BNF captured a Council seat in 1971 -
Ntlhayatlase, in the Kanye North parliamentary constituency - which
they had failed to contest in 1969, and held their seat at Moshaneng
in the same constituency (in 1970). The Barolong seat of Good Hope
however remained safely in the hands of the BDP in the 1971 by-election.1
Another gain for the BDP came with the defection of the BNF Councillor
for Mmathethe (in the Ngwaketse/Kgalagadi constituency) to the BDP in
1970. Thus the party composition of the Council - ignoring nominated
Councillors - was the same at the end of the Session as at the beginning.
In the 1974 election the chips were down between National ET*ont
and Democratic Party - a fact reflected in the highest turnout (41%)
of any District in Botswana. On the one hand the BDP felt confident
that support for the BNF was ebbing away: on the other hand there
were a number of seats, uncontested by the BNF in 1969, where the
outcome was uncertain. The Local Government Election tested the
theories completely insofar as it was a straight fight between the
two parties in all the seats in Gangwaketse; the supremacy of the BDP
in Borolong however was unchallenged. In the event,as shown by
Table 3.6, the BDP achieved a healthy swing towards itself but there
were consolation prizes for the BNF in two seats. In summary, the
BDP gained two seats and held two potentially marginal seats where it
had been unopposed in 1969. The Front on the other hand held its
1 References: BDN, 25 MAY 71; 2 OCT 70; 30 NOV 71
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by-election gain, and repeated its victory over the BDP candidate -
this time the carpet-crossing Councillor - in Mmathethe. Probably the
most significant figure is the swing in comparable seats of +14.4% to
•If*
Domkrag; for all contested seats the rise in the BDP vote was 11.5%.
Another feature of some significance was the proportionally greater
success of existing Councillors (including nominated Councillors) who
contested the 1974 Local Government elections.
TABLE 3.6
LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION RESULTS - SOUTHERN DISTRICT 1974
BDP BNF
Candidates 24 20
Seats won 14 10
Candidates unopposed 4 0
Share of vote in contested seats 55.5% 44.5%
Turnout: 41.27®
In the Parliamentary election the story was similar, albeit
complicated by changes in constituency boundaries. These facilitated,
but do not of themselves alone account for the notable victory scored
by Vice-President Quett Masire in winning the (revised) constituency of
Ngwaketse-Kgalagadi from the sitting MP, Patrick Tshane. Masire's
courage in fighting in his home district rather than taking a safe seat
elsewhere was saluted by rejoicing crowds of Domkrag supporters in
Gaborone, who saw it as a knock-out blow against "tribalist" (i.e. BNF)
politics. The BDP also held comfortably the seat of Moshupa, where it
had been unopposed in 1969 (and increased its majority in Lobatse/
Barolong), although failing to achieve much success in the (new) Kanye
North and South constituencies. Figures are given in Table 3.7.
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TABLE 3.7
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS 1974, SOUTHERN DISTRICT AMI LOBATSE
Constituency Percentage share of votes
No Name BDP BNF
27 Moshupa 75.6 24.4
28 Kanye South 33.6 64.6
29 Kanye North 37.2 62.8
30 Ngwaketse/Kgalagadi 67.3 33.7
31 Lobatse/Barolong 80.8 19.2
27-30 Gangwaketse
27-31 Southern District and Lobatse
28-30 BNF "base"
part of 31 Borolong (estimated)
55.3 44.7 Turnout 41.2%
59.6 , 40.4 Turnout 39.4%
45.8 54.2 Estimated swing to
BDP, +12% approx.
92 8 approx.
In summary, then, the 1974 elections saw a substantial recovery
of the BDP's position in both Parliamentary and Local Government
elections in the south. The uneven impact of the rise of the BNF as
the Opposition to the BDP is illustrated however by comparing the four
Council seats which were contested in 1966 with the 1974 results. At
one extreme the BDP vote rose over this period by 11% in one seat
(Manyana) and at the other fell by no less than 64% (in Mmatshitswana).
Clearly, then, the mere presence of an "Opposition" candidate does not
cast much light on the impact on the voter.
The parties
If then the party label is important, what is it that distinguishes
the parties from each other? Repeatedly the answer given to this
question in interviews was to the effect that the only real distinction
was between the "ins" and the "outs" and that this had little to do
with policy. It would be facile - yet probably correct - to conclude
that the status of the party leadership was the crucial factor (i.e.
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that any party supported by Chief Bathoen would have done equally well
in Ganwaketse). But first it is necessary to review the occasions on
which there appeared to be a difference between the parties in the
Council, and/or a clear party policy particularly from the National
Front side. The number of such occasions, it must be stressed, is
small.
The BNF had acquired, in the urban areas at least, the reputation
of being a radical/populist party, the champion of the poor and the
low-paid. It was therefore to be expected that the party in local
government would adopt the same sort of stance. One or two examples
bear this out, the first being the party's total opposition to the
imposition of a bicycle tax (on a vote on bye-laws supported by all but
one of the BDP Councillors) on the grounds that this was an imposition
with no concommitant benefits in the form of maintenance of cycle tracks.
Another issue was that of school fees: BNF Councillors asked first for
1
a reduction in school fees, and pled subsequently for leniency in
dealing with those unable to pay the fees on time and financial assist¬
ance for the poorest parents; the latter motion was defeated. A further
instance was a motion tabled by a BNF Councillor to "consider about
2
farmers who plough many fields."
Another topic raised by the BNF nationally was race relations and
in particular any vestiges of European privileges which still remained
after Independence. Here again the party in the Southern District
asked some pointed questions, e.g. why there were still segregated
3
cemeteries, and why a white District Commissioner presided over a
1 SDC Minutes, 1-4 SEP 70 and 25-26 MAY 71. These policies were
later adopted by the Government.
2 SDC Minutes, 30 NOV 71; SDC Agenda 11 JUN 74
3 SDC Minutes, 30 NOV 71
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court while a black District Commissioner did not. The Front also
complained that the Mazezuru (a religious sect of Rhodesian origin
who made a living as tinkers) did not pay taxes or hold licences for
2
hawking; what is interesting about this initiative is that the BNF
line was quite the opposite from the approach adopted by the People's
Party, whose leader, Philip Matante, was known as a champion of the
Mazezuru and other immigrants with problems.
If the BNF had a radical reputation in its early days, the
accession of Chief Bathoen to the party immediately cast doubts in
many people's minds as to how a conservative if not reactionary figure
like the ex-Paramount Chief of the Bangwaketse could fit in to a radical
party. And if there was to be a traditionalist wing of the Front - or
indeed a general shift in policy towards traditionalism - the Southern
BNF was obviously the section where this would be in evidence. What
is interesting is that the BNF did not adopt a traditionalist policy, or
at any rate not a consistent one. Thus while a BNF motion calling on
the Kanye Museum to be named after its (aristocratic) founder may have
seemed to confirm the BNF position, it was outweighed by a much more
significant motion in the same meeting to abolish, or at least restrict,
corporal punishment in customary courts; the amended motion was
successful. Even more strikingly, it was the BDP who proposed a motion
for the introduction of bye-laws to make attendance at kgotla meetings
compulsory and the BNF who opposed it on the grounds, firstly, that it
would mean the revival of the old chieftainship's policy of labour
regiments, and secondly that it was contrary to central Government
1 SDC Minutes, 23 MAY 72 (The answer was that the latter was in fact
not a District Commissioner but a District Assistant. i




policy.1 One possible interpretation of this anti-traditionalist line
is that some, at least, of the BNF Councillors were aware of the unpop¬
ularity of Chief Bathoen's past harsh rule and of the authoritarian
streak which seemed to be emerging in the rule of his son and
successor, Chief Seepapitso IV, culminating in a classic High Court
2
case on corporal punishment, which the young Chief lost.
Mention has been made of the radical tradition in the BNF. In
two instances however the party seemed to be advocating a free enterprise
approach, namely to the question of water. Proposals were made that the
Council should sell its dams "to some members of the tribe who are
financially able," and that "all council boreholes situated in agricul-
r -i 3
tural areas be sold to members of communities who [liveJ around them."
A rather contradictory motion urged that the District Council run its
4
own bus service.
The policies of the parties may be none too easy to define; rather
easier to determine is the attitude towards parties. Official mistrust
of (opposition) "politics" is reflected in statements such as the speech
of the Assistant Community Development Officer to the Council in which
he warned Councillors to keep politics out of public meetings attended
by Community Development staff as this would lead to "misunderstandings";
the Education Secretary in a report detailed certain private schools
as having "Party Political Affiliation.The central Government more¬
over on one occasion removed a BNF Councillor from the Ngwaketse land
1 SDC Minutes, 7-10 SEP 71, 5-7 SEP 72
2 BDN, 22 NOV 72
3 SDC Minutes, 20-21 FEB 73
4 Ibid., 22-23 FEB 72
5 Ibid., 7-10 SEP 71; Education Committee Minutes, 9 MAY 72
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Board.1 The official mistrust of the BNF was reciprocated: witness an
unsuccessful motion calling for party scrutineers to be present during
the processing of Council (internal) elections, "because officials do
2
not count nominations properly."
The attitude of the parties towards each other however was rather
more constructive. For instance, applications by the BNF for the use
of a Council hall, and by the BDP for the use of the Kanye showground
3
for a fete were approved without any difficulty. Against this must
be set the fact (already discussed) of BNF underrepresentation on
Standing Committees of the Council.
This last point brings out what is probably the most important
aspect of the party system: parties are an electoral machine, organised
to win representation on the Council and in Parliament, and able to
reward members with positions of prestige thereafter (including the
Government's power to nominate additional Councillors, and in effect
to co-opt four extra MPs to the National Assembly). At the Council
level at any rate little guidance to policy is inherent in the party
system, only the inclination or instinct by the BDP to support "official"
policy and by the BNF to question it. Perhaps there might have been a
clearer policy division between the two sides had there been a Leader
of the BNF in the Council, particularly when the BDP side was led by
4
the experienced former MP for Kanye North, B. R. Chibana. The BNF's
leader could have been Chief Seepapitso, but in effect it was left to
a non-Councillor, ex-Chief Bathoefii, as "party boss" in the District, to
organise meetings of the party caucus. This he did however too
1 SDC Minutes, 7-^10 SEP 71
2 Ibid., 20-21 FEB 73
3 Report of General Purposes Committee JUL-SEP 69; SDC Minutes 10-12
NOV 70
4 Subsequently co-opted back into Parliament, but retaining his position
as SDC Chairman.
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intermittently to provide an adequate substitute for an active leader
in the Council chamber. This factor would contribute towards an
explanation of the very different levels of organisation and cohesion
visible between the BNF in the Southern District Council and the BPP in
the North East District Council.
CHAPTER 4
THE CENTRAL DISTRICT COUNCIL
No study of local government and politics in Botswana could afford
to ignore the Central District, whose role in the political system of the
Republic is generally, and rightly, regarded as crucial. There are
several reasons for scrutiny of the District. In the first place it
covers 25% of the total land area of Botswana, and a much higher
proportion of agricultural land as half the country is accounted for
by the Kalahari semi-desert. More significantly, its population
comprises no less than 43% of Botswana's rural population (36% of the
1
total). Apart from the North West District Council (which receives
substantial revenues from game hunting licences) it is the wealthiest
of the District Councils and started its life with reserves of
2
R300,000, inherited from the Bamangwato Tribal Administration; it is
v
little wonder that the Central District Council is sometimes regarded
as the model District Council.
In political terms too the District is, from the BDP viewpoint, a
model one. All twelve of the constituencies which fall within the
District are safe Domkrag seats, the most marginal indeed having a
BDP majority in 1966 of 23.1%, while the Democratic Party's share of
the poll in Serowe North in that year was 98„5% (the candidate being
1 National Development Plan 1973-78, Part III para 1.152
2 Central District Council Minutes, 15-17 SEP 71
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Sir Seretse Khama). Overall the BDP polled very nearly 90% of the
votes cast in the Central District in the General Elections of 1965
and 1969. In Local Government Elections, moreover, the pattern of
BDP dominance was equally evident, the party winning 31 out of the 32
seats on the Council in 1966 and 1969, many of them unopposed.
The loyalty shown to the BDP in the Central District is an amalgam
of two factors: the generally conservative views of the rural Setswana-
speaking districts and the overwhelming personal loyalty commanded by
Sir Seretse Khama, who was heir to the Chieftainship of the Bangwato
and so is still greeted to this day in Serowe more often as "Kgosi"
(Chief) than "Tau-Tona" (President). The strength of Bangwato clan
identity moreover is the obvious factor accounting for the failure of
the Opposition to gain a Parliamentary foothold in the Kalanga-speaking
area of the Central District (known as the Bokalaka), in sharp contrast
to the position in the Kalanga-speaking North East District, which is
a BPP stronghold.
The particular interest of the Central District Council for this
1
study lies in the fact of its single party (or^virtually single-party)
composition. It can thus be seen as a test bed for examining the
2
argument advanced by Vengroff in favour of turning Botswana into a
3
one-party state although, as Tordoff and Vengroff acknowledge, much
would have to be done to the BDP before anything significant could be
expected of it. The Central District Council, then, provides a
picture of a one-party Council, "untreated".
1 Apart from a period of two years from mid-1967 to the end of the
First Session, the BPP held one seat on the Council.
2 R. Vengroff,"Local-Central Linkages and Political Development in
Botswana," (1972), Ch VI.
3 Tordoff, Pilane & Sarpong, Report of the Local Government Study
Group, (1970), Ch. 11 (a).
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Of secondary interest is the relationship between the traditional
authorities of the Bangwato and the District Council, which after all
was set up to democratise local government and reduce the power of
the Chiefs. If a special relationship exists anywhere between ruling
party and aristocracy, it would be found in this District. It should
be noted that here one is talking about relations with the traditional
institution of clan government, free of the complication of a strong
and we11-entrenched personality (such as Chief Bathoefi, par excellence,
in the Southern District). Hie bulk of Central District is Bangwato
clan territory, although the District also includes the Nata Crown Lands
(later State Lands) in the north, extending to the Rhodesian border,
and the Tuli Block of Freehold (almost entirely white) farmers along
the Limpopo (the border with South Africa}.*
In this chapter there will be an examination of the attitudes of
Councillors to various problems and issues which appear significant,
and particular items of controversy will be studied. It will be found
that the major clashes did not occur on questions of policy (certainly
not party policy, by definition), but that disputes were largely along
institutional battle lines, with the Councillors in most cases operating
as a body against other groups (or individuals). The process of planning
and the allocation of resources come in for considerable scrutiny. The
concluding section discusses the District as a political arena and draws
some conclusions concerning the working of the "democratic system"
and its relationship with other forces in the District.
1 Hie mining town of Selebi-Phikwe, now run by a Town Council, was




If the Central District is vast and rambling, the same could be
said of its meetings (which not infrequently lasted three days) and
its voluminous minutes, which has advantages for the researcher in
giving details of discussion as well as decisions. As in the
Southern District, the lack of a Setswana version of the Handbook was
1
a contributing factor towards the sloppy application of procedure,
manifested particularly in the haphazard application of the Standing
Order that provided for the automatic referral of motions to the
2
appropriate committees. But whereas in the Southern District the
Chairman exercised this power, in the Central District it was usually
the Council Secretary's advice that was followed on this question.
3
Moreover officials habitually replied to Councillors' questions and
indeed the Secretary was quite capable of dismissing a motion as
4
"unnecessary" and it is the Secretary who emerges as the dominant
influence in guiding Council business throughout, rather than the
Chairman (who in the First Session was the Acting Chief).
Officials
As head of the administration, and as an educated, professional
administrator, a Council Secretary clearly has the potential to play
a prominent role in his Council. In the case of the Central District,
the individual concerned, Mr L. M. Seretse, combined an agreeable
personal manner with an aristocratic family background, years of
experience in the Bangwato Tribal Administration and close ties with
1 CDC Minutes, 19 NOV 69
2 Criticised in a letter from Permanent Secretary, MLG&L, to
Secretary, CDC, 12 AUG 68
3 Ibid., for criticism of this.
4 CDC, Agenda for meeting of 7-9 OCT 68. This sort of behaviour came
increasingly under challenge from Councillors in the Second Session.
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the President (his cousin). Towards the end of the Second Session he
resigned from his post, subsequently to enter Parliament, and quickly
rose to become Assistant Minister of Local Government & Lands. Much
of the esteem in which the Central District Council was held in
Gaborone was due to his personal contribution and that of his deputy
and other officers. His position was further strengthened by the
changes in chairmanship of the Council, owing firstly to the changes
1
in the post of Tribal Authority, ands secondly, to the change to an
elective basis for the Chair in the Second Session.
This position of power did not however go unchallenged. Examples
abound of minor reverses suffered by the Secretary at the hands of
Councillors, such as rejection of his draft agreement on cattle auction
sales, dissatisfaction at the handling of appointments, a refusal to
accept the Secretary's ruling that the Treasurer could attend only
certain committees, and a rejection of his views on the tactics of
2
applying to the Government for an increase in allowances. A more
serious row occurred over the nomination by the Chairman and Secretary
of the Council of members to serve on the Licensing Committee for the
3
newly-constituted township of Selebi-Phikwe: Councillors obviously
felt that the executive had gone too far in encroaching on their
Prerogative of electing members to serve on committees, the power to
confer status (expenses paid) to Councillors. But the culmination
4
of resentment felt by Councillors came with a dramatic debate on a
motion described by Mr Seretse as one of "no confidence" in the
1 I.e. Acting Chief
2 Finance &. General Purposes Committee Minutes, 19 JUL 67; CDC Minutes,
22-23 MAR 72; F&GP Minutes, 25 SEP 72; CDC Minutes, 27-28 SEP 72
3 For coverage of Selebi-Phikwe, see the local newspaper Puisano,
now defunct.
4 Witnessed by the writer.
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Secretary over his handling of the question of increasing Councillors'
allowances. Councillors suspected that the Secretary, whose personal
opposition to the resolution in question had been made plain, had
failed to pass the message on to the Ministry. In the end an apology
by the Secretary and an amendment by a Councillor led to the reestablish-
1
ment of amicable relations.
In trying to assess the extent of the Council Secretary's power,
it is clear that sometimes decisions were simply not implemented, in
varying circumstances, as indicated in the following remarks by
Councillors: "all had not been going well. Many decisions had not been
2
implemented." This did not however inhibit the Secretary from laying
down the law and overruling a committee (in correspondence with the
Ministry) nor on commenting (on a motion condemning the Land Board)
that District Councils were not that impressive or popular either)
Another manifestation of the influence of the Secretary was his
practice of touring the District and then using his tour to make
various recommendations about local matters to the Council and on
3
one occasion direct (and successfully) to the Government. Although
the Secretary was occasionally challenged or rebuked over the extent
of his authority internally, he was on stronger ground when responding
to any outside challenge. Thus criticism by a Member of Parliament
4
in the National Assembly was refuted by the Secretary and his action
endorsed by the Council, who likewise approved of his blunt criticism
1 CDC Minutes, 27-28 JUN 73; see also 20-21 MAR 73
2 CDC Minutes, 10-11 MAR 69, 22 JUN 71
3 Ibid., 21-22 JUN 72; 20-21 MAR 73; 22 JUN 71, and 13-14 DEC 72;
Health & Works Committee Minutes, 15-16 NOV 72; 12-13 DEC 72; 24 JUL
24 JUL 73
4 Hansard, 24, p. 422 (31 MAR 68)
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of the Government's failure to provide financial support for obligations
1
laid statutorily upon the Council.
Other officials' actions likewise met with varying responses from
Councillors, sometimes getting through despite queries, on other
2
occasions being subject to censure. The controversial Education
Secretary in particular was at the centre of a recurrent storm of
criticism, but this cause c^lfebre merits separate treatment later in
this chapter.
Councillors' Remuneration and Facilities
The row in 1973 (adverted to above) over the Council Secretary's
handling of Councillors' applications for an increase in their allow¬
ances was merely the most dramatic example of members* concern for their
own financial well-being and facilities. Starting with the Preparatory
Commission in 1966, and again in 1968, 1969, 1973 and 1974 motions were
3
passed demanding increases in Councillors' allowances. In many
instances the Council Secretary's doubts were swept aside but in at
4
least two cases the Ministry took the same view as the Secretary.
Still, the pressure coming from a number of Councils, if not all, did
have its effect, and allowances were progressively increased over the
years.
Less success attended Councillors' efforts to improve the
facilities available to them to perform their functions as represent¬
atives of large areas (half or one-third of a Parliamentary constituency).
1 CDC Minutes, 15-16 JUL 68, 20-21 MAR 73
2 Education Committee Minutes, 26-27 OCT 72, 12-14 JUL 73
3 Central District Preparatory Commission Minutes 23-24 MAR 66; CDC
Minutes 18-19 MAR 68, 27-28 SEP 69, 20-21 MAR 73, 27-28 MAR 74
4 CDC Minutes, 20-22 JUL 67 (marginal comments), CDC Minutes, 20-23
FEB 67, 20-22 JUL 67
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A question asked in the early days of the Council as to whether
Councillors could have the use of Tribal Administration offices was
answered in the negative. More surprisingly, a motion to allow
Councillors the use of Tribal Administration telephones was defeated
by 15 votes to 11, and the Secretary ruled that Councillors, not being
1
"officials", were not allowed free Central District Council stationery.
All of this must have been rather discouraging to Councillors -
who were under the impression that the new system was to take over
many of the functions of the traditional administrative system - but
they appeared to accept the position fairly tamely. The same was not
true of the question of the provision of Government Gazettes free to
all Councillors. In spite of the Council Secretary's opposition the
Council voted to provide all Councillors (not just committee Chairmen)
with free copies of the Gazette. Two years later when nothing had
been done to bring this about a similar motion was again passed.
This time the Ministry of Local Government & Lands vetoed the
2
resolution. With unconscious irony the Minister of Local Government
& Lands in his address to Council two months later urged all
Councillors to read the Government Gazette so as to be fully informed
3
of laws and statutory instruments. The whole episode does tend to
bear out Gunderson's labelling of Botswana as an "administrative
4
state" in which information is controlled by officialdom.
1 CDC Minutes 20-23 FEB 67, 20-22 JUL 67
2 Ibid., 20-22 JUL 67, 23-25 JUN 69, 15 SEP 69
3 Ibid., 19 NOV 69
4 G„ L. Gunderson, "Nation-Building and the Administrative State:
The Case of Botswana" (1970)
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Issues
One of the most striking features of the Central District Council
is the lack of controversy on many items. This does not mean that
discussion was perfunctory - quite the reverse - but rather that the
detailed attention paid to a whole range of questions only rarely raised
matters of policy or principle. The degree of consensus, and indeed
fundamentally conservatism, amongst Councillors was palpable. A prime
example is education: despite the large number of mentions which education
rates there is very little of political interest in the decisions or
1
debates and, apart from the odd instance of pressure group activity,
the main context in which education matters caused controversy was
2
central-local government relations.
Water, Land and Cattle As might be expected, however, the primary
economic interest of a cattle-rearing people did give rise to certain
decisions of principle. The first of these concerned the ownership of
boreholes and the linked question of the spacing between them and the
exclusive use of grazing land which borehole ownership in effect
conferred. As in the Southern District, Council's policy on ownership
from the outset was the normal one of favouring syndicates as opposed
3
to individual owners. (It should be pointed out that the degree of
communalism which syndication involves in practice varies considerably,
in accordance with the strength and persistence of individual farmers,
especially in times of drought.) This policy was implemented for purely
grazing land but when it came to boreholes in the fields ("lands"),
1 E.g. from the newly established Anglican diocese of Botswana
(Education Committee Minutes, 12 OCT 73).
2 Concerning questions such as recognition of schools (Education
Committee Report MAR-JUN 67), or the English-medium school in Mahalapye
(mentioned below), or the financial burden of primary education (CDC
Minutes, 15-17 SEP 71).
3 CDC Minutes 12 SEP 66, 15-16 JUL 68, 21-22 JUN 72
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situated some distance from the "permanent" or official villages, the
policy became something of a football between different factions. Thus
the Acting Chief intervened successfully (as the passage below shows),
even if his victory turned out not to be a lasting one. In his capacity
as Council Chairman he
reported that during his tour of the District people did not
accept Councils' resolution about lands' boreholes being
taken over and run by syndicates. He said that people regarded
lands' boreholes as village boreholes. ... It was RESOLVED
by a ma.-jority vote that Council would reverse its former ^
decis ion and continue to maintain and run lands' boreholes. . . .
The Council accepted the policy of the Ngwato Land Board, once it was
set up, that boreholes should be sited at least six miles apart from
each other (later amended to five miles), although debating the problems
2
of unlimited access by non-owners of boreholes to water.
Another question of principle which appeared briefly was that of
the sale of water, particularly in the large villages (or towns) such
as Serowe and Mahalapye. The principle was accepted without question,
although the "right" to water (where it can be found) was as popularly
believed in as the right to land, and it was left to the District
Development Committee to grapple with the problem at some length; the
Council was concerned only with the details of the draft agreement
3
urged upon it by the Government. Either Councillors were unaware of
the potential trouble water fees would cause; or were prepared to sit
back and let the Government's Department of Water Affairs carry the
can.
1 CDC Minutes 20-22 JUL 67 (emphasis added).
2 Ibid., 14-17 SEP 70, 22-23 MAR 72
3 CDC Minutes 20-23 FEB 67; Central DDC Minutes, 24 FEB 72, 15 MAY 72;
H&W Minutes, 15-16 NOV 72„
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A more fundamental issue, and one which may yet prove the
thorniest problem of all for Botswana, is that of fencing. The mere
suggestion of fencing communal land in the early days of independence
was so emotive that it was almost automatically turned down by the
people. Yet after the 1974 election the Government has moved with
increasing boldness into discussions of land conservation which involve
1
fencing, to some extent at least. The Government's policy change, of
course, falls outside the period studied but it is of interest to see
what happened when this topic was raised in the Bangwato heartland.
When a motion was first introduced in favour of fencing (by a
Tuli Block [freehold] farmer) it was decisively defeated, and at a
committee meeting the following year it was reported that "the tribe
had totally rejected the introduction of fences on tribal land,"
although some Councillors declared themselves in favour of the organised
2
fencing-off of fields from grazing land.
In 1971 however the startling communication was made to the
Council from the Ngwato Land Board to the effect that the Board "in
principle accepted the idea of fencing grazing areas to improve the
main industry of the country." A major debate followed which concluded
with the resolution:
That in view of the controversial nature of the subject
it should be put to the people for purposes of explanation,
and that Councillors go back to their wards to discuss
the matter with them before they could commit Council to
a decision which might not have emanated from popular
opinion.^
1 Government Paper No. 2 of 1975: National policy on Tribal grazing land
2 CDC Minutes, 12 SEP 66; Minutes of Planning Sub-Committee of
Community & Economic Development Committee, 29 JUN 67; CDC Minutes,
20-22 JUL 67
3 CDC Minutes 22 JUN 71 (emphasis added); ibid., 15-17 SEP 71,
20 DEC 71
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The Ministry of Local Government & Lands were however so alarmed
by the prospect of a district-wide debate on this topic that they
quickly "called a halt to further discussions either at Council or
Kgotla levels" and an Agriculture Ministry spokesman warned against
1
going too far ahead of public opinion on land conservation. Clearly
the paternalist tradition in Gaborone was at work here: policy
innovations had to come from the centre to be acceptable.
Apart from the above matters of principle, controversy mainly
followed administrative or institutional lines. The generally unpopular
2
Department of Water Affairs (and also Geological Surveys, which
prospected for water) gave rise to frequent criticism in all Councils,
not least the Central District, and this is dealt with in Chapter 8.
Likewise the subject of subordinate Land Boards, which is one (but the
most important) aspect of the question of decentralisation in the
District is reviewed below.
The story of relations between the Central District Council and
the Ngwato Land Board is one of gradual deterioration. In its early
days Council was happy to endorse the establishment of the Board - only
stipulating that the Chief (also Council Chairman) be a permanent
member of the Board - and to lend it a sizeable sum to finance its
administration. The official amalgamation of the staffs of the two
bodies did not however prevent criticism of the lack of co-ordination
between them, and the Council on one occasion implicitly vetoed a Land
Board decision by referring it back. Matters came to a head with a
1 CDC Minutes, 15-17 SEP 71, 20 DEC 71
2 The Department's own defence, that it was chronically short of man¬
power even to fill its establishment, partially explains the situation
but merely shifts the blame to the Government as a whole.
motion that "in view of the Ngwato Land Board's failure to discharge
its functions satisfactorily, recommendations to the Ministry be
1
made that the board be dissolved and new members appointed."
Although the motion was defeated (following interventions by
both the District Commissioner and the Council Secretary), the
inefficiency of the board, the lack of consultation, and the popular
discontent were freely acknowledged. A contributing factor moreover
was the Ministry's refusal to allow Headmen and Sub-Chiefs to continue
to deal with minor matters such as extensions to fields and courtyards
an object lesson of the difficulties inherent in replacing a well-
established and decentralised traditional system with a new and
centralised one. There can be little doubt that this policy decision
was due not to lack of foresight but to the Government's determination
to drive home the point that there was a new order in the land.
Criticism of the Ngwato Land Board came both from conservatives and
from those who were impatient with the membership of the Board. Hie
fact that all involved were BDP members did nothing to affect the
feelings aroused by the whole question, nor the outcome.
A similar problem was posed by matimela, something which the
Government was keen to see Councils take over from the traditional
2
authorities. One aspect of the problem concerned who was to inform
the people about matimela - the Chief and Headmen or the Councillors.
A more serious headache was the financial one. Whereas under the
traditional system matimela had been a recognised source of revenue
and had caused few serious administrative problems, in transferring it
1 CDC Minutes, 15-16 JUL 68, 24 JUN 70, 13-14 DEC 72; Serowe Planning
Sub-Committee Minutes, 17 SEP 73; CDC Minutes, 20-21 MAR 73
2 F&GP Minutes, 25 MAY 67 (marginal comment); BDN 26 SEP 67.
to the Councils it seemed to become transformed overnight from ax.
asset to a liability.1 Hie costs which now came into the open may
well have been concealed under the old regime, which relied on the
Chiefs' complex network of contacts. Again it seems this problem was
caused by the Government's determination to replace the traditional
system (including the patronage and funds which went along with it)
with a new, bureaucratised and accountable one even at the risk of
unpopularity. The sheer size of the Central District (compared with
the Southern District) made the problem that much more difficult.
Commerce The District Council's policy on trading was a conservative
one. Thus it was laid down at the outset that viability had to be
demonstrated before applications to extend licences could be approved,
and not long afterwards the licensing authority recommended that no
further applications for licences be considered unless requested by
the Chief. The only attempts to achieve minor modifications in the
approach of the Licensing Committee were the suggestions made by a
Councillor to involve local opinion in cases where there were rival
applications or disputes over the granting of licences, and the
Secretary's reporting of an initiative from a national District
Development Conference to relax hygiene regulations in order to
2
encourage small shopkeepers in smaller villages.
1 Even as late as 1972 the CDC Secretary criticised the Government
for failing to provide sufficient funds for matimela collection, and
a year later it was stated that "Council is using huge sums of money
to get water for Matimela." CDC Minutes, 20-22 JUL 67, 20-21 MAR 72
C&ED Minutes; 24 MAY 73.
2 C&ED Report, AUG 66; C&ED Minutes 10 FEB 67; CDC Minutes 23-25 JUN 69,
13-14 DEC 72
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The Council's attitude towards engaging in commercial activity
1
itself was mienthusiastic. For instance it specifically declared
itself in favour of private enterprise over the processing and market-
2
ing of hides and skins, and rejected (by 19 votes to 3) a motion in
3
favour of grain buying by the Council; it had earlier accepted the
statement that the Government was not in favour of such a policy any¬
way as it would tie up too much capital. The only exception to the
general policy was the Council's decision to run an abattoir in Serowe,
4
but this was on health grounds.
Councillors were particularly opposed to the excessive granting
of licences to hawkers, and resolved to lobby their MPs during the
the passage of a Bill before Parliament. A committee
was in favour of Hawkers being limited, and the encouragement
of Business Licencees to take out Hawkers Licences instead
so as to be able to supply those in outlying areas adjacent
to their shops."®
Faced however with the necessity of applying the law on hawking,
a firm policy of keeping hawkers at least five miles away from shops
6
was adopted and reiterated several times. Moreover the Council were
willing to assure de Beers (the big South African mining company) that
no hawking licences would be granted in mining areas, in accordance
7
with the Company's policy.
1 In this it was in line with the later policy of the Ministry of
Commerce &, Industry which preferred to keep any new publicly sponsored
enterprises under its wing.
2 Minutes, Planning Sub-Committee of C&ED Committee, 26 MAY 67
3 CDC Minutes, 10-11 MAR 69. Interestingly, one of the movers of the
motion was an aristocratic member of Council. (The Ministry of
Agriculture official who attended the meeting - in order to press his
pet project of a spoxts stadium - said he had no knowledge of the
tecnnical problems involved in grain storage.')
4 Minutes, Planning Sub-Committee, C&ED Committee, 26 MAY 67
5 F&.GP Report, SEP 66 - FEB 67
6 CDC Minutes 10-11 MAR 69; Licensing Committee Minutes 29 SEP 72, and
29 JUN 73




It should not be thought, however, that Councillors were
defending their own personal interests - an allegation made concerning
the Licensing Committee in another district - but rather that their
views favoured traders in general. Indeed on two occasions the suggestion
that a Councillor was putting forward proposals to benefit himself led
to a hostile reaction from other Councillors. In one case a Councillor
was rebuked publicly for bringing up his own personal interests in the
1
form of a motion. Even more significant was the failure of the ex-
Tribal Authority of the Bangwato himself to get approval for plans for
a tourist enterprise (rumoured to be a Holiday Inn hotel-casino complex)
in the east of the District, and for a brewery in Serowe. The only
other case to come to light was a series of questions asked by a
2
Councillor who owned many cattle concerning cattle sales in his area.
Destitution
One of the distressing duties of the Councils was the relief of
destitutions It was a much more prominent problem in the Central
District than in the other two districts, possibly just because every¬
thing in the Central District was writ large. In the mythology (and
probably reality) of the old traditional system the Chiefs and their
underlings took care of those whom even the extended family system -
so characteristic of and fundamemtal to African society - had left with
no means of support whatsoever. Moreover, while the old clan system
1 CDC Minutes 22 JUN 71; the voting on the motion was 17-11.
2 Ibid., 3-5 OCT 73 and 24-25 MAR 71
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may have made the Chief the wealthiest individual, it did also Lave
the virtue of being a self-balancing system in financial (or resource)
terms. Thus income from court fines and matimela cattle was expended
inter alia on destitutes.
So serious did the problem appear to the Council in 1969 that
"others in despair felt that Council should stop any relief of destitutes
since Council could not hope to cater for all destitutes in the district."
Hie number of destitutes in 1973 was estimated at 4,000, and provision
was made for them at the rate of R7.50 per annum (or R7.00 plus burial
2
costs): total cost R30,000.
Nor was the scale of the problem the only intractable aspect:
equally difficult was the identification of genuine destitutes. It
was never completely resolved as to who should locate destitutes -
Councillors or Headmen. Certainly many Councillors failed to submit
lists of names by the deadlines requested; yet perversely refused on
one occasion to allow certain "vacancies" thus left to be filled by a
surplus of names from the quasi-urban centre of Mahalapye. In similar
vein protests were made by Councillors from remote wards at the favouring
3
of the district capital of Serowe.
The question of destitution is another illustration of the difficul¬
ties attendant upon replacing the old and familiar system with a new
one. The Councillors who formed the District Council seemed to sense
that it provided possibilities of patronage, but these were outweighed
by the disadvantages of being involved in the invidious task of
selection; hence the hesitant, rather negative approach to the whole
distressing business.
1 CDC Minutes, 23-25 JUN 69
2 Health & Works Committee Minutes, 9 AUG 73
3 C&ED Minutes, 24 MAY 73; CDC Minutes, 24-25 MAR 71, 20-21 MAR 73,
21-22 JUN 72
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PLANNING AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION
An analysis of the process of planning and the allocation of
resources in the Central District Council has to grapple with two
apparently contradictory facts. On the one hand the Councillors can
hardly be described as docile, and examples abound of successful
intervention and amendments made to plans. On the other hand the
fact remains that these alterations tended to be peripheral and to
leave the main body of the plans intact and indeed unchallenged. The
most convincing explanation is that Councillors treated meetings of
the Council (especially full Council but also committees) like kgotla
meetings; whereas for the officials servicing the Council it was a
question of the complex administration of a large district, and this
meant a systematic survey, based on explicit criteria, of the develop¬
ment needs and possibilities of the District. What happened then, on
the whole, was the acceptance of officials' criteria as a basis for
planning, but with the legal power of Councillors to take decisions
being used to deal with any anomalous or urgent situation not taken
account of.
One advantage which officials had was their superior understanding
of a planning system which relied on documents written in English,
which was complex, which worked to deadlines, and which - to add to
the potential for confusion - changed over the period under review.
The introduction of the District Development Committees symbolised the
Government's dissatisfaction with the district status quo and a shift
towards a new system. Long before the District Development Committee
structure was established the Council itself had set up a Five Year
Planning system which entailed Five Year Planning Sub-Committees of the
main standing committees; furthermore the membership of those committees
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included co-opted outsiders as well as Councillors, and in this
way resembled the subsequent District Development Committee idea.
But the role of these planning- sub-committees tended to make the
decision-making process even more baffling to many Councillors, and
not only those who were not literate in English. A recognition of
this was the postponement, on more than one occasion, of discussion
1
on plans or annual estimates from one meeting to the next.
Another baffling question concerned the system of plans which had
been adopted by the Council. Thus "the plan" was cited repeatedly by
the Secretary,in reply to "ward" questions, to explain why a particular
facility could not be provided in the near future. Logically, too,
the other side of the coin appeared with the invocation of the
National Development Plan by officials in support of projects. Less
specifically, a request for the provision of a vehicle to deliver
materials to assist with Village Development Committee projects was
2
countered by the answer that "there are no funds." On the other
hand,
Arising from questions and queries by some Councillors that
certain projects were not included, the Chairman of the
Planning Committee explained that the drawing up of a plan
was not the final thing. A plan was always subject to
revision from time to time to take the latest developments
into account.^
And again,
It was explained that having boreholes in the list of
priorities did not mean that they would automatically
be equipped.4
1 E.g. CDC Minutes 13-14 DEC 72; see also ibid., 7-9 OCT 68 where it
was complained that Councillors had not had time to study the documents.
2 4bid., 20-22 JUL 67; F&GP Report APR-JUN 68; H&W Minutes 15-16 NOV 72.
CDC Minutes, 14-17 SEP 70
3 Ibid., 23-25 JUN 69
4 H&W Minutes, 26 SEP 72
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Councillors might have been forgiven for concluding that plans were
a weapon to be deployed tactically. As a corollary it may be added
that the increasing formality of district level planning is bound to
decrease the degree of latitude permitted to the bureaucracy in
decisions on implementation, and pari passu to increase the scope for
Councillors' initiatives provided they time their submissions right.
It would be tedious to list all the examples of the rubber-
stamping without challenge of significant plans, which committed
Councillors for years ahead to a limited number of development projects.
A few highlights may suffice. These include a Five-Year Education
Plan, District lists of priorities for the provision of village water,
the District Development Plan, the DDC's proposals for self-help
contributions (percentages), the annual estimates for all major
committees and a list of development projects.*
Rather more interesting are those occasions when Councillors
amended the recommendations put before them. In the first place it
should be noted that Councillors did not feel inhibited in amending
2
or referring back committee reports in general. Then there were cases
where a point of general concern in principle was made in the form of
an amendment to a planning document. Examples are decisions to
reduce matimela fees, prune certain estimates, or accept a Central
Government suggestion for inclusion in a plan only on certain conditions.
Other amendments were in fact endorsements of suggestions made by
Council officials. (These last are parallelled by the acceptance of
1 CDC Minutes, 25 SEP 67; H&W Minutes, 20 JUN 68; C&ED Minutes,
23 NOV 72; CDC Minutes, 13-14 DEC 72; H&W Minutes, 25-26 APR 73;
C&ED Minutes 14 AUG 73; H&W Minutes, 9 AUG 73; Education Committee
Minutes, 7-8 AUG 73.
2 E.g. CDC Minutes 15-16 JUL 68, 18-20 MAR 70, 27-28 JUN 73
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the Council Secretary's remarkable initiatives, following a tour of
the District, whereby he made suggestions to Council for the improve¬
ment of education facilities in a remote village, and negotiated with
N1
the Government for the health facilities in another area.)
The activities of Councillors acting as the spearhead of pressure
from their wards for the allocation of resources are the most interest¬
ing, but, in contrast to the large number of questions brought to
the forum of Council meetings, the number of successful interventions
at the crucial stages of decisions on priorities and planning documents
is not large. However individual Councillors managed to obtain con¬
cessions such as these: the inclusion of two remote schools in an
upgrading programme; a modification to the plans of a foreign donor
for a village; the resiting of a borehole; the upgrading of a school
and two alterations to water development plans to give higher priority
to Councillors' villages. Another category of intervention involved
a joint challenge by a number of "outlying" Councillors to allocations
for the Independence Day and destitute funds, the result of which was
2
a reallocation away from Serowe.
The conclusion must be that "backbench" Councillors in particular
often missed opportunities of pressing the interest of their constit¬
uents through a lack of understanding of the administrative and
and committee structure of the Council; and that the vacuum left was
filled by the Council staff (many of whom, in this context, were
expatriate volunteers), who tended to view planning as a technical
1 CDC Minutes, 15-16 JUL 68, 7-9 OCT 68; H&W Minutes, 12-13 DEC 72,
9 AUG 73, 25-26 APR 73, 24 JUL 73; Education Committee Minutes,
17-18 APR 73, 16 JUL 73.
2 C&ED Minutes, 26-27 JUN 68; CDC Minutes, 20-23 FEB 67, 15-17 .SEP 71,
21-22 JUN 72, 13-14 DEC 72; H&W Minutes, 12-13 DEC 72; CDC Minutes
7-9 OCT 68, 14-17 SEP 70, 21-22 JUN 72.
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matter based on objective and quantifiable criteria. The following
quotation from an address to the Council by the Government Town
Planner illustrates:
The [Serowe Planning] committee will know best what people
require. ... he had read books about the Batswana, how
they lived in the past, what were their needs and how they
made their homes. So if the basic requirements are known,
e.g. schools, water facilities, houses and the population
of the people, it would be very easy to plan. The people
would be made to participate in this exercise when
planners would merely provide expertise.
A rather more typical attitude was the concern of such staff as
Council Advisers to ensure that when there were funds and/or plans
for development projects these should go ahead with the minimum of
delay; to achieve this objective they were prepared to do battle if
necessary with those who held the purse strings (Council Treasurer and
Ministry of Finance & Development Planning) in the general interest
of the District. Their attitude, not unreasonably, was that, provided
they adhered to the rules, it was not their fault if Councillors
failed to comprehend exactly what was being done all the time; after
all, the Councillors had every opportunity to take initiatives, if
they wanted to.
EXTERNAL ASPECTS
Village Development - "Ipelegeng"
On the face of it, the Central District ought to be as fertile
territory for the success of self-help as any in the country: over¬
whelmingly pro-BDP, bound by ties of traditional loyalty to the
President, virtually free of Opposition political activity. Yet the
absence of the obstacles which are said to hamper self-help in some
other districts merely serves to highlight the problems inherent in
1 CDC Minutes, 3-5 OCT 73
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the whole idea of self-help. The use of the word Ipelegeng here to
connote the voluntary self-help schemes, the Village Development
Committee and similar organisations, and the schemes of Food-for-Work,
Famine Relief, Drought Relief, etc, while doubtless upsetting the
bureaucratic purists (who can readily distinguish between the various
schemes and titles), does reflect the very real confusion in the minds
of very many Batswana, who thus tend to lump together all kinds of
village development project work as "Ipelegeng" (or Boipelego).
Early in the Council's history the Chairman (and Chief) testified to
this confusion in these words:
The public had not been fully aware of their role nor the
implementation of schemes which were intended for them and
consequently the principles of 'self-help'were unknown to
them.*
A major reason for this confusion was the failure to appreciate the
different schemes which were put forward, some for rations, some
2
totally voluntary, some partly voluntary.
It is widely recognised that since the demise of the old
regimental labour system - which, while undoubtedly authoritarian, did
achieve concrete results - there has been something of a vacuum, and
the introduction of a democratic successor system is as yet only a
3
partial success. The voluntary principle has been undermined by a
number of factors. The Central Government's own schemes (already
mentioned);, which in turn were heavily influenced by foreign aid
agencies, are dealt with in a later part of this chapter. But in
1 CDC Minutes, 20-23 FEB 67 (emphasis added). "Chief" should properly
read "Tribal Authority."
2 For a discussion of related issues see G. Williams, "Taking the
Part of Peasants," in Gutkind & Wallerstein, Political Economy of
Contemporary Africa (1976).
3 See Chapter 6 below, especially pp. 282-289
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this connexion it has to be emphasised that the recurrence of drought
1
- like Tanzania, Botswana was given "Independence with famine" - is
a built-in disturber of voluntary self-help schemes (unless some very
different approach were to be adopted towards the problem of famine
relief).
The implications of famine relief are far from being the only
factors to undermine the voluntary principle, however. An early
ministerial speech to the Council introduced the idea of incentive
grants for self-help, and later the Council casually endorsed the idea
of payment for helping to supply water for a VDC project. In another
instance it was decided that three VDCs which had failed to dig
trenches for a water reticulation project should pay a financial
contribution in lieu of the labour. In other cases wealthy traders
2
made donations which counted as "the community's contribution".
Finally with the systematisation of Ipelegeng (largely by the District
Development Committee*s planning procedures) the voluntary principle
came to mean in practice the "percentage principle" - which comes
pretty close to the idea of a village levy, or even a contribution
payable by the District Council.
The fundamental weakness of the principle of voluntary self-help
was compounded by institutional problems of varying complexity. A
reflection of those in the Central District was the appearance of the
national Director of Community Development on two occasions three years
1 S. S. Mushi, "Revolution by Evolution: the Tanzanian Road to
Socialism," (1974), p. 83
2 CDC Minutes, 5-6 JUL 66, 15-17 SEP 72; H&W Minutes, 17-18 APR 73,
25-26 APR 73; CDC Minutes, 12 DEC 73
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apart. The first (in 1968) was to explain the proposal for the
establishment of Village Development Committees throughout the District
1
by his Community Development Assistants. However the partial failure
of the scheme is testified to by the reappearance of the Community
Development Director before the District Council three years later.
On this occasion he had to explain such fundamental points as the ex-
officio membership of VDCs; their objectives ("to investigate the needs
of its own village and recommend to Council what action ought to be
taken"); the procedure for dealing with the crucial project form, the
possibility of electing a chief (or headman) as chairman (not recommended,
because "naturally the people might fear to express their views freely");
the relationship of the Community Development Department to Council and
the VDC; the size and elected basis of the VDC; and the problem of the
2
ex officio headman's seat in one area with several headmen. Clearly
some of the points made arose from experience of difficulties; equally
the failure to define such fundamental matters in advance betrays a
lack of foresight. The upshot was the creation of a large number of
VDCs, some of which lapsed, and revival has often proved a more painful
and difficult process as a result of previous bitter experience.
In some areas, the Council noted with apparent approval, VDCs
assumed the mantle of the traditional administration, for instance in
helping to identify destitutes or - illegally - issuing stock sales
permits. In other villages the Parent/Teacher Association (PTA) came
to perform functions similar to those of the VDC - in one case acting
as a court of first instnce - and warranting official recognition, to
1 CDC Minutes 20-22 JUL 67. The basic institution of local
Development Committee had been mooted by the [Famine] Relief &
Rehabilitation Officer for the District, some months previously: C&ED
Report OCT 66-FEB 67.
2 CDC Minutes, 18-20 MR 70
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the extent that Councillors could be authorised to organise therm *
The role of the ex officio members of the VDC frequently gave
rise to problems. In the early days when Ipelegeng involved the
doling-out of rations (for which the demand was greater than the
supply) Councillors took an active interest in the famine relief
2
programme. As Ipelegeng moved into the truly voluntary self-help
phase, Councillors in a number of instances were able to perform a
"broker" function: using work already done under Ipelegeng in order
to get action on a road, for example; asking Council to complete a
self-help project; or promising Ipelegeng work in order to achieve the
3
resiting of a (planned) borehole. Headmen on the other hand tended
to perform a more negative role - or, more crudely, wield the power
of veto. Disputed occurred over the membership of one VDC, where the
Headmen told the Councillor (who represented several villages) that the
latter was not a member of the VDC. Another, enterprising, Headman
4
proposed that his travelling expenses should be met from VDC funds
Hie serious consequences of continuing hostility between Headmen and
Councillors was explicitly outlined in 1971 by the retiring acting
Paramount Chief and Council Chairman as follows :-
The apparent lack of co-operation between traditional
authorities and councillors ... he said should not be
allowed to prevail as it can only bring about stagnation
in development.®
1 C&ED Minutes 24 MAY 73; CDC Minutes, 11-12 SEP 74; Education
Committee Minutes, 26-27 OCT 71, 17-18 APR 73.
2 C&ED Reports, AUG 66 and OCT 66-FEB 67
3 CDC Minutes, 23-25 JUN 67, 15-17 SEP 71
4 Ibid., 15 SEP 69; CDC Agenda, 7-9 OCT 68
5 CDC Minutes, 22 JUN 71
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While certain particular causes of failure can be pinpointed, the
problem is clearly a complex interaction of many factors. An excep¬
tionally frank analysis by the Council's Development Officer of the
1970 Development Programme brings out the salient features and is
worth quoting:
. . . the 1970 programme was beset with several problems
which rendered it a failure. Some of these problems were
the scarcity of funds, lack of co-operation between instit¬
utions concerned, i.e. chief, councillors and Village
Development Committees and also failure on the part of the
officers and councillors to visit villages earmarked for
the programme. ... in some villages, agreements between
Council and Communities were in some cases misinterpreted
by Councillors to the people hence delaying progress. . . .
the other big obstacle in the development of projects was
the lack of communication between Councillors and officers
i.e. Councillors were not furnishing officers with the ^
necessary progress reports about their electoral Wards.
When it came to suggesting remedies - other than the almost
ritual plea for more co-operation and understanding by all concerned -
Councillors definitely rejected proposals to compel villagers to
participate in development projects but did agree to remove building
materials contributed by the Council if no progress was visible after
2
six months.
In concluding consideration of Ipelegeng it will have been noted
3
that the difficulties experienced in the Central District with
mobilizing the people have been considerable despite the absence of
significant Opposition party activity at the local level so frequently
blamed by BDP spokesmen in other areas for lack of progress, or of
the traditional rearguard action fought by the Paramount Chiefs else¬
where.
1 CDC Minutes, 20-21 MAR 73
2 Ibid., 20-22 JUL 67; Education Minutes, 12 OCT 73
3 For a few examples of VDCs in difficulties see BDN, 9 FEB 67,
13 FEB 67, 11 NOV 69, 11 FEB 71; for some examples of more successful
VDCs see BDN, 21 SEP 67, 21 JAN 69, 5 MAY 70, 5 FEB 73
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The role of Councillors
Central District Councillors were not short of advice on how to
perform their functions. An instance is the address by the Minister
of Local Government & Lands to the inaugural meeting of the Second
Session, in which the Minister emphasised the need for Councillors to
do the best for their constitutents, familiarise themselves with the
system, especially finance - "Too often [Councillors] blindly accept
estimates drawn up by their staff and fail to realise the implications
of, or reasons for, what they approve" - and report back after every
Council meeting to the electorate. The staff were not there to make
1
policy but to feed information to the Councillors. Certainly the
4
role of Councillors severally as channels of communications was well
understood in theory. The usual bringing of grievances to Council was
balanced by examples of Councillors being told to go and explain policy
or decisions to the people, e.g. arrangements for a mobile clinic, or
2
being given an investigatory role. Earlier mention has been made of
Councillors' role as compilers of lists of destitutes, as organisers
of PTAs, VDCs etc. Yet there remains a grey area requiring proper
definition - witness the reprimand handed out to one Councillor for
3
interfering in school administration. Not least of the problems was
the overlapping of the communication function between the Councillors
and the officials, notably the Council Secretary and Chairman - both
of whose tours of the District tended to become increasingly important
vehicles for suggesting action on problems which the Councillors might
4
have raised.
1 CDC Minutes, 19 NOV 69
2 H&W Minutes, 25-26 APR 73; CDC Minutes 22 JUN 71; 27-28 SEP 72;
Education Committee Minutes 12-14 JUL 73, Licensing Committee Minutes
27 JUL 73
3 CDC Minutes, 15-17 SEP 71
4 See chapter 6 for further discussion.
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A number of individual Councillors performed a visible role of
"broker" e.g. in achieving the switching of priorities between
1
different schools in the same ward or the completion of a project.
2
As a group however, Councillors were sometimes frustrated, or
became rather trapped by procedure. A good instance was the establish¬
ment by a sub-committee of an ad-hoc sub-sub-committee to examine
Councillors' proposed projects; this ad-hoc committee had a membership
3
of five, only one of whom was an elected Councillor.' Councillors
tended therefore to react in their frustration with attacks on the
officials of the Council or occasionally by demanding the reference-
back of a committee report. Those who bore the brunt of this were
increasingly the Council Secretary (whose position has been discussed
above) and the Education Secretary, whose cause c^l&bre is the subject
of examination later. But clearly Councillors as a body did not fully




Relations between the Central District Council and the traditional
authorities of the Bangwato are none too easy to characterise. Oil the
one hand the District is the heartland of BDP support and the degree
of overlap in personnel between the two systems is impressive. On the
other hand Gillett has suggested that considerable tensions and rivalries
bubble away beneath the surface and that it is only the unique position
of Sir Seretse Khama in commanding loyalty that preserves the fa9ade
1 Education Committee Minutes, 17-18 APR 73; CDC Minutes 14-17 SEP 70.
In addition see above, pp. 171 and 176.
2 E.g. in the unnecessarily protracted attempt to get a hospital
visiting committee established.
3 Planning Sub-Committee of C&ED Minutes, 29 JUN 67
4 The classic study of the Bangwato is I. Schapera, "The Ngwato of the




of unity. The resolution of the apparent paradox lies in two
distinctions, one of level and one of time, as well as the necessity
of weighing up particular cases of conflict or co-operation (and
integration}.^
Taking first the theme of harmony, "the foundations laid by the
Bamangwato Tribal Administration and its establishment of a Tribal
Council and an Executive Committee" were the subject of testimony by
2
the Minister of Local Government at the Council's inaugural meeting.
As inheritor of the Tribal Administration, moreover, Council inherited
most of its employees. For the First Session the Chief of the
Bangwato was ex officio Chairman of the Council (and was elected
Chairman at the beginning of Session II), and, more significantly, the
aristocratic members of Council (both elected and nominated) were
elected to very nearly one-third of the committee seats available at
the first elections in 1966 (nine out of twenty-eight) - a high degree
of over-representation. Further examples of the close relationship
are Council's agreement to pay the Chief's expenses incurred on a
trip to Israel and its suggestion that the Chief have a veto on
licensing applications. In turn the Chief, faced with a Government
request for the cession of Bangwato land to the state, requested that
Government spokesmantrame and explain the proposals to the District
3
Council. The force of custom was demonstrated, too, by the passage
of a motion asking that the custom of bogadi (dowry) be officially
1 S. Gillett, "The Survival of Chieftaincy in Botswana," African
Affairs, LXXII, 287 (1973)
2 CDC Minutes, 5-6 JUL 66
3 Staff Committee Report, JUL-AUG 66; F&GP Report APR-JUN 68; C&ED
Report OCT 66-FEB 67; CDC Minutes, 26 JUN 69, BDN 26 JUN 69
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1
reintroduced into Gamangwato. The voting- on that occasion however
was 15-12 in favour, which indicates the divisions within Councillors'
ranks concerning "traditionalism".
All was not sweetness and light however, particularly when it was
the village Headmen and the intermediate level of the traditional
administration that was at issue. In this latter category are to be
found the large number of Khama relatives, some of whom were keen to
jockey for position. The large number of questions concerning custom
and the whole traditional system which cropped up during Session I of
the Central District Council reflects the problem of demarcation which
preoccupied many Councillors in the early days of the Council. Specific
problems of communication arose, such as who was to tell the people
about matimela, or inform the Bangwato kgotla of District Council
decisions or collect/approve the lists of village destitutes. Moreover,
overt criticism of the aristocracy was expressed in the Council
chamber, necessitating an assurance by the Acting Chief that traditional
appointments were made on merit and were not restricted to the ruling
2
Sekgoma family.
As the pull of the Bangwato aristocracy fell away so did their
3
share of elective positions. Increasingly the leadership of the
Council fell into the hands of the "new men", symbolised by the election
as Council Chairman of Mr Colin Blackbeard, one of the District's
wealthiest traders (and later MP for Serowe North) in 1971. The
relative eclipse of the traditional authorities was caused in part
1 CDC Minutes, 7-9 OCT 68
2 Ibid., 20-22 JUL 67, 9 DEC 68; C&ED Minutes, 24 MAY 73; CDC
Minutes 7-9 OCT 68
3 See pp. 93-96 above
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by the illness of the original acting Chief, the resignation of his
successor, and prolonged discussions about the future of the Bangwato
chieftainship. There was no-one remotely resembling a Chief Bathoen
in the traditional system of the Bangwato, since the original Chief,
thanks to the British Government during Protectorate days,
inadvertently had his way paved to becoming Prime Minister Seretse
1
Khama.
Relations with the Central Government
The Central District received its fair share of VIP visits from
Ministers and senior civil servants. Ihe purpose of such visits
varied, from the purely ceremonial to the admonitory. The Minister of
Local Government & Lands, for instance, in an address criticised the
"tendency among a number of councils to treat the meeting of Council as
a debating ground for every imaginable topic irrespective of whether
2
such topic has any connection with the functions of the Council;"
while the Permanent Secretary in the same Ministry criticised unauth¬
orised virement and warned of closer Government scrutiny in the future.
Other official visitors, from other ministries, used the Council as a
sounding board for reactions to planned policy innovations such as
3
wildlife preservation schemes. Sometimes these occasions were purely
formal and boring, but most of them were seized with alacrity by
Councillors as an occasion to question the Man from the Ministry, some-
4
times to the extent of embarrassment. In a special category are the
1 "The Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, expressed regrets
at addressing Council without a jacket. ... He said how things had
changed. The last time he had addressed the then Tribal Council on
voting procedure his interpreter had been Mr Seretse Khama. " CDC
Minutes 7-9 OCT 68
2 Ibid., 20-23 FEB 67
3 CDC Minutes, 27-28 SEP 72, 21 MAY 70
4 See p. 185 below for an example.
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most ceremonious of all visits, but also the occasions for the most
serious business, namely the special Presidential "cession sessions",
at which the Council was asked to approve the ceding of land and
1
mineral rights to the Government.
Less spectacular was the correspondence between the Ministry and
the Council Secretary. At the level of officials, this was concerned
mostly with the form of the minutes or clarifying obscure points. But
it is worth gently exploding the myth that Mr E. M. K. Kgabo, Minister
of Local Government & Lands for most of the period under review, was
interested solely in his home district, the Kweneng, an idea which was
connected with the view that he was busily securing his political
2
base there. In fact Kgabo took a close interest in a number of issues
concerning the Central District, sending memos to his officials especially
on questions concerning matimela and the traditional system in general.
In particular he opposed the proposal to use matimela for traditional
ceremonies, and was suspicious of attempts by the Bangwato traditional
3
authorities to cling to their privileges.
In addition to pressures concerning matimela regulations, the
Government made suggestions for the contents of the Council's input to
the District Plan, while other Government representations concerned
an English-medium school and school area committees, the last two
1 CDC Minutes 11 MAR 67 and 26 JUN 69; BDN, 14 MAR 67
2 For politics in the Kweneng, see Vengroff, op. cit.(Especially Ch. V)
3 Correspondence between Permanent Secretary, MLG&L and CDC Secretary,
21 AUG 67 and 13 SEP 67; F&GP Minutes 25 MAY 67; "The decision
(Serowe kgotla*s) ... to refer the question of the ownership of
matimela to the traditional authorities clearly aims at flouting the
powers of the district council, which I am not prepared to tolerate"
(18/8/67 Note from Minister to Principal); note of 18/1/72 re^ costs of
upkeep of borehole involving ex-Chief Sekgoma Khama. The Minister's
interest in these matters in the Central District was reportedly the
result of representations from a Cabinet colleague from Gamangwato.
In any case he was generally keen on curbing the powers of the
aristocracy.
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examples giving rise to a certain amount of friction as Councillors
1
felt they were being dictated to.
When the Central District Council raised its voice in protest -
which it did not infrequently - the complaints were usually attributable
to one or other of two basic causes, finance or a lack of communication.
The Treasurer's complaint about the Government's forcing the Council to
deplete its reserves up to the point of crisis, while understandable,
was an indication that the Council was being forced into a more
developmental, active role but also being forced to submit its plans
for close Government scrutiny. Later the Council protested about the
problems caused by cuts in expenditure imposed on them by a Government
which also refused to grant sufficient "pump priming" funds for the
2
establishment of the matimela system it ostensibly prized so highly.
In the financial field it is interesting to note that the Central
District was less disposed to swallow its medicine than was the
"problem" Southern District.
In more general terms the Central District's complaints included
the common one of the Government's tardiness in replying to communic¬
ations, and its failure to consult the Council on the question of the
extension of the bounds of Selebi-Phikwe at the expense of the Central
District. On one occasion indeed the Council protested at a press
release issued by the Government and demanded a public retraction.3
Apart from sporadic friction in general between the Central
District Council and the Government, there were three particular areas
1 H&W Minutes, 9 AUG 73; CDC Minutes, 22 JUN 71; Education Committee
Report, MAY-JUN 68
2 CDC Minutes, 15-17 SEP 71; Education Committee Minutes, 7-8 AUG 73;
CDC Minutes 20-21 MAR 73
3 Education Committee Report, MAY-JUN 68; H&W Minutes, 24 JUL 73;
CDC Minutes, 22 JUN 71, 13-14 DEC 72, 23-25 JUN 69
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of activity which caused the greatest amount of dissatisfaction, none
of them directly/exclusively the responsibility of the "parent" Ministry.
As in the other two Districts, the biggest single sphere of discontent
was water. Examples of failure on the part of the Department of Water
Affairs to come up to expectations or even to reply to letters are
legion, but it added insult to injury when the Minister of Commerce,
Industry & Water Affairs, on a VIP visit, declared that he would not
deal with questions concerning water as the official from the Department
of Water Affairs was absent. Small wonder that Councillors "expressed
misgivings" at the ability of the Water Affairs Department to cope
with a new borehole maintenance scheme, and later recorded their view
of the "failure of the Department of Water Affairs to cope with the
maintenance of the existing boreholes in the District." The refusal
of the Geological Survey Department to drill for water as requested,
moreover, while perhaps technically justified, caused further bitterness,
1
which might have been avoidable by good public relations.
Next to water - and connected causally if not organisationally -
the greatest cause for criticism of the Government concerned the Food-
for-Work or Famine Relief or Drought Relief programmes. It has already
been seen how fragile the voluntary principle of self-help could be,
and how much effort was required to try and put across the distinction
between self-help and food-for-work. The following minute is worth
quoting since it brings out the criticisms of the whole Food-for-Work
idea by the District's representatives after six years experience:
World Food Programme Project
The Secretary told Council that the question of the
resumption of Food-for-Work Programme was discussed at
1 CDC Minutes, 21 MAY 70, 7-9 OCT 68, 20 DEC 71, 15-17 SEP 71
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length (at the National Conference of District Development
committees). Ihat fears were expressed from all quarters
by those who have experienced something bitter about food
contribution toward VDC projects.
The Secretary went on to say that the conference
members, having given several reasons against the reintro-
duction of the food-for-work programme, expressed them¬
selves in favour of a food programme to relieve the
destitutes. The World Food Programme officer stated that
the WFP could not provide food on the foregoing terms.
There was diversity of opinion among Council members.
Some welcomed the programme and others spoke against it
recalling its aftermath once it was discontinued, that it
would have a serious effect on all future attempts to
institute a genuine self-help development programme. The
matter was put to vote. 7 were in favour and 15 were
against it, and it was
RESOLVED
To endorse the decision of the National Conference
that Food-for-Work Programme should not be
reintroduced.1
The Councillors were understandably annoyed when the Government intro¬
duced the scheme six months later.
Members said that they were inclined to believe that the
food-for-work programme would disturb the Village Development
Committees as the people who are involved in the programme
are the very same people who are used by the Village
Development Committee.
The Development Officer reiterated . . . that this programme
came suddenly from Government and that was why Councillors
and Village Development Committees had not been informed at
the initial stage to what extent they would be involved in
the matter.^
Subsequently Councillors testified to having had their fears confirmed :-
. . . during the introduction of the drought relief programme
village development committees and councillors were never
consulted. CDAs and teachers were the only people who were
responsible for the organisation of the people and the
distribution of food. This meant therefore that Councillors
would have difficulties in trying to mobilise people ....
Council members came to the conclusion that as 1974 was the
year of consultation they were hopeful that the Ministry would
1 CDC Minutes, 13-14 DEC 72
2 i£id_. , 3-5 OCT 73
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consult council and not issue directives whenever they
have some plans to do something.1
These hopes were dashed however with the further major disruption
of a crash programme of public works called the Accelerated Rural
Development Programme (ARDP), which aimed to create a sizeable and
visible difference in rural infrastructure (transport, education and
health especially) during the run-up to the 1974 election. However
Councillors in the Central District on the whole reacted favourably,
or were neutral, since the benefits of the scheme were tangible and
were worth paying the price of the lack of consultation which had so
perturbed Councillors in the case of the Food-for-Work programme.
2
Members of Parliament
Although Members of Parliament made up the bulk of the Central
District Preparatory Commission, and although the Secretary and
Chairman of the Central District Council (in Session II) were sub¬
sequently elected to the National Assembly, the links between MPs and
3
the District Council were weak. Backbench MPs rarely attended
4
meetings of the Council although ministers, and the President himself,
did occasionally attend. One MP, B. Steinberg, who represented Boteti,
5
did sit on a Council sub-committee for a time. But on the whole MPs
neither visited the Council offices nor wrote to the Council with
problems.
The notable exception to this rule was M„ P. K. Nwako, who
developmed a very close relationship with the Councillor for Palapye,
6
both of whom collaborated on a series of issues. A prime example of
1 CDC Minutes 12 DEC 73
2 Chapter 9 is devoted to a fuller study of MPs. This section is
concerned with MPs seen from the perspective of the District Council.
3 See the Tordoff Report (op. cit.). p. 57
4 Ibid; CDC Minutes, 18-19 MAR 68
5 Minutes of Five Year Planning Sub-Committee; C&ED, 14 APR 67
6 See BDN, 8 SEP 69, 15 SEP 69
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Nwako's activity was the Lerala clinic case. Here the MP persuaded a
local businessman to make a sizeable donation towards the cost of a
local clinic and this donation, it was subsequently agreed at the
Councillor's instigation, counted as the Community's contribution in
terms of self-help percentages. Another MP who worked closely with
one of his Councillors to urge the reticulation of water to a village
school was unsuccessful when it was pointed out that the school was
1
next door to his store. Mostly MPs raised questions in the National
Assembly with no reference to the Council and these were occasionally
2
brought up in the Council. In one instance the MP for Mahalapye, who
had attended a Council meeting, criticised the Council Secretary's
handling of business and was formally rebuked by the Council for
3
interference.
It is not being argued that MPs were inactive, but rather that
their activities tended to by-pass the Council. In its turn the
Council (usually prodded by the Secretary) only very intermittently
4
decided to refer matters to MPs to take up. Most of the time the
two institutions were in watertight compartments.
SPECIAL ISSUES
The Education Secretary
The rise and fall of the first Education Secretary of the Central
District warrants special mention on various counts: firstly because
of the importance of the position (the CDC being the biggest employer
of teachers in the country), secondly because of the inordinate amount
1 H&W Minutes, 15-16 NOV 72, 25-26 APR 73, 15-16 NOV 72
2 E.g. CDC Minutes, 22 JTJN 71 and 13-14 DEC 72
3 lbid., 15-16 JUL 68. See also pp. 384-385 below.
4 E.g. F&GP Report, SEP 66-FEB 67; Education Committee Minutes,
17-18 APR 73; CDC Minutes 3-5 OCT 73
189
of attention given to the question by Councillors and others, and
lastly but by no means least because of the light it sheds on the
workings of the local government system in general.
As soon as the recommended appointment as Education Secretary of
the former Tribal Administration Assistant Education Secretary was
made known it was under fire, and the recommendation adopted only after
a lengthy session in camera, while an emergency motion laying down that
the holder of the post of Education Secretary should hold a professional
certificate in teaching was tabled - but ruled out of order - soon
1 2
afterwards. Complaints followed concerning the transfer of teachers,
delays of up to six months in paying teachers, that the Education
Secretary had by-passed the Finance Committee etc. The criticisms
were of arrogance, arbitrariness, insensitivity and maladministration,
not least with regard to women teachers. However despite the manifest
discontent amongst Councillors it was held that the individual concerned
could not be dismissed, and instead a seasoned trouble-shooter was
sent by the Central Government to investigate. As a result of his
confidential report, the post of Chief Education Secretary was
created: i.e. relative demotion. The irony of the situation was
that Council were unable to make a suitable appointment and this made
the Education Secretary - much to the annoyance of Councillors -
Acting Chief Education Secretary, and as a last straw were forced to
pay him an acting allowance. However eventually the officer concerned
took the hint and a golden handshake and resigned. But the whole
affair took a total of seven years - which underlines the weakness of
1 CDC Minutes, 12 SEP 66, 20-22 FEB 67
2 Education Committee Report, MAY-JUN 68; see also Tordoff Report,
op. cit., pp. 23-25
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Councillors in exercising authority over senior staff. It also
illustrates weakness in the system in dividing responsibility for
education between two officials (the other being the Education Officer,
„ 1
a field officer of the Ministry of Education).
Decentralisation and the Mahalapye question
The Central District, by virtue of its size, has been the subject
of recurrent, and uniformly unsuccessful, proposals to break it up or,
more commonly, to decentralise it by creating Subordinate District
Councils or Area Councils. The idea, first accepted by the Central
District Preparatory Commission, was accepted in principle by the
2
Council, but nothing happened. The Tordoff Commission and the later
Chambers and Feldman mission recommended that the matter be reactivated"
and the District Development Committee then considered the question at
4
great length. The main visible result was the decision to build up
5
one of the northern villages as an Area administrative headquarters.
The significant fact is that there was no pressure coming from
Councillors for the creation of subordinate district councils: instead,
pressure for decentralisation came in other ways. Examples are the
Agricultural Show (an annual event in Serowe), which some Councillors
wanted held in subordinate areas as well as or instead of the central¬
ised show. Similarly there was successful pressure to divide up the
cake for the annual Independence celebrations into the twelve parlia¬
mentary constituencies. A further reallocation was made of the funds
1 CDC Minutes, 22 JUN 71, 22-23 MAR 72, 3-5 OCT 73
2 On a motion proposed and seconded by the Councillors for Mahalapye.
CDC Minutes 20-23 FEB 67
3 The Tordoff Report, op. cit,, pp 21-23 & Appendix III; Chambers &
Feldman, Report on Rural Development (1973), pp 217-220
4 Central DDC Minutes, 12 JUN 73
5 F&GP Minutes, 19 JUN 73
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1
for the relief of destitution. The most obvious explanation is
that Councillors were more interested in decentralisation of patronage
than of responsibility.
This squares with the institutional change which aroused the
greatest interest in Councillors, namely the creation of the Subordinate
Triabl Land Boards When the novel Land Board system was creaking
audibly, Councillors countered the proposal of the Ngwato Land Board
that the introduction of subordinate tribal land boards should be
delayed with a resolution urging that preparations for their establish-
2
ment be expedited; many Councillors were subsequently elected to the
Subordinate Tribal Land Boards, which thus considerably increased their
power and prestige.
The reason for the resistance to the break up of the administrative
3
unity of the District was fundamentally political. The nuclear
4
("true"i Bangwato had over a long period created an empire in which
they were a small minority, but this process was so successful that
most inhabitants of the Central District referred to themselves as
Bangwato and were proud to do so, since the Bangwato are by far the
largest clan, if not the most senior in historical terms in Botswana.
But this much-prized unity - the basis for BDP power as well as that
of the traditional authorities - was potentially threatened by the
large linguistic minority of Kalangas in the north of the District; it
is axiomatic that any form of elected subordinate council system would
1 C&ED Report, OCT 66-FEB 67; CDC Minutes, 14-17 SEP 68, 21-22 JUN 72
2 Ibid., 14-17 SEP 70
3 "The members were alerted as to the sensitivity of the issue involved
and that it should not be discussed outside of the meeting." Central
DDC Minutes, 12 JUN 73
4 See Schapera, "The Ngwato of the Bechuanaland Protectorate," op.
cit. .
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create a Kalanga-speaking sub-council. And there is an underlying
fear amongst many Setswana-speaking Bangwato that the Kalangas, given
"home rule" in the northern area (known as Bokalaka) might start
behaving politically like the Kalangas of the North East District and
Francis town, both strongholds of the BPP. Hence the reluctance to
contemplate tampering wit h the existing system.
Paradoxically, perhaps, the most persistent demands for decentral¬
isation have come, however, not from the Bokalaka but from Mahalapye.
1
The proposal - mooted at a public meeting - that it might form a
township on its own (like Selebi-Phikwe) led to a strong reaction in
the Council, which is worth quoting fully:
The Chairman said that he had recently attended a meeting
at Mahalapye where a desire that Mahalapye should become a
township authority was expressed, but his own feeling was
that if the idea of a township authority was a good one,
Serowe should be the first town in the Central District to
be declared a township authority.
He also said that he would shortly be touring the
Central District as TRIBAL AUTHORITY. . . .
Points raised by members ....
(i.i) That it was not the feeling of the majority
of the people of Mahalapye that the town should be
separated administratively from the entire District. The
feeling of others who were at the meeting was that a town¬
ship authority should be introduced in Serowe first as was
the practice with all new orders of things. Others had
intimated that they would return to Serowe, from where they
had originally come, if Mahalapye became a township
authority.
(iii) Councillors from places within the Mahalapye sub-
district area mentioned that if Mahalapye became a town¬
ship authority, they would request the Government to be
excluded from the township.
(iv) That althought the idea may be a good one, it was
still early for its implementation.
(v) That Mahalapye did not raise enought revenue to make
it self-sufficient.
(vi) That Serowe could neither be a township authority as
many surrounding smaller villages depended on it for
revenue.2
1 BDN, 2 MAR 71
2 CDC Minutes, 24-25 MAR 71
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In another respect Mahalapye played a lone if not maverick role.
This was the celebrated case of the Mahalapye Community Centre1 (a
building- of interest to architects as an object lesson of the pitfalls
of amateur architecture), which was conceived on a grand scale and
proceeded with until there were difficulties both structural and
financial. At this point the matter came to the Council in the form
of an application for funds. A certain amount was forthcoming- but
the Ministry expressed disapproval of any further grant and successful
2
recourse was made to foreign aid sources, notably the US Embassy.
Now the building stands as a monument, but also the possible nucleus
of any future Subordinate District Council or Town Council administration.
More is said in Chapter 6 about the factors behind the politics of
3
Mahalapye, which are more complex than in most parts of the District.
In conclusion it should be recorded that Mahalapye's two Councillors
acted together in sponsoring motions more frequently than Councillors
of any other constituency, but were disproportionately unsuccessful in
these joint initiatives. This may indicate a certain degree of anti-
Mahalapye backlash, but it did not carry over to committee elections,
where Mahalapye Councillors achieved a growing prominence.
THE CENTRAL DISTRICT AS POLITICAL ARENA
Hie Ethnic Factor
There is only one recognised clan within the District - the
4
Bangwato - but there are three main linguistic minorities. The Kalangas
have already been mentioned, but despite the alleged sensitivity of the
"Kalanga issue" - or, just possibly, because of it - there was no
1 For an early report see BDN, 2 MAY 69
2 CDC Minutes, 24-25 MAR 71, 15-17 SEP 71
3 Pp. 306-308
4 In the sense of first language: many can speak Setswana, the country's
lingua franca. See also Schapera, op. cit.
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discussion whatsoever of the Kalangas as a group nor of the Kalanga
language.* The question of the support for opposition parties, which
was definitely greater in Kalanga-speaking areas in the northern part
of the District, is examined below. A difficulty inherent in
examining the question however is the lack of data on the mother
tongue of the people of the District, or indeed any other part of the
country.
Likewise Europeans were not treated as a group. Occasionally
remarks were made about "big" traders and farmers who must have been
white and in one instance Council rejected a plea for recognition of
a private school on a (white-owned) farm, while accepting a similar
2
plea from a village private school. But compared with the North East
where there was frequent criticism of white farmers, the Tuli Block
farmers were virtually ignored (in the Council, though not in
Parliament). Indeed a number of Europeans played a significant part
in the Council, two serving as Councillors and several others (the
second Speaker of the National Assembly, the Rev A. A. F. Lock, MP;
B. Steinberg, MP; and Patrick van Rensburg, the internationally known
educationalist) served on Council committees by cooption. The victory
3
of the fluent Setswana-speaking Councillor Blackbeard in the election
to the Chairmanship of the Council could also be seen as a triumph
for Botswana's non-racial policy.
4
The policy on the Basarwa (Bushmen) was less liberal: indeed the
question of Tswana attitudes to the Basarwa is the Achilles heel of
1 The only partial exception was a query of the spelling of Tutume/Totome,
and it was decided to use the latter (Setswana) version. CDC Minutes
22-25 MAR 72.
2 Ibid., 20-23 FEB 67; Education Committee Minutes, 10-14 JUL 73
3 He defeated one of the elected Councillors for Serowe.
4 Botswana's Basarwa have been a magnet for anthropological researchers.
Prescribed reading for those interested in the subject ought to be
A. M. Merriweather, Desert Doctor (1969>, p. 80.
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Botswana's non-racialism. Thus a motion was tabled: "that Bushmen
whose theft of livestock is increasing should be removed and brought
1
home." Councillors were divided on the issue, some maintaining
that the allegation was too sweeping or could be dealt with through the
courts; those in favour of the motion
said that Bushmen were thieves because they had nothing to
do as they were no longer owned and did not plough nor
owned cattle. They also pointed out that they could be
removed as they were illegal settlers as they did not have
the Chief's permission to occupy the land they do.
2
The motion was finally referred to the Chief (by 22 votes to 2) and
the matter lapsed.
Although the Bangwato clan clearly predominates in the Central
District some of the more traditionalist elements objected to the fact
that, whereas the Bakwena, Bakgatla, and Bangwaketse gave their names
to their District Councils, this was not the case in Central District.
Accordingly a motion was proposed to change the name of the Council to
Bamangwato District Council but was defeated 3-25, one Councillor
3
remarking that the Bangwato should be "above tribal divisions."
Nevertheless when it came to the privilege of hunting in
S
Gamangwato, Councillors expressed a strong determination to reserve
those rights to members of the clan and opposed the suggestion that
4
the Chief could allow dispensation to non-clansmen. When it came to
rights over land (including hunting) the traditional clan system holds
very firm.'
1 CDC Agenda 7 OCT 68; amended to read "to Serowe" instead of "home"
when introduced.
2 CDC Minutes, 7-9 OCT 68
3 ibid., 20-23 FEB 67. Motion proposed by an aristocratic nominated
Councillor and seconded by the Councillor for Palapye.
4 CDC Minutes, 22 JUN 71, 18-20 MAR 70. The known fact of discretionary
exceptions did not alter clansmen's reluctance to lose their privileges
in their own territory.
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Elections
That the Central District is a stronghold of the ruling Botswana
Democratic Party there can be no doubt. In Parliamentary General
Elections it has held every one of the twelve seats with ease. The
size of the BDP's election triumph is shown in Table 4.1.
TABLE 4.1
BDP; GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS; CENTRAL DISTRICT (12 constituencies)
1965 1969 1974
Seats held 12 12 12
Unopposed - 2 2
Share of vote in contested seats 89.9% 89.7% 93.4%
Smallest majority 23.1%* 40.3%* 53.6%**
* Tonota ** Sebinas & Gweta
The Opposition challenge has steadily faded, the only interest concerning
the party label of the unsuccessful candidates. Tables 4.2 and 4.3
illustrate.
TABLE 4.2
NUMBER OF OPPOSITION CANDIDATES IN GENERAL ELECTIONS: CENTRAL DISTRICT
1965 1969 1974
BIP 11 6 3
ENF - 7 2
BPP 11 5 4
Ind. - 1
Total 22 18 10
TABLE 4.3
OPPOSITION PARTIES' SHARE OF VOTES IN GENERAL ELECTIONS: CENTRAL DISTRICT
(Share of vote in seats contested by respective party in brackets)
1965 1969 1974
BIP 3.1%( 3. 4%) 2.1 %( 3.3%) 2„1%( 5.1%)
BNF 2.8%( 4.6%) 0.3%( 1.2%)
BPP 7.0%( 7. 8%) 5.4%(11.6%) 3 . 8%(1 5. 0%)
Ind - - 0.5%( 4.4%)
Total 10.1% 10.3% 6.7%
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The District Council elections tell the same story. Tables 4.4, 4.5
and 4.6 show the position (32 Council seats at stake).
TABLE 4.4
BDP: LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION RESULTS; CENTRAL DISTRICT
1966 1969 1974
Candidates nominated 32 32 32
Seats won 31 31 32
Unopposed 15 19 22
Share of vote in contested seats 82.3% 83.3% 87.5%
Smallest BDP majority 13.0%* 5.2%* 22.5%*'
* Sebina ** Mathangwane
TABLE 4.5
NUMBER OF OPPOSITION CANDIDATES IN CENTRAL DISTRICT COUNCIL ELECTIONS
(Seats won in brackets)
1966 1969 1974
BIP 9(0) 3(0) 4(0)
BNF 1(0) 10(0) 0(-)
BPP 7(1) 4(1) 6(0)
Ind. 2(0) O(-) O(-)
Total 19(1) 17(1) 10(0)
TABLE 4.6
OPPOSITION PARTIES'
PERCENTAGE SHARE OF POLL IN CENTRAL DISTRICT COUNCIL ELECTIONS
(Share in seats contested by respective parties in brackets)
1966 1969 1974
BIP 6.0 ( 9.6) 2.2 ( 6.8) 4.2 ( 7.7)
BNF 1.1 (30o8) 6.1 ( 9.1)
BPP 9.8 (30.0) 8o4 (32.8) 8.2 (18.4)
Ind. 0.8 ( 5.4)
Total 17.7 16.7 12.4
The question of a Kalanga anti-BDP vote has been raised. The
tables which follow give the share of the poll gained by the Democratic
Party in the ten constituencies contested in 1965 and 1969 and the
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eight Polling Districts which were contested in all three General
1
Elections. The constituencies or Polling Districts with a Kalanga-
speaking majority (or at least a very substantial section of the
populace) are shown above the line; the lists follow the normal Botswana
order, which is roughly from north to south. The "solid" Setswana-
speaking constituencies show a very high degree of support for the BDP
(around 90%), much higher than the Kalanga-speaking ones. Another
significant point is the constituencies which swung away from the BDP
in 1969. Ihis was the year when all BDP-held constituencies outside
the Central District bar one showed a negative swing, whereas most
constituencies in the Central District (and also those held by the BPP)
swung towards the Government„
TABLE 4.7
PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCIES CONTESTED IN 1965 AND 1969
CENTRAL DISTRICT: BDP SHARE OF THE POLL(percentage)








































+ 2 o 2
1 The Parliamentary Constituency boundaries were changed in 1972
making accurate comparisons impossible.
199
TABLE 4.8
POLLING DISTRICTS CONTESTED IN ALL THREE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS:
CENTRAL DISTRICT: BDP SHARE OF THE POLL (percentage)
Pollin* District 1966 1969 1974 SiiffiES. 212268.6 from *66 from °69 from ®66
Sebina 56.5 49.3* - 7.2 72.7 +23.4 +16.2
Nkange 76.1 67.4 - 8.7 76.8 + 9.4 + 0.7
Totome 78.4 67.5 1 O co 84.1 +16.6 + 5.7
Mathangwane 23.1 33.0 + 9.9 61.2** +28.2 +38.1
Tonota West 71.9 84.5 +12.6 82.7 - 1.8 +10.8
Shoshong 89.5 91.5 + 2.0 91.9 + 0.4 + 2.4
Mahalapye North 90.6 96.1 + 5.5 94.7 - 1.4 + 4.1
Mahalapye South 91.2 92.8 + 1.6 94.3 + 1.5 + 3.1
* Held by BDP in three-cornered contest
** BDP gain from BPP
The evidence suggests that there was an anti-BDP swing in the
far north of the District in 1969, in common with most of Botswana out¬
side Gamangwato; but that this ground was more than recovered in the
1974 local government poll.
By-elections Cone Parliamentary and six Council) during the
period 1965-1974 showed no surprises in electoral behaviour, the BDP
winning all seven contests with ease and in several cases unopposed.
The biggest upset came in a Council by-election in 1967 in Mathangwane.
This was the People's Party's only seat but went uncontested to the
1
BDP. The BPP won the seat back in the 1969 election, only to lose it
in 1974 (on the lowest turnout in the District).
1 The matter was the subject of a strong protest by the BPP MP for
Tati West, who wrote to the Ministry concerned complaining about the
administrative handling of nominations. The Ministry in an internal
communication admitted that irregularities might be held to have
occurred and it was suggested that legal action might be taken.
The matter was not however pursued to that extent. Ministry of Local
Government & Lands, By-elections file.
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1
Administrative irregularities also occurred over the Shoshong
by-election but on this occasion the Ministry felt that the matter was
so grave that the by-election had to be held all over again, and even
2
the second time round all was not done according to the book. A more
serious case arose from the conviction of a Councillor on a charge of
3
stock theft„ The Councillor was suspended for a time from the Council,
then resumed his seat, only to be dropped by the BDP at the 1969
elections. In another case a Councillor was debarrred for not sub¬
mitting any election expenses but subsequently readmitted.
In the light of the widely held view that the BDP as an electoral
machine is efficient - its proud boast is that it has never lost a
deposit - it is interesting to note that on two occasions no valid
nominations were received for by-elections CSefophe and Tonota East)
4
and a second nomination day had to be notified. Had an opposition
party been on its toes it could have gained a walkover, even in the
Pomkrag heartland.
Parties and Policies
With one minor exception one does not find in the Central District
any examples of party-initiated policy discussions or questions (the
exception being the Mahalapye-based national Vice-President of the BNF,
Dr K. Koma, who was inter alia spokesman of the Botswana Small Traders'
1 BDN, 25 AUG 71
2 But the embarrassment of having to hold a third by-election (in a
safe BDP seat, where the opposition came from the Independence Party)
was too great and the minor irregularity ignored.
3 A fine was imposed with the option of a prison sentence, the terms
of which would have led to the seat's being declared vacant: a Ministry
of Local Government &, Lands official suggested this to the Attorney-
General but his reply was in the negative, on the grounds that the gaol
sentence was not actually served. MLG&L, By-election file.
4 Ibid.
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Union and proposed a ban on the use of free transport by big traders
1
to bring people in to their stores). So the two topics are really
quite separate.
The question of party membership came up in two ways. In 1970
the lone People's Party Councillor complained at the partisan bias of
elections to committees (i.e. his exclusion for the second time at the
annual round of committee elections). An attempt was made eighteen
months later to unseat him from the Council on the grounds of a period
of non-attendance but the Chairman ruled against this on the grounds
2
that he had sent his apologies to the Chairman on each occasion.
Later in 1972 he was co-opted to one committee and in the annual
committee elections in October 1973 was elected for the first time to
serve on a Council committee. To put the matter in perspective, however,
it should be recorded that the BPP Councillor was not the only one to
fail to gain a seat on any committee, while other Councillors served on
more than one.
The other context in which political parties were invoked was the
Secretary's conception of the Councillors as party representatives, and
the implication that the party should be the source of guidance on
policy and make provision for such facilities as offices if Councillors
3
wanted them. For instance the following appeared on the Agenda of an
early meeting of the Council:-
Question 14 What is the function of the Councillor in his
constituency? Cllr. Mrs. Kaang
1 CDC Minutes, 22-23 MAR 72
2 Ibid., 14-17 SEP 70, 22-23 MAR 72
3 Mr Seretse was unusual in going out of his way to mention, let alone
praise, political parties. His subsequent elevation to a Ministerial
position in Local Government &, Lands was to give him the opportunity
to translate his beliefs into practice.
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Answer; the Councillor is advised to contact her party
machinery at Headquarters, for the necessary guidance.
Matters for party politics are best left to the politicians.
When members stood for election in the various constituencies
-i
they were guided by their party machinery.
Although anything resembling a " party line" of policy was absent,
this does not mean that there were not some divisions of opinion
particularly on socio-economic issues. On two occasions the question
of private versus Council enterprise caused lengthy debate: the proposal
to close down the Council maintenance workshop and use private garages
was heavily defeated, but equally the motion that the CDC should buy
and store grain was equally unsuccessful. The matter of policy on
2
hawkers' licences, mentioned above, was also queried by a Councillor.
But the most consistent set of innovative proposals came from radical
expatriates, the leading light being Patrick van Rensburg, a South
African political refugee who has been responsible for the Brigades
Movement, a whole series of activities related to it and to the Swaneng
Hill School. Co-opted on to a planning committee he put forward a
series of proposals on conservation and public enterprise (and was
3
opposed particularly by Mr B. Steinberg, MP, a wealthy trader). Hie
institution of the District Development Committee, serviced by
enthusiastic expatriate volunteers, gave a valuable forum for the
propagation of such ideas, and one can identify the expatriates in
4
Serowe (and offshoots of the Swaneng Hill School in Tutume, Tonota
1 Agenda for CDC meeting, 20 FEB 67. In the Minutes however the
answer appeared as: "Cllr. should consult her party machinery or
Members of the National Assembly."
2 CDC Minutes, 18-19 MAR 68, 10-11 MAR 69
3 Minutes of Planning Sub-Committee of C&ED Committee, passim but
especially 14 APR 67
4 See J. R. Sheffield (Ed.), Road to the Village: Case Studies in
African Community Development (1974) (Chapters by Sheffield and
G. P. Pearson).
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and Mahalapye) as the major source of policy initiatives in the
District. They found counterpartss moreover, in certain central
Government Ministries (this is explored in Chapter 8).
Hie Council and the People
For all the CDC's reputation as a "model council" there was
patently a long way to go before it could be said that the public
understood what exactly the reform of local government meant. One or
1
two quotations make this plain and provide a suitable commentary with
which to end this chapter.
1966: The Councillor appeared to be unable to distinguish
what was Tribal from what was a Council responsibility.
1967: The Chairman on opening pointed out that although
Council had completed a whole year, nothing much had
been accomplished. ... He went on to ask Councillors
to seek and consider the opinion of the tribe before
formulating decisions. ... if nothing had been
achieved since District Councils were founded, as one
Councillor had said, the fault lay with the Councillors
themselves.
1969: Most Councillors said Council could not solve the
problem seeing it was difficult to arouse the interest
of the people to come to their meetings. Ever since
Independence people were losing interest in public
affairs. . . . unanimously RESOLVED: that people should
be encouraged to attend official public meetings.
1973: Council had also not reached the stage where people
were satisfied with its work.
1 CDC Minutes 12 SEP 66, 20-22 JUL 67, 23-25 JUN 69, 20-21 MAR 73
CHAPTER 5
THE NORTH EAST DISTRICT COUNCIL
Hie frontier North East District (the rural part of the area known
as the Tati District)1 although one of the smallest in Botswana, has
always attracted a disproportionate amount of attention, and this
continues right up to 1977 with armed incursions from Rhodesia bringing
2
a new kind of newsworthiness to the District.
3
Hiree hundred miles from Gaborone by untarred road, the District's
29,000 inhabitants look for commercial services to Francistown and
Bulawayo more than Gaborone, with the Rhodesian-owned railway providing
an important link between all three places. The North East is a
pioneering district in a number of ways. In political terms the Tati
District provided the base for the first serious political party in
4
Bechuanaland, the People's Party, which from the first articulated
N
an anti-colonialist, Pan-Africanist philosophy; in those days
Francistown was the largest urban centre in the Protectorate. Right
up to (and including) 1974 the BPP has received a majority of votes in
the Tati District. The North East District Council is unique among
the Local Authorities for having experienced contests for every single
1 Formerly known as the Tati Concession. Administratively one District
Commissioner covers both Francistown and the North East District.
2 See series of Botswana High Commission (London) Press Releases, 1976
and 1977 ["Monthly Newsletter"]-
3 I.e. at Independence; since then parts of the main North-South road
have been tarred and more is planned.
4 See BPP Constitution, para. 2: National Headquarters.
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seat on the Council in the 1966, 1969 and 1974 elections, and also in
having had an Opposition majority of elected members on all these
occasions. Likewise in Parliamentary elections the District has given
its loyalty consistently to the People's Party. The North East District,
then, is the original Opposition stronghold.
In another sense the North East was a pioneering one, in having
the first secondary school (no longer extant) and a traditional regard
for education which is doubtless connected with the poverty of the rural
hinterland of Ff-ancistown combined with the influence of (in colonial
days) European-controlled Francistown as an enclave in its midst.
Two main theories are adduced to account for the persistent
loyalty of the people of the North East to the People's Party. The
first is put forward by those who see Batswana politics as "tribalist"
and is based on the fact that the bulk of the population are Kalanga
and speak a language which is incomprehensible to the Setswana-
speaking majority of Botswana (it is close to Shona, which indicates
the origins of the Kalangas). This is reflected in the fact that the
BPP in its literature used all three languages (English, Setswana and
1
Kalanga) and that the language issue has been raised by the BPP MPs.
There are two obvious objections to this argument. One is the
fact (noted already) that Kalangas in the neighbouring Central District
have voted predominantly for the ruling BDP. The other is the success
of the BPP in the Mochudi constituency, in the Kgatleng, and in a
2
number of District Council elections.
1 See below, p. 381
2 A further, more refined objection to the "Kalanga theory" points to
the heterogeneous origins of the people of the District, despite the
prevalence of the Kalanga language there. This is explored in I. Schapera,
The Native land problem in the Tati district (Bechuanaland Protectorate)
(1943), which is essential reading for a proper understanding of the
District.
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The alternative explanation sees the BPP vote in the Tati District
as a protest against deprivation. An eloquent description of the area
begins: "The history of north-eastern Botswana formerly known as the
Tati Concession is one of exploitation," and continues: "The North
East is in fact a depressed area.1,1
It is the combination of two elements which make for the depressed
state of the District. These are land and people. If one takes the
2
estimate of the Administrator of the Tati Settlement Project, 37,000
people need to be considered as the true population of the District
which would give a notional density figure of 7 per square kilometre
(18 per square mile). But this figure, although high compared with the
3
national figure of 3.0 persons per square mile is highly misleading.
Even if the de facto population of 26,000 (enumerated in the 1971
census) is used it is in fact confined to less than half the district,
since 59% is still owned by the freehold farmers and the Tati Company.
The 41% is divided into the communal land tenure area (17% of the
district) and the land which the State acquired from the Tati Company
4
in 1969. So the pressure on land is severe: even if all the land were
purchased by the Government it is doubtful if it would be sufficient to
support the present human and livestock population without degrading
1 J. Flood, Report on Development Projects Supported by Botswana
Christian Council (1974), p„ 234
2 E. B. Egner (Administrator, Tati Settlement Project), Interim
Report of the Tati Settlement Project (1971) [Subsequently referred to
as Egner, Interim Report] p. 2
3 For consideration of demography generally, see P. Smit, Botswana:
Resources & Development (1970), Chapter III
4 See R. P. Werbner, "Land, Movement and Status among Kalanga of
Botswana," in M„ Fortes (Ed.), Essays in Social Anthropology (1976),
Ch. 7 (especially p. 98)
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the vegetation. It can readily be seen, therefore, that land is the
main political issue.
The politically delicate situation is made explosive by the
juxtaposition of well-watered white farms and an over-stocked Kalanga
"reserve". As will be seen, the large cattle owners and the really
poor peasants have a common grievance in the form of land hunger,
but their interests in other respects diverge.
The final ingredient in the political complexion of the area is
provided by the experience of Tati 'Company rule in Francistown. The
main town in the North East at first sight used to resemble a South
2
African town of comparable size, with a predominantly white, low-
density "Fi-ancistown proper" on one side of the river and the railway,
and the densely-populated, almost wholly African Tatitown, complete
with shanties, company beerhalls and appalling hygiene on the other
side. Moreover the South African-owned Company had a legal monopoly of
trading, controlled the granting of trading licences and imposed levies
on goods. For a town in an independent African country Francistown
was incredible; and it did little to make the Company rule more palatable
s
to go back in history to the granting of mineral concessions by
3
Lobengula and the British colonial office.' Add to the picture the
racialist attitudes of visiting white Rhodesians and one could wonder
not at the support of the North-easterners for the People's Party but
at their basic tolerance. It was no coincidence that the Vice-President
of the Republic chose Ffancistown to make a major speech on race
4
relations.
1 Egner, Interim Report, (op. cit.>, pp. 3-4, 18
2 Flood, op, cit., pp. 297-300. The desire to transform the apartheid
appearance of Francistown underlay the 1970 Francistown Planning Proposals.
3 Ibid.,; Schapera, op. cit, Section I, Appendices A and B
4 BDN, 17 MAY 71; the speech was printed and distributed nationwide.
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One final aspect of the social structure of the District should
be mentioned to complete this background sketch. Hie traditional
administration is de-centralised (as are, incidentally, the "villages",
in contradistinction to the Tswana pattern);1 i„e. there is no
"Paramount Chief" or "Chief" of the Tati District. Instead a number of
independent Chiefs - described misleadingly in official parlance as
2
sub-Chiefs - are recognised; the Kalanga term Shfe is frequently
employed in referring to these Chiefs. For purposes of representation
in the House of Chiefs one Shfe is chosen to represent the Tati District
as a whole.
INTERNAL WORKINGS
Parties and Elections within the Council
Party politics were an important aspect of the District Council
and yet the analysis of them is rather involved; thus the generalisation
that the BPP had a majority of elected members but the BDP was in over¬
all control has to be considerably modified. In the first elections
(in 1966) the BPP won four seats, the BDP two and G. E. N. Mannathoko,
was elected as an Independent (against BDP and BPP opponents). The
Government then used its powers of nominating three additional members,
all of whom were expected to support the BDP in the Council, to give
seats to three Sh6s (Chiefs/Sub-Chiefs). The party balance thus was:
BDP - 5; BPP - 4; Independent - 1; total - 10.
Moreover with Chief S. K. Ramokate elected Chairman (unopposed),
it looked as if the BDP would be in command through his casting vote.
1 In both respects there are parallels with the pattern of Igbo
organisation in Eastern Nigeria.
2 See Schapera, op. cit, especially Sections I and II
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However the post of Vice-Chairman went to N. Gunda, the most influential
People's Party Councillor, who defeated Chief Mosojane by 6 votes to 4.
Ihis indication that the BDP vote could not be counted on to remain
solid was confirmed in the election which followed for the finance
committee, in which Chief G. Moroka was unsuccessful. For the remainder
of the committee elections the nominees were unopposed. Hie nomination
pattern reveals the early strategy of both BPP and the Independent to
support each other, thus blocking whatever chance there may have been
of a BDP steamroller. At any rate the Opposition Councillors did as
well in the number of committee seats gained per head as did the BDP.
However the most significant statistic to note about these elections
was that no Councillor failed to be elected to some office as there
were more than enough seats to go round. Two BPP Councillors, the
Independent Councillor and the nominated BDP Councillor Chief Ramokate
all ended up with more than one place. The balance of the parties in
the standing committees was roughly fifty:fifty with the BPP in all
but one case Cfor the first two years) having half the seats; with
Councillor Mannathoko's support they would have been able to control
v.
the important Finance Committee.
The effectiveness of the BDP as a group was hampered by the rather
non-political nature of the Chiefs and the evidence suggests that,
while both groups caucussed about elections,the BPP more frequently
met together than did the BDP as well as having a somewhat more
coherent philosophy. It was not very surprising that when, following
the death of one of the aristocratic nominated Councillors, the
Government chose a replacement it was a BDP candidate defeated in the
1966 election - a trend which was confirmed in the 1969 nominations.
Another key factor in the question of party control over office
allocation was the position of G. E. N. Mannathoko. Mannathoko had
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revealed the strength of his support in the 1965 General Election
when as Independent he polled a respectable 20.3%, and this was con¬
firmed by his easy victory in the Masunga Polling District in the 1966
LPcal Government elections. At first, as has been seen, he collaborated
with the BPP, culminating in his election as Chairman of the District
Council for 1967/68 (defeating Chief Ramokate), only to lose a year
1
later to Chief Ramokate; a certain rivalry certainly existed between
these two influential figures.
Ramokate'S growing unpopularity gave the BPP a chance of unseating
him and this was achieved in spectacular fashion on a motion proposed
by a BPP Councillor, seconded by a nominated BDP Councillor, early in
1969. The voting was 5-3 in favour of the no-confidence motion, and the
leader of the People's Party group was then elected in a straight fight
with Ramokate, by 6-2. Councillor Mannathoko and a BDP Councillor
were absent, leaving the BPP and BDP with four Councillors each; it is
clear therefore that first one, then two BDP Councillors forsook their
party to oust Ramokate. This was the high point for the BPP, but was
countered by a stern reaction from the Government. First the District
V.
Commissioner intimated that he continued to recognise the defeated
Ramokate and attended the following meeting of the Council,at which he
was rebuffed by the Council,who resented the Government's interference,
as this passage shows :-
(c) Election of Council Chairman: A lengthy dispute took
place between the District Commissioner and members of the
council about the presently elected and former Chairman in
conjunction with savingram [memo] Q/13/II/69 (35) of the
28th March, 1969 from the District Commissioner.
1 This time the BPP split their votes between the two candidates,
reflecting the reservations they were beginning to have about Mannathoko.
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(d) Resolution: The resolution of the council was that the
election of another Chairman was not outside their powers
and the recognition of the former Chairman by the District
Commissioner did not involve this council and they, as
council had elected their own 'Chairman.
(e) Chairman's Allowance: The Council's resolution on
Chairman's allowance was that the North East District
Council as a living entity, would not rely on verbal talks
by the District Commissioner and the Ministry and as
responsible Organization nothing stopped the payment of
Chairman's allowance unless the Council itself had ordered
such stoppage accordingly.1
Ihe matter was not however allowed to rest there and the Permanent
Secretary in the Ministry of Local Government & Lands called another
special meeting to discuss the whole question of the Chairmanship.
Implicitly the Ministry ruled to the effect that a Council was not free
2
to replace the Chairman, thus ending the high point of BPP influence
in the Council. There followed an erosion of the People's Party's
support.
Towards the end of the First Session Councillor Mannathoko made the
switch, albeit informally, from Independent to support of the BDP. This
was publicly confirmed in his parliamentary candidacy for the Democratic
Party in Tati West in 1969. By coincidence his brother R. M. Mannathoko
had been appointed Permanent Secretary, Local Government &, Lands, shortly
3
before. Mannathoko's tacit defection from the working alliance with
the People's Party was followed by a further blow for the BPP when
their victorious candidate in a Council by-election, A. J. Sebeela,
crossed the carpet to the BDP. These moves gave the BDP a paper majority
of seven to three by the end of the First Session.
1 NEDC Minutes, 9 APR 69
2 Ibid., 20 MAY 69
3 See above, p. 26
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The BPP however retaliated effectively at the polls. In October
it gained a seat from the BDP (who in turn picked up the seat formerly
1
held as an Independent by G. E. N. Mannathoko). The result, BPP:5,
BDP:2, plunged the Government into the necessity for a hard decision,
since even using its power to nominate three additional members would
not have guaranteed Domkrag control of the new Council. So the
Cabinet had to decide whether to accept the verdict of the North East
electorate or to pack the Council in blatant fashion. An order was
2
gazetted increasing the number of nominated Councillors to 5. As if
to rub salt in the wound the nominees selected were with one exception
3
defeated BDP candidates for the Council; the exception was the
Permanent Secretary's brother, the former independent, who had stood
unsuccessfully for the Parliamentary seat of Tati West as candidate
of the Democratic Party.
Not surprisingly, the People's Party contingent walked out of the
4
first meeting called after the election in protest. The election
as Chairman of G. E. N. Mannathoko and a BDP Vice-Chairman was however
followed by committee elections in which all Councillors-, including
the absent BPP members, were elected to various committees. It may be
seen as a reflection of the unease the BDP felt about their artificial
majority position but at any rate the practice of power-sharing continued
1 Who did not defend his Council seat.
2 "Establishment of the North East District Council (Amendment) Order 69,
S.l. No 110 of 1969: Amendment of Section 2 of Legal Notice 28 of 1966.
Subsection (2) of section 2 of the Establishment of the North East
District Council Order, 1966, is amended by the deletion of the figure
and words '3 nominated members' appearing therein and by the substitution
therefor of the figure and words '5 nominated members'." Government
Gazette, VII, 59, 7 NOV 69. See Appendix "A" for the Government's
justification of the decision.
3 They included Chief Ramokate, who had stood for election this time,
and the ex-BPP Councillor who lost his seat after crossing the carpet.
4 NEDC Minutes, 25-26 NOV 69. See below, p. 214.
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consistently throughout the Council's history - in sharp contrast to
the position in the Southern District at the same juncture, where the
1
Opposition were left out of elected positions completely.
The BPP retained the initiative psychologically, as the party
chosen by the people, a fact which was reflected in numerous policy
positions, but they also planned to get even with Mannathoko for
deserting them. Their chance came after two years of strong leadership
by Chairman Mannathoko when the defection of two BDP Councillors,
S. Mafa and Chief Ramokate, from a Domkrag caucus meeting enabled them
2
to get Mafa elected Chairman, much to Mannathoko's surprise.
From the above examples of intrigue it is obvious that party is
important in the realm of internal Council elections. It should
further be noted that in the Second Session the BDP kept majorities on
all but one committee; for a time at least monopolised representation
on the Licensing Committee and the Land Board; and chaired all committees.
But as a consolation prize a newly created Health Committee was given
a BPP majority and in return the committee members elected a BDP
3
Councillor as its chairman. Overall the number of standing committee
seats per Councillor worked out very fairly at BDP 8.7; BPP 8;
Independent 10.
Procedure
The North East District Council started its life on a shoe-string,
with minimal staff and makeshift offices. Its early minutes were also
rather threadbare, albeit full of political interest. But the effect
1 See p. 76 above
2 NEDC Minutes, 13 JAN 72 (and personal observation). One of the BPP
Councillors afterwards remarked in private that they had "coup'ed"
Mannathoko.
3 NEDC Minutes, 26 FEB 73; Health Committee Minutes, 18 MAY 73
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1
of an overworked and undertrained chief official (Secretary/Treasurer)
is discernible in the failure to follow proper procedure on such matters
as confirmation of minutes or recording the fate of motions. This,
together with the poverty of the Council, accounted in large measure
for its low reputation in Government circles in Gaborone; as will be
seen, the situation was transformed with the appointment of a new
Secretary late in 1970, underlining the key nature of the position of
Council Secretary.
As often happened in other District Councils, the Secretary
answered many of the questions tabled by Councillors, as also did the
District Commissioner, who played a more active part in the affairs of
the North East District Council and from a much earlier date than was
2
the case generally. The theory of "question time" was that wherever
possible the appropriate committee chairman would reply to questions
falling within the remit of his committee; the North East District
Council ignored it more openly than most.
Procedure became a party issue on two matters. The first was the
power of committees to take final decisions (i.e. under delegated powers).
A leading BPP Councillor attempted to have all committee decisions made
subject to confirmation in the full Council but was informed by an
official that this would contravene the Ministry's model Standing
Orders. Linked with this issue was the principle of collective
responsibility, which some civil servants interpreted in a restrictive
way to mean that once a committee had taken a decision all members of
1 The official concerned tried several times to divest himself of
one of his posts but was not successful until 1970. See NEDC Minutes
28 AUG 67 and 19 AUG 70. At the end of the First Session there were
still only seven employees.
2 See below, pp. 238-242
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it were then bound to support the committee's recommendation with
their votes when it came to the full Council. Clearly if this policy
were applied it would hamper the Opposition, since committees usually
reflected the party composition of the Council as a whole. On the
specific occasion when it arose however it was aimed against the former
Council Chairman, Chief Ramokate, and involved the decisions of the
whole Council which it was said all Councillors should support;
ironically the BPP, having achieved a victory on licensing policy at
1
that meeting, saw the decision reversed at the following meeting.
The uncertainty over procedure may have had something to do with
the fact that bilingual copies of Standing Orders were not available
until near the end of the Second Session; as in other Councils the
exclusive us of English in official documents gave rise to considerable
difficulties. In the North East too there was the additional problem
of the language of debates. Kalanga was preferred by most Councillors,
although all could understand Setswana. As a result the use of
Setswana often indicated the presence of a VIP or outside official
(such as a District Commissioner or District Officer); equally where
v
the official concerned spoke only English one could find Kalanga
spoken (with English translation) or a mixture of the three languages.




The uncertainties about procedure on the part of Councillors gave
3
the officials of the Council extra power. Two instances of the use of
their power, the more striking for being travesties of normal inter¬
pretation, were the opinions given (and accepted) by the [Peace Corps]
1 NEDC Minutes, 26 AUG 67, 6 SEP 67
2 Ibid., 22-23 MAR 72
3 Including the Senior Revenue Officer/Education Secretary, who was
asked by the Chairman to rule on procedural matters. Ibid., 28 AUG 67.
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Council Adviser. A BPP Councillor's motion to "consider amendment of
Standing- Order 22(b)" he dismissed as "improper and it deviated from
Handbook procedure." In the next meeting concerning a motion "That
Council consider about Matimela" (from a BDP Councillor) the ruling
given was that "This item has been moved several times for discussion
which is against the Standing Order." The post of Council Adviser, it
should be explained, was created to allow Peace Corpsmen with degrees
in law and/or public administration to help to improve the running of
the Councils; it is perhaps not surprising that the North East District
Council should resolve, at the same meeting, not to seek a replacement
1
for the first appointee.
The Council Adviser's ruling preventing the debate of a motion on
a subject discussed at a previous meeting was at odds with previous
practice. On another occasion the Secretary persuaded the Council to
debate the decision it had taken at a prior meeting not to approve the
2
sale of Chibuku beer; the decision was in fact reversed. A more
questionable example of official power was the rewriting of minutes,
inter alia to delete a passage critical of the District Commissioner's
V.
3
handling of applications for building on state land; the revised
4
version was approved with only minor corrections.
As in the other Councils studied, the personality of the Council
Secretary was a factor of major importance. This is well illustrated
by the change in style which followed the appointment of D. K. Kwele
to the post late in 1970. Kwele was an exceptional figure in many ways.
1 NEDC Minutes, 27 JAN 70, 8 AUG 70
2 Ibid., 11 SEP 69
3 Ibid., 23-24 AUG 73 (two versions); letter of 19 SEP 73 from Council
Secretary to District Commissioner. The meeting in question was
attended by the Permanent Secretary, MLG&.L.
4 NEDC Minutes, 21 NOV 73
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1
A past President of the National Front, and a very active one at that,
he was greatly disappointed, firstly by the Front's decision not to
nominate him as their Presidential candidate in the General Election of
1969, and secondly by his poor performance at the polls in the northern
(Central District) constituency of Nkange, where he came third with a
mere 10.6% of the votes. This experience convinced Kwele of the
impracticality of the vision of the BNF - as it was then constituted -
as inheritor of the Opposition mantle in the north. Kwele brought
colour and controversy to a rather depressed Council office, not least
in the grandiloquent English for which he was renowned. Council
meetings and minutes bcame much more lengthy, Action Sheets were
produced, and the Secretary's position generally took on a more central
aspect.
This new level of activity did not necessarily mean that the
North East District Council became that much more efficient. Indeed
the new administration was described in the report commissioned for the
Botswana Christian Council in the following words: "the Council
2
Secretary ... is a man of irrational ways ..." The Secretary
himself admitted on one occasion "that he had been extremely busy and
3
could not carry out the Council resolutions."
One might ask what the Secretary was so busy doing that he could
not implement Council resolutions. One answer, in general, was that
Kwele (like his counterpart in the Central District) spent a fair amount
1 For examples see BDN 7 JUL 67, 25 APR 69, 30 APR 69, 23 JUN 69; also
above, pp. 25-26.
2 J. Flood, op. cit., p. 237
3 NEDC Minutes, 23-24 MAY 73
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1
of time on tours of the District, for which he was allowed to purchase
a van. These tours were the subject of reports to the Council, and,
while sometimes organised to deal with specific problems - such as
refusal to pay water fees - also allowed him to make speeches and
frequent appearances which gave the impression that he was building up
a base of support in the District. Whether he was toying with the idea
of a return to national politics - and if so, under what umbrella - is
a matter for conjecture. Certainly he had a flair for publicity, as
his meeting with the immigrant religious minority, the Mazezuru, showed,
2
since it resulted in a front page story in the Daily News.
Some of the functions which in the First Session were performed by
the Chairman - e.g. trouble-shooting in the District and liaising with
Government department - were taken over by the incoming Secretary.
This may be what prompted a resolution (passed with two-party support)
3
that the Chairman should visit the Council offices twice a week.
Some idea of Kwele's policy objectives may be gleaned from moves
he made to initiate debate shortly before the 1974 General Election on
a series of issues which were both popular and central to the policy of
the BPP; the upshot was that the BPP line was endorsed by the Council
4
as a whole, despite opposition from individual BDP Councillors. On
1 NEDC Minutes, 17-18 JUN 71, 12-13 JUN 74; Finance & General Purposes
Committee Minutes, 20 JAN 71; NEDC Minutes 22-23 MAR 72; for some
references see BDN, 4 JUL 71, 27 JUN 72, 11 SEP 72 and 4 MAY 73.
2 NEDC Minutes 23-24 MAY 73; BDN, 2 JUL 73, and also 31 JUL 73.
3 NEDC Minutes, 12 DEC 68, 25 MAR 69, 22-23 MAR 71.
4 Ibid. . 20-22 FEB 74, 12-13 JUN 74; see p. 224 below.
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the other hand there was a suspicion in some quarters that Kwele was
secretly close to the ruling BDP and was merely trying to steal the
Opposition's clothes. In support of this theory it was alleged that
Kwele had developed a close relationship with the leading BDP figure
in the District, Councillor Mannathoko, and it was common knowledge
that he was in almost daily telephone contact with the latter's brother,
the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Local Government & Lands.
1
Whatever the truth of the matter, Kwele remained an enigmatic figure.
Facilities and Remuneration
2
By and large Councillors put up with poor facilities at the
#
Council offices in Tatitown, with new offices on the way, and made few
3
complaints. Nor did they make any demands for local facilities for
themselves. Maybe this was due to the general lack of facilities in
the District and the consequent habit of looking to Francistown for
most services; moreover although the state of the roads, especially in
the rainy season, made travel very difficult, the distances as the
crow flies are relatively small.
On allowances, too,the North-Eastern Councillors were somewhat
more abstemious, making fewer demands for increases of the kind made
in the other two Councils. There was however one notable occasion
when Councillors sat down and pruned estimates under a number of heads
in order to finance the increase authorised by the Ministry; the items
4
cut included boreholes, dams and staff training.
1 As a postscript it can be noted that Kwele made no attempt to involve
himself again in party politics at the 1974 elections. He has since been
transferred to another District.
2 It was only when a VIP visited the Council offices that Councillors
resolved to try to get proper toilet facilities provided, to obviate
embarrassment to distinguished visitors. NEDC Minutes, 9 APR 69.
3 Ibid., 22 DEC 70, 9 MAY 73
4 Ibid. 6 SEP 68, 23-24 MAY 73; 8 JUL 70.
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Issues
Water The North East District is plagued with the problem of too much
water at certain times and places and too little at others - a
1
situation which has been officially known since 1905. A major
coordinated effort was required to solve the related problems of water,
land and communications and this was beyond the Council's capacity to
2
plan for. Council activity on the water front, therefore, concentrated
on smaller-scale problems.
The first of these problems was the reluctance of consumers of
water for non-domestic purposes (i.e. stock watering) to pay the water
fees ordained by the NEDC. The committee responsible reported "the
deplorable condition of its collection of revenue" to the full Council,
who sent the Secretary, in conjunction with the local chiefs to talk to
backsliders. He reported back on the "flimsy excuses" that had been
produced and Council reaffirmed its determination to collect all fees,
3
including arrears, from the communities concerned. But the time-lag
of almost six years between the first decision to charge water fees
and this "tough" resolution suggests that Councillors, regardless of
v.
party, were far from anxious to force the issue.
Cattle The question of matimela recurred regularly and took two
forms. In the area of communal land tenure a great deal of discontent
was expressed over the failure of Chiefs and Headmen to implement the
the matimela regulations, and indignation was expressed in particular
at Chief Ramokate's reluctance to operate the scheme until it had been
fully discussed in all kgotlas in the District. A significant aspect
1 See Flood, op, cit. , pp. 234-241; Schapera, op. cit., pp. 20-21 (and
Commission Report of 1905 cited in ibid., Appendix C).
2 The District Development Committee and the Tati Settlement Project
were the key agents of change in this sphere; their impact is discussed
later.
3 NEDC Minutes, 22 DEC 70, 22-23 MAR 72, 21-23 JUN 72
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of Council debates on the subject was the all-party combination cf
1
Independent, BDP and BPP in criticism of the Chiefs. Ctn this issue
the interests of cattle-owning commoners (well represented on the
BDP benches) deviated from those of the Chiefs.
In the case of the State Land and Freehold or Tati Company land,
the parties parted company several times. A lengthy debate initiated
by Chairman Mannathoko, on the effects of having the only matimela
pound for the Tati District in Francistown (run by the Town Council),
revealed this clearly. A BDP motion to have the pound law abolished
failed on a tied vote after the District Commissioner had defended the
law eloquently as a defence of the interests of the poor; a BPP counter-
motion to ask the Francistown Town Council to levy District fees on
North East animals in the pound likewise failed 6:6. In each case one
2
BDP Councillor must have voted with the Opposition. Subsequently on
initiatives from BDP Councillors it was agreed to ask the Government to
3
establish a North East District pound.
Land Similar configurations of party conflict and collaboration were
to be found on the land question. A united front was formed whenever
the issue of the eviction of African farmers ("squatters") arose from
European-owned or Tati Company land areas, which happened several times
in the 1968/69 period. Petitions, delegations and protest letters were
4
agreed upon unanimously. Similar action was taken to have fences
removed which blocked roads customarily regarded as rights of way.
1 NEDC Minutes 28 AUG 67, 11 DEC 68, 8 APR 70, 26-27 FEB 73
2 Ibid., 22 DEC 70
3 Ibid., 10 MAR 71, 12-13 JUN 74
4 Ibid. , 6 SEP 68, 11 DEC 68, 6 FEB 69, 9 APR 69
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The consensus became somewhat frayed however over the question of
the Tati Land Board. To be sure, the BPP did not oppose its establish¬
ment, or the motion to give it control of State Land. But one People's
Party Councillor questioned why the Land Board was composed solely of
Chiefs - which was not strictly true, but it was overwhelmingly BDP in
1
composition.
Likewise the proposals embodied in the Tati Settlement Project,
which were to give rise to a sharp conflict of interests expressed at
the national level, did not lead to a clear party division. In part
this was due to the complexity of the
pointed out, was identified as urgent
Magistrate, who warned:
question, one which, as Schapera
in 1931 by the then Resident
There exists a situation affecting native settlement which
in the near future will cause the Administration much
anxiety. ... I consider that half the native population
in the Native Reserve should be evacuated and that would
leave room for the remainder and give them space for
expansion. . . .
The Makalaka [Kalangas] have made no progress and their
wealth is not increasing owing to deplorable over-stocking.
Hie position is clear, i.e. the Government must give
serious thought to the relieving of the congestion, and
the question must not be long delayed.^ v
Schapera goes on to say: "The Reserve as a whole is wickedly grazed out."
The failure of the colonial administration to act on Schapera's
comprehensive recommendations was a principal reason for the radical
politics of the bulk of the people of the North East District. Three
years after Independence the President decided to grasp the nettle and
announced, in an election campaign speech in Francistown, the acquisition
1 NEDC Minutes, 26 APR 68, 23-24 MAY 73, 21-23 JUN 72. See also Werbner,
op. cit., p. 103, on the enhancement of the sub-chiefs' status resulting
from the new system.
2 The "Nettleton Report" cited in Schapera, op. cit.. p. 8
3 Ibid., p. 16
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1
by the State of a sizeable tract of land from the Tati Company. The
question of what to do with it was then left to a radical Manx economist/
civil servant who was appointed Tati Settlement Project Administrator.
2
His report was then submitted to the Government. The Cabinet were met
with determined opposition to some of the recommendations by Richard
Mannathoko, and Egner was called to appear before the Cabinet to defend
his report. The real issue at stake was whether the vacant land was to
be used as cattle post (grazing) land for the wealthier cattle-owners,
or whether the larger herds of cattle would be forced to move to land
further away, in the North of the Central District. Clearly there was
here all the potential for a party cleavage but, owing to the complexities
of the administrative procedure for considering it, by the end of
Session II it had not surfaced in the Council.
Nevertheless certain related issues did arise, for instance the
recognition as permanent settlements of villages like Themashanga on
State Land and their consequent right to services such as schools.
There was continuing controversy over the proposal for village grouping,
i.e. the attempt to organise the decentralised Kalanga villages into
nucleated settlements on the Tswana pattern. The BDP, and especially
the Chiefs, were keen on the idea. For their part the BPP found it
difficult to resist the argument that it would make the provision of
services to villages much easier if more people lived near one central
point in each village, but questioned the wisdom of forcing people to
move. Accordingly the Council as a whole agreed in principle to the idea,
3
but with BPP reservations about its practicability. Soon afterwards the
1 See Macartney, "Botswana Goes to the Polls," Africa Report, XIV, 8
(DEC 69), and ibid. . XVI, 2 (FEB 71) for corrigenda; BDN, 17 SEP 69.
2 Egney, op. cit.
3 NEDC Minutes, 23-24 MAY 73, 21 NOV 73; 20-23 SEP 72; 21 NOV 73,
20-22 FEB 74
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Council Secretary ingeniously introduced the subject of tiny villages;
in the lengthy debate that followed, the BPP line - to accept that
such settlements had the right to remain, even if their chance of
1
receiving amenities were thereby reduced - was accepted. Another BPP
victory was achieved on a motion to provide compensation for people
2
whose land was invaded by roads or pipelines.
Education Although education received the greatest amount of attention
from Councillors - and indeed an official address to an incoming District
3
Commissioner remarked "Generally this is an Education Council" - the
amount of dispute over education was slight.
One sensitive issue was the demotion, dismissal or transfer of
teachers and on several occasions the Education Committee recommendations
4
or decisions were rejected, before the committee's right to take final
decisions was established. Much more controversial was the proposal to
close down small "uneconomic" schools:
On the question of the uneconomic schools, the Education
Committee had expressed the necessity to have such schools
closed. . . .
Council then plunged into a very serious debate, with feeling
running very high and characterized by very bitter exchanges.
It was indeed, a tug of war. . . .
After lengthy and tense debate Council resolved that the
matter be shelved. . . .®
On subsequent reconsideration of the matter
Council unanimously resolved that such schools should continue
since schools were not run for profits - but for the purpose
of fighting against illiteracy.
The decision was essentially a success for the People's Party's arguments.
1 NEDC Minutes, 12-13 JUN 74
2 Topic again introduced by the Secretary. NEDC Minutes 23-24 AUG 73
3 Ibid., 28 AUG 67
4 Ibid., 12 OCT 66; Education Committee Minutes, 22 JUL 69; NEDC Minutes
31 JUL 69.
5 Ibid., 10 MAR 71
6 Ibid., 17-18 SEP 71
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Commerce It was perhaps predictable that there should be differences of
opinion between a group of BDP Councillors, almost all of whom were shop
owners, and the BPP, only one of whom was a businessman. A major clash
came on the question of hawkers' licences - which as has been seen, was a
1
controversial subject in other Councils. The BPP brought up the topic
of licensing hawkers and were opposed by two BDP members who maintained
that there was no point in entertaining the suggestion as there was no
area in the Reserve without a shop.
Councillor K. K. Sechele [BPP] then said that in fact the
council was composed of too many traders who must know that
they had been elected by the people and that if they refused
entirely to make a bye-law for hawking the electorate would
undoubtedly conclude that they are protecting their own
interests
Assisted by a temporary defection from the BDP, the BPP succeeded in
getting the motion through the Council (5; 4, Chairman abstaining) "that
3
the council make a bye-law allowing for hawkers in the area." At the
next meeting however the voting went against the BPP and in favour of a
BDP amendment to adopt hawking bye-laws only subject to the following
proviso: "That the Council advise the licensing authority to limit
4
licences to places where there were no established stores." As the
licensing authority was firmly under BDP control there was every likeli¬
hood of its heeding the Council's advice.
Another round of the contest over commercial policy was fought over
the question of the granting of applications by the District Commissioner
for shops in the State Lands:
1 See above, pp. 112-113 and 165
2 NEDC Minutes, 28 AUG 67
3 Ibid.
4 NEDC Minutes, 15 SEP 67
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Minute C55/73 Permanent Structure in Statelands; Council
condemned the way the District Commissioner handles ^
applications for permanent structures in Statelands. . . .
2
In spite of this resolution, the BPP Chairman of the Licensing
Authority was unable to dissuade the committee from proceeding (with
the District Commissioner's encouragement) with applications for
3
trading licences on State land.
Revenue The North East District's position as the country's second-
poorest district (defined in terms of per capita deficit grant received
4
from the Government) was reflected in the much greater attention paid
by the Council to the problems of revenue raising, including several
tax drives, repeated attempts (successful in the main) to get revenue
from Francistown Town Council and, most striking of all, bi-partisan
agreement on taxing bicycles, beer, "tea-parties", wood gathering and
5
"Scotchcarts". Evidently the People's Party were prepared to suppress
doubts about these unpopular taxes in order to widen the Council's
woefully thin tax base.
Destitution As befits what has been described as a "rural slum",6
there was a problem of destitution but the Council, though anxious to
grant as much relief as possible, could only afford the sum of R1 per
7
month for the destitutes it was able to assist. Remittances from
1 NEDC Minutes, 23-24 AUG 73, original version (deleted from revised
versions).
2 It may appear anomalous, but when the Licensing Authority (Committee)
changed from being a BDP monopoly it then elected a BPP Chairman, the
BDP nevertheless retaining its majority.
3 Licensing Authority Minutes, 28 SEP 73
4 Flood, op. cit., p. 234
5 NEDC Minutes, 18 SEP 71. "Tea parties" are rather more alcoholic than
the name might suggest; "Scotchcart" is the official description for a
kind of open ox-drawn waggon.
6 Flood, op. cit., p. 236
7 F&GP Committee Minutes, 29 JAN 72
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relatives (in Francistown and elsewhere) kept many of the District's
1
Population from starvation. Possibly as a consequence of the small
size of Councillors' wards the difficulties experienced in other
districts in identifying destitutes did not surface in the North East.
PLANNING AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION
The North East District's mode of dealing with planning and the
allocation of resources in general differed markedly from the practice
obtaining in the other two Councils, in the much closer scrutiny to
which plans were subjected. Indeed, apart from the first annual
2
estimates, which were approved formally, all plans and estimates were
3
subject to debate even if eventually approved. There are many
4
instances of amendments to estimates and development plans, usually
in the form of additions to lists of projects. Two reasons can be
advanced to account for the high degree of interest in planning: the
absence of special Council planning machinery (owing to the small size
of the Council) and the consequent debating of more business in full
Council; and the level of political awareness in general.
It is however very noteworthy that the party division so apparent
on many other questions (already discussed) is virtually absent from
this aspect of Council business. Instead the tendency was for geography
rather than party to predominate in arguments about the allocation of
projects. This was undoubtedly aided by the Government's choice of
nominated BDP Councillors from amongst the Chiefs (in the First Session)
and even more so from defeated Domkrag candidates (in both Sessions).
There were thus, particularly in the Second Session, two Councillors
1 Egner, op. cit.. pp. 5-6; and C. Kerven, Migration to Francistown
and the effects on the urban and rural community (1976)
2 NEDC Minutes, 12 OCT 66
3 E.g0 ibid.. 27 JAN 70, 8 APR 70; Development Committee Minutes,
5 FEB 71
4 NEDC Minutes, 11 DEC 68, 8 JUL 70, 8 AUG 72, 20-21 DEC 72, 9 MAY 73.
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1
from all but one ward and they often combined to pursue local
interests despite their different party labels. A. classic case was the
argument over the location of the one major clinic (as opposed to the
smaller health posts) which the Development Committee had decided the
District should have. The Council was split down the middle on the
merits of the largest village (Mapoka) versus a small but more central
settlement (Malambakwena). Eventually the advice of the Tati
2
Settlement Project Administrator was crucial in resolving the deadlock.
The close involvement of the District Administration with the North
East District Council (strengthened and institutionalised by the
District Development Committee) was a further factor in the tendency for
decisions on the allocation of development expenditure to be taken on
hard data rather than on a party basis.
EXTERNAL ASPECTS
Village Development/lpelegeng
Voluntary self-help was not a great success in the North East, as
the following quotations testify. The first came eighteen months after
the Council had been established.
[The motion] that means be devised to improve response to
communal collections and communal projects once they have
been agreed on by a community . . . was discussed at length
and the council resolved that it be referred to the House
of Chiefs as it was a territorial [i.a national] problem.3
1 It is perhaps not purely coincidence that it was the Councillor for
the only ward (Kalakamati) which consistently supported the BDP who
complained at the neglect of his ward; he was refuted by three other
Councillors, two BPP and one other BDP. NEDC Minutes 26-27 FEB 73
2 Development Committee Minutes, 5 FEB 71; NEDC Minutes 10 MAR 71
3 Ibid., 30 JAN 68
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Four years later the position was little better, and the Secretary
reported:
Owing to limitations in staffing and failure of some
Village Development Committees to render the contribution
they should, consequently some projects have not yet been
completed.1
The Assistant Community Development Officer was even more outspoken:
Progress on self-help projects have been very very poor,
there will be no completed projects at the end of this
year. ... It is really disappointing that there will
not be a single self-help completed project at the end of
the year 1972. When other councils will be embarking on
their 1973 projects, the North East District will be
struggling back like an oxen wagon with the 1972 projects.
. . . I fail to see how shall we be able to develop our
areas in the district, if there are no strong efforts from
the higher authorities to try to help people in their
proposed projects.2
It is difficult to ascertain the precise reasons for this general
failing, but certainly there was inefficiency in dealing with project
application forms (which went through the Council Development Committee
and were then sent by the Secretary to the Community Development
Department) and in forwarding names of workers (by Councillors), while
"unforeseen circumstances" prevented delivery of building materials. On
the ground some VDCs experienced problems in keeping track of funds and
3
Councillors were asked to intervene to supervise. The scattered
population pattern typical of Kalanga country exacerbated the nationwide
problem of seasonal migration; this gave rise to problems of "sub-VDCs",
which were referred to the Community Development Department. A motion
to allow four small villages to form one VDC was however referred to the
local Chief on the grounds that "Council has nothing to do with the
formation of VDCs as this is the duty of chiefs and their people."
1 NEDC Minutes, 13 JAN 72
2 North East DDC Minutes, 10 NOV 72 (3rd Appendix)
3 NEDC Minutes, 8 JUL 70, 10 MAR 71, 26-27 FEB 73.
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Nevertheless some VDCs and PTAs operated independently of both Chiefs and
Councillors and had to be told to invite both ex officio members to their
1
meetings, as late as 1973.
In attempting to deal with the problems of Ipelegeng the North
East District Council embarked on a policy of hiring workers, and event¬
ually persuaded the Ministry to lift its veto which was imposed (on
2
policy grounds). Kwele as Council Secretary particularly encouraged
3
this cash-based approach, which certainly was popular with many people
(and increased their dependence on the Council) but transferred Ipelegeng
into a rather different system from the original pure self-help idea. A
further application of this approach was the Council's role in supervising
4
the progress of VDC projects in detail. It should be added that, on
this subject, party allegiance did not play any obvious part in determining
Councillors* behaviour. Further details are given in Chapter 6.
A contrast with other Districts was the welcome given (or at least
the absence of complaints about) the major Government programme of
Drought Relief and Accelerated Rural Development; the only complaint
was that the effect of staff movements resulting from the new Unified
5
Local Government Service interfered with the implementation of the ARDP.
The overall conclusion therefore is that the impoverished North East
generally welcomed any extra cash or other resources coming to the
District as a relief from the problems which beset the self-help
programme.
1 NEDC Minutes, 20-23 SEP 72, 26-27 FEB 73, 23-24 MAY 73
2 Ibid. 11 DEC 68, 22 DEC 70, 26-27 FEB 73, 25 APR 73, 23-24 AUG 73
3 E.g. encouraging the purchasing of bricks from, and by, VDCs: ibid..
17-18 JUN 71 and 20-21 DEC 72; F&GP Committee Minutes, 17 MAY 73
4 NEDC Minutes, 20-23 SEP 72, See also p. 297 below.
5 NEDC Minutes, 21 NOV 73, 12-13 JUN 74
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The role of Councillors
In spite of the relatively high level of activity displayed by
North Eastern Councillors there was a fair amount of uncertainty
1
about their precise role; witness the rather plaintive question,
tabled by a Councillor with four years* experience behind him, "What
is our duty in the Council as Councillors?" (He was referred to the
2
Handbook.) This particular Councillor in any case was notably
assiduous in asking for progress reports on the implementation of
3
decisions affecting his ward. This watchdog role was performed by
other Councillors too, but more typical was the role of spokesman
4
performed by most Councillors.
Individual Councillors were mandated to investigate various
problems, such as the blocking of roads by fences, or humiliations
allegedly inflicted by European farmers, or formed part of delegations
to meet the Tati Company (concerning evictions) or villagers with
water problems. Councillors were also given administrative or super¬
visory duties on such matters as tax drives, the recruitment of navvies,
5
and VBC finances. Perhaps the most noteworthy point about this
activity was that BPP Councillors were as much involved as their BDP
counterparts.
A perennial problem, in this District as in the others, was
delimitation of powers between Councillors and Chiefs/Headmen. Thus
1 Evidenced at conferences, e.g. UBLS, Division of Extra Mural Services,
Councillors Seminar; report on the second seminar for Councillors for
The Francistown Town Council and North East District Council.
2 NEDC Minutes, 8 JUL 70
3 E.g. ibid., 25 MAR 69
4 Good examples ibid., 28 AUG 67, 26 APR 68, 11 SEP 68 and 23-24 AUG 73.
5 Ibid. , 17-18 SEP 71, 22-23 1VAR 72, 6 SEP 68, 23-24 MAY 73, 30 JAN 68,
22 DEC 70, 26-27 FEB 73
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Councillors were advised to "co-operate with chiefs and give them
advice," while the Chiefs were told they should co-operate with
Councillors. Still the question kept recurring:
In reply to a question . . . about the power of the headman
over the councillor, the Secretary said that the Chief/
Headman has powers at his Kgotla, while the Councillor is a
representative of his ward.
But as late as 1973 Councillors were still passing resolutions to the
effect that "Council should remind Chiefs and Councillors about their
.1dutieso"
The Traditional Administration
Relations between Councillors and Chiefs were characterised not
only by uncertainty but also by friction manifested in a highly critical
attitude by many Councillors towards the Chiefs, as is instanced by the
following quotation on the question of the grant for Independence Day
celebrations, "Sub-chiefs and Headmen were strongly warned that this
money was to be used on the day of celebrations by all." At its next
meeting Council supported a circular sent by the Secretary to all
concerned warning that receipts or statements on oath could be required
2
to account for the spending of this grant.
Much fire was directed at the Chiefs for their tardiness in sending
in lists of matimela - for instance by the end of 1968 only two beasts
had been reported - and this led to allegations that Chiefs were con¬
cealing the strays. The solution adopted was the calling in of
Chiefs' lists to be entered up centrally by the Council, but even
then the complaints continued that Chiefs were evading the law. A
1 NEDC Minutes, 15 SEP 67, 26 APR 68, 17-18 JUN 71, 26-27 FEB 73
2 Ibid., 11 SEP 70, 22 DEC 70
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rather different charge was that Chiefs had interfered with the
construction of dams by trying to alter their location to suit their own
1
purposes.
Yet despite these blunt criticisms of Chiefs* behaviour, there was
no attempt to ignore, far less do away with their traditional
administrative functions. Even the disputed Independence Day fund
continued to be allocated according to Chiefs* areas of jurisdiction
and channelled through them, while their customary function of acting
as a channel for consultation on such matters as the draft Land Bill
and village grouping or the non-payment of water fees was supplemented
by their ex officio membership of local tax exemption vetting committees
(together with the local Councillor). They were also - rather
inefficiently - involved in selecting destitutes and (with the help of
the Community Development Department, when available) in the formation
of VDCs.2
Thus it appeared as if there was considerable support in the
Council for the institution of chieftainship, as distinct from the
behaviour of individual chiefs, and this was brought out with particular
clarity by a resolution, passed nem, con., expressing concern at falling
attendances at kgotla meetings and petitioning the Government to give
the Chiefs powers to compel the public to attend such meetings. Such
support was probably necessary for an institution which was being
weakened by the traditional tactic of rebellion, the breaking-away of
disaffected elements. Chief Ramokate, seconded by a BDP Councillor,
succeeded in getting a majority of Councillors to support him in con¬
demning breakaway settlements and asking the District Commissioner not
1 NEDC Minutes, 11 DEC 68, 9 APR 67, 27 JAN 70, 8 APR 70, 26-27 FEB 73;
F&GP Minutes, 17 MAY 73.
2 NEDC Minutes, 11 DEC 68, 7 JUL 69, 25 APR 68, 20-21 DEC 72,
22-23 MAR 72, 25 MAR 69, 11 SEP 67, 26-27 FEB 73
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1
to recognise such "unauthorised settlements" on State Land. The
weakness in the system was enhanced by the lack of the unifying control
2
exercised in the Tswana clans as well as by the existence of state
land next door to communal land. Chieftainship in the Tati was not a
hierarchical aristocracy so much as a squirearchy, wealthy (in relative
terms) but diffused, and hence less able to fend off the challenge of
the new men, with whom they tended to blend. The changed leadership
(and membership) of the Council - in the Second Session only one Chief
was nominated to the Council - symbolises this neatly.
Relations with the Central Government
There is an apparent paradox in the relations between the North
East District and the central government. The objective conditions
would seem to indicate the necessity for frequent contact between the
two, these conditions being, on the one side, the dependence of this
3
poverty-stricken district on the Government for assistance to supplement
its own meagre resources, and, on the Government side, concern about the
political and indeed strategic sensitivity of this frontier district.
Yet the Council received only three VIP visits from the capital, and
one of these was due to a crisis situation, while another was at the
invitation of the North East District Council, viz. the opening of the
4
new offices. Moreover minutes of the North East District Council
attracted far fewer marginal comments and the only issue which appears
to have interested the Minister himself was the suggestion of the
1 NEDC Minutes, 20-21 DEC 72, 20-23 SEP 72
2 See Schapera, op. cit., pp. 27-28
3 The Government felt obliged to write off the Council's debt caused by
the necessity of meeting teachers* salaries at one stage; this was
warmly welcomed by the Council. NEDC Minutes, 6 SEP 68
4 Ibid., 20 MAY 69, 17-18 JUN 71
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1
closure of certain schools. It is indeed a prominent feature cf the
Government's relations with the North East District Council that
there were channelled to a very great extent through the District
Commissioner, and this is discussed below.
On appropriate occasions the Council acted as a pressure group,
in particular asking for additional funds for school bursaries and for
2
a bigger grant for Independence Day celebrations. They also revived
3
the idea of a secondary school in the District proper and asked
permission to inspect primary schools themselves. This last resolution
- moved by a BDP Councillor and passed nem. con. - was swiftly vetoed
by the Government, which announced that it had ordered an immediate
inspection of schools in the North East District by the Education
4
Officer, Francistown. Another example of a tactical win following an
earlier veto concerned the payment of project workers. The Council (as
has already been noted, particularly the Council Secretary) was keen on
the idea of payment, but this was initially prevented by the Ministry.
The eventual reversal of the decision was however the result not only
of North East District Council pressure but also of the intervention of
the Botswana Christian Council, which revealed that the practice of
5
paying "allowances" had been established for years in another ministry.
1 Note from Minister to Under Secretary, 24 MAR 71 (Ministry IG&L files,
NEDC). Another matter which concerned him was whether the District
should have a capital outwith Francistown.
2 NEDC Minutes, 28 AUG 67, 6 SEP 68
3 Ibid., 30 JAN 68. The original Tati Institute had been the brainchild
of K. T. Motsete, who founded the BPP.
4 NEDC Minutes, 23-24 MAY 73, 23-24 AUG 73. This was not so much a bid
for extra power as a way of protesting at the inactivity of the Ministry
official concerned.
5 NEDC Minutes, 26-27 FEB 73, 23-24 AUG 73. For an illuminating
account of the inter-ministerial relations concerned see Flood, op, cit.,
p. 239.
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Differences of opinion between the Government and the Council took
various forms. The most dramatic case concerned the deposition of
Chairman Ramokate by his colleagues in 1969 and the two extraordinary
meetings which followed (the second attended by the Permanent Secretary,
Local Government & Lands), the upshot of which was the de facto
1
reversal of the Council's decision. Such speed of action and high
drama were rare. More typical was the long drawnout story of the North
East District Council's quest for its own matimela pound which, despite
the keen interest shown in the matter by the influential Councillor
Mannathoko, took the Government over three years to decide, and even
2
longer to implement.
Another bone of contention - as in the case of the other Councils -
was relations with the Department of Water Affairs. Apart from the
3
lengthy delays experienced in getting replies from the Department -
which was par for the course - the North East District Council had a
protracted battle over the Borehole Preventative Maintenance Scheme (BPMS)
and a smallish sum of money connected therewith. It may appear almost
comic for it to take two years to establish the fate of a cheque paid
five years earlier into the account, but it was time-consuming (discussed
at seven meetings of the full Council, not to mention the DDC and
correspondence), frustrating and probably unnecessary. To add to the
irony, when the money was found the Council was told that it had been
fully spent. "Councillors noted that the statement was rather incredible"
and doubtless regretted having (at the Secretary's instigation) reversed
1 Already discussed: see pp. 210-211 above.
I
2 NEDC Minutes, 10 MAR 71 and passim thereafter
3 On a different matter, see NEDC Minutes, 22 DEC 71
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their earlier decision to have nothing to do with the scheme, the more
so when they were presented with a bill for additional expenses
1
incurred?
The other water problems which caused the Council much concern also
involved Government agencies and both arose in acute form in 1972/73.
Had a proper water development plan been implemented earlier the crisis
in the villages of Tati Siding and Tsamaya (with Siviya) could have
2
been avoided. Both these villages concerned were on the Eastern, non-
communal land and the situation became acute for various reasons at the
end of 1972. The Council was basically unable to do anything except to
act as a pressure group, which it did via the District Commissioner, the
District Development Committee (of which he was Chairman) and the Ministry
of Local Government & Lands. Emergency assistance was provided by the
Botswana Christian Council and more permanent relief by the Government
3
ordering Geological Survey to take action. This case study indicates
the problems of red tape and the limitations on the power of the local
authorities.
The important innovation of the Unified Local Government Service
(ULGS) met with considerable criticism in the North East.
Councillors expressed great concern at the fact that, whenever
Council asks the Unified Local Government Service to upgrade
an Officer, the Unified Local Government Service transfers the
Officer to another Council on or pending promotion. 4
Council also deplored the system of indiscriminate transfers . . .
1 NEDC Mins., 22-24 MAY 73, 22 DEC 71, 21-23 JUN 72, 23-24 AUG 73
2 The problem of water for Tati Siding was first raised by a Councillor
in 1968. NEDC Minutes, 11 DEC 68.
3 Ibid.. 23-24 MAY 73; North East DDC Minutes, 13-14 DEC 72, 16 OCT 73;
NEDC Minutes, 23-24 AUG 73, 21 NOV 73; Flood, op. cit., p 241; NEDC
Minutes 21 NOV 73, 20-22 FEB 74.
4 Ibid., 12-13 JUN 74
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As if anticipating such a hostile reaction to the scheme, the Under-
Secretary in the Ministry of Local Government & Lands, addressing
Council soon after the introduction of the scheme, made the following
mollifying remarks :
Referring to the Unified Local Government Service,
Mr Makobole pointed out that the power to employ, promote
and dismiss Council's employees was taken from Councillors
not because they (councillors) were inefficient, but because
government realized that councillors were busy with the
development of their districts and Botswana as a whole.
In conclusion, Mr Makobole congratulated councillors for
the respect they show for their Chairman, and for their
understanding of Standing Orders.1
The District Administration
The function of District Commissioners vis-A-vis District
2
Councils was not precisely defined until the "Tordoff" reforms of 1971
inter alia made them ex officio members of the Council and District
Development Committee Chairmen. But in the North East the District
Commissioner (or one of his deputies) played an important role from
the inception of the District Council, attending most meetings of the
full Council and some committee meetings. A number of reasons have
already been suggested which combined to make the position of District
Commissioner (Francistown) one of the most senior postings and
probably the most exciting. In brief, the special features included
the division of the Tati District - between two local authorities
(Francistown Town Council and the North East District Council) and,
more significantly, between the de facto communal land ownership in the
Northern part of the District, the Tati Company and foreign freehold
farmers and the State Lands purchased by the Government in 1969; added
to which were non-legal settlements and grazing by peasant farmers in
1 NEDC Minutes, 23-24 AUG 73 (emphasis in original).
2 The Tordoff Report, op, cit., Chs. II and V
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the east of the District (dividing- into "recognised villages" and
"squatters"), and the illegal immigration of Rhodesians. The high
degree of emigration from the North East District recorded in the 1971
census (the highest in the Republic in fact) was a reflection partly of
the pattern of working and living in Francistown, partly the result
of job-hunting elsewhere; Francistown-born inhabitants were a minority
(25%) of the town*s population, 21% of which originated from the North
1
East District.
Race relations in Francistown were more touchy than anywhere else
in Botswana, witness the notorious decision by the white members of
the Francistown Club to ostracise the first post-independence District
Commissioner for telling them that a racially exclusive club was
illegal and would not be tolerated; the fact that the District
Commissioner concerned was an Afrikaans-speaking South African immigrant
who had decided to naturalise did nothing to placate the Afrikaner farmers
involved. This incident was merely one manifestation of the general
fact that there was a security problem in the area, with either
infiltrators or a fifth column responsible for attacks on the refugee
transit camp which has long been a feature of Francistown and has
enabled thousands of political refugees from South Africa and Rhodesia
to escape; a further example was the need before independence to guard
the BBC transmitter set up after UDI in Rhodesia to beam British
2
broadcasts to the rebel colony.
1 Report of the Population Census 1971 (op. cit.), pp. 107-108
2 See H. M. Tapela, "The Tati District of Botswana, 1866-1969" (1976),
passim; J. Halpern, South Africa's Hostages (1965), especially pp. 452-
453; R. P. Stevens, Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland (1967), pp. 158-159;
and J. E. Spence, "The Implications of the Rhodesia Issue for the Former
High Commission Territories," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies,
VII, 2 (1969), p. 107.
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On the party-political plane, the Tati District has been the
main base for Opposition politics, which many BDP members view as
basically tribalist, hence the speech by the Minister of Local
Government & Lands, Mr Englishman Kgabo Con the only ministerial visit
1
to the Council) in which "the Minister condemned tribalism."
On its side the Council found that at every turn it became involved
with the Tati Company, the European farmers, Francistown Town Council
or the Rhodesian regime. In all of these cases the District Administration
was the obvious place to turn to for assistance. A few examples will
illustrate the working relationship between the two.
As the voice of the Government the District Commissioner had the
duty of consulting the Council and assembled chiefs on the draft
Tribal land Bill and later announcing the formation of the District
Development Committee. He urged the introduction of beer bye-laws
(on the grounds that Francistown Town Council had already adopted
them), intervened successfully in the debate on the location of the
2
District clinic and approved of the decision to go ahead with the
consideration of applications for building (shops) on State Land, despite
3
earlier criticism. His advice to a committee considering applications
for the post of Senior Revenue Officer/Education Secretary was however
rejected:
The postponement of the applications did not satisfy the
District Commissioner as the Adviser of the Council which
apparently arouse [sic] dispute between the members of the
Committee and the District Commissioner.
Decision
The final decision of the Committee was postponement of
the meeting ... to reconsider the applications.4
1 NEDC Minutes, 17-18 JUN 71
2 Ibid., 26 APR 68, 22 DEC 71, 9 APR 69, 10 MAR 71
3 Licensing Authority Minutes, 28 SEP 73; NEDC Minutes, 23-24 AUG 73
(original version).
4 Finance Committee Report to Council meeting of 6 FEB 69 which endorsed
the decision.
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This rebuff was not unique, being forshadowed by the stormy meeting
at which the District Commissioner®s refusal to recognise the newly-
1
elected Council Chairman was rejected as "irrelevant" by the Council,
and the reaction by EPP Councillors to the District Commissioner's
speech at the opening meeting of the Second Session, from which this
extract is taken:
In his brief speech, the District Commissioner said, he was
happy to meet all the Councillors and hoped that they were
going to work harmoniously without Party differences as was
the case duirng their [1969 election] campaign. He was again
stressing on the point that, it was important and potential
task as a councillor to work the people for the people. He
further made them realise that when they entered the Council
Chamber, their party differences were left outside but just
to discuss thoughts of progress. He said to them, as you are
here, it is your duty to elect a Chairman not because he
belonged to a certain party.
. . . Some Members Leave the House; Some members stood up to
question why the majority of the [unsuccessful] Botswana
Democratic Party Candidates were nominated as Councillors
and declined that they were not going to take part in the
elections of Vice and Chairman. After some comments and
questions by all members, five firmly stood against seven
and unceremoniously walked out of the Chamber. The elections
carried on because the remaining members formed a quorum.2
Most of the time however the District Commissioner was involved in
taking action (with the Council Secretary) in pursuance of Council
decisions, such as the problem of getting gates opened (which involved
international law as the location was on the Rhodesian border), surveying
the population on State Land to see if it justified its own school,
investigating the position of "deserted farms", or accompanying the
Secretary in a tour of the District to talk to the people about Local
3
Government tax and matimela problems.
1 See above, p. 211
2 NEDC Minutes, 25-26 NOV 69
3 NEDC Minutes, 21-23 JUN 72, 20-21 DEC 72, 25 APR 73
\
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The advent of the District Development Committee system
institutionalised much of the activity which had already become the
established pattern in the Tati District as well as adding- a fresh
dimension.
Members of Parliament
Although the MP for Tati West, K. M. Nkhwa, whose constituency
covers most of the District, had fairly close informal contacts with the
BPP Councillors there was little formal contact between him or his
Leader and MP for Francistown and Tati East (P. G. Matante) and the
Council. The only documented case of Nkhwa's intervention came through
a Parliamentary Question on the peri-urban "no-man's land" of Somerset
West, where the issue was the payment of fees for children attending
schools in Francistown proper. This was the subject of a note by the
Minister of Local Government and Lands and correspondence between the
1
Ministry and the Council. (Ihe immediate problem was satisfactorily
resolved but the ultimate solution was the transfer of Somerset West to
Francistown.)
Nkhwa's question was on his own initiative rather than at Council's
request; the only instance of the latter was the unusual decision to
ask a member of the House of Chiefs, Councillor Chief Ramokate, to raise
an issue in that body, which technically is not part of Parliament, but
has established the right to question Ministers and debate general
2
questions.
1 NEDC Minutes, 22 DEC 71 (marginal note); ibid.. 22-23 MAR 72.
2 Ibid., 30 JAN 68; see J. H. Proctor, "The House of Chiefs and the
Political Development of Botswana" Journal of Modern African Studies, VI,
1, (1968), pp. 69 ff
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Foreign Donors
The obviously pressing problems of the North East combined with
1
its relatively manageable size and accessibility to make it a magnet
for aid from overseas, involving principally the Botswana Christian
Council, the United States Embassy, the School Partnership Programme
2
and the World Food Programme. With one or two exceptions the Council
did not actively initiate requests for aid, but rather responded to
explicit offers of assistance, such as sums of money for emergency
water supplies from the Botswana Christian Council or from the United
3
States Embassy Self-Help fund for school building. Water was the
problem which most aid aimed to alleviates followed by school building
and health projects.
Even though aid was, in general, very welcome it gave rise to a
number of conflicts. These were not the result of the strings attached
- although on one occasion Councillors actually refused to take up an
offer until they could see how it would fit into the Council's embryo
Development Plan - so much as personality clashes and administrative
inefficiencies,, Delays in submitting project memoranda resulted in
delays ranging from three months on water projects to over a year for
4
a classroom building project. The greatest amount of friction arose
over aid personnel and their relations with the permanent Council Staff,
culminating in a decision by the Council:
. . . that they will rather require an old and more experienced
water engineer and that the present Council Adviser need no
replacement.®
1 In comparison with the more poverty stricken but remote Kgalagadi
District, for instance.
2 These being requests to the International Planned Parenthood Federation
for two nurses, and an application to the Christian Council for fruit trees
and help with water supplies, NEDC Minutes 11 SEP 70, and 23-24 AUG 73.
3 Ibid.. 22 DEC 70, 7 JUL 69
4 IPid., 22 DEC 70, 10 MAR 71, 21-23 JUN 72, 20-23 SEP 72, 23-24 AUG 73
5 Ibid. , 8 APR 70
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On the side of the donors, the report commissioned by the Botswana
Christian Council, reacting to the poor working relationship with the
Council Secretary, recommended that
In the particularly sensitive field of personnel assistance
... no benefits at all can be envisaged from further
support [for] this District Council.1
When the District Development Committee system was set up, however,
the expatriate CUSO volunteer District Officer (Development) and DDC
Secretary managed to achieve a better working relationship with the
Council Secretary and the newly-appointed Council Development Officer.
THE NORTH EAST DISTRICT AS POLITICAL ARENA
The Ethnic Factor
The "Kalanga question" undoubtedly exists in the mind of Tswana
politicians. But the language question, raised in Parliament by MPs
2
from the North East and Central Districts, was mentioned only once in
3
the Council, when it was noted that compulsory Setswana in school
examinations disadvantaged non-native speakers, which category included
the bulk of the North Eastern population. The fact that many uneducated
Kalangas were less than fluent in Setswana meant that Radio Botswana,
reception of which was difficult enough in the area, was not listened
4
to very much, and instead the Shona service of Radio Rhodesia had a
5
much larger audience.
1 Flood, op. cit., p. 241
2 See Hansard, 14, pp. 184 ff (13-14 JUL 66); and p. 381 below.
3 NEDC Minutes, 22-23 MAR 72
4 Kalanga and Shona are mutually comprehensible.
5 The effect of this can be noted from the virtual absence of
participation from the North East in the Radio Learning Campaign
mounted by the University's Division of Extra Mural Services. (Radio
Learning Campaign files).
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There was one minor ethnic problem that concerned the Council
and this was the Mazezuru Community, who on religious grounds were
opposed to allowing their children to attend local schools. A series
of discussions was held in which the Council achieved a measure of
success.1 But relations on the whole were amicable and Councillors
paid tribute to the disproportionate contribution to self-help made by
2
Mazezuru.
The major ethnic problem however was undoubtedly one of relations
between the white farmers (and the Tati Company) and the local African
farmers or would-be farmers. At almost every meeting of the Council
between January 1968 and September 1969 complaints were made about
the treatment of Africans by Europeans in the freehold area. Repeatedly
strong protests were made about evictions (often at very short notice),
arbitrary "fines" charged for cattle trespassing and the closure of
rights of way with fences. An investigation was ordered into reports
of humiliation suffered at the hands of European farmers; in short,
3
relations were bad. Undoubtedly this continuing friction was the
factor which precipitated the sudden announcement by the President,
during the 1969 election campaign, of the nationalisation of Tati
Company Land - an announcement the implications of which were still
4
being worked out years later.
Elections
For the psephologist studying Botswana the North East District
has the unique advantage that no candidate has ever been returned
1 NEDC Minutes, 20-21 DEC 72, 26-27 FEB 73, 23-24 MAY 73
2 Ibid,, 20-21 DEC 72
3 Ibid., 22-23 MAR 72, 20-22 FEB 74
4 See above, pp. 205-206
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unopposed, enabling- precise comparisons to be made in all polling
districts between the 1966, 1969 and 1974 elections (the position
being complicated only by the transfer of the Somerset West suburb to
Francistown in the 1974 election). For Parliamentary elections the
North East is however divided between the Tati West constituency
(renamed North East in 1974), which covers more than half the District,
and the constituency of Francistown & Tati East (renamed Francistown
in 1974) which covers the remainder of the North East District as well
as Francistown; together the two constituencies comprise the Tati
District. These caveats notwithstanding, the trends are quite clearly
discernible. Table 5.1 tells the story of BPP success at the polls
for the North East District Council, with Francistown Town Council
shown in Table 5.2 for comparison.
TABLE 5.1
LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS; NORTH EAST DISTRICT COUNCIL
Seats won (number of candidates in brackets)
1966 1969 1974
BPP 4 ( 7) 5( 7) 5( 7)
BDP 2( 7) 2 ( 7) 2 ( 7)
Ind 1( 2) - -
BNF - 0( 1) -
Total 7(16) 7(15) 7(14)
TABIE 5.2
LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS: FRANCISTOWN TOWN COUNCIL
Sests won (number of candidates in brackets)
1966 1969 1974
BPP 6 ( 8) 6 ( 8) 4 ( 8)
BDP 2( 8) 2 ( 8) 5 ( 9)
Ind. 0( 1) - -
Total 8(17) 8(16) 9(17)
* One BDP candidate returned unopposed
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To amplify these figures, Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show the share of the
vote secured by the contesting parties in the North East District and
Tati District as a whole respectively.
TABLE 5.3
LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS; NORTH EAST DISTRICT COUNCIL
Share of the votes cast (percentage)
1966 1969 1974
BPP 58.2 63.1 51.6
BDP 30.4 36.0 48.4
Others 11.3 0.9 -
Swing: 1966-69: +0.35 (i.e. to BDP)
TABLE 5.4
LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS:
NORTH EAST DISTRICT COUNCIL + FRANCISTOWN TOWN COUNCIL
Share of the votes cast (percentage)
1966 1969 1974
BPP 65.2 63.2 53.7
BDP 27.8 36.3 46.3
Others 7.0 0.6 -
Swing: 1966-69: +5.4
It is not possible to calculate a precise swing on the basis of
the 1974 election owing to boundary changes and one uncontested seat in
FTancistown but clearly the BDP improved its position very substantially
in 1974 everywhere in the Tati District.
The same story is true of the Parliamentary elections, which
demonstrates that it was the national standing of the parties rather
than their performance in the Council that was the determining factor
in voters1 behaviour, with the reservation that the BPP vote in the
District Council election in 1969 and 1974 was slightly higher (by 0.8%
to 1.4%, i.e. approximately 1%) than the estimated vote it received in
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the rural part of the Tati District in the Parliamentary elections.
Hie tables which follow (5.5, 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8) are self-explanatory.
TABLE 5.5
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS:
TATI WEST (1965, 1969)/N0RTH EAST CONSTITUENCY (1974)
Parties' share of the vote (percentage)
1965 1969 1974
BPP 51.6 59.4 51.5
BDP 26.1 37.7 48.5
Ind. 20.3 - -
BNF - 2.9 -
BIP 2.0 - -
Swing: 1965-69: +1. 9%
TABLE 5.6
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS:
FRANCISTOWN AND TATI EAST (1965, 1969)/FRANCISTOWN CONSTITUENCY (1974)
Parties' share of the vote (percentage)
1965 1969 1974
BPP 77.3 65.1 52.6
BDP 21.2 34.9 47.4
BIP 1.5 - -
Swing-; 1965-69: +13.0%
TABLE 5.7
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: TATI DISTRICT
Parties' share of the vote (percentage)
1965 1969 1974
BPP 66. 9 62.7 51.9
BDP 23.2 36.1 00
BIP 1.7 - -
BNF - 1.2 -
Ind. 8.2 - -
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To complete the data, the one by-election which occurred for the
North East District Council took place on 1 FEB 67 in the BPP-held
1
ward of Tshesebe East. The result of the straight fight, a BPP
majority of 39.8%, indicates the peak of People's Party support in that
ward. The successful candidate subsequently crossed the carpet to the
BDP and lost his seat heavily at the 1969 election, albeit with a
slightly better result than average (in terms of swing) for BDP
candidates. This is the only evidence of a personal vote, whereas the
2
exaple of Chief Ramokate's spectacular failure in his home ward when
standing as a BDP candidate in 1969 gives some indication of the primacy
of party (and the irrelevance, certainly in this District, of aristocratic
birth) in determining voting behaviour. There was no obvious factor to
account for variations in voting pattern from ward to ward within the
general picture.
Parties and Policies
Much of the analysis of the business of the North East District
Council has been concerned with identifying the impact of party as a
factor. It has been found that Councillors in the North East resemble
their counterparts elsewhere (the Southern District Council in Session II
being particularly relevant for purposes of comparison) in being concerned
as party members with the holding of office in the Council, and as
1 Ministry of Local Government & Lands By-election file. Government
Gazette, V, No. 8.
2 He received 15.8% of the votes, in a straight fight with the
incumbent BPP Councillor.
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individuals in agreeing- to a consensus on a substantial range of issues,
but particularly regarding relations between the Council as a whole and
outside bodies. But the North East differs from the Southern District
Cin its two-party phase) in the very definite inter-party cleavage
on a number of policy matters.
The policy divisions were most marked on the problem of small
settlements where the BDP favoured village grouping and were prepared
to contemplate closing down "uneconomic" schools and were strongly
opposed by the BPP, who take seriously their party title as champion of
1
the people. This is brought out also by the clashes over licensing
hawkers and permitting commercial development on the later acquisitions
of State land. Other sharp differences occurred over the siting of a
dam, over compensation, and over relations between freehold farmers and
their neighbours in the communal areas.
Yet the consensus is also striking. There was unanimous condemnation
of some of the objectionable actions of the Tati Company and certain
European farmers, and a similar lack of party-based cleavage on the
provision of amenities and social services in general and their location.
More remarkable the BDP Councillors were almost as critical of the
Chiefs'/Headmen's administration of matimela as were the BPP, and this
foreshadowed the switch in Government policy away from nominating
2
traditional leaders to the Council.
Even in the sphere of committee elections the North East Councillors
operated a system of co-operation to the extent that no Councillors
were excluded from committees, even if the BDP held almost alL the
1 Some BPP Councillors however were converted to the principle of
village grouping but insisted that it be purely voluntary; others remained
hostile to the whole idea.
2 In the Second Session there was only one such appointment - and he
was a defeated BDP candidate.
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Committee convenerships. The periods when the BDP monopolised certain
bodies (Licensing Authority and Land Board) were ended after BPP
criticism by the inclusion of at least one non-BDP member. This does
not disprove the theory of a North East District oligarchy, but it does
indicate a willingness to share committee positions.
Caucussing was more intense than elsewhere and did not occur only
1
before elections but was a regular feature. This degree of party
organisation culminated in the election of a BPP Councillor as Chairman
for a short spell, and the later election of a disgruntled (and none too
effective) BDP Councillor who (with impunity) defied the party caucus.
These BPP manoeuvres to split the ruling party were matched by the
enticing of a BPP Councillor to cross the carpet, where he joined the
former Independent in supporting the Democratic Party.
If, as has been implied, the BPP made much of the running on policy
matters (based on their moral authority as the victors at the polls) and
displayed a relatively high degree of ideological consistency, the
question that arises is why they lost support between the 1969 and 1974
Local Government Elections. Hie answer is probably an amalgam of two
factors perceived by the public: their unimpressive leadership and lack
of credibility as a national party; and the impracticability of trying
to elect a BPP Council, given the implacable opposition of the Government
to such an eventuality.
The Council and the People
It has been widely recognised that the role of the District
Councils which were introduced in 1966 has yet to be fully understood
by the bulk of the people and this communications gap has been referred
1 The District Officer reported frequent use of Council meeting rooms
by the BPP (MIG&L, note from Principal B to Principal A, 21 APR 69)
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to on a number of occasions. One attempt to get through to the people
was the decision to admit the press (which is ironic, since public
access to Council meetings is automatic unless Councils decide otherwise
1
for specific items), and years later the Council expressed concern at
2
the lack of coverage it received on Radio Botswana. That this breakdown
of communications was not however entirely the fault of the media is
brought out in the following extracts:
1970 The Chairman brought to the notice of the Council that
he had got complaints from the public that some members
of the Council did not even take an interest in acquaint¬
ing their wards they stand for with Council dealings.
The chairman was commenting in brief the importance of
members visiting their wards, receiving their complaints
and also reporting back Council proceedings.3
1972 The District Commissioner . . . informed Council that
members of the public were complaining that their
Councillors do not visit them regularly to hear and take
their complaints to Council.
Commenting on the complaints, most of the Councillors
indicated that members of the public were to blame because
the people themselves refuse to turn up for meetings.
Resolved: Council resolved that Councillors, accompanied
by an officer from the District Commissioner's office
should visit areas in the district and encourage people
to attend meetings, and that the people should be addressed
by both Councillors, Government Officers and Council
Staff.4
1 NEDC Minutes, 28 AUG 67; Model Standing Orders, S.Q. 16.
2 NEDC Minutes, 20-21 DEC 72
3 Ibid., 8 APR 70







Village Development Committees (VDCs) have become a basic
institution in Government thinking, forming the foundation of the
"democratic pyramid" idea frequently used by Government spokesmen.
Ihe official VDC Handbook puts it this way:
Decisions in a democracy are taken by you, in your village as
well as by the Government in Gaborone and by the District
Council. . . .
. . . the VDC represents the interests of the village as a
whole. At the same time it is part of the whole Government
system - indeed tge most important part of Government machinery
at village level.
Still it is possible to overstress the importance of VDCs. Despite
statements to the effect that "it was one of the set government proposals
that every village that had a school had to have a Village Development
3
Committee," many villages had none, or at least experienced considerable
periods with no functioning VDC. Nor does this mean that such villages
have experienced no development at all during such periods, or that they
have no voice or no way of having their interests represented. As non¬
statutory bodies, VDCs are purely voluntary organisations and their
1 Since their original ad hoc establishment to cope with the needs of a
famine/drought relief programme, just before independence.
2 Botswana Extension College, Village Development Committee Handbook
(final draft) (1974). pp. 3, 4
3 Statement by a Community Development Assistant. Mapoka VDC Minutes
(meeting at Nlapkwane), 28 AUG 71
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function and standing in their particular villages are determined by a
number of factors, historical, social, geographical, economic and
political.
Some studies have been undertaken of the political workings of
individual villages, and equally some aggregate data has also been
1
compiled. But the former where compiled in depth gives a series of
unrelated case studies, while the latter, being derived from the
filling-in of questionnaires by VDC office-bearers, lacked confirmation
through systematic interviews and cross-checking with other information
available. In an attempt to produce valid findings about a fair sample
of villages, therefore, three villages were selected from each of the
three districts chosen for study, but with the important proviso that
the VDC minute book should be not only extant but available. What
follows, then, is derived from extensive interviews and the written
record of nine villages: three groups of three each. They are: in the
North East District, Mapoka, Masunga and Tsamaya; in the Central District
(Mahalapye area), Kalamare, Mahalapye and Makwate; in the Southern
District, Digawana, Good Hope and Molapowabojang.
One fact to emerge can be disposed of early. This is the rather
surprisingly low degree of overlap in the various records kept - surprising
because of the relatively small size of the areas involved and therefore
the consequence that the number of physical developments which occurred
or were mooted was of manageable proportions. In most cases a complete
record of projects could be compiled by collating the information lying
2
in various administrators' files, but it was clearly a much-needed reform
1 These are reviewed later in this chapter.
2 But note the following remarks : "Some of the completed projects do not
appear in this report because their records could not be found anywhere in
this office" (prefaced to a Community Development Report on "North East
District. Self-Help Projects since 1966-1972")
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to combine this into one format and the District Development Committee
and planning- procedures which have now become an established feature of
local administration in Botswana had yet to make their impact in the
period under review. But in any case what is essayed here is not a
comprehensive catalogue of development projects but an analysis of the
processes at work, both within the village community (i.e. horizontally)
and (vertically) between the village and the district or indeed national
level. The VDC is at the intersection of these two sets of relations.
VDCs: CONSTITUTION AND INTERNAL ORGANISATION
One searches in vain for a "model" constitution of VDCs, although
certain features are generally accepted in official thinking as
fundamental. But the "unwritten constitution" of each VDC is an
individual one and will emerge later in this chapter from a study of the
relationships in practice between various organisations. Nevertheless
a useful start can be made by citing three semi-official statements of
the role of VDCs.
The Village Development Handbook (drafted at the end of the period
under review), answering the question, "What is a VDC?", states:
A Village Development Committee is a committee set up by a
village to help develop it. Members are elected at a kgotla
meeting. Anyone living in the village can vote at the meeting
or become a member of the VDC. The aim of the VDC is to
improve the village for the benefit of all the people living
in it. A VDC is not controlled by any political party and it
cannot force anyone to do what he does not want to do. But
the VDC is not powerless. It can call for help from everyone
living in the village to help with projects.
This is the VDC's job:
It finds out what the needs of the village are and discusses
them.
It lists those in order of importance so that the most urgent
come at the top of the list.
It reports back to kgotla on what it has done each year.
1 Botswana Extension College, Village Development Committee Handbook
(op. cit.). p. 4. The draft was approved by the Minister of Local
Government & Lands.
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An example of the guidelines given by Community Development Field Staff
is the following, taken from the inaugural meeting of the Good Hope VDC:
(a) wide development with prior consideration of important
things - like schools, roads, clinics and hospitals.
Ihe people would be notified of any developments at
general meetings.
(b) to lead people in different allocations of work.
(c) the members should set an example and should not
unofficially disclose any information regarding the
Committee's decisions. Should know that unity is strength
and should, in their unity, centre all tjjieir minds to
the up-keep of Good Hope's developments.
An even fuller exposition was given at the launching of the Tsamaya VDC
by the Assistant Community Development Officer:
He then described the functions of the VDC as briefly summed
belowo
(1) That the VDC's duties are associated with the general
development of the village.
(2) That it is the eye of the village.
(3) That it handles, accounts for all village funds.
(4) That it plans beforehand all development projects for
the village - which thing was done by a headman by
himself, and that the Government now chose a particular
Committee to do those projects and that the Headman was
an ordinary member of the Committee. Here instead of
the individual decision of a Headman the vote decided
the validity and rigidity of the members.
(5) That all committee meetings could only be held at other
places rather than Kgotla. That the Chairman and the
secretary came to the Kgotla through the headman to say
out its decisions subject to majority approval.
(6) That such committees have not come to take the powers of
Chiefs, Headmen etc. only as far as court cases were
concerned - that trial cases were the responsibility of
Headmen.
Routine Duties
That such committees should meet regularly right through
the year about fortnightly to:-
(1> To plan for the forthcoming year i.e. with special regards
to classrooms, roads etc. and have and be governed by the
time factor in carrying out proposed projects.
(2) That all desired materials must be ready before the proposed
projects are undertaken; and emphasised that planning was
important.
1 Good Hope VDC Minutes, 30 JUL 70
258
(3) That where the PTA exists it is there to advise the VDC
on other school developments though it is concerned with
-i
sports etc
Various theories of the VDC's function were propounded by VDCs
themselves. The main lines of thought were, firstly, that the VDC
was the leading organisation in the village - the executive of the
kgotla (thus kgotla meetings called at the VDC's request were sometimes
2 3
referred to as general meetings as opposed to "executive" meetings ),
the umbrella organisation to which all others were subordinate. This
interpretation was expressed by speakers at one meeting, opposing the
proposal of a member of the traditional administration to refer a
problem to the Chief. One argued that "we are authorised for the whole
village and thus everything should reach us first and then be passed
on," while another stated: "the progressive approach is that the VDC
should take decisions and convey its minutes to the Chief and the MP.
4
The Chief, MP and Councillors have nothing to do with it."
An alternative view was that the VDC was merely one club or movement
amongst several concerned with development, and one VDC went so far as
to refer to these other organisations as other "development committees"
5
of the village. This approach is more marked in the earlier-formed
Committees which were organised during the big Food-for-Work programme;6
7
one VDC indeed retained the name "I.C.D. Committee" (Ipelegeng Community
Development Committee) from 1967 to 1969.
1 Tsamaya VDC Minutes, 16 APR 70 (emphasis in the original)
2 Mapoka VDC Minutes, 12 NOV 70
3 Ibid., 24 JUL 71
4 Mahalapye Central VDC Minutes, 10 JUL 70
5 Tsamaya VDC Minutes, 22 MAR 72




One of the few features common to all VDCs is that they are
1
elected at kgotla meeting's and that they have the usual officebearers -
Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Treasurer, Secretary (and often Assistant
Secretary}. The frequency of election varies from once a year to just
once; and the turnover of members is generally rather low and mainly by
the choice of the member concerned. The total membership varies widely,
from eight to over twenty. Likewise the number of ex officio members,
although always including the Headman, may stop at him but, in most cases,
includes the local Councillor(s) and the Community Development Assistant
(CDA). Others who feature in some are Head Teachers, MPs, Agricultural
Demonstrators, the District Officer, PTA chairmen, and sometimes
representatives of other organisations. In some cases several members
of the traditional administration were members, up to a maximum of ten
in one village. Moreover the number of members varied over time.
Although the committees were all elected, there were two interesting
variants on the electoral process. In one village the unsuccessful
candidates for the ordinary membership became alternates or reserves,
but were entitled "co-opted members" and thus qualified to be listed as
"members"; this unusual system was the legacy of the CDA who established
the Mapoka VDC. In Kalamare the committee was suddenly augmented (at
election time) by the addition of four members designated "MP's nominees".
Hie one VDC election which the writer actually witnessed (at the North
Eastern village of Mosojane) is recorded in Appendix C; the variations
in composition are to be found later in the chapter.
1 This can of course be by acclamation rather than by voting.
2 Kalamare VDC Minutes, 4 DEC 69
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Modus Operandi
The minutes of the VDCs vary as widely as their composition. The
only features which are found virtually without exception are the
recording- of the date of the meeting and the names of the member leading
devotions (which always occurred at the beginning of the meeting and
frequently at the close]). This latter feature has two explanations :
the strength of the Christian tradition in Botswana (a predominantly
1
Christian nation) and the desire for a degree of formality in deciding
when to open a meeting. Otherwise formality in the sense of European
2
committee procedure is very much the exception (save for the practice
of addressing the chair).
3
Minutes were written in English in two villages, in Kalanga in
4
two, and in Setswana in the remainder. Frequently the minutes were
read out (and less frequently confirmed or corrected) at the following
meeting, but by no means always. Similarly reference to "matters
arising" and the use of an agenda were the exception rather than the
rule. Thus, apart from financial statements, which were commonly given
in the form of "expenditure to date and balance in hand," the ethos of
the VDC was the ethos of the kgotla, manifested in the necessity to
allow everyone to have their say and then attempt to reach consensus.
1 This is not inappropriate, given that the creation of the Bechuanaland
Protectorate owed much to Livingstone and other Christian missionaries.
The Church of Livingstone, the LMS (London Missionary Society) Church,
now known as the United Congregational Church of Southern Africa, is the
largest denomination in the country. in addition there are now many
independent churches.
2 In the ten minute books studied there was only one reference to
proposing and seconding a motion (where a motion "fell for lack of a
seconder"): Tsamaya VDC Minutes, 5 MAR 71
3 Kalamare and Tsamaya
4 Mapoka and Masunga
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While this approach may not always be conducive towards snappy
decision-making, it does provide much invaluable insight into the
working of the committees.
Some committees, faced with the problem of reconciling the lengthy
discursive nature of the committee with the need for action, resorted
1
to the creation of sub-committees, either ad hoc or "executive" (but
2
usually called by some other name such as "emergency committee,"
3
"working committee" or "caretaker committee". In most cases however
executive functions were performed by leading lights on the committee,
including Chairmen, Councillors, Secretaries, Treasurers, Headmen,
CDAs, et al., who typically reported back to and sought retrospective
approval from the Committee.
One of the major problems encountered by VDCs was that of
attendance at meetings. There are two aspects of the problem: one is
the low turnout at meetings which actually take place which, for VDCs
4
where attendance was listed, averaged around 58%. The following
extracts bring out the problem. "It was just a general complaint of
5
these members absenting themselves. So nothing was done . . ."; "A
very poor attendance and nothing much was said";6 "Of the 18 VDC
members I know only six. Even of the six only about four attended
7
meetings. Meetings were a flop."
1 E.g. for fund-raising: Kalamare VDC Minutes, 16 OCT 68
2 Ibid *, 4 DEC 69
3 Mahalapye Central VDC Minutes, 20 JAN 71
4 This confirms the Findings of a survey conducted by the Botswana
Extension College, which found a mean attendance of 60%. (A. Etherington,
Villagers as developers - I), p. 4. BEC's figures on attendance of
councillors and CDAs (40% and 30% respectively) also confirm the writer's
findings.
5 Kalamare VDC Minutes, 19 FEB 68
6 Molapowabojang VDC Minutes, 11 AUG 71
7 CDA (Mookane area!, Report on Community Development Work, May 1969 -
referring to Makwate VDC
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Some VDCs attempted to deal with non-attendance in formal ways :
1 2
requiring- apolog-ies for absence, writing- to absent members, or
3
reducing- the quorum to the two principal officebearers. One Committee
4
resolved to debar members absenting themselves three times in a row,
5
while another decided to fine members R2 (over £1) for non-attendance.
The same solution was suggested in another VDC but rejected after a
lengthy discussion, which was clinched when one member pointed out that
"the people you complain about are not here".'6 Clearly there was no
one solution to this perennial problem.
A related aspect is the frequency of meetings. Four VDCs set a
1 8
target of weekly or fortnightly meetings, but none came anywhere near
achieving this norm; in fact the best average achieved was one meeting
9
every three weeks. Nevertheless the idea of a fortnightly (or better)
norm was reflected in a survey administered at a series of VDC training
conferences, half of the answers to the question also claimed that there
10
was no significant seasonal variation. Since a majority of VDC members
are farmers this finding was surprising and turns out to be an example
of the "halo effect". From the records of the ten VDCs studied it emerges
1 Mahalapye South VDC Minutes, 29 MAR 73
2 Good Hope VDC Minutes, 24 AUG 70
3 Kalamare VDC Minutes, 3 MAR 69
4 Ibid., 4 DEC 69. This follows the District Council Standing Orders
and was suggested by the newly-elected councillor.
5 Molapowabojang VDC Minutes, 18 OCT 72
6 Mahalapye South VDC Minutes, 21 JUL 73
7 Ibid., 29 MAR 73; Good Hope VDC Minutes, 24 AUG 70; Kalamare VDC Minutes,
23 OCT 68 and 21 JUN 72
8 Ibid., 4 DEC 69; Makwate VDC Minutes, 16 SEP 72
9 By Molapowabojang VDC
10 Etherington, Villagers as developers - I (op. cit., hereinafter referred
to as "Etherington - I" etc.) pp. 4, 6
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that the average interval between meetings was 40 days (i.e. just over
1
nine meetings per annum) but that the seasonal variations, as
demonstrated in Figure 6.1, are a very prominent feature indeed.




Village Development Committees' concern about attendances was
rivalled by their preoccupation with money, since in practice the number
3
of projects which do not require a cash input is very limited. In
addition there were very often strings attached to Council support (in
materials or money) for a project, taking the form of an assumed/required
4
community contribution expressed as a certain sum of money. Most VDCs
however opted to hire builders, buy locally made bricks, etc. rather than
organise construction projects themselves, and this inevitably forced
5
them to raise more money to pay for this method; the most sophisticated
example of deficit financing was a loan of R3,000 negotiated by the large
Mahalapye VDC from a bank.6
It is difficult to give a definitive estimate of the amount of
money handled by a typical VDC, owing to the emphasis (where financial
1 One VDC discussed the problems attendant on the phaladi (scattering
of the people): Digawana VDC Minutes, 20 MAR 71
2 E.g. "The two sub-committees [Mahalapye North and South] have not met
from 8th March to 30th June 1972, the reasons been given is the members
who were still at the lands [=fields]": CDA (Mahalapye), Quarterly Report
- Second Quarter 1972.
3 Recognised by the Botswana Extension College Village Development
Handbook) op. cit. , p. 14.
4 E.g. a Central District Council offer of R600 provided the village put
up R193 in cash or kind: Makwate VDC Minutes, 14 OCT 72
5 Some VDCs indeed went into the red owing to this practice: Digawana
VDC Minutes, 1 FEB 72; Molapowabojang VDC Minutes, 21 JUN 72
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reports are regularly given) on the balance in hand rather than annual
statements. But (leaving aside the high finance of the Mahalapye
Community Centre),* the identifiable annual turnover varied from very
2 3
small sums (well under R100) through R509 to R722 in particular cases.
(Hie de facto population of the last two villages is respectively 2,715
4
and 912.) Figures given for the Central District in 1968 (with 66 VDCs
in operation) were as follows:
Total contribution in cash
(a) By villages: R18,564
(b) By Botswana Christian Council: R3,916
(c) By Central District Council: R403
(d) By School Partnership Programme: R5,712
Sources of funds varied from village to village. In addition to
Council grants, the most favoured ways of raising money were per capita
5 6
levies (varying from 10 cents per head to R3 for each employee; one
VDC decided to charge R1 for men and R0.50 for women, then on reflection
7
decided not to discriminate and made it 50c each); or subscriptions
levied on each traditional ward. Two villages in the North East
received substantial sums from dmigrds working in South Africa, Rhodesia
8
and towns in Botswana: a pattern found elsewhere in Africa but not
encountered in the other villages in Botswana. One village received
9
funds for various permits for parties, and also court fines. Functions
such as concerts, f§tes or parties (at which the sale of beer and food
1 See pp. 306-307 below, and p. 193 above
2 CDA (Mapoka) Annual Report 1972 (This was the sum raised by the
VDC itself.)
3 Kalamare VDC Minutes, 11 MAR 70
4 Community Development Department Annual Report: Central District
Data, p. 1
5 Good Hope VDC Minutes, 21 FEB 72
6 Tsamaya VDC Minutes, 2 JUL 70
7 Kalamare VDC Minutes, 11 MAR 70 and 1 APR 70
8 Mapoka VDC Minutes 19 FEB 71; Masunga VDC Minute Book, 3 OCT 71 and
passim
9 Kalamare VDC Minutes, 16 AUG 72 and passim
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were the main attraction) were also popular, although the amount of
profit made was often rather small. Such occasions performed a useful
social function and were sometimes combined with major events such as
1
visits by a Minister to open classrooms.
All the effort put into fund-raising ans self-help can be totally
negated by corruption; indeed the mere suspicion that funds have been
misappropriated can be sufficient to ruin a VDC's efforts and poison
2
relationships within a village. Even a case of alleged embezzlement
unconnected with the VDC in one village cast a dark shadow over the
committee's operations as all receipt books in the village were
confiscated by the police. As will be shown in the latter part of this
chapter memories of past irregularities in the handling of funds are
long, the effects lasting over a decade. The number of cases of
3
alleged or proven corruption is relatively small, and this is perhaps
surprising given the fact that only 39% of VDCs in one survey kept
their funds in a bank:
TABLE 6.2
4
VDCs classified by method of storage of VDC funds
N %
Funds kept in a bank account 36 39
Ftinds kept with treasurer 31 34
Funds kept elsewhere 25 27
Total 92 100
No reply 2
1 E.g. Mapoka VDC Minutes, 2 OCT 71; Kalamare VDC Minutes, 14 NOV 68.
In 1970 four ministers attended a total of 20 such opening ceremonies in
the Central District alone: Community Development Department, Central
District - Region II, Annual Report for 1970, p. 6.
2 The accused was removed from the post of court clerk. Kalamare VDC
Minutes, 1 AUG 73
3 Two examples from the Central District: "The VDC is unhappy about the
headman's alleged lack of cooperation and sabotage. They reported that
certain monies had been misappropriated by the headman." (Central District
Council Secretary's Report: "Third Tour of the Central District: 9th November
- 21st November 1972");letter from Councillor Sekwate to Central District
Council, Serowe, 19 MAR 72: "I'm instructed by Village Community
Development [committee] to inform you that the chairman had used the
community's funds to the amount of R226.69."
4 Source: Etherington - 1, p. 7
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Planning
As might be expected from the informality which is characteristic
of Village Development Committees, decisions on projects were not
normally taken in a systematic way; as Curtis says, this may well
gradually change as the impact of the establishment of district planning
1
machinery comes to be felt at the village level. There are instances
2
of the systematic debate of priorities within the VDC or at a k^otla
3
meeting called at the VDC's request, but these are exceptional. A more
4
typical pattern is a list of projects derived from ideas emanating from
within the village and also suggestions from outside, either by a
government field officer (e.g. the CDA) or as part of a District- or
nation-wide plan (particularly the Food-for-Work, or Drought/Famine
Relief schemes). Uiis list is then added to by "emergency" requests
(for repairs to teachers' houses, for instance); some projects are only
partly implemented; the resultant dilemma is whether to persevere with
unattractive projects or to abandon them in favour of new ones. The
confusion is enhanced when implementation is in various hands - teachers'
housing delegated to the Parent/Teacher Association, for instance - or
the materials donated by the Council are damaged, used for other purposes
or removed by the Council. Add to the picture vagueness in accounting
5
for money, and the resultant process while certainly "rolling" can
1 D. Curtis, "Ideology and the Impact of Development Agency Activity,"
(1977), p. 139
2 Good Hope VDC Minutes, 30 JUL 70
3 "250 attended where development plans was presented by VDC, and
accepted after detailed discussion, i.e. at Mahalapye." (Community
Development Department, Central Regional Monthly Report, August 1968, p. 5)
4 Specific instances will be found below in the section on individual
VDCs.
5 For an excellent study illustrating this see Curtis, op. cit, pp. 141-145.
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hardly be described as "planning-".
Leaving aside for the moment the question of projects originating
from outside the village, there are evident within the VDCs two
tendencies as regards project selection. One is the influence of the
pattern established in the early days when villagers tended to think in
terms of building programmes - the so-called "hard" projects such as
1
schools and health facilities. The other is the vested interests of
2
teachers and ex officio members, notably CDAs, in getting houses
built or repaired for themselves or their colleagues. The fact that
these bids for resources have usually succeeded indicates the legitimacy
which attaches to offices such as theirs as much as the desire by
villagers to have sufficient teaching staff for their children. The
influence of other vested interests is more difficult to detect with
3
certainty - they usually involve the precise location of various
developments - but one generalisation that can safely be made is that
VDC projects benefit those nearest the centre of the village most, and
they normally include the ex officio members of the VDC and their
relatives.
THE VDC AND OTHER FORCES IN THE VILLAGE
The reference to "other forces" in the village includes two
apparently distinct categories: the ex officio members and other
organisations. With regard to the former, it may appear paradoxical
to classify them as "other" forces, yet their influence can very often
1 Recognised in Botswana Extension College, The Training of Village
Development Committees, NOV 1976, p. 8
2 Teachers are often elected to the VDC as secretaries or as other
officebearers; in some villages the Head Teacher was regarded as an
ex officio member.
3 One example is the decision to build latrines at the kgotla; and
(long term) tribal offices; Kalamare VDC Minutes, 20 MAY 70
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be specifically identified, justifying the categorisation. The position
of the "other organisations" is in fact comparable since in most villages
there is representation on a de facto or de jure basis of these other
organisations. The two categories thus converge. On the one hand the
supposedly ex officio members were sometimes not regarded as members at
1
all, or complained that they were not informed about meetings and hence
could not attend: this was true of headmen, councillors and Community
2
Development Assistants alike. (Before going on to discuss the
contribution of councillors and CDAs it should be emphasised that what
is being analysed here is their "horizontal" role, i.e. as members of
the village community, rather than their "vertical" function as
"brokers" or liaison personnel - which is the subject of a later
3
examination.) On the other hand there is one instance of a village
where the practice was to elect one delegate from each of the four
organisations existing in the village - Farmers' Association, Parent/
Teacher Association, Women's Club and Youth Organisation. In most
villages however it just happened that there was overlapping membership,
4
directly or through spouses.
The District Councillor
Generalisation about the impact of councillors on VDCs is a
hazardous enterprise - and can produce some rather surprising
1 E.g. in Makwate where the CDA reported that neither Headman nor Head
Teacher was a member (the Councillor and CDA did not reside in the
villagei CDA (Mookane), Monthly Report, MAY 69. In Molapowabojang it
was stated that the Agricultural Demonstrator and the Councillor ought
to be/become members (VDC Minutes 14 SEP 71)
2 Examples, respectively: Masunga (VDC Minutes, 3 OCT 71), Tsamaya
(VDC Minutes, 7 JUL 71); Digawana (VDC Minutes, 18 NOV 71) and Themashanga
(CDA [Tsamaya] Annual Report 1972).
3 Masunga
4 The question of differentiation by gender is a profound subject in
itself and is referred to below, pp. 283 and 315-316
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1
results - owing- to the difficulty of isolating: the relevant factors
labelled "councillor", and the most meaning-ful conclusions have to be
specific to a particular village, a particular councillor and a
2
particular period. One of the problems is that of estimating how
frequently a councillor attends VDC meetings. One survey produced a
3
figure of one-third of meetings attended by a councillor. This
figure is higher than the number of recorded attendances in the villages
in this study, which worked out at 21% (n = 41/193). The figure may
underrepresent the position in that councillors may have attended some
meetings without being mentioned in the minutes (few VDC minutes
regularly recorded the names of those present); against this must be
set the fact that, cwing to the number of VDCs which had two councillors
4
as ex officio members, the proportion of recorded attendances as
against possible attendances was only 16%. These figures however cover
a range from 83% to no attendances and are thus of dubious value, but
clearly cast considerable doubt on the popular view that the VDCs are
the councillor's power base from which to challenge the headman, or
that he "controls" the VDC through the party.^
1 See Vengroff's conclusions on the amount of success achieved by VDCs
defined by authority type. R. Vengroff "Local-Central Linkages and
Political Development in Botswana" (1972), pp. 48-52.
2 For excellent examples see D. Curtis, op. cit.. Chs. 5, 6. Other
instances are contained in P. J. Rollings Village Development Committees
in Totome (1974).
3 Etherington, - I (op. cit.), p. 11
4 Mapoka, Masunga and Tsamaya (after October 1969); Mahalapye (Central).
In other cases (Molapowabojang after October 1969; Digawana; Makwate)
the Councillor was non-resident.
5 Mahalapye South (after the 1970 by-election)
6 Vengroff, op. cit., p. 47. The question of party activity at the
village level is discussed in the next chapter. See the Chambers &
Feldman Report (1972), especially p. 187.
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When councillors did attend meetings their suggestions were
frequently adopted by the Committee - on such matters as teachers'
housing in Mapoka; a pay rise for the village postman in Tsamaya; or
raising a loan from the Parent/Teacher Association in Mahalapye South.1
Councillors' status was underlined by their executive role, especially
in Mapoka and Mahalapye (see following section for details) where they
were much involved in the supervision of projects and ceremonies,
banking, and the removal of bottlenecks in the supply of building
materials. Councillors occasionally made loans or donations to VDCs
2
or helped with transport. They also accepted or were assigned
responsibility for arranging the election of the VDC (and in one case
3
also the PTA) in two villages.
It is clear that councillors possessed considerable influence when
they chose to exercise it; the relevant question perhaps is why some
chose to do so while other did not. Some answers will emerge from
consideration of each village in turn.
4
Ihe Community Development Assistant
While politicians tend to see the elected councillor as the leading
light in activating or encouraging VDCs, the prevalent civil service
view is that the task is much more likely to be accomplished by the
g
trained professional, the Community Development Assistant. How
influential, then, is the CDA?
1 Respective VDC Minutes: 15 OCT 70; 5 MAR 71; 29 MAR 73
2 See respective VDC Minutes: Masunga, 8 AUG 71; Molapowabojang 28 SEP 72;
Ibid., 27 OCT 71 .
3 CDA (Mookane) Annual Report, 1971 [for Makwate VDC]; Kalamare VDC
Minutes, 4 DEC 69; CDA (Kalamare) Monthly Report, NOV 70
4 Many CDAs have become Assistant Community Development Officers(ACDOs):
the term "CDA" is employed as a convenient shorthand for all grades of
Community Development personnel in the villages.
5 See Government Paper No. 1 (MAR 72), p. 20; Government Paper No. 2
of 1973, p. 15; and Chambers &, Feldman, Report on Rural Development (1973),
pp. 227-234. For a critique of the "social engineering" approach, see
Curtis, op. cit., passim. See also P. G. L. Wass, "Community Development
in Botswana" (1972), Part II passim.
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The first interest of any new C'DA is obviously her or his own
housing. This question has featured in a number of villages. To be
fair to the CDAs, they did not normally arrive and then set about
organising the VDC to build them a house; it was usually understood that
the CDA's right to accommodation imposed an obligation on the host
1
village and/or the Community Development Department to provide one.
Nevertheless construction or renovation of CDA housing did entail the
diversion of village resources (primarily labour, both skilled and
unskilled) to house the Community Development worker, and occupied the
2
attention of VDCs in four villages.
CDAs further successfully suggested building classrooms and roofing
3
teachers' houses. But the limits to the influence CDAs possessed in
deciding priorities (as opposed to their liaison role with their
Department or the Council) are clearly seen in the rejection of a move
4
to set up a "projects committee" and the angry reception given to the
CDA's criticism of the VDC's priorities as indicated in the following
extract:
The CDA complained of recklessness of building [with] the
tribe's money. This topic rose [sic] a long argument and
misunderstanding. The acting Chairman pointed out that
this should not be discussed in the Special meeting but
in our general meeting. The meeting was closed.®
It is not all that surprising that CDAs' opinions were less
influential than those of councillors, since the former were almost
1 Materials were often made available by the Community Development
Department for the "right" kind of projects.
2 Mapoka VDC Minutes, 8 MAY 71; Tsamaya VDC Minutes, 17 JAN 73;
Kalamare VDC Minutes, 16 OCT 68, 20 AUG 69, 26 NOV 69, 3 JUN 76,
24 MAR 71; Community Development Department (Serowe), Central District:
Region II: Annual Development Plan for 1969.
3 Kalamare VDC Minutes, 11 OCT 68, 24 MAR 71
4 ibid., 18 OCT 72
5 Ibid., 20 OCT 70 (The matter was never reopened. Earlier criticism
by the same CDA had been ignored: ibid., 15 JUL 70.)
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invariably younger than the average age of VDC members, and in addition
1
many were women (who were a minority on all VDCs); in two of the most
active VDCs (Mapoka and Mahalapye Central) the CDA's views did not
figure at all.
When it came to prodding VDCs into action, however, CDAs were
2
much more successful. One village greeted a new CDA as "our leader"
a title which was analogous to that of "project leader" under the Food-
for-Work scheme. In this capacity Community Development personnel were
3
able to get VDCs to decide on projects for Food-for-Work workers and
4
simply to have meetings. But the most important aspect of this sort
of activity was the holding of elections. Almost all VDCs were either
5
formed by a CDA or were addressed by Community Development personnel
immediately after their formation.6 In pursuance of one of their
primary duties CDAs initiated reflections, where these had not taken
7
place, in several villages.
The other principal function performed by CDAs was executive -
reporting on the progress of a project, accounting for money, convening
g
meetings of village organisations, all at the respective VDC's request.
The combination of a low degree of influence on the content of
decisions - accentuated by a level of attendance/participation only
1 13°Io according to Etherington - II, op. cit. . p.2
2 Kalamare VDC Minutes, 31 OCT 67
3 Digawana VDC Minutes, 14 JAN 71
4 Ibid., 18 NOV 71, 1 FEB 72; CDA (Kalamare) Report, AUG-DEC 69
5 E.g. "I formed a development committee in June": CDA (Mahalapye),
Monthly Report, JUN 68
6 E.g. Good Hope VDC Minutes, 30 JUL 70, 6 AUG 70; Tsamaya VDC Minutes
18 APR 70
7 Makwate VDC Minutes, 6 SEP 72; Digawana VDC Minutes, 1 FEB 72; Good
Hope VDC Minutes, 22 MAR 71, 10 MAY 71; CDA (Kalamare) Report, AUG-DEC 69
8 Good Hope VDC Minutes, 24 AUG 70; Kalamare VDC Minutes, 27 JUN 72,
13 JUL 72, 16 AUG 72; Mahalapye Central VDC Minutes, 20 OCT 70
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1
slightly higher than that of councillors (25%: N = 49/193) - with
an important role in maintaining the existence and activity level of
2
VDCs (and other organisations) is understandable. The expectations
of the Community Development Department, as indicated in the format of
the frequent returns demanded of CDAs, were conducive to a quantitative
rather than qualitative account of village activities.
3
The Headman
It is widely accepted that the village chief or headman is the
most important figure in the village, even to the extent of being
4
described as the "leader" of the village. More often the decline in
the position of the chief is commented upon, but even this presupposes
5
a position of at least influence if not power; it is sometimes expressed
as a veto or partial veto. This aspect will be dealt with below (in
connexion with the VDC's relations with the people), but even regarding
the headman's position in the VDC decision-making process it must be
noted that he possesses a unique combination of advantages. Firstly
he is resident, by definition, unlike some councillors and CDAs.
6
Secondly he is a professional - unlike the councillors. Finally he
1 The figure given in Etherington - I, op. cit., p. 11, is 40%. The
figure given above however is based on mentions in minutes and is thus
cerainly an understatement.
2 E.g. Dancing Club, Youth Club and Women's Club formed by one CDA in
just over one year. CDA (Kalamare) Reports, JUN 68 - DEC 69.
3 Headman here means the principal traditional authority in the village.
He may be officially or popularly entitled Chief, Chief's Representative,
or Subordinate Tribal Authority, and may be Gazetted (and paid) or unpaid.
4 A. Kuper, Kalahari Village Politics: An African Democracy (1970), p. 237
5 A substantial minority of people supported the chief and/or did not
realise the extent of the diminution of his powers in a survey conducted
by Holm. J. D. Holm, Dimensions of Mass Involvement in Botswana Politics
(1974), passim; and earlier unpublished survey data (mimeo), kindly made
available to the writer.
6 Although increasingly "being a District Councillor" has come to be
regarded as a profession. (See Appendix D)
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is likely to be both permanently there, and local - unlike teachers.
It is clear, therefore, that he has a decided edge, in most villages and
in the long run, over the other ex officio members of the VDC - if he
chooses to exercise his influence.
It is however exceptionally difficult to estimate, in a generalised
way, the degree of influence which the headman can exert in practice.
In the first place some villages contain a number of traditional
authorities (where a village is sub-divided into customary wards, for
1
instance). Moreover the approximate number of attendances by the
headman (Sl^o), while looking impressive compared with the figures for
councillors and CDAs, is partly a function of the fact that two VDCs
2
had the headman as their chairman (for at least part of their history)
and in another, where the headman was vice-chairman, his presence was
3
deemed essential for certain decisions to be taken. A further
problem is that not all VDCs distinguished clearly between committee
("executive") and public kgotla ("general") meetings; by definition the
headman would be present, as convener, at the latter. Furthermore if
a chief does not feel like attending every meeting of the VDC he can
4
afford to sit in the wings, wait for proposals to be reported to him
and if necessary turn up at the next meeting: it is unusual for VDCs
to move with precipitate haste even if no public meeting is required
to endorse specific decisions.' As a last resort the headman may wait
1 This is particularly the case in Mahalapye; and in Good Hope, which
on paper included ten chiefs/headmen on its VDC (Good Hope VDC Minutes
22 MAR 71, 10 MAY 71)
2 Kalamare and Molapowabojang
3 Digawana VDC Minutes, 17 JUN 71, 1 FEB 72
4 Although Curtis points out that the chief's grapevine is not always
guaranteed effective: Curtis, op. cit., p. 146-147
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until the next kgotla meeting - where he will be playing on his home
1
ground - before intervening.
A further relevant point is this : to what extent does the headman
need the VDC? Insofar as he is an established official, his personal
problems are likely to be subject of correspondence with the Secretary
2
of the Tribal Administration; as far as housing, water, and other
amenities are concerned headmen were usually fairly well provided for,
3
and defensive about them rather than ambitious for further visible
4
material benefits of the kind which VDCs could provide. Indeed a
headman may well be justified in regarding over-close identification
with the VDC as dangerous, to the extent that VDCs are regarded by the
village as just one of several voluntary organisations: it is only where
the VDC is seen to have a superior position as "executive of the kgotla"
that the headman could reasonably accept a leading role in it.
With all the above caveats entered, one or two examples of
headmen's influence on VDC decision making can be noted. In Kalamare
these include the decision to build a dispensary,6 and plans for the
construction of a Tribal Administration office and for latrines at
7
the kgotla. In another village the headman managed to get a storeroom
8
located within his courtyard.
1 Pitfalls may exist even here, however: ibid., Ch. V, passim
2 The volume of mail coming in to the Bangwato Tribal Administration
Secretary's office surprised the writer. They covered personnel and
judicial matters in the main.
3 For instance the traditional administrative office in many places has
a telephone - something envied by councillors, who may or may not be
allowed to use it on occasion.
4 Curtis (op. cit, p. 102) bears this out.
5 Etherington - III, op. cit. p. 8
6 Project selected by the Headman, according to a questionnaire return.
7 Kalamare VDC Minutes, 20 MAY 70, 17 JUN 70
8 In Makwate: CDA (Mookane) Annual Report 1971
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The conclusion must however be that the headman's influence, whilst
it is strong, is exercised either directly through a VDC office (chairman
usually) or indirectly through an alliance with the leader(s) of the VDC.
It is much more often the case that headmen maintain a certain distance
from the VDC as a committee, but can play a crucial role in the
1
mobilization of the people, or the reverse. This point is taken up
below.
Other Village Organisations
The other organisations referred to here fell into four categories:
(i) the well-nigh ubiquitous Parent/Teacher Associations (PTAs); (ii) the
organisations composed entirely or mainly of women (Botswana Council of
Women [BCW] affiliates, often simply called "Women's Club"; the Young
Women's Christian Association [YWCA]; the Red Cross); (iii) Youth Clubs
(with various titles); (iv) other (secular) organisations such as
Sports Associations, Independence Day Committees and Water Syndicates.
It should be mentioned that village level organisations including the
VDC and the PTA afford the only "political" outlet for teachers since
2
they are ineligible to stand for election to Councils or Parliament.
As regards women's organisations there is a tendency for the BCW and
Red Cross to be identified in the capital with the (BDP) establishment,
since the leadership is provided by wives of leading politicians,
3
including Lady Khama and the wife of the present Foreign Minister.
1 See Etherington - III, op. cit., p. 8
2 See J. D„ Holm, "Rural Development in Botswana: three basic political
trends," Rural Africana (Fail 72), pp. 87-88. The teachers' union has
had a very limited impact.
3 This extract from the Daily News lends credence to such a view: "Raised
fists of salute and shouts of 'Tsholetsa domi.'' [the BDP slogan] greeted
Sir Seretse Khama when he arrived in Kanye ... to open the annual
conference of the Botswana Democratic Party which he leads.
"Junior Red Cross members danced round the President's car chanting a
song in which the BDP Government was likened to a new-born baby. Lady
Khama joined in the dancing." (BDN, 18 APR 74)
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Hie YWCA, on the other hand, being- an older-established organisation
with pre-independence links with South Africa, has often been seen as
the preserve of South African immigrants (many of them teachers' wives).
It is dubious if this kind of interpretation holds much validity for
the clubs established in individual villages, where local personalities
are the dominant factors.
Reliable data on these organisations in the villages is hard to
come by, owing principally to the changes that inevitably occur in all
voluntary organisations over time. However Table 6.3 gives the membership
as reported by CDAs for five villages, and compares them with the relevant
population figures in the 1971 census (for the village proper and the
Enumerator Area [ea] which includes it).
TABLE 6.3
Membership of Other Organisations
Village BCW Red Cross Youth Club Population
Village EA (c)
(aj Mapoka (proper) 56 - 55 (23 male) 180 2,715*
(a) Mapoka-Nlapkwane 25 - - 55 920
(a) Masunga 40 - (formed later) 414 712
(b) Digawana 22 - - 949 949
(b) Good Hope 22 10 (3 male) - 472 995
(b) Molapowabojang 19 12 (female) - 346 1 ,030
* de facto
Sources: (a)) CDA (Mapoka), Annual Report, 1968
(b) Community Development (Kanye), Quarterly Progress
Report, AUG-OCT 72
(c) Central Statistics Office, Guide to the Villages
of Botswana (1973)
A majority of VDC members were also members of other organisations
according to a Botswana Extension College survey in which the
respondents were 266 officebearers. The average VDC member held 1.2
1
positions on committees of other (secular) organisations. Table 6.4
indicates the ratio of "involved" to "non-involved" categories by office.
1 The difficulty with including churches is that many were not run by
"committees". Nevertheless the percentage of VDC members on Church
organising bodies was 327o. Source: as for Table 6.4
TABLE 6.4
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POSITIONS IN OTHER ORGANISATIONS













Note: (a) includes other officebearers (e.g. Vice-chairman)
and ex officio members
Source: Etherington - II, p. 10
Although the data is not entirely satisfactory it can confidently
be stated that there is a very substantial degree of overlap in the
1
membership of VDCs and other organisations (44% in the case of PTAs)
This fact puts into perspective the findings of Vengroff that members
of other organisations were much more disposed to participate in VDC
2
or indeed any self-help projects: the explanation is that the membership
and leadership of those organisations typically overlapped with the VDC.
In some cases self-help projects were independently organised by the
3
PTA. More commonly other organisations assisted the VDC in implementing
4 5
projects or were requested by the VDC to provide assistance. It was
6
exceptional for the roles to be reversed.
1 Ibid.
2 Vengroff, op. cit,, pp. 221-225
3 E.g. in Molapowabojang (VDC minutes 11 MAR 73, 13 JUN 73) and Makwate
(CDA [Mookane] Monthly Report, MAY 69).
4 For instance the YWCA in Kalamare (VDC Minutes, 14 NOV 68)
5 The PTA was asked for help in Mahalapye South (VDC Minutes,
21 JUL 73) and Mapoka (VDC Minutes, 15 OCT 70, 2 OCT 71).
6 One such exception was help with bricks for the YWCA in Kalamare
(VDC Minutes, 20 NOV 67), provided at the urging of the Headman and
the MP.
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The same pattern is found in the realm of finance. Apart from one
1 2
case of a loan and one of a grant from the VDC, the traffic was in the
3
other direction. As a rule donations were made on an ad hoc basis,
4
although one PTA claimed to make a donation "almost annually". Likewise
5
VDCs did not generally try to levy subscriptions but asked other
6 7
organisations for loans or ad hoc donations. The voluntary nature of
the relationship between the VDC and other organisations comes out quite
8
clearly.
Joint meetings with one or more organisations were commonly called
by VDCs, particularly when there was some event in the offing such as a
Presidential visit or a Youth Rally; it was rare for the initiative to
9
be taken by another organisation in convening such meetings. The
VDC's position may perhaps be summarised as prima inter pares : playing
the leading role but with little more than moral authority to back it
up. One or two quotations illustrate VDC members' view of the relationship.
The PTA in one village was described as having an "advisory role", and
10
was criticised for failing to report to the VDC. In another the VDC
was described as an "invigilance committee" which could expect to be
1 To the school: Tsamaya VDC Minutes, 2 JUL 70
2 To the YWCA to cover costs of sending delegates to a conference :
Kalamare VDC Minutes, 20 OCT 70
3 Examples: From the YWCA in Kalamare (VDC Minutes, 23 OCT 68, 7 MAR 73)
and Mahalapye (Central VDC Minutes, 6 JUL 71) and the BCW (ibid.)
4 In Masunga, 1967-72
5 An exception was Mapoka where the Sports Association was expected to
pay an annual subscription. (VDC Minutes, 24 JUL 71)
6 E.g. from the PTA (Mahalapye South VDC Minutes, 29 MAR 73)
7 For instance from the BCW in Molapowabojang during a financial crisis
(VDC Minutes, 22 NOV 72)
8 And is underlined by a VDC/PTA dispute about paying for classroom
repairs (Mapoka VDC Minutes, 12 NOV 70)
9 An example is the Digawana PTA (VDC Minutes, 24 JUN 72)
10 Tsamaya VDC Minutes, 18 APR 70 and 21 OCT 71
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1
kept informed of the Women's Club activities. In a third village the
Independence [Day Celebration] Committee reported formally to the VDC,
2
albeit reiterating its independent status.
VDCs in a number of villages assumed an administrative or supervisory
role appropriate for the "executive of the kgotla". In one village it
asserted that the VDC Treasurer should hold the funds of all "branch
3
committees". In another it took over responsibility for the postal
4
service, while in a third it vetted projects to be undertaken by other
5 6
organisations and agreed to take over and run the football ground. It
should however be emphasised that it could do none of these things without
the co-operation of the other organisations concerned. The significance
of this is that "control" of the VDC by no means guarantees control over
anything else.
Ihe VDC and the People
However misleading the term "executive of the kgotla" may be as a
description of VDCs, it does point to the crucial importance for the VDC
(and therefore distinguishes it from the other organisations) of the
kgotla. In a subject where one searches in vain for a simple unive^al
pattern the centrality of their relationship is indisputable. The
7
centrality of the kgotla as an institution has been widely commented on.
1 Kalamare VDC Minutes, 31 OCT 67
2 Mahalapye Central VDC Minutes, 20 OCT 70
3 Kalamare VDC Minutes, 6 NOV 68
4 From the PTA (Digawana VDC Minutes, 24 JUN 72)
5 Mahalapye Central VDC Minutes, 20 JAN 71
6 At the suggestion of Queen's Park Rangers F. C. (ibid., 25 FEB 72)
7 FTom the classic studies of Schapera to the more recent works of,
inter alia. Curtis, Kuper and Vengroff (all op. cit.).
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For village development the kgotla is the platform for announcements,
financial statements, progress reports and the discussion of future and
ongoing projects. The feeling that the kgotla was the only official
means of making announcements lay behind the exhortations in some
villages to VDC members not to "reveal VDC secrets" before the appropriate
1
kgotla meeting made the plans public: it was important not to weaken
in any way the legitimising function of the general kgotla meeting.
The fundamental principle that kgotla decisions, arrived at by
consensus and after debate, were binding on all villagers meant that
VDCs could, and had to, use the kgotla as a means of mobilising the
the people for action. As an example from a village where self-help
work had run into difficulties, the following extracts from the VDC
Minute Book indicate the Committee's approach to the kgotla. The VDC
agrees to ask for kgotla meetings: (i) "at which the people would be
told to do the work;" (ii) "to explain that [certain projectsl should
2
be started;" (iii) "to tell people to start at once."
Village development on a self-help basis has to face formidable
obstacles. The climate (temperature over 90°F in the shade in summer);
poverty; the traditional division of labour (if that is the appropriate
term) in which much of the physical work is done by women and much
drinking is done by men; the seasonal pattern of subsistence agriculture;
and frequently apathy. None of these factors is new, but they combine
with modern factors in different ways and sometimes result in intractable
problems. The migration of the young and the more educated people away
1 Tsamaya VDC Minutes, 5 MAR 71




from the villages, for instance, tends to leave fewer able-bodied men
than women in the village. Women are therefore expected to carry out
the bulk of the work and the ratio of women to men on development projects
2
has been put at 7:3 in one village; in another village it was stated
3
that "mostly only women turn up to work". (The official national figure
4
given for "Ipelegeng" workers in 1967 was 90% women.) Yet the
participation in the kgotla is traditionally a male preserve, and women
are in the minority on VDCs - outnumbered 3: 1 in the Southern District,
5
according to one estimate while a national sample survey gave the
0
female percentage as only 13%. This rather fundamental fact is rarely
discussed at (male-dominated) development conferences]!
7
A more generally recognised problem is the confusion caused by the
successive programmes of famine relief, notable the Food-for-Work scheme,
8
and the attempt to run voluntary self-help projects in parallel with
or after the cessation of, the famine/drought relief scheme. Testimony
to this problem was paid by a senior Headman thus: "It has been a
difficult task for people to embark with enthusiasm, since the
discontinuation of Food-for-Work,1^ and by a Community Development
1 See Report on the Population Census 1971 (1972), Ch. 13, and the
(unpublished) proceedings of the Workshop on the National Migration
Study, UBIS, Gaborone, 1977. This factor was identified by a senior
District Council official as a major contribution to the lack of "new
ideas of development" in the villages: Central District Council
Development Projects Report (n.d.), p. 2.
2 Nlapkwane (Mapoka): ACDO (Francistown) Annual Report for 1968
3 CDA (Kalamare) Monthly Report OCT 70
4 This is the estimate given in the Botswana Government Relief &
Rehabilitation Unit's first report (BDN, 20 JAN 67).
5 Community Development Officer (Kanye), Quarterly Progress Report,
AUG-OCT 72
6 Etherington - II, op. cit.. p. 2
7 See p. 39 above, and pp. 424-425 below,
8 E.g. in Kalamare with some difficulty (VDC Minutes, 19 SEP 73)
9 Address by Chief Letsholathebe to MPs visiting Tsamaya, 6 JUN 70.
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Assistant as follows : "Ever since the stoppage of Food-for-Work scheme
1
in May, no progress is being continued."
It is tacitly assumed that the way to overcome the various obstacles
to development outlined above is to harness the traditional system to
that end. The corollary to this assumption is the prevalent belief that
the chief or headman is in a key position, perhaps holding a virtual
veto, as convener of the kgotla - hence remarks such as: "It is
regrettable that where headmen are co-operative this should not be
2
taken advantage of." It may be true that "chiefs . . . feel that
[CDAs] have taken their job," that "headmen ... do not offer us any
help and do not take an interest in what [VDCs] do,"4 or that "chiefs
are not well aware that times are changing .... They complain that
their subjects no longer respect them as they used to. Sometimes they
think the CDAs, committee, councillors are taking away their powers. . . .
5
conaecpently retardation sets in." But one should beware of taking such
statements at face value since the chiefs may be convenient scapegoats
for council officials, CDAs and VDC leaders. At any rate it is rare for
a chief to refuse to call a kgotla meeting at the VDGs request - indeed
such action could be termed unconstitutional - and only in one village
6
was the headman criticised by the VDC on these grounds. In one other
village the chief told the Assistant Community Development Officer that
1 CDA (Kalamare), Monthly Report, JUL 71
2 Central District Council Secretary, quoted in Mmegi wa Dikgang fSerowel,
III, 16, (29 SEP 72)) p. 1
3 CDA (Mahalapye) Monthly Report MAY 68 (Referring to the Kalamare area)
4 Report by Mahalapye delegates on Rural Development Conference in
Serowe, 23-24 APR 72
5 ACDO (Francistown), North Eastern Annual Report 1969
6 Tsamaya VDC Minutes, 17 FEB 72
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he (the ACDO) could only handle the people through him (the chief).1
But deliberate and outright obstruction by the headman seems rare;
on the other hand it may well be his example that is important, rather
than his words.
One aspect of the traditional system which has been employed in
VDC attempts to mobilize the people is their organisation into wards,
in the traditional sense of village sub-divisions (each with its sub-
2
headman and sub-kgotla). The VDC Handbook recommends that the various
traditional wards should be represented in the VDC, but it is in general
accidental if this happens. Only one VDC (unwritten) constitution was
3
based on ward representation, while another used the councillors'
4
wards (polling districts) as the basis for sub-committees; one of these
sub-committees subsequently resorted to "segmentation" of their area
5
on the basis of traditional wards.
The purpose of sub-division by traditional ward was to bring the
responsibility for implementing central kgotla decisions closer to the
people. Thus wards were given pieces of land to level for a building
6 7
site, assigned target figures of bricks to be moulded, or told to
g
build shelters. Equally common was the pattern of ward collection of
9
money. One of the advantages of this system was that a defaulting
1 Good Hope VDC Minutes, 29 JUN 71
2 op. cit., p. 5
3 Masunga (VDC Minutes, 28 NOV 71; Community Development [Francistown]
Annual Report, 1968)
4 In Mahalapye. This was done at the suggestion of the CDA (Monthly
Report, DEC 69)
5 Mahalapye South VDC Minutes, 23 MAY 73, 21 JUL 73
6 Kalamare VDC Minutes, 23 OCT 68
7 Mapoka VDC Minutes, 13 MAY 74
8 Ibid., 23 MAY 71
9 VDC Minutes, Tsamaya 2 JUL 70; Makwate 3 MAR 74; Kalamare 18 NOV 70
and 26 JUL 72
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1
ward could be fined, if the system was strong enough to impose such
sanctions; an extension of this was the fining of those who held
parties, at the fields ("lands") some distance from the village proper,
without permits, thus asserting central kgotla control over these
2
"temporary" settlements on the periphery of the village area.
The question of sanctions for non-compliance with VDC/kgotla
decisions has been a perennial topic of debate. Steady pressure for
sanctions to be applied has come from many quarters. For instance, the
VDC Chairman, the Chief and a majority of villagers assembled at
3
Mmashoro (in the Central District) supported the idea, a sentiment
echoed by villagers in Mapoka who complained that "the chief doesn't
4
apply sanctions to non-workers." Nevertheless the Community Development
Department "have fairly consistently opposed the idea of penalties for
g
non-participators." Only in one village studied were sanctions seriously
attempted against those who failed to turn up to work or to pay
subscriptions.6 But in general the BDP Government is anxious to eschew
anything reminiscent of the old regimental labour system whereby chiefs
7
had the power to send out the age-regiments to undertake various tasks.
VDCs have tried to use the chief/headman for various specific
tasks. In one village where the VDC was having difficulty in getting
1 As happened in Mapoka (VDC Minutes, 23 MAY 71)
2 Where this happened, the Headman was also VDC Chairman; permit fees
accrued to the VDC (Kalamare VDC Minutes, 29 AUG 73).
3 "Should they be fined for not co-operating?" Mmegi wa Dikgang, III,
17 (20 OCT 72), p. 1
4 Kgotla meeting, 7 OCT 74 (eyewitness account)
5 S. J. Tennent, Report on Community Development (unpublished)(n.d.
[1974]), p. 22
6 Tsamaya VDC Minutes, 13 MAY 71, 21 OCT 71, 17 SEP 72.
7 A rather surprising finding of a survey by Holm (unpublished data)
was that 79% of adult respondents (and 71% of school children) said they
would heed such a call.
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support for a water reticulation project, the VDC decided to "ask the
1
kgotla to help us dig the trench." In another village an influential
speaker suggested "that we assign this task to the Chief as he always
knows best" and at the same meeting a more radical member complained
2
that "the Chief is really ruling through this committee." In the
Barolong capital village, Good Hope, the authority of the (Paramount)
Chief Besele II was invoked to summon (via the Tribal [now Local] Police)
3
the headmen of the area to attend VDC meetings.
Whether or not the chief is "co-operative", the relationship between
VDC and people requires popular attendance at the kgotla. Here the
4
record varies dramatically, from attendances of 300 in Mapoka, 250 and
195 in Mahalapye ("the response of the people is really encouraging . . .
5
several big meetings held"), to complaints about the "unco-operativeness
of the villagers",6 culminating in the plaintive report : "we called
7
meetings seven times but nobody came." Curtis found that "absenteeism"
was a deliberate tactic employed on certain occasions to cause a meeting
to fail.
Even when people do turn up at kgotla meetings, that does not
automatically solve the problem of getting people to turn out to work on
projects, since the people's attitude to the VDC, or the Community
1 Makwate VDC Minutes, 14 OCT 72
2 Mahalapye Central VDC Minutes, 10 JUL 70
3 Good Hope VDC Minutes, 15 MAR 71
4 CDA (Mapoka) Yearly Report 1972 ("attendance very good")
5 Community Development Region II Monthly Report, AUG 68; CDA
(Mahalapye) Monthly Report, MAY 68
6 Molapowabojang VDC Minutes, 13 FEB 73
7 Digawana VDC Minutes, 8 APR 74
8 Curtis, op. cit.. p. 147
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Development workers or the headman, may play a part. Thus one finds
oris de coeur from VDCs such as these:
1
Ci) "We are working- alone't
(ii) "The Chairman complained at being left alone to do the
cementing"2
(iii) "The people are difficult to manage, they were better off
with the chief;"3
(iv) "The committee had informed the people of their intentions
but the people do nothing."4
Confirmation of the difficulties encountered by Community Development
staff is indicated in many reports, of which the following is only the
most eloquent:
I have been gravely concerned about all the people, and they
are many indeed, who disregard the value of Community
Development and did not at all bother to contribute anything,
either in the form of money or labour, towards implementing
the projects which the VDC finds fit to embark on. . . .
these people with all malicious intent often mock at the
essence of Community Development as such that even goes as
far as use humiliating and provocative expressions against
the Ipelegeng enthusiast. They deliberately do these things
because they say that Community Development is not an
obligatory commitment and therefore it is not important,
and they can do whatever they please.
As a result of all these embarrassments and confusions,
many people who have previously shown a great deal of
keenness on Community Development become less interested,
and everyone lapses into a state of indifference on
Ipelegeng projects. . . .
. . . . This sort of thing does not in fact occur only
here in the Central District but also in other districts,
r. '
as experience has already shown. . . .
More light will be thrown on the successes and failures of
VDCs as mobilising agencies in the section below on the individual
1 Makwate VDC Minutes, 16 SEP 72
2 Kalamare VDC Minutes, 11 JUN 69
3 Ibid., 20 NOV 67
4 Makwate VDC Minutes, 3 MAR 74
5 CDA (Mahalapye) Monthly Report, JUL 69
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villages, but two points may be made here. In the first place the
tendency seems to have shifted from do-it-yourself to the hiring of
builders. Secondly some of the most successful VDCs have often been
able to raise substantial amounts of money from "outside" sources such
as businessmen or other donors. In both cases the poorer villages are
at a disadvantage.
THE VDC AND THE DISTRICT: PATTERNS OF COMMUNICATION
If Village Development Committees form an integral part of a chain
of democratic institutions, the question arises as to the nature of the
link, particularly between the VDC and the District Council or, more
generally, between the village and the district. It is to be expected
that councillors, as the only ex officio members of both VDC and Council,
would play a central role in the process of communication between the
two levels. Like MPs, councillors are (in the main) elected to
represent the people but, unlike MPs, all councillors form part of the
executive as well as the deliberative arm of government at district
level, since the District Council performs both functions (particularly
but not exclusively through committees). Almost continuously the
councillors representing the nine villages selected were members of one
or more Council committees. To what extent then, have councillors
(and to a lesser extent MPs) performed the function of "brokers" or
1
"middlemen"? And who were their main rivals for, or what were the
main obstacles to, these roles?
In order to examine the question it is necessary to look briefly
at the various methods of communication. Some relate primarily to the
national framework and these do not directly concern this study. Radio
o
Botswana, the Botswana Daily News, and certain ephemeral publications
1 See p. 4 above
2 All party periodicals and pamphlets can be so described. Attempts
to found local or regional newspapers have all foundered. The Mafeking
Mail &. Botswana Guardian (vith a small circulation) is the only alternative
to the Government—owned Daily News.
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fall into this category. Owing to the fact of majority illiteracy, oral
methods have to be preeminent (with the telephone a rare facility in
most of the nine villages). Access to the telephone and private
transport are particularly valuable to any would-be brokers: public
transport coverage is patchy in Eastern Botswana, and here the right
to have travelling costs defrayed is a most useful advantage.
Nevertheless the villages in Eastern Botswana ax*e not nearly as isolated
1
as these of the West. To the extent that VDCs correspond direct with
the District Council (and other district agencies), however, the scope
for middlemen is automatically reduced. The relevant question in this
connection is who is the recipient of written communications.
The various "bridge personnel" will now be examined in turn.
The Councillor
With the notable exception of two villages out of the nine,
councillors in general did not function as middlemen between the VDC
and the District Council, although in two other cases the councillor
explicitly or implicitly promised the VDC that he would report back to
them on Council business and represent them in Council decision making.
Moreover with very few exceptions the minuted decisions of VDCs and
those of the District Councils in covering the same period bore no
3
direct relationship with one another; where councillors did take up
matters on behalf of the VDC they did it with the Council Administration.
1 Such as the celebrated village of Kuli studied by Kuper (op. cit.)
2 Good Hope (VDC Minutes, 24 AUG 70) and Kalamare (VDC Minutes, 26 NOV 69)
3 One exception was the problem of boreholes in the Mapoka area raised
in the Council; Mapoka VDC Minutes, 15 OCT 70; North East District Council
Minutes, 22> DEC 70 and 22 DEC 71. Another was the Mahalapye Community
Centre, which was discussed several times in the Council; Mahalapye
Central VDC Minutes, 10 JUL 70-5 JAN 72 (passim); Central District
Council Minutes, 25 MAR 71, 16-17 SEP 71, 20 DEC 71, 22-23 MAR 72
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Several examples of this can be cited from the most northerly
village in this study, Mapoka, which had two councillors (one elected,
1
one nominated). Councillors made arrangements for assistance with
2 . . .3
repairing damaged buildings and for the provision of building materials;
and reported to the VDC on the arrival of new teachers, the new Land
Board system, Council bye-laws, and details of a post of midwife for the
4
clinic. in the quasi-urban "large village" of Mahalapye the two
5
elected councillors arranged for the use of Council transport,
helped arrange for a delegation to see the Council Secretary to seek
6
assistance for the Community Centre project, explained about Council
planning regulations; and made a major announcement about the workings
of the new Land Board system, during which they said that all applications




Of the six MPs who represented the nine villages examined here,
only two played a significant role in VDC affairs. It cannot be
coincidence that these two were the only MPs resident in these villages.
Confirmation of the importance of the fact of residence is provided by
the lack of comparable activity by one of these "active" MPs in the
affairs of the VDC in an outlying part of his constituency, and by
1 This was true from October 1969 onwards.
2 Mapoka VDC Minutes, 15 OCT 70, 27 MAR 71
3 Ibid., 12 NOV 70, 8 MAY 71
4 Ibid., 15 OCT 70, 27 MAR 71, 2 OCT 71, 2 JUN 71
5 Mahalapye Central VDC Minutes, 13 JUL 71
6 ibid., 17 NOV 70, 9 DEC 71, 6 JUL 71. An interesting point is that
the original request made by the VDC was for a meeting with the CDC
Community &. Economic Development Committee - the convener of which was the
Councillor for Mahalapye North (letter from VDC Secretary to Council
Secretary, 19 NOV 70),
7 Mahalapye Central VDC Minutes, 10 JUL 70
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the (more minor) role played in Mahalapye by the MP for a neighbouring
constituency1 who was Subordinate Tribal Authority (sub-chief) for
2
Mahalapye. The contribution made by these MPs is examined elsewhere;
suffice it to state here that their specifically "broker" role was much
less in evidence than their function as "patrons".
However the MP for Mahalapye did play an active part in a
delegation to the Central District Council, reporting back to the
3
Mahalapye Central VDC on the outcome; and was associated with the
attempt to have all applications to the Ngwato Land Board routed through
4
the councillor, chief or MP.
VDC Officebearers
The other category of elected people (one hesitates to call them
"politicians") which formed a bridge between the VDC and the District
Headquarters was certain key officebearers in five different VDCs. The
interesting fact about the five was that they were either headmen or
known party activists, or both. One of them,who became chairman of the
5
VDC for a while, was a shopkeeper and generally regarded as an
Opposition supporter; another, also a trader, was national Vice-President
of the BNF and held various office on the VDC.6 The remaining three
were all members of the traditional administration. One was a member
of a leading BDP family which included the local MP and councillor; he
7
was elected VDC Chairman. Another headman-cum-VDC-chairman had
1 Tswapong South
2 In the following section on the nine individual villages, and in
Chapter 9.
3 VDC Minutes, 9 DEC 70
4 Ibid., 10 JUL 70
5 In Mapoka




represented his area as a BDP councillor, while his opposite number
2
(and VDC vice-chairman) in a neighbouring village received the BDP
nomination for the same ward in 1969 (but lost to the BNF candidate).
Hie "broker" activities of four of these five officebearers fell
short of the dramatic, being concerned with writing letters and/or
bearing verbal messages back and forward; moreover it was apparent that
the headmen were able to use their dual position to advantage in
establishing their role as leading communicator. The net effect was to
blur the distinctions between the traditional and elected positions.
The traders had the advantage of mobility, which they used to establish
alternative routes of communication with the district centres. The most
effective broker, and indeed leader, was the then ENF Vice-President,
3
whose achievements are catalogued below, but included in particular the
4
idea of sending delegations to Serowe on two occasions; and delegations
were a rare phenomenon at either district or national level. Dr. Koma
provided many ideas: witness a request for a series of bye-laws to cover
Mahalapye, contained in a letter from Dr. Koma as VDC Assistant Secretary
5
to the District Council Secretary. The Council Secretary's reply
suggested that some of the requests be conveyed to the Subordinate
Tribal Authority (an ex officio member of the VDC.') and that others be
tabled by the councillors for Mahalapye at the next meeting of the
6
Council. The two councillors concerned did not follow up this suggestion.
1 The electoral ward of Gathwane, which included Molapowabojang and
Digawana.
2 Digawana
3 In the account of the Mahalapye Central VDC
4 Mahalapye Central VDC Minutes, 17 NOV 70, 9 DEC 70, 6 JUL 71
5 Dated 4 SEP 70
6 Date: 10 SEP 70
7 CDC Minutes, 14-16 DEC 70
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It is evident, then, that a number of VDC officebearers provided
an alternative to councillors (or MPs) as a bridge between District
Council and VDC. Hie main challenge to elected politicians' "middleman"
role (or, more realistically, the potential for such a role) came from
officials - employees of central or local government.
Community Development Assistants
CDAs were important as channels of communication. But even that
statement - like almost all other generalisations about the villages - has
to be qualified. In the early period of this study (since Community
Development was made the "Ipelegeng" Department), Community Development
personnel did have an important function to perform, particularly as
there was much confusion about the parallel functions of the Council and
the Community Development Department in approving projects and supplying
tools and building materials. However by the end of the period only 7%
of project application forms (according to a sample survey) were being
1
routed via CDAs while 82% were sent direct to the District Council.
2
This much-needed streamlining culminated in the transfer of CDAs to
become part of the Council staff.
The CDA's role was most prominent when the CDA was resident in the
village and where no strong leadership was forthcoming from other
quarters. One such village was Tsamaya, where the CDA explained the
District Council's Development Plan and assisted with the filling-in of
3
project application forms. Kalamare was a classic case: here too the
1 Etherington - I, op. cit., p. 9. 6% went "to the kgotla" and 6%
elsewhere.
2 One aspect of the change in the system was the redesign of the Project
Application Form. Originally destined for the Community Development
Department, it now goes to the Council. Wass, op. cit., App. VIII;
VDC Handbook, op. cit. , Appendix.
3 Tsamaya VDC Minutes, 17 JUN 73
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CDAs helped fill in application forms, informed the VDC about Food-for-
Work selection procedures etc., and above all read out letters from
Serowe. This last aspect, which was very important, shows that the
(resident) CDA was frequently the recipient of letters from the District
Council.
Non-resident CDAs were in a much weaker position, due largely to
their lack of transport. As Tennent points out, there were only
36 CDAs/ACDOs, supervised by nine Regional Community Development Officers,
1
for something like 300 recognised villages. Some did not possess even
a bicycle, and were in any case usually unaware of imminent VDC meetings
away from their local base.
But residence alone did not guarantee an important role for CDAs,
who barely feature in the achievements of villages like Mapoka (in the
earlier period), or Mahalapye, where there were active middlemen/patrons.
Apart from purely personal factors, the explanation for passivity seems
to be the belief in untrammeled self-help: the average CDA was happy to
be able to send in reports of progress viewed from the sidelines.
When a VDC was manifestly failing to function, however, as in the
case of Makwate, it was the non-resident CDA who repeatedly intervened
and tried to mobilise the committee, and the village in general, into
action, appealing the while to the councillor and the MP to come in
2
and assist in the process of invigoration.
Regional Community Development Officers did tour their districts
and one officer saw his role as a middleman, referring to himself as
"your representative in Kanye", and urging the VDC to contact him first
1 Tennent, op. cit., p.16
2 CDA (Mookane) Monthly Reports, NOV 68, APR 69, MAY 69 and Annual
Report 1971
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if they visited District A rather different approach was taken
by an officer based in Prancistown who wrote to a VDC urging them to
2
sort themselves out.' Later correspondence between the VDC and the
same officer concerned the CDA who was supposed to be in the village but
3
had disappeared, to the annoyance of the VDC.
District Council and District Administration Staff
Some categories of Council staff paid regular routine visits to
the villages to deal with specialised matters, particularly revenue and
education. But one characteristic of the period was the increasing
number of visits to deal with particular problems, especially those
concerning village development. This reflects the increases in staff
available to the Councils - posts such as Council Adviser, (filled by
expatriate volunteers), Works Superintendents and Development Officers.
The District Officers (Development), who were secretaries to the District
Development Committees and part of the District Administration, were a
parallel cadre. Altogether they made up a formidable team of informed
people who could talk to villagers with some authority about future
plans and current problems.
At least as important were the Council Secretaries, who came to
4
tour their districts with ever-growing frequency. This was especially
true of Lenyeletse Seretse in the Central District and preeminently of
Daniel Kwele, who was able to get round his relatively small North
East District with ease. The interest of the two Council Secretaries
in touring was more than just administrative (although each had
1 Digawana VDC Minutes, 24 JUN 71
2 Mapoka VDC Minutes, 19 FEB 71
3 Ibid., 24 JUL 71
4 See above, pp. 178 and 217-218
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1
reservations about councillors' reliablity as informants): both
possessed strong- political instincts, Kwele being ex-President of the
BNF and L. M. Seretse being destined for a parliamentary career with
the BDP. Kwele in particular gave every indication of building up a
2
base of support for himself.
Council Correspondence
One of the most striking findings derived from interviewing and
studying the records of the VDCs is the importance of direct correspondence
between the VDC (generally either the Secretary, or sometimes the CDA, less
frequently another member of the committee) and the Council Secretary or
other official at District Headquarters. The tendency seemed to increase
over the period studied, especially in the North East where the Council
Secretary attempted to formalise and control the hiring of labour and
3 4
contractors. In the Southern District it was the predominant method
of communication.
Self-evidently the greater the importance of direct correspondence,
the less the opportunities for middlemen. The implications of this are
the subject of the concluding part of this chapter.
1 See for instance Report on Third Tour of the Central District,
9th November-21st November 1972, in which the Council Secretary observed
that "Councillors are making no serious efforts to visit their electoral
wards before important meetings." (p. 16)
2 However on occasion Kwele's vigorous manner was counter-productive,
as when he berated the Tsamaya VDC publicly for tardiness in completing
projects; this occasioned an impassioned and bitter debate at the next
VDC meeting and a letter of protest. Tsamaya VDC Minutes, 14 APR 72
3 E. g„ Mapoka VDC Minutes, 24 JUL 71, 26 OCT 71; Tsamaya VDC Minutes,
13 MAY 71, 7 JUL 71, 17 SEP 72




It will already have become apparent that wide differences existed
in the structure, achievements and style of the VDCs in the nine
villages studied. It may therefore be helpful to give a thumbnail
sketch bringing out the salient features of each VDC in turn. This is
preceded in each case by the relevant extract from the offical
Village Guide.1 The villages are presented in geographical order, from
North to South.
NORTH EAST DISTRICT
(i) Mapoka: Councillor-led success story
EA Population; 2,715 (de facto), 4,062 (de jure);
Dwellings[compounds] : 438 (437 occupied)
Facilities: Church -LMS/UCCSA [Congregational] - Visiting
Preacher; Health - Clinic - Staff Nurse stationed here -
visited monthly by medical officer; School - Standard 7
Primary 7]; Water supply - borehole; Cattle crush; AD
Agricultural Demonstrator]; CDA; Local/Tribal Police Post;
Sub-chief and customary court.
[Commercial] Establishments: 2
A number of factors combine to account for the relatively high
level of activity in this border village. The BPP councillor (who was
also the unofficial leader of the BPP group in the Council) was the
leading light in the VDC and had substantial political support from
1966 to 1974 in this solidly BPP area. On the VDC, however, he was run
a close second by the unsuccessful BDP candidate in 1966 and 1969, who
was elected to the VDC at its inception and before he became a nominated
councillor in 1969. The rivalry between these two can be described as
creative tension, perhaps kept that way by the unshakable hold the BPP
appeared to have on the area. The Shfe (sub-chief of the area) was
generally regarded as a BPP sympathiser and lent his support to the VDC,
1 Central Statistics Office, Guide to the Villages of Botswana (1973).
The extracts have been only slightly edited. (Note that the information
given in the Guide is incomplete.)
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in particular threatening1 outlying wards with sanctions when appropriate.
Traditional wards were used as the basis for a number of enterprises -
a difficult undertaking in areas such as this, characterised by the
Kalanga dispersed settlement pattern. This situation may account for
the relatively warm attitute of the BPP councillor to village grouping
proposals.1
As with the neighbouring and rival village of Masunga, the 6migr6s
from the village encouraged a feeling of pride in Mapoka's development
2
and offered a little financial assistance. But developments in the
village were largely due to the VDC's own fund-raising efforts, assisted
by the PTA, the Council, and above all the councillors as middlemen.
It is worth noting that the absence of one CDA for a period of over six
months had no effect on the VDC, nor did the MP play a significant role
other than at election time.
The main problem with which the VDC had to deal was the status of
the outlying settlement of Nlapkwane where the BDP councillor lived.
Eventually, after trying to run joint meetings of all organisations in
both central Mapoka and Nlapkwane, a separate VDC was set up at
Nlapkwane, providing the BDP councillor with a potential power base.
But both councillors continued to participate in both VDCs.
(ii) Masunga: sedate pace
EA Population: 712; Dwellings: 136 (119 occupied)
Facilities: Churches - St. John's, St. Paul's, UCCSA (Resident
Preacher); Water supply: Borehole, well, dam, river; 2 cattle
crushes; School - Standard 7; VDC; AD; Tribal Police Post;
Health Post - opened Nov/72 - visited by Nurse from Mapoka
clinic; Sub-chief and customary court.
Establishments: 2
To some extent Masunga was a rival of neighbouring Mapoka. Pol¬
itically distinctive (for a North Eastern village) in the low level of
1 Kgotla meeting, 13 MAY 74 (eyewitness account)
2 Mapoka VDC Minutes, 19 FEB 71, 26 OCT 71
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support for the People's Party, its village politics were low key. Ihe
VDC regarded quarterly meetings as the norm, and considered itself as
the umbrella organisation with branches in the traditional wards
(situated some distance away from the central kgotla) and as far away
as Johannesburg. The amount of money raised by the VDC itself was
limited: dmigrds donated sizeable sums from time to time and the
1
"internal branches" were expected to raise the balance. The main
activities were concerned with the school, which was well represented
on the central VDC. The sub-chief, one of whose relations was elected
BDP councillor in 1969, seemed quite happy with the VDC and its pace
of activity. There was no resident CDA and no contact with the MP; the
Agricultural Demonstrator was active but mainly in forming a Farmers'
Association rather than on the VDC.
The dominant figure in the village however was the astute
2
Councillor Mannathoko, who, as has been described above, first won
the Council seat as an Independent and later declared for the Democratic
Party; the ward then elected a BDP councillor. Between them, Mapoka and
Masunga did fairly well out of the Council's allocation of resources
and this is attributed largely to the efforts of the four councillors
involved. Mannathoko in particular, as a shopkeeper and leader of the
Northern Botswana Traders Union, was able to act as a patron and broker,
especially during his spells as Council Chairman.
The effect of the position outlined above was to make external
sources (dmigrds and the Council) the main sources of resources for the
village; the VDC was in part by-passed by Councillor Mannathoko.




(iii) Tsamaya: teachers versus headman
EA Population: 1,043 (de facto), 1,057 (de jure); Dwellings: 288
(199 occupied).
Facilities; Church - Old Apostolic Church (no building), UCCSA
(Visiting Preacher); School - Standard 6; Water Supply - Dam;
Railway Line - siding; AD; Headman and customary court.
Establishments : 3
The Tsamaya VDC was unusual in having, for much of the time,
2
teachers in the positions not only of Secretary but also of Chairman.
With the arrival of a perceptive CDA, moreover, the "modern" leadership
of the VDC embarked on a fairly ambitious programme and was encouraged
to further efforts by the Council Secretary. However it ran into serious
difficulties. These can be attributed in part to the Shd, senior headman
of the area, who lived in the village. His original reaction of "relief"
3
at having the responsibility for development lifted from his shoulders
turned out to look more like an inclination to leave the VDC alone to
get on with it. So when the VDC decided to apply sanctions against
backsliders they found difficulty in pinning down the Sh6 to taking
action.
Popular reluctance to participate may well have reflected what Kerven
describes as "the universal suspicion of 'successful' people in the
community" as well as the "political decentralization ... of several
small new hamlets around Tsamaya, which are now claiming political
4
autonomy from the main village." A more problematical factor was party
1 For a brief history of Tsamaya see C. Kerven, Report on Tsamaya Village
(1976), pp. 1-2
2 This was sufficiently unusual to be remarked upon by the visiting
Community Development Officer for Fiancistown. Tsamaya VDC Minutes,
15 APR 70.
3 Ibid., 5 70
4 Kerven, op. cit. , pp. 10 and 3. The VDC appealed to the District
Council on the latter issue (VDC Minutes, 2 JUL 70).
302
political allegiance. The Senior Headman was known to support the BDP,
which fact was rewarded by his co-option to the Council Licensing Authority.
The populace as a whole however supported the BPP, whose councillor
(after 1969) was the brother of a nearby headman. But neither councillor
(the other was the ex-BPP councillor who was nominated to the Council
after crossing the carpet to the BDP and then losing his seat) played
an active part in the VDC, attending only intermittently. The BPP
MP moreover did not figure at all in the village, being perhaps more
concerned with his Francistown base. None of these three politicians
in any case resided in Tsamaya proper. Arguably the BPP could have done
more to support the VDC, but did not do so. Thus the VDC, led by
teachers who did not originate from Tsamaya, were left to try to
mobilise the people on their.own.
CENTRAL DISTRICT
(iv) Kalamare: long-running family show
Population: 912; Dwellings: 202 (156 occupied)
Facilities: Churches - UCCSA, Pentecostal Holiness Church
(Resident Preacher), Roman Catholic (Visiting Preacher);
School - Standard 7; VDC; YWCA; Postal Order, Telegraph and
telephone agency.
The VDC of Kalamare had a lot going for it. It was one of the
first established and maintained virtually unbroken records from 1967
to 1974. The Tswana nucleated settlement pattern is more conducive to
meetings than the Kalanga system of the North East and in this case the
authority of the headman was wedded to the VDC through his position as
2
Chairman; furthermore the VDC received a regular income from permits for
parties, court fines, and other "traditional" sources not normally
available to VDCs. Two other active members of the Committee were
1 NEDC Minutes, 21 DEC 72
2 There were complicated changes in the post of headman but the
incumbent in this village was always drawn from the same family.
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close relatives of the Chairman (one later becoming- councillor and the
other court clerk), as was the MP, who occasionally attended VDC meetings
and invented the idea of having four "MP's nominees" on the VDC.1 The
committee was fortunate also in possessing competent secretaries/assistant
secretaries (teachers) and, for much of the time, a resident CDA.
Politically Kalamare was solid Democratic Party territory, no Opposition
candidate having ever stood in the Council ward in any of the three
elections.
After a fairly bright start however the VDC began increasingly to
experience problems, until it had reached the stage of an adverse report
in the local newspaper and the District Council had to step in to
2
complete a project. To some extent the VDC was the victim of its own
early success: it simply could not keep up the momentum. But there
were other factors. Inefficiency was one: e.g. it took eleven months
3 4
to run a raffle and minor bills remained unpaid for fifteen months.
Another was a growing reluctance by many villagers to take part in do-
it-yourself work, and this was paralleled by instances of autonomous
activities in the "lands" settlements, where people were able to evade
the Headman's regulations on the holding of parties and were less and
less likely to contribute cash to developments in the central village.
These factors added to the confusion and disruption caused by the Food-
for-Work and destitute relief programmes, which made regular, if
unpredictable, appearances.
1 This idea is reminiscent of the Specially Elected members of
Parliament.
2 "Why some self-help projects never get completed", Mmegi wa Dikgang,
III, 16 (29 SEP 72)
3 VDC Minutes, 16 AUG 72 - 25 JUL 73, passim
4 Ibid., 20 MAY 70, 23 SEP 70, 11 AUG 71
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Inevitably the emphasis on "hiring rather than doing" grew, and
the MP in particular came up with offers of large sums of money from
the largest trader and the Mine Labour Organisation in neighbouring
Mahalapye* - both of which were sources of funds for the successful
Mahalapye Central VDC. Another initiative taken by the MP was to bring
a team to arrange for the sale of Chibuku beer with a levy going to the
2
VDC. As the councillor (the MP's brother) was an influential member
of the Ngwato land Board, Kalamare did indeed look like the model of
"patron" politics, with a decreasing level of popular participation.
(v) Makwate: dismal saga
EA Population: 702; Dwellings 165 (111 occupied)
Facilities: Churches - UCCSA: VDC
Es tablishments; 1
Situated a similar distance from Mahalapye but literally on the
other side of the tracks, Makwate could hardly have been more different
iTom Kalamare, apart from the fact that it was also located in a
3
staunchly BDP ward. The internal organisation of the VDC was poor, with
few decisions recorded in the minutes but much discussion and some
mutual recrimination. The election, initially, of an illiterate
treasurer cannot have helped. The Headman originally was reported not
4
to be a member, nor was the head teacher, while the councillor, who was
non-resident, made no recorded contribution.
Grave difficulties were encountered in getting the members, let alone
5
the villagers, to turn up for meetings, or participate in self-help projects,
1 Ibid., 26 SEP 73
2 Ibid., 19 MAY 69; CDA Monthly Report, MAY 69. This replicated the
arrangement between the company and the Town Councils. The manager of
the brewery was a nominated BDP councillor on Gaborone Town Council.
3 Mookane, where the Opposition (BIP) polled a mere 2.2% in 1966, returned
a BDP councillor unopposed in 1969 and 1974.
4 CDA (Mookane) Monthly Report, MAY 69
5 "Of the 18 VDC members I only know six. Even of the six only about four
attended meetings. Meetings were a flop. Kgotla meetings were a worse flop.
Headman far from interested in his village development work, always has a
lame excuse." (Ibid..)
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and even the Food-for-Work scheme worked badly.1 Indeed the only bright
spot was the successful raising of funds for the ceremonial opening of
the school, which had been built with a grant from a South African
mission. The ceremony itself occasioned a visit from the local
councillor - a rare event indeed.
Successive CDAs were very conscientious in their attempts to
resuscitate and organise the VDC, making repeated visits for the purpose.
In attempts to resolve the impasse, the CDA appealed to the local MP
(who was active in Mahalapye) to come and organise fresh elections, which
2
was "his responsibility," and was disappointed when there was no response.
Eventually the CDA turned to the PTA as the only active organisation in
3
the village and put his efforts into it as an alternative to the VDC.
Hie root cause of the unco-operative reaction of the villagers to
all appeals to implement self-help projects was finally uncovered by
the long—suffering CDA. It turned out that the Headman customarily
held the money from collections, and that disputes concerning these
funds dated back to 1964, but had been carried over into the new VDC
4
system. With the election of a new committee in 1972, chaired by the
village shopkeeper, the efficiency of the VDC showed signs of improving;
but the legacy of suspicion of financial irregularities remained the
pervasive factor.
(vi) Mahalapye: quasi-urban Hochpolitik
Population: 11,377 (de facto), 14,657 (de jure); Dwellings:
2,312 (1,876 occupied)
Facilities : Churches - Roman Catholic, Lutheran Church, UCCSA,
Seventh Day Adventist, ZCC [Zionist], St. Peter's, Pentecostal
Holiness Church, Spiritual Healing Church, Assemblies of God
1 Ibid., NOV 68
2 Ibid., MAY 69
3 Ibid., JUN 69
4 CDA (Mookane), Monthly Report, MAY 69 and Annual Report, 1971
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(Resident PreacherJ; Health - Hospital, Clinic; Government
Offices: District Officer, Revenue Office, Immigration
Office, Information, Education, Veterinary Department,
Agriculture, Central Transport Organisation;
Air Strip; Railway station; Banks; 3 Schools - Standard 7,
1 Secondary School; Garages; Mine labour Organisation;
Hotel; Grind Mills; 2 ADs; Cattle Crush; Brigade Centres;
Senior Sub-Tribal Authority; 1972 Settlers Association;
Customary Court; VDC; Madiba Builders Brigade - textiles,
mechanics, carpentry; Inspector of Works, Civil Aviation,
Community Development, Police, Customs, Agricultural College;
Magistrate; Roads Department, Water Affairs.
Establishments : 46
Mahalapye is very different from the other villages. In
population it is almost as big as Lobatse (which rates a Town Council);
it is bigger than most District headquarters, and it was once the main
1
railway centre of the country. In the official terminology of Botswana
however it is a "big village" rather than a "town", since the writ of
the traditional administration runs in Mahalapye. In modern terms it
is administered as two wards of the Central District and has a District
Administration office. The Central VDC in certain respects has taken
on the appearance of a community council, not just a development
committee.
This is evidenced by the calibre of the leading members, who have
included the councillor, two MPs, the Senior Chief (Subordinate Tribal
Authority), future councillors, future chiefs/headmen, an ex-Cabinet
Minister, and parliamentary and council candidates.
The most spectacular achievement of the VDC has been the erection
of a large but badly-designed and expensive community centre. The VDC
decided on the project and were committed to it before the District
Council was approached for funds by a delegation including the then
1 The Setswana word "motse" really means a village or place, without
distinction of size; the loan-word "toropd", derived from the Afrikaans
word "dorp", indicates a European-style settlement.
307
national Vice-President of the BNF, Dr. Kenneth Koma. The Council
1
decided to support it but were faced with a ministerial veto. The
BDP MP, Mr. G. K. Koma, as well as his relative Dr. K. Koma, were
largely instrumental in raising a relatively vast sum of money from
2
local businessmen and the Mine Labour Organisation, and eventually
also from international aid donors; in the end the cost of the project
ran into five figures. The opinion in Serowe was that the Community
3
Centre was planned as the town hall of a future town council.
Even before the Community Centre was finished, plans were going
4
ahead for a new Mahalapye Secondary School with Dr. Koma as manager.
5
This private school was conceived as a community day school and
doubtless it was hoped that the Government would in due course feel
obliged to take it over. Another project was the "stadium" or sports
ground, in addition to a host of less grandiose undertakings.
The last-mentioned were largely the responsibility of the sub-VDCs
for the Mahalapye North and South Polling Districts. The unusual
three-VDC structure was the brain child of the CDA6 but suited the
7 8
councillors. The Mahalapye South VDC, led by the Councillor elected
in late 1972, behaved more like the VDCs examined in other smaller villages.
1 CDC Minutes, 24-25 MAR 71, 16-17 SEP 71
2 Mahalapye Central VDC Minutes, 5 JUN 72
3 See pp. 192-193 above
4 Mahalapye Central VDC Minutes, 21 JUN 72
5 It thus complemented the fairly new "Swaneng movement" Madiba School
on the outskirts of Mahalapye.
6 CDA (Mahalapye) Monthly Report, DEC 69
7 Strangely it was criticised by visiting Cabinet Minister K. P. Morake
in January 1970, at a VDC meeting (to which the local CDAs complained
they were not invited) chaired by the Mahalapye MP. CDA (Mahalapye)
Bi-monthly Report, DEC 69/JAN 70.
8 The records of the North VDC were not made available to the writer
by Dr. Koma, the Minutes Secretary. „
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In summary, then, Mahalapye was dominated by a very effective
alliance of the MP, the traditional administration (one of whom was MP
for a nearby constituency), the Councillors and a leading ENF politician.
They were given substantial support in money and materials by the
biggest trader in the village, a South African.* Some help was provided
by the various PTAs and by the District Administration; but the CDAs did
not really require to do much after the initial launching except where
the Food-for-Work scheme required them to play an administrative role.
SOUTHERN DISTRICT
(vii) Molapowabo.jang: Inner circle
EA Population: 1,030; Dwellings: 214 (167 occupied)
Facilities: School - Standard 6; Red Cross, BCW; Co-operative
Society Marketing Camp; Visiting Priests: Roman Catholic,
Seventh Day Adventist, UCCSA.
Establishments: 1
Molapowabojang VDC displays certain similarities with its Kalamare
opposite number. Like Kalamare it was dominated by the Headman - who
again was Chairman - and his family (one of whom owned the village shop).
In the case of Molapowabojang the Letshabo family accounted for no less
2
than 52% of the attendances at the committee. In internal efficiency too
it rates fairly high, having the record for frequency of meetings (on average
every three weeks), and recording assiduous correspondence with the
District Council. A further similarity is the fact that the Headman was
also local councillor from 1966 to 1969.
The difficulties encountered in mobilising the populace in
Molapowabojang, however, were due in large measure to the different
1 See for instance BDN, 5 FEB 69, 11 FEB 69, 8 JUL 69, 6 AUG 69.
2 The Molapowabojang Minute Book recorded all attendances and absences.
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political climate. As part of Gathwane ward, Molapowabojang returned a
1
BNF councillor with large majorities in both 1969 and 1974 and the view
was expressed by one of the VDC leaders that the BNF supporters in the
area were negative. As the VDC leadership here was clearly identified
with the BDP it is not surprising that the support given to it was
lukewarm the further away from the kgotla one went. Popular distrust
was due also in part to an old problem of accounting for funds raised a
2
decade previously and involving "some three dignitaries of the village."
In the circumstances the VDC looked to the Council as its main
source of funds, but was assisted also by the (non-resident) BNF
councillor who helped out with both cash and transport. This was not
enough, however, and increasingly the energetic Head Teacher, who was
also Vice-Chairman, turned to the PTA and successfully organised building
projects through it instead, albeit reporting to the VDC on what was
being done. Another organisation of some importance was the water
syndicate, whose leadership was entirely separate from that of the VDC,
3
and which liaised independently with the councillor and the BNF MP.
(viii) Digawana: party differences
Population: 949; Dwellings: 191 (151 occupied)
Facilities: Churches - UCCSA, African Methodist Evangelical,
Pentecostal Holiness Church (Resident Preacher), Assemblies
of God (Visiting Preacher); Health - shared; School -
Standard 7; Salaried Headman; Community Centre; AD; Cattle
Crush; Water Supply - borehole, dams, river; BCW.
Establishments : 4
As Digawana forms part of the same Polling District as Molapowabojang
the same remarks about support for the BNF apply. But in Digawana the
1 The BNF polled 86.6% in 1969 and 76.5% in 1974. The BDP had been
unopposed in 1966.
2 VDC Minutes, 15 NOV 72
3 Who tabled several parliamentary questions on the subject.
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VDC itself was divided. The Headman, who had stood unsuccessfully in
1969 for the Democratic Party in Gathwane ward and was VDC Vice-Chairman,
was opposed by the prospective National Front candidate for the same
ward and his family, culminating- in an interview in the Botswana Daily
News in which forthright criticisms were made by the same future BNF
1
councillor. The tensions in the committee were matched by a boycott
of kgotla meetings called to discuss VDC matters, and the resignations,
2
under pressure, of the Chairman and the Secretary. The eventual outcome
3
was the election of a complete outsider as chairman; the newly appointed
CDA also moved in to try and restore harmony.
The lack of harmony in the VDC is reflected in stagnation. In
particular the Chairman called few meetings and most of those that did
take place were called at the request of the Community Development
Officer in Kanye, the Ipelegeng Foreman, the Treasurer/Head Teacher, or
the PTA. The most notable thing the VDC did was to take over the postal
service, at the PTA's request.
A certain amount of building was done, but this was largely
undertaken by professional builders. As in Molapowabojang, the VDC
successfully turned to the Council for assistance, but despite this it
4
found itself in financial difficulties in meeting bills.
(ix) Good Hope: Women's rule in mini-capital
EA Population: 995; Dwellings: 198 (162 occupied).
Facilities: Churches - Methodist, Roman Catholic, UCCSA,
Seventh Day Adventist; Health - clinic; School - Standard 7;
Transport - bus daily; Water Supply - borehole, dam, well;
AD; Cattle Crush; Red Cross, BCW; Chief and Customary Court.
Establishments : 4
1 BDN, 26 ,1UN 74
2 Digawana VDC Minutes, 8 APR 74
3 But he complained that people would not accept him because he was a
Mokgatla.
4 Digawana VDC Minutes, 14 JAN 71, 1 FEB 72
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In terms of party politics the nearby village of Good Hope was
miles away. As the heart of Barolong territory it was a consistent BDP
1
stronghold. The problems which the VDC encountered are attributable to
2
different sociological factors. The fact that the chairperson was a
woman, and that for part of its history so were the secretary and vice-
chairman, may have had some effect: it is impossible to prove. The
problems however seem much more directly linked with the unique combination
of the dispersed settlement pattern of the Barolong farms (Good Hope's
population is less than 500) and Good Hope's position as clan capital.
This meant that ten headmen as well as the (Paramount) Chief were supposedly
members. Chief Besele II wanted to reign but not necessarily to attend
VDC meetings. As a result of the system the link with the kgotla was
unsatisfactory; subsequent to this study Chief Besele was deposed by the
3
Government for incompetence. An additional factor was the fact that
Good Hope was in some senses already well provided with facilities owing
4
to its status as "capital".
The other potential leaders for various reasons played little part
in the affairs of the VDC. This was due partly to the relatively high
turnover of councillors (who were not resident in Good Hope proper in
any case) and CDAs. The MP, also Minister of Education, lived in Gaborone
1 Unopposed in 1966 and 1974, the BDP polled 83.7% in 1969, and 89.7% in
the September 1971 by-election, in the Council Polling District.
2 The Setswana term "modulasetilo" is applicable equally to male and
female chairmen.
3 This was the first time since independence that a "Paramount" Chief
was actually deposed. See p. 37 above.
4 An illustration of the preferential treatment was the annual allocation
of Independence Day grants, whereby Good Hope received the second highest
grant in the District, ten times higher than other small villages.
SDC Minutes, 1-4 SEP 70.
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and had to pay more attention to the urban part of his Lobatse/Barolong
constituency. Thus, although the VDC was run competently enough, it
made little impact on the farmers around the village, and relied on
collaboration with the Food-for-Work scheme to achieve its targets.1
CONCLUSIONS
It has been felt necessary to explore in some detail the activities
and practices of VDCs. The apologia for this is threefold. Firstly
the record sometimes conflicts with the recollection of villagers
(for example in recalling the date of the foundation of the VDC; or who
was responsible for completing a project, the council or the village;
and whether this was done on a do-it-yourself basis or against payment
2
in cash or kind). These are fairly important matters to get right.
Secondly the very complexity of the situation at the grassroots had to
be brought out, if only to warn against the danger of drawing facile
conclusions or making too sweeping generalisations. In the third place
it was necessary to see whether one could distil any kind of constitutional
theory about VDCs, in both internal and external relations; it is worth
noting in this context that the Minister of Local Government &, Lands, in
answer to a Parliamentary question in 1972, declined to set out any
3
constitutional guidelines.
One of the theoretical confusions surrounding VDCs is the question
of whether they are in essence village councils or development
4
associations. As Wass points out, a curious - but one might ask
1 BDN, 7 JUN 74
2 Tennent confirms the absence of proper statistics on VDC projects
(op. cit., p. 68)
3 Hansard No. 40, p. 103 (14 MAR 72)
4 Zambia solved the problem by having both Ward Councils and Ward
Development Committees. Republic of Zambia, Villapp Productivity and Ward
Development Committees (Lusaka, 1971)
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Freudian? - slip occurs in the wording- of the Community Development
Department's original Project Application Form: the form was to be
signed by the "Chairman of Village Council",1 whereas what was meant
was the VDC Chairman. The "village council" concept underlies the
stress on election by the whole village, rather than simply by those
interested (which might bo just as effective in terms of getting action).
Moreover a number of villages have seen the VDC as in a superior position
vis-A-vis other organisations and this legitimacy is presumably derived
from election., Against this must be set the Government's fear of
2
political party involvement in VDCs, which it fears might hamper
VDC development activities; the ex officio membership of the local CDA;
and the tendency of other VDCs to regard themselves as merely one of a
number of committees concerned with development in the village.
Assessment of the performance of VDCs depends on the criteria used:
are they judged by their efficiency in seeing projects through, or by the
extent to which the village people participate? The two need not
co-incide.3
Where the two strands converge is in the idea of mobilisation.
Without exception VDCs rely on the kgotla (convened by the headman) to
contact the people. The more "successful" VDCs in one sense may be
those that have failed in the attempt to mobilise the mass of the people
and instead have resorted to raising money from the better-off, or from
1 Wass, op. cit, p. 403. The form was designed to be countersigned by
the CDA.
2 Discussed in the next chapter.
3 For a useful discussion of this point, see A. Osborne, "Rural
Development in Botswana: a qualitative view" (unpublished Master's thesis,
Centre of Southern African Studies, York University [England] [n.d.]),
pp. 42-43 and passim; and summary thereof, appearing with the same title
in the Journal of Southern African Studies, 11, 2 (1976).
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external sources, in order to hire builders. Other VDCs, faced with
similar problems, may have persevered with the kgotla, the headman and
the traditional system generally, by assigning responsibility for action
and/or fund raising to the sub-kgotla (i.e. traditional wards, through
their sub-headmen), and by threatening sanctions against non-co-operative
villagers. The net effect may have been more in line with the idea of
"self-reliance". Either approach can be commended, or the reverse,
according to the criteria used.
A rather different criterion is fairness. Chambers &, Feldman were
concerned at the regressive nature of flat-rate levies,* while Tennent
sees the danger that VDCs and the pressure on villagers to contribute
voluntary labour and cash may result in exploitation or the "self-
destitution" of the rural population to help put up expensive basic
2
infrastructure (particularly given seasonal shortages in manpower).
Tennent would prefer to see the "spirit of self-help" stressed rather
3
than VDCs' administrative efficiency.
As far as the Government is concerned, a further factor is added to
the equation: the future of the traditional system. If VDCs are to be
effective in terms of physical development, they must in most cases rely
on the headman's authority (to imply or invoke sanctions, even if he
cannot correctly apply them) and this in turn strengthens the traditional
system. Yet one strand in BDP policy undoubtedly is the democratisation
of rural government and the progressive elimination of the powers and
status of the aristocracy. One possible way out is the election of
1 Chambers & Feldman, op. cit, pp. 188-189
2 Tennent, op. cit., p. 49
3 Ibid., p. 48
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headmen - a process already in train. The dilemma, as yet unperceived,
is that headmen elected for life may, first of all, be drawn from the
hereditary ruling- class and, secondly, thus acquire such additional
prestige that they will exercise more, not less, authority in connection
with a VDC which is supposed to be elected annually.
A feature of VDCs which is of particular interest is their composition.
Are they, in their membership, more representative of the people than
1
are the more "middle class" councillors? Or are they the vehicle for a
plutocracy? The table which follows indicates the share of elected
positions on the VDCs studied, firstly by people described as "ordinary
2 3
farmers" (without another source of income} and housewives (who were also
not employed otherwise nor the wives of the better-off); secondly, the
proportion of (all) women is given.
TABLE 6.5
Percentage share of membership of VDCs
All elected members Of ficebearers
Peasants (a) 58 (b) 41
Women (c) 27 (d) 18
Note: The range covered in the boxes is as follows:
(a) 30% (Mahalapye Central) - 84% (Digawana)
(b) 10% (Kalamare) - 60% (Digawana)
(c) nil (Masunga) - 52% (Good Hope)
(d) nil (Masunga, Tsamaya, Mahalapye South) - 50% (Good Hope)
The above figures compare with those calculated on a slightly different
1 Pace J. D. Holm, "Rural Development in Botswana: three basic political
trend^'(1972), pp. 85-88. (See following chapter for discussion on this
point.)
2 Excluding what Shivji calls "rich peasants" (wakulima-tajiri) in
Tanzania. For an attempt at a class analysis of Tanzania see I. G. Shivji,
Class Struggles in Tanzania (1976), passim.
3 As in the Scottish crofting counties, many wage-earners are also active
in agriculture, part-time.
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basis by the Botswana Extension College survey, which produced the
following:
TABLE 6.6
Percentage share of membership of VDCs








Source: Botswana Extension College Survey
Some of the differences reflect the different basis of calculation; others
are probably due to the different sample populations.
The BEC Survey also produced data on education, showing that one-fifth
of VDC members reporting had never attended school while one-third had
completed primary education (with little variation between the main
officebearers and the total). The principal officebearers were considerably
better educated than their (male) age group: 43% of the under-40s and
23% of the over-40s had completed their primary education, compared with
the national (male) figure of 15.2% and 3.1% respectively; the mean
age of VDC members (again with insignificant differences between the main
officebearers and the total) was 46.
It is evident then that the VDCs are not microcosms of village
society, and that men, and those not classifiable as ordinary farmers,
1 Derived from Etherington - II. op. cit., Tables 1 and 6
2 Ibid., p. 3 and Tables 2, 3, 7 and 8
317
occupy a disproportionate share of places on the committees. But does
this make VDCs a plutocracy? Here the findings of Kuper that "the
1
correlation between wealth and political influence is slight" are
confirmed by a comparison of the membership of the VDCs with fiscal
data indicating the number of those paying the maximum rate of Local
Government tax (R48 per annum) and the holdings of cattle. There is some
correspondence between the two lists but it is - especially if one
2
excludes the ex officio members of VDCs - fairly slight, in all cases.
What Kuper reports for Kuli is borne out in general by the nine villages
studied: "Some of the wealthy villagers . . . have no political influence,
while some of the influential men . . . are only moderately wealthy by
3
village standards." As regards big cattle owners - and the concept of
"big" varies from district to district - there is even less correspondence
with VDC membership than is the case with shopkeepers. Curtis's
explanation - that they are typically preoccupied with their grazing areas
4
and hence frequently away from the village - is a persuasive one.
Membership of a VDC in any case does not automatically confer -
although it may indicate - influence, let alone real power. Kerven
5
reports that the wealthy members of a village are viewed with suspicion,
and concludes that the assumption of a "demonstration effect" may be
6
unfounded. The influence which members of a VDC may possess chiefly
concerns the selection of projects, and here the vested interests of
teachers and CDAs are revealed. But the authority of the VDC over the
1 Kuper, Kalahari Village Politics (1970), p. 87
2 See Appendix G
3 Kuper, op. cit. , p. 87. (The word "moderately" is an important qual¬
ification: the broad stratum of semi-destitutes exerts little influence
at any level.)
4 Curtis, op. cit., pp. 73-74
5 Kerven, op, cit., p. 10. (This may well prove atypical of Botswana as
a whole however.)
6 Ibid., p. 11. Curtis (op. cit. passim) makes this point at some length.
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people depends very largely on its impact on the kgotla (and the
attendance at the latter), and VDCs in all cases have had to struggle to
mobilise the people to implement decisions. Moreover rival organisations,
notably PTAs, can be much more effective than VDCs. The idea that the
VDC can be used as an instrument of control is wide of the mark, as is,
in general, the idea of a political party's setting out to capture
control of VDCs, thereby providing the local councillor with a power
base. (The role and organisation of parties at the grassroots is
discussed in the following chapter.) What can be asserted with some
confidence is that the VDC tends to give most weight to the interests
of those near the centre of the village, and that the problems experienced
in implementing projects tend to increase with distance from the centre.
In denying that VDCs in general can be viewed as councillors' power
bases in the villages, one is faced with the question then, what exactly
is the role of councillors, vis-^-vis VDCs? Three points can be made here.
Firstly, some councillors did undoubtedly play a leading role in the
VDCs and can be described as "patrons" in the sense of providing leadership
and assistance. Secondly, those that did were invariably residents of the
village in question and could be said to be acting as villagers rather
than councillors. Moreover they did not display the same level of
activity in the other villages they represented. The variable thus
appears to be ease of (verbal) communication, reinforced no doubt by the
social ties of membership of a particular village community. This is
equally true of MPs. Thirdly, the ceremonial aspect was important
(for councillors and MPs): their attendance at any big event, and in a
prominent position.* An illustration of this is a VDC officebearer who,
1 Which usually means seated on a chair - the equivalent of being on a
platform party - instead of on the ground.
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after his election as district councillor,* became a markedly less active
participant in VDC meetings but made a point of attending all ceremonial
occasions.
An attempt has been made to distinguish between the "patron" and
"broker/middleman" roles of councillors. It must be admitted however
that this distinction has been difficult to sustain in practice. One
reason is probably that councillors did not themselves see their roles
as so divided. Instead they usually refer to themselves as "representatives".
2
As has been noted earlier, this concept is interpreted by councillors
and observers in various ways, but the typical pattern is somewhat
Bagehotesque, rather than being reminiscent of the machine politics from
which the "broker" concept is derived. Another interpretation of
councillors' role vis-a-vis the villages is hierarchical, and would
account for the importance of ceremony: it seems likely that the
status conferred by the position of councillor (and likewise MP and
Minister) is perceived as being akin to the hierarchical structure of the
traditional administration.
Even where councillors are anxious to establish themselves as
middlemen they have formidable obstacles to overcome. Far from being
3
able to monopolise information flows, they must compete for space in a
multi-channelled flow of information involving CDAs, Council Staff,
Government officers, headmen, VDC officebearers etc.. To be successful in
such competition councillors need to be exceptionally well-informed and
well-versed in administrative procedures: a not impossible task, but
1 For Kalamare
2 Particularly on pp. 51-53
3 As alleged by Vengroff, op. cit., Abstract, second page. Vengroff's
assertion is contradicted by Curtis, op. cit., p. 163
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one which is not performed by very many councillors. It is not surprising
that many are content with a dignified rather than an aggressive position.
Increasingly the trend over the period studied has been the
bureaucratisation of village-district communications. Ihis is due partly
to the fairly high volume of direct correspondence between council secretaries
and VDCs, but has been accentuated by the growth of council staff concerned
with development matters, the advent of District Development Committees
(including District Officers[Development]), all of whom, like council
secretaries, have spent increasing amounts of time in touring the villages.
Finally the transfer of CDAs to the council staff has given councils
resident officials in or near most villages.
In spite of all this there is still much room for improvement in
communication and planning, since "The more deeply the Government becomes
involved in developing illiterate communities the more muddle will be
1
encountered." Councillors are only one group among the personnel who
could help to dispel the muddle. One of the snags is that the Government
itself - e.g. by launching a Food-for-Work scheme, or the Accelerated
Rural Development Programme, at short notice - can throw everything into
confusion, the effects often lasting for a considerable time. The
Government could do much to help realise the ambitions it has in its
rhetoric frequently reiterated for the VDCs as an institution.
In conclusion two points should be made. One is the importance of
geographical factors, which are at least as important as party politics.
These include the fact of residence of principal actors, and the gradual
disintegration of the fabric of rural society, with more and more people
2
residing for longer and longer periods away from the village centre.
1 Tennent, op. cit., p. 20
2 See R. Silitshena, Preliminary Notes on some Characteristics of Households
and the Population that is Settled Permanently at the Lands in the Kweneng
District (1977}, p. 16
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The other is the importance of the purely personal factor: some of the
achievements catalogued above are due in large measure to the energy




There are special difficulties involved in obtaining- data on party
organisation in Botswana. There are various reasons for this. For one,
the quest for party organisation is reminiscent of Sherlock Holmes's
inquiries after the celebrated dog that didn't bark in the night; an
even more apt analogy in many places may be Mearns's equally celebrated
2
"man upon the stair". Confirmation of this is provided in part by
the Tordoff Committee's concern for the need to "strengthen the
organisation of the governing party, which, over most of the country,
3
is the only effective political party," while Curtis, commenting on
two solidly BDP villages (in the Southern and Kweneng Districts
respectively), states categorically:
(
Political parties are not conspicuous in the villages. The
ruling party in Botswana has a commanding position, so that
activity between elections is minimal. The opposition,
though legal, tends to be secretive. . . . the level of
political party activities in the village is so low between
elections that alliances in village affairs do not necessarily
follow lines of party allegiance.4
The distinction Curtis makes here between the ruling party and the
opposition gives a clue to the other major difficulty inherent in
ascertaining details of party organisation. This was the only question
1 I.e. the dog was there but had a good reason for not barking.
2 "As I was going up the stair
I met a man who wasn't there.
He wasn't there again today. . . „" (Hughes Mearns, The Psychoed)
3 Tordoff, Pilane & Sarpong, Report of the Local Government Study Group
(1970), p. 9 ——<•




on which interviewees were reluctant to give details, amounting on
I
occasion to a blank refusal, expressed in the form of a question,"Why do
you want to know?" Two explanations suggest themselves for this
uncharacteristic reticence. One is simply embarrassment, in cases
where there is in reality no branch or constituency organisation. The
other is the colonial legacy of regarding politics as a dirty word:
political parties in the days of the Protectorate were almost automatically
suspect and assumed to be subversive organisations. As an aspect of this,
opposition politicians in particular are aware of the existence of the
police Special Branch and its historically established interest in
1
compiling dossiers on political activists. It is however of limited
interest to obtain names of members of a "branch" which does not normally
2
meet at all, and whose main function is to provide signatures on
nomination papers every four or five years.
Related to this point is the practical difficulty of defining what
is meant by a "member" of a political party. Even if one could obtain
access to membership files these would indicate those who had actually
paid an annual subscription (20 cents in the case of the BDP). Some of
those would reflect the exceptional activity of the leading party man
in the area (say, the MP) while excluding, in many areas, those who
were publicly identified with a particular party but had not paid their
1 Instances of this are documented by H. M. Tapela, "The Tati District
of Botswana 1866-1969", pp. 297-298; and R. P. Stevens, Lesotho, Botswana
and Swaziland, (1967), p. 155
2 In one village the BDP committee consisted of the two District
Councillors, two of their relatives, and two others who were normally
resident elsewhere. (The Treasurer, an ex-candidate for the Council,
lived 30 miles away while the Secretary worked in Johannesburg.)
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subscription in a particular year. Vengroff testifies to the
difficulties encountered (even in a relatively "active" period and district),
1
in persuading supporters to pay their dues to the ruling party.
Despite reluctance to give details of party membership in specific
locations, some generalities can be noted. Opposition leaders tend to
take refuge in rather grandiose claims of constituency organisation in
all constituencies, even if the party in question has failed to contest
more than a fraction of the seats at Parliamentary or Council level.
But some general political activity can be noted, especially by the BNF
2
(in the bigger centres of population, notably Gaborone,) in 1968-69 and
in one or two villages such as Molapowabojang (Southern District), while
3
the BPP does maintain a visible level of organisation in certain wards
of Francistown. In the towns the tradition of meeting in the "Freedom
Squares" is an important one and dates back to the days when the
nationalist movement exercised its right of freedom of speech in a
particular open space, not the kgotla. Freedom Square meetings are a
fairly regular occurr&nce in the urban centres and are held by BDP
and Opposition alike. MPs and Ministers are prominent in such meetings
and even the President himself^despite his increasing tendency to
cultivate a Head of State image, was not above making Freedom Square
4
speeches before the '69 Election.
Public meetings aside, national leaders of the ruling party are
fairly frank about the gap between the desired and the actual levels of
1 R. Vengroff, "Local-Central Linkages and Political Development in
Botswana" (1972), p. 181
2 BDN, passim
3 It also sent an organiser round the remote West prior to the 1969 election,
with some success in the Local Government elections. The unfortunate
official almost perished of thirst when he became stranded in the
Kalahari. BDN, 12 MAY 69.
4 Ibid., 16 OCT 69
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Domkrag activity. One minister stated that liaison, which was badly
lacking, could be provided by constituency committees but that these
rarely met although MPs could call them together. In essence the BDP
maintains a national infrastructure, including some very competent
national office bearers in Gaborone and offices in Serowe, Mahalapye,
Palapye (Central District>, Kanye (Southern District) and Francistown.
1
Only the last mentioned has had a professional organiser. The others,
manned by clerical staff, are almost an embarrassment to the party in
their under-utilisation. The Mahalapye office has occasionally been
2
used for VDC meetings, while the Serowe office awaits word from
Gaborone of such occasions as ministerial visits. They have stocks of
posters, membership cards etc. and are glad to see visitors.' The
practical philosophy of the Democratic Party on organisational matters
is a mixture of laissez faire and decentralisation: it is really left to
local party members to regulate their own activities and although MPs
and Councillors are seen as having a leading role to play they are not
3
under any pressure to give an account of their lack of activity.
This decentralisation extends to the organisation of by-elections.
The local branch is expected to find the deposit (although Headquarters
is prepared to step in if strictly necessary). In this connection the
BDP's proud boast never to have lost a deposit has to be viewed against
the low percentage (5%) required to save it, and the fact that it has
on at least two occasions failed to nominate a candidate for a District
1 Until he, embarrassingly, fell from grace and had to resign.
2 See Mahalapye Central VDC Minutes, 10 JUL 70
3 One persistent critic of the lack of party support for councillors
was L. M. Seretse, now an MP and Cabinet Member and formerly Central
District Council Secretary. See his Report on Third Tour of the Central
District, 9-21 NOV 72; and J. Wiseman, "The Organisation of Political
Conflict in Botswana, 1966-73" (1976), p. 295.
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1
Council by-election. Exceptionally the national organisation was
involved in supplying cyclostyled leaflets for a Francistown Town Council




In recent times the finances of the opposition parties have been,
as far as can be judged, rudimentary, making it impossible for them to
run offices or employ full-time organisers to match the BDP. In fact
the main source of financial support comes in the form of MPs* salaries
and councillors' allowances; the elective process thus provides the
personnel for party organisation. Other prominent party officebearers
are self-employed, usually in commerce or in some cases as farmers,
since the major employer - the state - debars civil servants, local
government officers, teachers and para-statal organisation employees
from public involvement in party politics.
These remarks apply equally to the BDP. But the party has from
early on attracted the support of wealthy traders, notably Jimmy Haskins,
who has held ministerial office since Independence, and Ben Steinberg,
MP '65-'74 for Boteti; more recently Welly Seboni, manager of the
Chibuku brewery and MP (for Gaborone &. Ramotswa 1969-74, for Gaborone
since 1974J has been a conspicuously well-off member. In addition most
BDP MPs have considerable cattle holdings and many own stores.
However the party has moved away from dependence on large donations
1 See above» p. 200. The party has also on one or two occasions given
support to an Independent candidate, usually a minister of religion.
"Baemedi Ba Domkrag Tlhophong E E Tlang Seetebosigo 13" [Democratic
Party Candidates in the Forthcoming Elections on 13th June], Therisanyo/
Consultation IV, 4 (MAY 66), p. 4
2 In the early '60s finance was a cause of serious friction within the
BPP, leading to a three-way split. See J. Halpern, South Africa's
Hostages (1965X, pp. 289-290.
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with the construction of Tsholetsa House (at a cost of R200,000) on a
1
prime site in central Gaborone. The calculation was that rents from
letting out part of the building would clear the debt (raised largely
by a party appeal) and provide a guaranteed, regular, independent
2 3
income. Party subscriptions are small beer in comparison: Domkrag
MPs are issued with six membership registers apiece. Party fetes in the
main centres are another, well publicised, source of income. Assistance
has been given to the party also by the West German Friedrich Ebert
Foundation, which has rented office space in Tsholetsa House.
Publications
Party publications are conspicuous by their absence. At one time
there were three periodicals4 - Masa [The Dawn], published by the BPP;
Puo Phaa [Straight Talk] published by the BNF; and Therisanyo/Consultation,
the organ of the BDP. Puo Phaa never resumed regular publication after
5
the sedition case in 1967 and the other two have quietly ceased to
0
appear. The reason why Therisanyo (with a circulation of 5,000) was
discontinued was given by a senior member of the BDP as follows: "It
was too much Gaborone-based - a repetition of the Daily News." In
other words the BDP, once it was securely the ruling party, did not
feel a need for a party organ.
In any case the ideological content of the various party publications
was virtually divorced from any connection with local government or
1 BDN, 18 JUL 74
2 The Government obligingly helped to ensure the realisation of this
ambition by moving the Ministry of Commerce & Industry into Tsholetsa
House not long after the 1974 General Election. BDN, 19 DEC 74
3 Vengroff reported membership figures ranging from four to 200 in various
Council Wards in the Kweneng District in 1970. Vengroff, op. cit., p. 180
4 All four parties produced, very infrequently, occasional pamphlets.
5 Held at Mahalapye, 19-21 DEC 67. See above, pp. 24-25.
6 Except for an Election Special edition of Therisanyo in 1974.
328
rural development issues, dealing- instead with national and international
politics. Indeed political education as such, at any level, has been
1
almost wholly lacking in Botswana,,
One is prompted to ask, then, what do partisans do all day? One
2
outlet is attendance at Annual Conferences, which are important
particularly in settling the leadership of the BNF. In the case of the
other three parties they are essentially treated as a forum for speeches
3
from the party leader.
Party competition of course is not wholly lacking at the grassroots.
As an example, in a village where the People's Party were entrenched, but
in an increasingly marginal parliamentary constituency, the number of
public political meetings held in the five months leading up to the 1974
4
General Election was five, two held by the BPP and two by the BDP plus
5
a Presidential visit which was officially treated as non-political.
Such intense activity is however typical only of pre-election periods and
in Opposition and marginal seats at that.6 It is indicative moreover
that party political broadcasting on Radio Botswana is confined
1 There have been signs, after the 1974 elections, that the BDP has .
become aware of the deficiency and has started to hold a series of
seminars. See BDN, 28 JUN 76
2 Moreover the costs of holding and attending the conference necessitate a
modest flurry of local party fund-raising activity. For BDP examples,
see BDN 17 FEB 70 (Kweneng), 14 JAN 71 (Ngami) and 31 JAN 74 (Serowe).
3 Sir Seretse's Presidential Addresses to the BDP Annual Conference,
usually reprinted for circulation, read like his addresses to the National
Assembly and often deal with the international position of the Republic
as much as its internal problems. (Latterly also an occasion for a
formal address by a UNIP fraternal delegate.)
4 Eyewitness accounts from Mapoka. Dates of meetings: BPP, 19 MAY and
12 AUG; BDP, 17 AUG and 3 OCT; President's visit 29 AUG 74.
5 And as such attended by the BPP MP, K. M. Nkhwa, Councillors of both
parties, and members of the two local VDCs, with transport provided by
the North East District Council.
6 This is corroborated by CDAs• reports (one of the questions they are
asked to answer is the number of visits by MPs or Ministers).
329
to general election campaigns: the raison d'etre of parties is
generally perceived as the organisation of elections.
CANDIDATE SELECTION
Clearly the nomination and selection of candidates is an important
aspect of party activity. The procedure in all four parties is similar,
the main difference between the Democratic Party and the opposition
parties lying in the greater degree of formality in the HDP approach.
In all cases the local party organisation is asked to suggest one or
more possible candidates for the appropriate ward/constituency.
These names are then submitted to the party leadership Cin the BDP case,
the National Executive Committee), which makes the final selection, on
the basis of its knowledge of the suggested candidates. Where the party
in question holds the Parliamentary seat the MP is the most important
link in the chain of selection for Council candidates, and this is seen
clearly in the Tati West Cnow North East), Mahalapye, Shoshong and
Lobatse/Barolong constituences. BPP leader P. G. Matante, and Chief
Bathoefl of the National Front, virtually possessed the power of selection
of candidates for their respective local Councils,1 although elsewhere
the BNF Central Committee did exercise control. In Borolong - safe
Domkrag territory - the key figure was B„ C. Thema, MP, a senior Cabinet
Minister from the Party's advent to power and also a member of the small
BDP election committee (which included the national organising staff and
a few minis terq)0
The Democratic Party was well aware of the much greater amount of
patronage it had at its disposal (compared with the other parties) and
did not flinch from dropping unsuitable candidates - or, less frequently,
those who had fallen out of favour with someone in the party hierarchy.
1 I.e. North East District Council, Francistown Town Council and the
Southern District Council.
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In 1969, for instance, in the Central District the sitting BDP councillor
for Mookanewas dropped, as was the councillor for Kalamare and one of the
Mahalapye councillors, while the same occurred in the Gathwane and Good
Hope wards of the Southern District. A detailed examination of each
case shows that failure to make an impact, either on the Council or in
the villages, was what carried weight more often than the desire to
bring in a more favoured candidate. But the more active the local MP,
the more often the latter occurred: in the absence of strong representations
from him the tendency was to readopt a candidate (particularly a successful
one electorally) who was willing to serve again.
The most conspicuous examples of "party boss" influence over
nominations in fact came from other parts of Botswana, notably the
1 2
Kweneng and the remote Ghanzi and Kgalagadi districts. In the last-
mentioned case the local MP, to the annoyance of party HQ, signed the
nomination papers of his prot£g£ as candidate for Gakhibane ward without
authorisation from the National Executive Committee. The District
Commissioner in Tsabong, as Returning Officer, accepted the papers as
valid (there being no quick way of seeking confirmation from Gaborone
and probably no apparent need to do so). As a result the sitting BDP
councillor had to stand as an Independent - successfully as it turned
out.
1 Here the leading light was E„ M„ K. Kgabo, Minister of Local Government
& Lands. See Vengroff (op. cit. X. especially pp. 190-199. The sitting
MP for Molepolole North was very annoyed at being dropped in favour of
a young proteg£ of Kgabo. For further information see Macartney, "The
General Election of *69," Botswana Notes and Records, 3 ('71) p. 212
2 See A. Kuper, Kalahari Village Politics (1970), Ch0 3. Harry Jankie,
an influential local councillor, got the National Assembly nomination
in 1969 (at the second attempt) and was a very active party organiser.
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RECRUITMENT OF CANDIDATES
Although there is now a fair amount of information available about
the background and status of Members of Parliament, Councillors and
1
candidates, none of it is complete. Data published by Holm is based
on interviews with almost two-thirds of the MPs and three-quarters of
2
the Councillors in three districts (about a quarter of all Councillors).
It demonstrates that both groups (irrespective of party> are more
wealthy, better educated and "bigger" farmers than the average Motswana.
More recent information, derived from the University of Botswana,
Lesotho and Swaziland study of the 1974 General Election and hitherto
3
unpublished, is reproduced in Appendix D. The UBLS study succeeded in
eliciting responses from very nearly half of all council candidates and
hence is of very great interest. But several obstacles in particular
are encountered in using the information. One is the multiple response
to questions about occupational background, so that on average candidates
have been in two or three categories (consecutively or concurrently),
e.g. farmer and blue-collar worker. Another is the answer "Councillor"
to the question on present occupation. And again the size of land
farmed and/or cattle held are not related directly to the categories of
occupation. What is still needed - it lay outwith the scope of this
study - is an in-depth investigation of all candidates (for Local
Government and Parliamentary elections) before one can start talking
definitively in more precise terms, whether of class analysis or of other
criteria (e.g. ascribed status, leadership of other groups, religion, etc.)
1 J. D. Holm, "Rural Development in Botswana: the basic political trends",
Rural Africana. Fall 1972
2 Kgatleng, Southern and South-East Districts.
3 The writer is most grateful to Jack Parson, Department of Government
& Administration, UBS (Gaborone), for kindly making this data available.
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A further difficulty of particular relevance for this study is the lack
of breakdown as between districts. An example is the BPP, which elected
a substantial number of candidates to the North East District Council
and Francis town Town Council; yet only one BPP respondent in the survey
gave "councillor" as his occupation, indicating probably that the
respondents were drawn from further south. Certainly the social back-
round of BPP and BDP in the North East District was, in general, different:
the bulk of the BDP councillors were businessmen, their opponents
usually not. It may be possible to think in terms of a leisured class
of public-spirited citizens (as in rural Scotland) but it is arguably
more relevant to look at specific situations: villages and districts.
Even here an unexpected problem was the number of obscure
candidates, who were virtually unknown to most of those supposedly
knowledgeable local people interviewed: a rather puzzling phenomenon,
given the small scale of Batswana politics. The most plausible
explanation is that parties drafted in either unknown outsiders, or
those whose local connections were tenuous, to be the local standard
bearer; and there is evidence that this happened in a number of instances.
1 .
Some of these can be described as perennial opposition candidates.
With all these qualifications made, there were clearly two main
pools of talent which were tapped by political parties in their quest
for candidates, and moreover the two pools were connected. The first
is defined in terms of education. It is a statutory requirement that
candidates for the National Assembly must be reasonably competent in
2
English, the official language of debates. For Councils it is obviously
desirable, owing to the predominance of English in documents„ It comes
1 See Macartney, "The General Election of 1969," op. cit., for the
number of "crossover" candidates.
2 Constitution of Botswana, Section 62 (d)
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as no surprise therefore to find that 81% of MPs in Holm's sample were
1
former civil servants and/or teachers; the BDP listed eleven of its
thirty-one original candidates in 1965 as teachers or civil servants.
2
A further eleven were listed as employees of the old Tribal Authorities.
After the first Assembly elections and the Local Government elections
the following year, the predominant position of the Democratic Party
became very clear. From then on any teacher or civil servant contemplating
resigning in order to stand for election for an opposition party had to
be mindful of the high risk of unemployment. Thus the doctrine of the
non-political civil service has tended to make the BDP more closely
3
identified with the civil service since most of those resigning to
stand for election have done so on a BDP ticket - comprising 46% of all
the party's "new" MPs.
In addition to teachers and civil servants the main occupational
group from which candidates have been drawn is shopkeepers and Master
Farmers, most if not all of whom are educated men. A particularly
interesting regional grouping of the former is the Northern Botswana
4
Traders Association. Its twenty-seven members included two Northern
MPs (one of whom was Secretary]), two North East District Councillors
(one of whom, an ex-Parliamentary candidate for Tati West, was
Chairman), one Central District Councillor, and a sub-Chief who was a
1 Holm, op. cit., p. 88
2 Therisanyo/Consultation, II, 2 (FEB 65]) pp. 2-8. Seretse Khama was
of course the most famous of the last-mentioned category.
3 A Permanent Secretary's wife stood for Gaborone Town Council on the
BDP ticket (and subsequently became MayorX. Two Cabinet Ministers'
wives were also candidates. An expatriate civil servant's wife who
stood as an Independent for the same council - unsuccessfully - was
subsequently nominated to it.
4 As at 26 APR 72. Two years later it had over 47 members (BDN,
22 APR 74]:.
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nominated member of the North-East Licensing- Authority; all six were
BDP members.
The other pool of talent can be described as those who had already
shown an interest in public affairs* Some of those were ministers of
religion or leading church laymen, but the main body, in the earlier
days of electoral activity, was the traditional administration, which
had acquired a semi-democratic element through the election of Tribal
Councillors (i.e. in the eight Tswana clans). The BDP's original
candidates list included ten (out of thirtyone) who were shown as
1
Tribal Councillors, including Seretse Khama and Quett Masire. In more
recent times a similar role has been performed by the Town and District
Councils, whose members have provided 56% of the BDP's new candidates
since the establishment of the Local Government system. As regards the
District Councils studied, the two main sources under this section
were the VDCs and the traditional administration, each the subject of
a section to follow.
THE PARTIES AND THE TRADITIONAL ADMINISTRATION
Reference has already been made to the traditional system of
administration as providing a source of candidates for local government
and the National Assembly, and indeed Holm has put the percentage of
aristocrats amongst the MPs and Councillors he surveyed as 47% and 59%
2
respectively. A few MPs, and a much larger number of District
Councillors, continue to perform both traditional-administrative and
elective-representative functions. The most celebrated example of the
1 Therisanyo/Consultation, III, 2 (FEB 65), pp 2-8
2 Holm, op. cito, p. 86. For what is here rendered as "aristocrats",
- or members of ruling families - Holm has coined the term "bakosi"
which he defines as those having paternal kinship ties with a local
chief or headmen: he estimates this group as comprising 15%-20% of the
[Tswana?] population.
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former is the MP for Tswapong South who was simultaneously Deputy Speaker
of the National Assembly and Chief (Subordinate Tribal Authority) of
Mahalapye. When he resigned in the latter capacity he was succeeded by
the District Councillor for Mookane, who was subsequently to be acting
Chief (Tribal Authority) of all the Bangwato - a position which meant
his relinquishing his Council seat for Mookane. When, in turn, his
move to Serowe left a vacancy, an election was held in Mahalapyo. The
successful candidate was already the deputy sub-chief (Headman) for
Mahalapye and a leading VDC member. In the poll for the Headman's
position another active VDC member, who twice stood, very unsuccessfully,
for a Mahalapye ward of the Central District Council on the Independence
Party ticket, failed narrowly in his bid for the traditional position.
Interestingly, his support in the election for the position of headman
exceeded by a considerable margin the vote he polled as BIP candidate
1
for the Council, illustrating the importance of the party label - and,
incidentally, the public's ability to distinguish between different
kinds of election.
This was no isolated instance of the overlapping of modern party
allegiance with traditional-style faction politics. The establishment
of the BNF in the Southern District by ex-Chief BathoeK is the most
prominent example of this process, but there are several others.
Kuper's detailed study of faction politics in Kuli village in the Ghanzi
District provides the basis for a fascinating case of interaction
between the two. At the time of Kuper's field work it was possible to
1 The votes he polled were as follows :
a) Council election, Mahalapye South 1966: 110 (9.0%) [straight fight]
b) Headman election, Mahalapye, 1973: 221 (42.8%) [three-cornered
fight]
c) Council election, Mahalapye North, 1974: 56 (5.3%) [straight fight]
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state that "In Northern Kgalagadi District the national political
parties provided the basis for a new expression of opposition after
Botswana's independence, but this has not happened in Ghanzi District."
Yet in the 1969 elections the previously unsuccessful contender for the
BDP nomination (and a "ruling- family" member! for the District Council
ward was able to win the seat for the People's Party, in what had
previously appeared solid Domkrag territory, defeating another prominent
(and wealthy) villager; the roles were reversed in turn in 1974 when
2
another wealthy local man won the seat back for the BDP.
The founder of the very first political party in Botswana (the
short-lived Bechuanaland Protectorate Federal Party) provides another
illustration of traditional-modern political interaction. L. D. Raditladi,
3
who has been described as a "Ngwato aristocratic rebel" founded the
BPFP as a conservative reforming party. But "the Ngwato tribal council,
perhaps mistaking Raditladi's move as a bid for the Chieftainship,
quickly gave him the position of Subordinate African Authority (sub-
4
chieftainship) at Mahalapye . . . and he 'forgot polities'." However
when the District Councils were inaugurated Raditladi made a bid for
election as a BIP candidate, with notable lack of success (8% of the
votes in Mahalapye North). After that it seems that "L. D." really did
forget about party politics.
POLITICAL PARTIES AND VDCs
The official view, reiterated time and time again, is that there
should be no connection whatsoever between political parties and VDCs:
1 Kuper, op. cit., p. 90
2 Ibid., pp. 83-86 and 181-182. The interesting point is the way in which
village faction leaders were able to acquire a national party label in
order to enter the District Council arena.
3 Tapela, op. cit., p. 293
4 Ibid., p. 294
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the latter are to be "non-political" bodies elected without reference
1
to the former. If this is more than just rhetoric, there are several
reasons which underlie the government line. One is undoubtedly the
colonial heritage of regarding parties as not very respectable: at
worst subversive, at best a necessary evil but in general out to disturb
2
the smooth running of affairs by introducing party divisions. Another,
more realistic if not cynical, interpretation is that before "party" and
"politics" is tacitly understood "opposition": in other words that
party control by the BDP would be all right but opposition party
activity definitely would not. In support of the suspicion of opposition
parties, ruling party politicians have frequently accused all three
opposition parties of opposing self-help and attempting to frustrate
particular self-help schemes. The Minister of Local Government & Lands
described the BPP as "barren of constructive proposals" and of being
r -i 3
unworthy to "work for the planned development of [local] areas". For
their part the Opposition MPs refute allegations of sabotage or
4
obstruction, while continuing to express doubts about the principle of
5
Ipelegeng.
In support of the latter view Vengroff has alleged that VDCs in the
Kweneng District were generally controlled by the BDP, and that the sole
exception was summarily dismissed by the MP, who called for a fresh
1 Reflected in, for example, Chambers & Feldman, op. cit., p. 186; The
Village Development Handbook.op. cit., p. 4; and S. J. Tennent, Report
on the Community Development Department (n.d. [1974]), p. 21.
2 Party involvement is seen as unfortunate by both Chambers & Feldman
Cop, cit. p. 182) and Tennent (op, cit. p. 21)
3 Appendix A
4 E.g. K. M. Nkhwa, BPP MP (Tati West^ in Hansard No. 42 (27 OCT 72)
p. 123.
5 As has been seen, the term is ambiguous, giving rise to confused
debate.
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election. A cause c£l&bre occurred in the large Central District
village of Palapye. Here it appears that the old committee, dominated
by the local BDP Councillor (a close associate of the MP for Tswapong
North) and other Domkrag supporters, was replaced in an election by a
predominantly BIP committee, The issue became complicated by allegations
and counter-allegations concerning funds, and matters reached a high
pitch with the circulation of a confidential report in the ministries
in Gaborone. Hie local Community Development Assistant was hurt at
being accused of failing in his duty of ensuring proper elections, or
even of deliberately collaborating with the Independence Party,
allegations which he indignantly rejected. At all events the pressure
from the local MP was strong enough for the Minister of Local Government
2
& lands to step in and suspend the committees, pending the holding of
fresh elections. These two cases are exceptional but, firstly, illustrate
3
the influence which a strong local "patron" MP can exercise and,
secondly, cast doubts on the Democratic Party's commitment to local
democracy.
Most of the time however VDCs plod along in a much less exciting
manner and the VDCs in this study in general fall into this pattern.
This does not mean that there is an absence of identifiable partisans
on the VDCs: quite the contrary. In the cases of Mapoka, Mahalapye,
Molapowabojang, Good Hope and Digawana there were members - in addition
to the local councillors, who were by definition party members - who
were publicly known as partisans through having stood for election to
1 Vengroff, op. cit., pp. 47-48. Unfortunately he gives no further
details.
2 BDN, 9 JUL 74. The legal basis for such action remains a mystery, since
VDCs are non-statutory bodies.
3 Both MPs were ministers.
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the district council (and in one case the National Assembly). At no
time was any official concern shown about any of these known politicians'
membership of the VDC. Furthermore VDCs were a source of recruitment
of candidates who got experience of public affairs through serving on
them; examples are Mahalapye, Kalamare, Digawana, Mapoka and also
Jackalas I in the North East, where the VDC Chairman got the BDP
nomination for the Parliamentary constituency of Tati West in 1974. In
solidly Opposition areas, moreover, it would be surprising if elections
failed to produce a VDC which was not composed predominantly of
opposition supporters. It would appear, then, that it was only when a
local BDP MP felt that Opposition dominance of a VDC meant a loss of
face for him and the party that the injunction against party involvement
in VDCs was wheeled out and used against the offending committee.
Despite their worries about the incursion of party divisions into
VDCs, Chambers and Feldman take the sensible view that "Any person who
is active in support of a political party is also likely as a responsible
citizen to be actively concerned to promote development in his area," and
recommend "a national approach to rural development involving all parties
1
and all people." On the whole this is the philosophy which has been
adopted by the Government in practice. If VDCs do increasingly take
on the appearance of village councils it seems inevitable that this view
should come to predominate.






There are various possible ways of examining relations between the
central Government and the District Councils. One could, for instance,
explore the methods of control and communication, who determines
priorities, the degree of flexibility or rigidity involved in the
planning mechanism, and the overall allocation of resources of money,
staff, materials and services. The decision to present this chapter in
a mainly chronological manner arises from the conviction that the most
striking thing about central-local government relations is their dynamics.
The other analytical categories mentioned will be incorporated within the
chapter at various - sometimes slightly arbitrary - points according to
the period with which a particular aspect or theme was principally
associated.
THE EARLY DAYS; SETTLING DOWN
1
The "revolutionary change" in local government which occurred in
1966 was a very quiet one indeed. In the early days two considerations
were uppermost in the minds of the Government. One was the establishment
of the new system and its exposition to the new Councillors and staff -
many of whom were recruited direct from the old traditional administration
system. The other was the preoccupation with the chieftainship and its
blending with the new district council system - hence the ex-officio
chairmanship of the local Paramount Chief (where there was one). Likewise




visits from the Minister of Local Government (initially Tsheko Tsheko)
and other Government spokesmen tended to stress the continuity of the old
and the new, so that the legitimacy attached to the Chief would transfer
to the council. Repeated efforts were made to convince the lower ranks
of the aristocracy, including the Headmen, that their position was
1
unchanged and unchallenged by the election of District Councillors.
It was a great help to the Government that the ruling party nationally
gained a majority of elected seats in all but one of the district
councils, and even there (in the North East District Council) the
Opposition was more hostile to the chieftainship that was the BDP. Only
in one district - the Kgatleng - was there a strong Opposition party
2
tacitly supported by the Chief.
Following the appointment in October 1966 as Minister of Local
Government & Lands of Mr. Englishman M. K. Kgabo, a more determined
3
opponent of the chieftainship, the Government first encouraged and then
legislated for the transfer of stray cattle (matimela) to the district
4
councils, before going on to tackle the fundamental question of land
allocation previously the prerogative of the chiefs.
5
Of great symbolic importance were the "cession sessions" at which
the President personally attended Council meetings and explained why the
Government wanted to take over from the principal clans the rights to
the minerals which lay below clan land; the North East District, having
1 See above, p. 36
2 See J. A. Wiseman, "The Organisation of Political Conflict in Botswana
1966-73" (1976)), p. 279 and passim. The BIP opposition in the North
West District Council resembled the BPP in the North East, rather than
the Kgatleng BPP.
3 See above, pp. 163-164 and 183
4 The Matimela Act 1968 (No. 25 of 1968)), following the Matimela (Model)
Bye-Laws, 1966 (L.N. No. 100 of 1966)
5 See above, pp. 128 and 183
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no such rights to cede, missed out on this type of occasion. Other themes
stressed in ministerial visits were the dependent position of councils -
"I think you would be well advised to consult my Ministry before you
make final consideration of matters which may be of far reaching importance",
as the Minister of Local Government & Lands told Kgatleng District
1
Councillors - and staffing problems of both quality and quantity. This
extract from another speech by Minister Kgabo illustrates the point:
It is unfortunately true that the present situation is in
many ways far from satisfactory. . . . The District Councils
are new, their Councillors and staff are largely
inexperienced. . . . immediate improvement can - and indeed
2
must - be effected. . . .
VIP visits were a welcome sign to Councils that they were in touch
with real people. For those Council Secretaries (and they were the
majority) who had been used to working in close proximity with their
superior - the Chief - the sense of isolation was strong. It was
frequently complained that the staff of the Ministry of Local Government
3
& Lands did not get round the districts sufficiently often. Instead
Council Secretaries were in regular receipt of didactic lectures from
Gaborone such as these: "Your minutes tend to be extremely long and
detailed. It should be possible to be more brief and at the same time
4
give the relevant details"; "There is great scope for the improvement
5
of the layout and content of your minutes", "Do the next set of minutes
correctly and compare them with the model minutes in the Handbook";6
1 On 20 JUN 67
2 Opening Address to the District Commissioners' Conference, 23-24 OCT 67
3 This probably stemmed more from the small number of senior civil
servants in the Ministry than from disinclination.
4 Permanent Secretary, MLG&L, to Secretary, Central District Council,
11 DEC 67
5 Permanent Secretary, MLG&L, to Secretary, Ngwaketse District Council,
26 OCT 66




"Was the Council dormant for 6 months?"; "Although these minutes are
not as late as some have been in the past - two months . . . is still a
2
quite unacceptable delay."
As chief representative of the Central Government in the district
the District Commissioner was also brought into the act, but the impact
was hardly more personal. One District Commissioner wrote a five-page
letter on the subject to the Council Secretary, complaining at the
3
length of minutes (20 pages for an average statutory meeting); he in
turn received complaints from his superiors in the Ministry of Local
Government & Lands such as these:
With reference to the minutes of the above meeting [of the
Central District Council] I confess that I am quite unable
to understand why no notice whatever is taken of the hand¬
book, the model minutes and the instructions for writing
them issued by the Minister as a directive.
... is there any way of persuading those concerned to read
and apply them?4
5
While the expatriate civil servants who wrote all the above messages
seemed to despair of making Batswana Local Government officers conform
to the English local government norm,^ the reaction of the Council
7
Secretaries and Chairmen was restrained, and produced little difference
in the conduct and recording of meetings, which were rooted in the
kgotla traditional modes of debate, in which the fact of contribution to
discussion was as important as the outcome.
1 Permanent Secretary, MLG&L, to Secretary, Ngwaketse District Council
31 JUL 67
2 Permanent Secretary, MLG&L, to Secretary, Ngwaketse District Council
19 FEB 68
3 District Commissioner [Serowe] to Secretary, Central District Council
25 AUG 67
4 Permanent Secretary, MLG&L, to District Commissioner, Serowe, 22 APR 68
5 Although all letters to and from the Ministry were officially
communications from the Permanent Secretary who was a Motswana from an
early date.
6 Explicitly recognised in letter referred to in footnote 3 above
7 E.g. Central District Council Secretary to Permanent Secretary, MLG&L
11 DEC 67
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This early phase was characterised by a low level of interest by
Gaborone in local government, and a willingness to let expatriates in
1
the Ministry keep on with their preoccupation with procedural correctness.
Developmental activity was hardly uppermost in anyone's minds during
this period, which was dominated, in the words of one senior civil
servant, by "colonial snobbishness" vis-a-vis local government.
TRANSITIONAL PERIOD: GROWING DISSATISFACTION
Administrative aspects
After the local government system had been operating for something
like two years, a number of factors combined to disturb the sluggish
pace of the councils. In the first place an attempt to improve the
administrative competence of the councils was made by bringing in a
sizeable contingent of expatriate volunteers (mainly Peace Corps, but
later also CUSO [Canadian] and British volunteers) to the districts. The
first wave were appointed as Council Advisers and took up their posts
late in 1968. Most of them were young law or public administration
graduates and their first task was to try to improve the procedures of
the Councils. But soon they were having a major impact on the sort of
2
activities Councils were undertaking. in particular they became more
and more concerned with development matters.
This new look was completely in line with the new stress on
development which was becoming increasingly evident in the Ministry and
the Government generally. Councils who did not already have one were
1 The expatriates generally preferred to stick to "purely administrative"
matters, leaving "political" matters to the Batswana (Minister and
Permanent Secretary)).
2 For instance the Central District Council Adviser was largely
instrumental in persuading the Council to use its (fairly substantial)
reserves in order to undertake various projects - much to the Treasurer's
dismay (see above, pp. 172, 184).
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1
encouraged to form a development committee and in general there was a
growing recognition in the corridors of power that the District Councils
were of direct relevance to the vast bulk of the population. It was
also becoming plain that the capacity of the Department of Community
2
Development to develop rural Botswana was strictly limited. Another
factor of major importance from 1968 onwards was the influence of the
new Ministry of Development Planning (which became the Ministry of
3
Finance & Development Planning in 1970/71). Indeed one of the first
tasks undertaken by the newly appointed volunteers (and/or the District
Commissioners) was the preparation of the first district development
plans; these were subsequently passed (often with no significant amend¬
ments) by the District Councils. It should perhaps be stressed that the
by now well-known bonanza in central Government revenues was still some
4
distance in the future at this juncture.
From the point of view of the Councils, too, there was a considerable
degree of frustration with attempts to communicate with central Government
5
Ministries and Departments (other than the "parent" Ministry). The main
complaints centred on the slowness of communications; the reluctance of
departments to divulge information; and above all the difficulty of getting
action on the implementation of such things as borehole drilling or road
improvements.
1 Recorded in the speech of Director of Economic Affairs, Ministry of
Finance and Development Planning, to the Second National Conference of
District Development Committees, Gaborone, 6 DEC 73.
2 See P. G. L. Wass, "Community Development in Botswana" (1972),
S. J„ Tennent, Report on Community Development Department (1974), and the
Annual Report of the Community Development Department 1969/70.
3 See H. Dahl, "The Creation of New Ministries: Ministries and Selected
Government Department, Public Corporations, Boards, Museums etc, 1966/67",
in Cohen & Parson (Eds.) Politics and Society in Botswana (1976) pp. 179-181.
4 See Q. Hermans, "A Review of Botswana's Financial History, 1900-1973",
Botswana Notes and Records, VI (1974)
5 See above, pp. 129; 184-185; and 236
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Last but not least on the list of administrative problems was the
question of the District Administration: as Sillery put it, "Somewhere
in the middle of the maze lurks the figure of the District Commissioner".
It was evident that this position had either to wither away or be given
a new role. In favour of the former solution it was argued that it was
a colonial relic; against this had to be set the undoubted fact that
every Motswana was familiar with the institution of Molaodi, whereas the
2
Council and its officials and members were as yet less known.
All the above considerations led the Government to establish, at
the end of 1969, a Local Government Study Group under the Chairmanship
of Professor W. Tordoff with the following terms of reference:
To examine the structural relationships between the various
agencies responsible for provision of services and of
development at' the district and village levels (the agencies
include Central Government Ministries and Departments,
District Administration, Traditional Authorities and Local
Councils); to indicate areas where changes in relationships
or allocation of responsibilities could improve functional
efficiency and local participation in governmental processes;
to consider and comment on the role of non-governmental
organisations in modernising social attitudes and mobilising
people for development.^
The "Tordoff" reforms were to alter the shape of rural administration,
as will be seen below.
The Political Dimension
Before going on to look at the administrative reforms consequent
on the work of the Tordoff committee, it is necessary to look at the
political developments which were proceeding in parallel and came to a
head in the crisis of 1969.
1 Sillery, op. cit., p. 183
2 There is no real Setswana term for "Council": the loan-word "Khansele"
is used.
3 Tordoff, Pilane & Sarpong, Report of the Local Government Study Group
(1970), p. 1 " " ~
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It had been on the cards for some time that the powers of the
1
chiefs would be further eroded - indeed this was the principal
attraction of the institution of District Councils for many ministers.
One change was easily made, viz. the removal of the (Paramount) Chiefs
as ex officio Council Chairmen of the relevant Councils, and this was
2
duly done in November 1969. The Chiefs remained members of the
respective Councils and as such were eligible for election to the Chair
but in some cases - notably the North West District Council and the
3
Kgatleng District Council - suffered the humiliation of electoral
defeat at the hands of their "subjects".
More difficult, because more basic, was the removal of the power to
allocate land from the Chiefs. The popular reaction to the Tribal Land
4 5
Act 1968 was such that, even with an amending Act in 1969, it was not
Q
until 1970 that the Government was able to reform the system. It is in
part indicative of the Government's lack of faith in the District
Councils that the function of land allocation was given to a new body in
each communal land tenure area, the Land Board, rather than being trans¬
ferred to the Councils to administer by a committee. Instead the Land
Boards had a tripartite constitution, being composed of representatives
of the Traditional Administration (including the Chief) and the Council,
plus ministerial nominees. Moreover the role of the lower ranks of the
aristocracy was reduced to one of endorsing applications and this
1 As the chiefs were well aware. See Proctor, op. cit., passim.
2 See Appendix "A"
3 See Wiseman, op. cit., p. 279
4 Act No. 54 of 1968
5 Tribal Land (Amendment) Act 1969 (No. 48 of 1969)
6 See W. Tordoff, "Local Administration in Botswana, Part I," Journal of
Administration Overseas, XII, 4 (OCT 73), p. 180
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inevitably led to the necessity of creating Subordinate Land Boards
in the larger districts.
1969 was a year of crisis for the BDP Government. It was widely
1
recognised that the party stood to lose support in the General Election
due by early 1970. In particular the towns of Gaborone and Lobatse were
expected to fall to the new radical BNF, while the BIP looked capable of
taking three seats in the North West. Then the decision of Botswana's
Senior Chief, Bathoen II, not only to enter the electoral lists but to
team up with the National Front, created an unpredictable situation. In
addition to the Parliamentary election the Local Government elections,
2
now synchronised with it, opened up the prospect of Opposition gains
in many Councils wards where the Democratic Party had been unopposed in
1966. It was largely this uncertainty that prompted President Khama to
call the two sets of elections early, in October 1969. Moreover, what
now looks like a minor curiosity of the 1969 election campaign, namely
3
the "Kalanga Coup" scare, led to the sudden cancellation of the plan to
send the Kalanga-speaking Richard Mannathoko to London as High
Commissioner; instead he found himself Permanent Secretary of Local
Government & Lands.
The scene was then set for the crisis of conscience of the
Democratic Party government (returned to power with a reduced majority
in 1969). Since the BPP had increased its representation on the North
East District Council (Mannathoko*s home district), the Government's
power of nomination was no longer sufficient to give the BDP control.
1 For the election (of 1969) see W. J. A. Macartney, "Botswana Goes to
the Polls," Africa Report, XIV, 8 (DEC 69).
2 See above, pp. 26-27; and BDN, 8 MAY 69
3 See above, p. 26
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The result, a "decision which falls short of the ideals we have set our¬
selves to achieve local democracy," was taken and announced somewhat
1
defensively by Minister Kgabo. The justification he adduced was the
2
need for "planned development".
THE NEW LOOK
Having ensured that all Councils were under the control of BDP
Councillors ostensibly dedicated to development, the Government
proceeded to set up new machinery for district planning in which the
Councils* role was far from clear. There was a widespread assumption
that the purpose of the new District Development Committees (DDCs) was
to strengthen the position of the Central Government (acting through the
District Commissioner as Chairman} in each District at the expense of
the elected Councils. This suspicion was so strong that it took the
Acting DC's deliberative and casting votes to defeat a motion amounting
to "no confidence" in the new system moved at the inaugural meeting of
the Southern District Development Committee by the District Council
• 3
Chairman.
The impact of DDCs is analysed below, but there are a number of
other developments which added up to the "new look" in local government.
For the Councils an even more important innovation was the introduction
of the Unified Local Government Service (ULGS), foreshadowed in the
4
(M. J.) Pilane Report of 1972. The effects of the ULGS were twofold.
1 See Appendix "A"; also Hansard, 30, p. 377 ff. (27 NOV 69)
2 Appendix "A"
3 Personal observation; the vote of 5-4 against the motion is recorded
in Southern DDC Minutes, 26 JUL 71.
4 Report of the Commission on the Salaries and Conditions of Service of
Local Government Employees (1972), discussed in Tordoff, "Local Administ¬
ration in Botswana, Part I", op. cit., pp. 177-178
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In the first place control over the higher levels of staff (appointments,
promotions etc) was removed from the Councils' Staff Committees (or
equivalent), which became almost redundant. Secondly, and as a
consequence of this, the senior staff were liable to transfer at short
notice - as was notoriously the case with District Administration staff -
to other districts. While this was ostensibly aimed at providing the
now better-salaried local government officer with a more attractive
career structure, it was also quite clearly a heavy blow against the
particularism which was seen as an inevitable concomitant of the old
system, whereby most staff belonged to their home district (and many in
fact were inherited from the pre-Independence Tribal Administration).
From the perspective of the internal politics of the Councils, the
move however strengthened the power of Councillors vis-a-vis powerful,
1
entrenched Council Secretaries, described above. At the same time
2
however the most powerful spokesman for many Councils vis-k-vis
Gaborone was liable to lose his power base at the stroke of a pen wielded
3
in Gaborone. It is little wonder that some Councils protested.
A movement in the other direction however - i.e. strengthening the
position of Councils - took place with the decision to transfer Community
4
Development field staff to the District Councils, although they retained
5
a separate status in not being covered by the ULGS,
This movement of Community Development staff was one of the
0
recommendations of the study of Chambers and Feldman which reported
1 See pp. 106-107, 154-157 and 216-219
2 See p. 155 above
3 See p. 237 above
4 The Department was the subject of a searching internal inquiry by
Tennent (op. cit.)
5 It was suggested that they be incorporated in the ULGS at a seminar
for District Council Secretaries, Gaborone, 26 JUN 74.
6 Chambers & Feldman, Report on Rural Development (1973)
352
in 1972. One of the most interesting aspects of this study is the
timing: the ink was barely dry on the first DDC minutes when the terms
of reference of the Chambers and Feldman study were being drafted.
They included the following:-
. . . to review [the] Government's policies, priorities, and
programmes for rural development, and the institutional and
administrative arrangements for their implementation at both
central government, district and village levels. ... to
study and make recommendations on the following matters:
the need to define the relationship between and the respective
roles of the ruling party at the district and village levels
on the one hand and the officials of Central and Local Govern¬
ment on the other in the mobilisation of the people to achieve
rural development, bearing in mind that Botswana is a multi¬
party democracy;
the need to promote [within] the democratic framework the
more effective involvement of non-governmental organisations
including Political Parties and to determine their role in
the implementation of rural development policies and
programmes and the interpretation of such policies^and
programmes to the people in the rural areas....
In the event Chambers and Feldman found three months too short a
time to deal with all the matters referred to in the very lengthy terms
of reference and concentrated on agricultural questions, notably
conservation and livestock; thus the touchy question of fencing communal
2
land became a respectable one for public discussion. As regards the
DDC system they were happy to endorse it and recommended strengthening
the DDCs with staff and other resources.
It is noteworthy however that the question of the role of political
parties was raised in the above-mentioned terms of reference, as it had
been discussed by the Tordoff Study Group, which is probably why the
3
report of the latter was never released for public consumption. One
1 Ibid., pp. Ci)-(ii)
2 Reversing previous Government policy; see above, p. 162.
3 It was however probably read with greater urgency than any comparable
publication by its recipients, since its dispatch was followed within 24
hours by a directive to return it unread to Gaborone as it had been
dispatched (to District Commissioners and others> in error, i.e. without
proper clearance.
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detects a certain wistfulness in some quarters (political and administrativeJ
1
in the capital for a TANU-style, mobilising' BDP; but this is countered
by the liberal-democrats within the Cabinet and the bureaucracy who
prefer the present constitutional framework to a leap in the dark.
PLANNING AND CO-ORDINATION AT THE CENTRE
Towards the end of the period studied there occurred a number of
changes at the centre which resulted indirectly from the creation of a
district planning system but also reflected two other factors. The
first of those was the growing influence of the "super-ministry",
Finance and Development Planning, which possessed three advantages in
particular. The traditional Whitehall-style Treasury function had been
exercised by the Ministry of Finance and its control was retained by the
new ministry. This was enhanced by the energetic and imaginative civil
servants (many of them expatriates, although the Permanent Secretary
took out Botswana citizenship]), who were able to sell the idea of
planning (geared to attracting overseas aid of all kinds)). Last but by
no means least of the Ministry's advantages has been the political and
administrative ability of Dr. Quett Masire, the Republic's Vice-President,
who has headed the Ministry since its inception. Masire moreover enjoys
the complete confidence of the President who, increasingly preoccupied
with foreign affairs from 1969 onwards, has been happy to leave the
running in many major internal questions to the Vice-President.
Next to Finance &, Development Planning in terms of innovative ideas
2
and an ability to put across arguments for an emphasis on rural development
1 See below, p. 428
2 For earlier criticism of the Government's failure to translate its
rhetoric into practice see J. D. Holm, "Rural Development in Botswana:
th^e basic political trends," Rural Africana, Fall 1972
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came one or two key civil servants in the Ministry of Local Government &,
Lands, all of whom had the additional advantage of practical experience
in the Districts. In the Ministry moreover the rise of K. P. Morake -
who first as Assistant Minister after the 1969 General Election handled
the developmental aspects of local administration (especially the DDCs> -
to be Minister of Local Government & Lands in 1973 gave a new complexion
to the Ministry. Morake, like the Vice-President, had a long- record of
activity in org-anising- the ruling- party and had a wider, more nation-wide
outlook than his predecessor. His shrewdness proved a vital asset in the
Ministry's new bid for influence. Simultaneously with Morake's promotion
to Minister came a chang-e of Permanent Secretary. The new appointee,
Ben Makabole, was a very different figure from his predecessor. A
young graduate who had risen rapidly in the Civil Service, he presented
a lower profile, and appeared more concerned with strictly administrative
matters, preferring to delegate more responsibility to his senior
assistants.
The emphasis of the Ministry of Local Government & Lands changed
from a preoccupation with cajoling District Councils into following
correct procedures to a readiness to get involved in disputes with
other Ministries, who now became the recipient of caustic correspondence
such as this: "Your uninvited comments on the way this Ministry chooses
1
to deal with its own portfolio responsibilities are surprising" (the
question at issue was slowness in equipping of boreholes).
The new-found assertiveness of Local Government & Lands can be
traced to the twin foundations of its alliance with the senior Ministry
of Finance & Development Planning and the Government's growing commitment
1 Permanent Secretary, MIG&L, to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Commerce,
Industry &. Water Affairs, 19 JAN 72
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to giving rural development explicit priority - a process which was
given its first formal statement in the Government's first "White Paper",
1
Government Paper No. 1 in 1972, and restated in a further Government
2
Paper in 1973 as well as being reflected in successive National
Development Plans. These Government Papers were widely distributed and
exerted a strong influence on the bureaucracy at all levels.
As an example of the tie-up between the two Ministries, the old
inter-ministerial committee for vetting rural development projects, which
had fallen into disuse (with the role being taken over effectively by a
senior civil servant in Local Government &, Lands), was changed into a
four-man committee consisting of two representatives from each of what
one might call the two rural planning ministries.
A notable feature of central administration became the dichotomy
between the "planning" and the "implementing" ministries. One potent
form by which the former put pressure on the latter was the Annual
Conference of District Development Committees, which came to meet for
several days. In some respects it was like the Parliamentary debate on
the budget, except that the criticism was better informed, and those
criticised could not shelter behind either Parliamentary rules or the
doctrine of ministerial responsibility. Appendix F illustrates the
follow-up requests made of the Government machine by the 1973 conference.
The influence of the conference was reflected also in various District
Council meetings, where a line adopted at the conference - e.g. on
licensing policy or on Food-for-Work - was put forward by the Council
3
Secretary.
1 Rural Development in Botswana: Government Paper No. 1 (1972)
2 National Policy for Rural Development; Government Paper No. 2 of 1973
3 See above, p. 164
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Complementing such annual conferences were institutions set up in
accordance with Government Paper No. 1 - the Rural Development Council
and the National Extension Education Co-ordinating Committee, as well as
the National Resources Technical Committee. A powerful additional fillip
was given by the creation of a small but high-powered Rural Development
Unit operating under Finance & Development Planning, which saw its role
as an "oilcan", helping to remove bottlenecks and generate ideas. These
it proceeded to do with energy and scored a notable success in getting
the Accelerated Rural Development Programme (ARDP) launched at the
beginning of 1974. In doing this it, and the Ministry of Local Government
1
& Lands, were able to argue that the substantial extra revenue which had
accrued to the Government ought to be applied to a highly visible
programme of rural development in election year 1974. The "rural
planning" pressure group thus hoped to make a lasting improvement in
District Councils' capacity for development administration, even if the
manner of the conduct of the ARDP was unpopular with those in the
Districts to whom it came as a surprise.
What has just been referred to as the rural planning group was just
one manifestation of a notable phenomenon in Botswana: the expatriate
"ideas men", who presented with enthusiasm papers at conferences and
seminars organised notably by the Botswana Society (President - Dr. Masire).
The Society also published a journal, Botswana Notes &. Records, edited
by a husband and wife team one of whom was a senior Government economist,
which provided a number of imaginative contributions to a series of
2
debates on the future shape of Botswana's economy and ecology. The
1 See Hermans, op. cit.
2 See particularly the special edition arising from the Conference on
Sustained Production from Semi-Arid Areas with particular reference to
Botswana, OCT 71.
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equivalent people in the Districts were the large number of volunteers,
particularly Canadian and American, who provided the bulk of the cadre
of District Officers (Development), i.e. District Development Committee
Secretaries. At one stage there were over 60 such graduate volunteers
1
to only four Batswana graduates in this area. The precise role of the
DDCs is a subject of the last section of this chapter.
CONTINUING PROBLEMS
Lest the impression may have been given that rural development and
planning was an unrelieved success story, it must be stressed that the
perspective from the Districts was not always the same as that of
Gaborone. One District Commissioner referred to the planners in the
capital as "oversophisticated and underage" and it was a common comment
that a very large part of the civil service was not taking the structure
seriously.
In this connexion there were frequent complaints that the time given
to District Development Committees and District Councils for the
consideration of documents like the Chambers & Feldman Report, or the
preparation of District development plans, was ludicrously short, and
inevitably meant inadequate discussion by the elected representatives of
the people. The typical pattern was a punishing schedule of drafting by
one or two officials, often expatriate, with little scope for amendment
owing to the time constraints; meanwhile the central Ministries had
already taken decisions which were of great importance for the Districts.
The other big complaint concerned the reluctance of central government
departments to give information. In one instance the Geological Survey
2
Department refused to answer a question from the DDC Secretary on the
1 As of March 1974
2 In the Southern District
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location of its drilling1 rigs; his opposite number in another District1
was unable to find out the location of boreholes. For their part some
of the Ministries under fire hit back, with comments such as these:
There has existed for some time considerable apprehension
about the status of Rural Electricity Projects, compounded
by [the] Government's apparent inability to devise a
coherent, national policy on the subject.
As a result costly mistakes have been made^ for
example at Palapye, Mahalapye and Serowe. . . .
Frank acknowledgement of the central government's shortcomings with
respect to district level planning was made in a speech by the new
Assistant Minister of Local Government & Lands in 1976 which included
this passage:
We acknowledge that our Ministry, and others, failed to
provide the Districts with the resources and encouragement
necessary in the last Plan period. We failed to monitor our
own response to your needs. We shall try and do better next
time.^
It was however above all to the District Development Committees that
the Government looked for solutions to the problems of communication
and co-ordination of development.
THE DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEES
Any assessment of the impact of District Development Committees cannot
be other than tentative at this stage, given that the institution came in
towards the end of the period studied. Moreover the continued existence
of the new structure was by no means guaranteed; witness the attempts made
4
after four years of its existence to have DDCs abolished. Nevertheless
DDCs provided both a useful source of information on the political ecology
The Central District
2 Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Works & Communications, to Ngwaketse
District Council Secretary, 7 AUG 70.
3 Hon. L. M. Seretse, MP, "Planning with the People: a new direction for
District Planning in Botswana," opening address of the National Conference
of District Development Committees, 1 NOV 76, p. 9.
4 See below, p. 368
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of each District and insights into the workings of the administrative
machine at District level; the fact that they met more frequently than
1
the District Councils, and that English was the language of meetings,
made the researcher's task easier.
Structure and practice
2
First a brief outline of DDC structure and practice is necessary.
Each DDC was chaired by the District Commissioner and had the District
Officer (Development) as Secretary. All included the District Council
Chairman and Secretary and a number of field officers of central
government departments. The number of these varied, as did the number
of co-opted members. Such a distinction is in any case academic since
there was no differentiation in practice between the categories of full
and co-opted members. What is noteworthy is the absence of elected
3
politicians, unless it should happen that the Council Chairman was an
4
elected rather than a nominated councillor - in two of the three
Councils in the relevant period this was not the case. (Indeed, as one
DDC Secretary put it, the DDC should be heavily weighted towards
bureaucrats "as it is strictly a device to facilitate better communication
between bureaucrats. It should in no way conflict with the District
Council or any other legislative body by having on it persons who
purport to represent the people.")
5
Actual attendance at DDC meetings varied tremendously. Apart
from the core members, others tended to regard it either as a chore,
1 On average every 4-6 weeks, compared with four annual statutory
(ordinary) meetings of the Councils.
2 For a useful summary of the initial period of the new structure see
Tordoff, "Local Administration in Botswana - I" (op. cit.)
3 And was the subject of a comment in Chambers & Feldman (op. cit.),
who recommended more involvement of MPs, on an invited basis, provided
they did not "overwhelm the proceedings with speeches" (p. 185).
4 Central and Southern District Councils. The North East District
Council chairman for 1972 was an elected (BDP) Councillor.
5 See Appendix E (for the North East DDC); and, for Ghanzi DDC, BDN,
18 FEB 75.
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to be avoided whenever possible, or as a welcome break in their
routine and/or a useful forum in which to fly personal kites.
Inevitably the contribution of the latter category, particularly
those who, as good committee men, took the trouble to "do their home¬
work," was much more marked in the realm of ideas, plans and projects.
The unwritten constitution of DDCs favoured consensualism - based
not on the kgotla norms, since most members were expatriates, so much
as the Pan-African principle of non-interference in internal affairs.
Particularly in the Central DDC the tendency was to accept the
expertise of the relevant officer and to support his schemes as part
of the "Serowe versus Gaborone" syndrome; undoubtedly the sheer size
of the Central District made for less familiarity with other members*
portfolios. In the North East DDC,by contrast, it was much more
common for departmental positions to be challenged and indeed the
DDC was seen by one Chairman as a useful device for embarrassing
defaulting departments. In this connexion the absence of certain
1
members was not infrequently criticised. However a major limitation
on the ability of the DDC to exert pressure on members (usually
officers of the "implementing" Ministries) was the number of expatriates
on three-year contracts, whose co-operativeness decreased with the
imminence of their departure. #
DDC leadership
An a priori assumption might be that the rapid turnover of civil
servant members of the DDCs would strengthen the position of the more
permanent members, notably the representatives of the Council and the
traditional administration. The time the system was in operation was
1 For three separate instances in one meeting see NEDDC Minutes,
13-14 DEC 72,
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far too short to be able to gauge this, and in any case it was counter¬
balanced by the advantage of those members - notably the District
Administrative staff - who brought with them previous experience of
another DDC.
From observation of actual meetings it was clear that the key
members were the District Commissioner as Chairman, the DO(D) as
Secretary, the Council Secretary, the Council Chairman, and often
one or two other assiduous individuals. To that extent the system
showed signs of developing into a closely co-ordinated oligarchy of
senior administrators - if, and only if, those concerned shared similar
views on both substance and procedure. Much of the variation between
the three DDCs studied was due to the presence or absence of such a
relationship.
1
In the North East, the Council Secretary was generally jealous
of his Council's position, and tended to comment adversely on any
procedural detail where he detected shortcomings - e.g. whether it was
the job of the Secretary or the Chairman to do something, or whether
2
the minutes had been sent out promptly. The net effect of such a
prickly attitude was to induce the DO(D) to devote an inordinate amount
of effort to ensuring that the Council Secretary was fully briefed and
consulted about absolutely everything, and to attribute the authorship
3
of documents to the latter wherever possible. With the later appoint¬
ment of a District Council Development Officer the relationship was
improved as he was able to liaise between his superior and the DO(D)/
District Commissioner.
1 See above pp. 216-219
2 NEDDC Minutes, 25 JUN 73
3 E.g. "Development in the North East District for 1973/78 - a report
by Secretary, North East District Council with the assistance of the
District Officer (Development)."
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In the Central District, by contrast, a relaxed attitude prevailed,
with both sides enjoying1 a relationship of mutual trust, so that the
DDC Secretary and Council Development Officer in particular worked
together in trying to extract the maximum of concessions from the
Ministry of Local Government & Lands.
In the Southern District the early hostility expressed by the
1
Council Chairman towards the DDC gradually gave way to a relationship
characterised by close co-operation. In this development the key
influence was the apparent acceptance by all concerned that they had
a common interest in Kanye in pressing demands on or making complaints
to the centre.
Case Studies
A classic instance was the inept handling of the Kanye Youth
Training Centre. At a DDC meeting much concern was expressed, as the
following extracts show:
Kanye Youth Training Centre
(a) The Chairman summarised for the Committee the contents of a
letter copied to his office as well as to the Director of
Community Development and the Permanent Secretary, Ministry
of Education, from the Ministry of Local Government and Lands
to the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning in which
. . . points were made with respect to the closing of the
KYTC by the 1st March, 1973.
(b> The Community Development Officer expressed surprise
and disbelief at the Chairman's report, stating that this
was the first time he had been notified of such matters,
as neither the Director of Community Development nor the
KYTC coordinator had informed him of such matters. He also
questioned whether the KYTC coordinator himself knew of this
turn of events.
(c) The Council Secretary expressed his belief that there
had been altogether too much confidentiality in the Ministerial
decision-making with respect to the future of the KYTC.
Cd) The Vice-Chairman of the Southern District Council stated
that, given present lack of information, rumours as to the
1 See above* p. 350
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future of KYTC were running- riot in Kanye and that young-
people were already preparing applications for entrance into
KYTC courses for next year.
(e) The Committee urged the Chairman to arrange at the (
earliest possible date a meeting between the Director of
Community Development and the proposed KYTC Board of
Trustees in order that the Director could brief them [on]
the present status and planned future of the KYTC, and in
order that the Director could hear the views of the
proposed Board on these matters.1
Further proof of the importance of the relationship between
Council and DDC is provided by the fate of two contrasting projects,
2
the Western Ngwaketse Development Programme in the Southern District
3 4
and the Matsiloje Group Cattle Ranch in the North East. Both involved
potentially controversial proposals: in the former the use of fencing -
hitherto anathema in communal grazing areas - and in the latter the
idea of a village co-operative to run a ranch. The Southern District
scheme was approved on behalf of the Council by one of its committees;
this procedure required the collaboration of the Council Secretary.
By contrast the North East District Council, asked by the Ministry
responsible to arrange for consultation with the local people, chose
to call a district-wide meeting, which had the effect of worrying the
Matsiloje villagers that "their" land (it was actually State Land) was
to be opened up to residents of other parts of the District; the scheme
virtually foundered on the rock of this distrust. The DDC secretaries
in each case regarded the Council Secretary as the key figure in
arranging the very different outcome to the two projects.
There was however a further and ultimately more important dimension
to these questions: the central Government. Support at ministerial
1 SDDC Minutes, 19 DEC 72 (emphasis in the original).
2 Project No SDDC 1
3 Initially Project A2 in the NED Development Plan 1973/78 (Part II)
4 On both projects see Hansard, 49, pp. 131-132 (15 MAR 74)
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level for the Western Ngwaketse Scheme was unreserved; the same was
not true of the Matsiloje scheme, to which one influential civil
servant who belonged to the North East District was strongly opposed.
The importance of Governmental attitudes was further demonstrated by
1
the question of decentralisation in the Central District. Following
2
the Tordoff and Chambers &Feldman recommendations, the Central DDC
discussed the question and came up with a scheme of administrative
3 4
decentralisation. In the event however not much came of the plan,
which conflicted with the BDP's interest in preserving the unwieldy
Central District as an entity.
The impact of the DDCs
Summarising the impact of the DDCs as an institution one can
conclude, firstly, that it succeeded in making a great deal of information
available amongst the members. Secondly, the most important individual
was the District Officer (Development>, who was able to use the
prevalent "consensualism" to inject many ideas into the system and have
them endorsed. Thirdly it helped create a distinct team spirit amongst
administrators in the district headquarters. This team, fourthly, came
to act as a pressure group on behalf of the district vis-h-vis the
5
central Government and also vis-^-vis the field staff of "implementing"
departments.
1 See pp. 190-192 above
2 The Tordoff Report (op. cit.), p. 21 and Appendix III; Chambers &
Feldman, op. cit., pp. 217-219
3 Central DDC Minutes 27 FEB 73, 12 JUN 73
4 Further discussion of which was halted by the Government (ibid.,
30 JUL 73).
5 A revealing remark was made by one D0(D) who said, "I have the
impression that there were a number of Gaborone bureaucrats who never
went out into the districts and felt, in recognition of that, that
they should listen to the DDC as their token gesture towards involving
the districts in decision-making. Most bureaucrats in Gaborone seemed
to relate better to the DDC than a political body such as the Council."
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It is however the relationship between the DDC and the District
Council that both occasioned most speculation during- the period of the
establishment of the novel institution and is most relevant to this
study.
Many participants in and observers of this new system remained
sceptical about the motives behind its introduction, seeing it as
part of the same process as the reduction of the powers of the Chiefs,
the "packing" of Councils with the Government's men, the creation of
land boards and the implementation of the Unified Local Government
Service. Such fears were not allayed by the remarks made by personnel
of the Ministry of Local Government & Lands to the effect that
in the case of a party clash between council and Government,
an opposition party would [if proposals for the transfer of
DDC functions to Councils were accepted] have control over
a District's development and the workings of its Ministerial
representatives. This could be potentially disruptive in
practice.*
The existence of friction as late as 1976 was testified to by the
2
Assistant Minister of Local Government &, Lands, in the following words:
It is my firm belief that local authorities should be made
free to make their own plans within the framework of the
National Plan, and that they should be encouraged to be free
to press for the acceptance of their plans as part of the
National Plans. In this respect we have District Development
Committees, where ideas can be exchanged at local level.
I am aware however that the role of these committees has
become a controversial issue to local authorities, but it is
my considered view that the sincerity of [the] Government in
establishing these committees to assist local authorities in
the planning process cannot be overemphasised. Perhaps it
could be that the idiosyncracies of some individuals in these
committees are responsible for the conflict and the apparent
rivalry between local authorities and themselves. There is
no doubt in my mind however that with the passage of time some
1 Resolutions and Minutes of the National Conference of District
Development Committees . . ., 28-30 JUL 75.
2 And former Central District Council Secretary.
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local authorities are responding- to the dynamics of change and
have a feeling that some of the controls from above on matters
of a local nature, which they are competent to handle, are
bureaucratic and tend to relegate them to a nonsensical role.
Whilst I do not wish to sound unsympathetic to the aspirations
of some local authorities for some autonomy, I would like to
say that complete autonomy at this stage of our development
particularly in the fact of shortage of manpower, could not
be casually granted to local authorities, but on the other
hand complete subordination to Central Government would negate
the objectives of our local Government system. Neither side
should be in opposition to the other: what should really be
at issue is the amount of free choice which the senior partner
should allow the junior partner. There is however nothing
derogatory to local authorities in accepting that Central
Government must have some control, the relaxation of which
can only come about when there is a visible improvement in
the staffing position of local authorities. It is therefore
incumbent upon me to appeal to everyone of you at this
conference to share your experiences and skills with local
authorities in an atmosphere of calm and mutual respect without
engaging in confrontation which could only taint the gigantic
efforts we have so far made within a short space of time.1
Nevertheless, despite evidence of an underlying suspicion of the
new system, the two sides did perforce establish a working relationship
which may best be characterised as a kind of bicameralism. The relation¬
ship was however peculiar in that the two bodies, literally and
figuratively, operated on different frequencies and spoke different
languages. This meant in practice that the DDC tended to acquire
something of an "executive committee" function for the district, and,
furthermore, that the position of those who were members of both bodies
was considerably strengthened. These were the Council Secretary, the
Council Chairman, the Chief (in appropriate Councils), the District
Commissioner, and the DC's staff including the District Officer (Development
In the many districts where a nominated Councillor was elected Council
Chairman this group included no elected representatives of the people
1 L„ M. Seretse, MP, "Planning with the People ..." (op. cit.),
pp. 7-8, (emphasis added).
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at all, and in no district was the Opposition voice heard in the new
system, irrespective of its local electoral strength.
That said, the "bicameral" relationship that evolved was less
upsetting to the Councils than they had originally feared. Thus
amendments to Council Development Plans were both minor and few in
number, and were matched by amendments accepted by the DDC from the
1
Council. Moreover the novel (and initially unwelcome) experience of
having its plans scrutinized by the DDC was outweighed by the new¬
found scope for commenting on those aspects of district-level
Government activity which were strictly speaking outwith the Council's
terms of reference.
While the planning procedure worked out reasonably satisfactorily,
it was often day-to-day DDC activities which were of greater real
significance, and here the record was a mixed one. One the one hand
examples exist of problems which the Council was happy to pass to the
2
DDC for solution. On the other hand decisions taken by the central
Government to use the DDCs (i.e. the local District Commissioner and
the Do[d]) to administer famine relief and to revise priorities for
3
implementation under the ARDP crash programme of 1974 revived some of
the original doubts. This was one of the factors underlying the
resolution in favour of the abolition of DDCs passed in 1975 at
meetings of District Council Secretaries and, more remarkably, at the
annual national conference of DDCs later that year. It is worth
1 A good example is the North East District Development Plan 1973/78.
2 E.g. water crises in the North East (see above, p. 237)
3 In a beautiful example of "objective" decision making, the original
priority list (drawn up painstakingly on the basis of population and
distance from amenities) was swiftly replaced by one taking into account
the logistics of rapid implementation.
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reproducing this extract from the debate:
DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE-DISTRICT COUNCIL RELATIONSHIP
PRESENT AND FUTURE
Chairman: B. G. Makobole [Permanent Secretary, Ministry of
Local Government & Landsj
INTRODUCTION
The Chairman drew the Conference's attention to a resolution
of the Mahalapye meeting of Council Secretaries earlier in
the year, which recommended the abolition of DDCs in favour




Councils, as political, elected bodies represent democracy
at District level and should therefore have the last word
in decisions affecting development in the Districts.
The conference resolved that functions of DDCs should be
passed over to Councils.
RESPONSES TO THE ARGUMENTS
Several objectives fsic] to the above arguments were voiced
mainly by Ministry of Local Government and Lands personnel
1
• • •
This unease expressed about the way the system was developing
concerned not so much the absolute powers of Local Government as its
relative position vis-a-vis the central Government and, above all, the
future course of institutional development. It was feared that, unless
the key resource of trained manpower was placed at the disposal of the
elected Councils, their potential growth into the main district-level
institution would be stunted and that the system would thus become more
and more one of district administration, complemented by consultation,
rather than the kind of executive role which formed an essential part
of the "democratic Local Government" model.
1 Resolutions and Minutes of the National Conference of District
Development Committees, 28-30 JUL 75
CHAPTER 9
MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT
There are a number of reasons for the inclusion of a chapter on MPs.
One is the pyramid theory which, at its most simplistic, would suggest
some kind of automatic connection between elected bodies at the various
levels. Some MPs, according to this theory, will be found to be playing
a part in representing the views of the District or Town Council appropriate
for their constituency. It has moreover been accepted by the Government,
1
following the Tordoff Report, that MPs ought to be actively involved with
district level organisations, i.e.. District Councils and District
Development Committees, and for that matter (pace Chambers & Feldman) with
2
Village Development Committees.
A second reason for dealing with MPs in this context is the broker or
3
middleman theory, discussed elsewhere. This assumes that the political
self-interest of an MP will impel him to cultivate links with Councils.
In so doing the MP would act as the Council's advocate with the central
Government and relay information to the Council about plans concerning
the Council (including legislative proposals) as well as progress on the
implementation of relevant decisions.
1 Tordoff, Pilane & Sarpong, Report of the Local Government Study Group
(1970), [hereinafter referred to as the Tordoff ReportJ, p. 52
2 Chambers & Feldman, Report on Rural Development (1973), p. 184
3 Especially pp. 3-4 and 289 ff.
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As important figures in their respective parties, moreover, MPs
have an additional direct bond with councillors in their constituencies:
every MP has within his constituency several district councillors
belonging to his party. This link was intensified over time with the
trend towards recruitment of town and district councillors as parliamentary
candidates, with one or two MPs indeed continuing to hold positions in
1
both levels of elected body simultaneously.
Over and above these reasons, it was to be expected that MPs, as
representatives of the people, would comment upon local government as
one of many institutions of interest to politicians. In particular
the often elusive differences between the parties (as regards local
government and rural development issues) could be expected to be refined
N.
in the crucible of debate in the National Assembly.
2
What is essayed here, then, is not a general analysis of Parliament
but rather an account of the relevant aspects of MPs' activities, with
the National Assembly as the starting point. But first it is necessary
to set the scene.
THE PARLIAMENTARY SETTING
The gentlemanly and good-humoured ethos of Botswana's National
Assembly lends point to its description as "a national on-going 'kgotla
3
meeting'". Fierce clashes are rare, as are fundamental disagreements
4
on policy matter, while divisions (votes) are generally avoided. But
1 In the Second Parliament these included notably the Mayor of Gaborone
and MP for Gaborone & Ramotswa; and a Specially Elected (Co-opted) MP
who remained Chairman of the Southern District Council.
2 For a comparative study of the Parliament of Botswana up to 1968
see W. J. A. Macartney, "The Parliaments of Botswana, Lesotho and
Swaziland" (1969), The Parliamentarian, L, 2 (APR 69), pp. 92-101.
Useful summaries of Parliamentary proceedings on a quarterly basis are
to be found in the same journal.
3 Editorial in Kutlwano.XIII. 9 (SEP 74), p. 20
4 Except where required, particularly for Constitutional Amendments
(Constitution of the Republic of Botswana, Section 90).
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1
of course Parliament, modelled on Westminster, has its own procedural
rules, not least the recognition of an official Opposition, which
modify the kgotla approach considerably. Moreover, as the years have
2
passed since the first Legislative Assembly met in 1965, the institution
has settled down into a pattern of its own which include^ increasingly,
constructive criticism - by which is meant a combination of two elements:
an acceptance of HDP rule for the foreseeable future, and an assertion
of the right of MPs to reject specific measures or practices on which
Members feel they have not been fully consulted. For its part the
Government has been prepared to accept occasional reverses, and
moreover has refrained from changing the rules to handicap the
Opposition - as happened in nearby Swaziland after the first post-
3
independence election.
Thus the loss of four seats by the ruling BDP in 1969, and the
consequent appearance of two new Parliamentary opposition parties, was
absorbed without much fuss; indeed the spectacle of divisions of opinion
4
on the Opposition benches caused a fair degree of satisfaction to
Democratic Party MPs. These disagreements however cannot in general
be related to basic policy differences so much as to tactical considerations,
such as whether or not to support a particular motion or Bill.
Differences between the two sides of the house did however exist.
Apart from matters relevant to local government and rural development
(discussed below), these can be summarised under the headings of
1 See Standing Orders of the National Assembly (several editions)
2 As the Assembly was termed under the Internal Self-Government
Constitution of 1965. The same body continued in being but was renamed
the National Assembly at Independence.
3 See "Swaziland" [Parliamentary Report], The Parliamentarian, LIII,
4 (OCT 72), p. 353
4 Particularly between the old-established BPP and their new rivals
the BNF.
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general opposition, external relations, race relations and localisation
(i.e. the exployment of Batswana, principally in the civil service, in
place of expatriates). All of these items reflect the Pan-Africanist
and anti-colonial heritage of the opposition parties. What is notable
is the extent to which either the Government or leading BDP back¬
benchers have stolen the Opposition's clothes on all of these issues,
1
while ill-advised actions or remarks by Oppostion MPs have further
dented their credibility. The Opposition parties have taken seriously
their duty to oppose, epitomised by a series of motions of no confidence
in various ministries tabled by the Leader of the BPP. But the
criticisms have been increasingly based on the Government's performance
rather than disagreements over policy. Even in procedural terms the
Opposition has resorted less and less frequently to tabling amendments
to Government Bills, thereby passing up the opportunity of further
debate but at the price of disclosing its alternatives. It has looked
as if each opposition party accepted its position as being permanently
on the left of the Speaker's chair.
It is not surprising then to note the steady growth in the self-
assertiveness of BDP backbenchers, who could sometimes use the fear of
a link-up between private Members on both sides in order to extract
2
concessions in the Domkrag caucus. Three instances can be cited to
chart the growing militancy of the Democratic Party backbenchers in the
Second Parliament (i.e„ after the 1969 Election). The first was an
amendment tabled by the BDP MP for Gaborone & Ramotswa to the Shop
1 Notably ex-Chief Bathoeff's visit to Namibia (see BDN 14 SEP 71) and
a speech by the BPP Member for Mochudi expressing reservations about
the President's condemnation of the Smith regime in Rhodesia (see
Hansard 30, p. 152 [24 NOV 69]).
2 The official term for the Parliamentary Party meeting.
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Hours (Amendment) Bill, 1970. It was pressed to a division and only
just defeated with the help of four Opposition Members; all parties
1
(except the one-man BIP.') and the Cabinet were split on this vote.
The next backbench revolt occurred over the question of Certificates
2
of Urgency which many MPs felt were being abused by the Government
for the convenience of an arrogant bureaucracy at the expense of the
3
Parliamentarians. Sharp criticism led to an undertaking, honoured
by and large, to reduce the practice drastically,, The climax came
with the defeat of the Government on the Second Reading of the Botswana
Housing Corporation (Amendment) (no. 2) Bill; the Bill concerned
authorisation for a loan to the Corporation but was used as the
occasion for a general censure of the Government's urban housing
4
policies. This revolt and a similar demonstration which followed it
5
immediately afterwards established the independence of Parliament,
since no measures were taken against the backbenchers involved.
As a corollary to this militancy, MPs on both sides complained
6
at the failure of Ministries to reply to letters and drew the obvious
lesson, viz. that the formal machinery of Parliament was by far the
7
most effective way to get action. This does not mean that MPs
1 Hansard 33, p. 145 (7 JUL 70)
2 A device used to shorten considerably the time available for MPs to
scrutinise Bills before their debate in the Assembly.
3 Hansard, 40, p. 14 (6 MAR 72)
4 See "Botswana" [Parliamentary Report], The Parliamentarian, LIV, 2
(APR 73) p. 104.
5 Ibid.
6 E.g. The BPP Leader on 16 MAR 71 (Hansard. 36, p. 170), and the BDP
MP for Kanye North on 29 MAR 68 (Hansard, 24, p. 196).
7 Parliamentary questions were accorded the same sort of priority in
the Government Mall, Gaborone, as in Whitehall, and were taken equally
seriously by Ministers. Supplementary questions were taken up more by
the Opposition than by BDP backbenchers.
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restricted themselves to Parliamentary channels for contacting- the
departments of state. There is evidence that MPs, when in Gaborone,
habitually dropped in on the Minister of Local Government & Lands,
combining- the traditional courtesy call with informal queries about
constituency matters. During- meeting-s of the National Assembly,
moreover, MPs naturally lobbied ministers in the bar/cafeteria. But
there was felt to be a barrier between MPs and civil servants, with
whom contact was more difficult in practice; hence the recourse to
formal procedures.
MPs AS CONSTITUENCY REPRESENTATIVES
Of the various procedures available to Members to raise constituency
matters, Question Time provides the most obvious, and the most frequently
1
used, method. By examining the questions asked it is possible to see,
firstly, how active MPs were in tabling questions and, secondly,
the extent to which they used Question Time to raise constituency
matters. Such a detailed examination also permits one to see behind
the aggregate data of party activity. It should be emphasised in this
connection that what counts is not the absolute so much as the relative
2
figures.
Thus the fact that in the Second Parliament of Botswana (which is
the more interesting, since all four parties were represented in it)
the Opposition MPs asked more questions than their BDP opposite
numbers (the ratio being 62:57 ) is found to conceal marked differences
between the "old" and "new" opposition parties. Table 9.1 gives the
details.
1 Most questions tabled were for oral answer. The data which follows
does not include questions for written asnwer, mainly because Hansard
provides an unreliable record of the latter.
2 Especially since there were problems with the production of Hansards,
largely due to deficiencies in the recording equipment; hence the data
is incomplete for some sessions.
375
TABLE 9.1
Parliamentary Questions by Party per Head
National Assembly: Second Parliament (1969 - 1974)
Total Constituency General
Overall 59 28 30
Government BDP 57 35 22
Opposition combined 62 15 47
Opposition BIP 185 51 134
BNF 70 11 58
BPP 14 7 7
Figures rounded to nearest whole number (in
Tables 9.1 - 9.3)
Data in Tables 9.1 - 9.5 inclusive refers to
full-time private Members only, i.e. excluding
those who were Cabinet Ministers for any part of
the relevant period, and those who were not
Members for the whole Parliament concerned.
The small number of questions asked by the People's Party MPs (a
quarter of the number asked by their rivals) may be partly a function of
their greater experience (since the number of questions asked by all
MPs - BDP and EPP - per day of Sitting declined perceptibly over the four
sessions from 1965 to 1968): even in the early days of the pre-
independence Legislative Assembly the Opposition asked fewer questions
than the Democratic Party (39% of the BDP level), as Table 9.2 illustrates.
Indeed the declining BPP share of question time in the First
Parliament (see Table 9.3) was reversed, albeit slightly, in the more
competitive atmosphere of the four - party Second Parliament.
TABLE 9.2
Parliamentary Questions by Party per Head
Bechuanaland Protectorate: Legislative Assembly: First Session (1965-66)
Total Constituency General
Overall 21 9 12
BDP 23 10 13





Parliamentary Questions by Party per Head
Republic of Botswana; First Parliament (1966-69)
Total Constituency General
Overall 27 10 16
BDP 30 12 18
BPP (Opposition) 6 1 5
The limitations of isolating- the party variable can be easily
discerned by a further breakdown of the questions asked by individual
1
MPs, given in Table 9„4.
TABLE 9.4
Parliamentary Questions; Activity Level (descending order)
Republic of Botswana: Second Parliament
Government:EDP Opposition


























Gas_ei^tsiwe_(Kany e_ S_. ), BNF
[average 59]
Yane (Kanye N „), BNF
swa)
Nkhwa (Tati W„), BPP
Tshane (Ngwaketse/Kgalagadi), BNF
Matante (Francistown & Tati E.), BPP
Motlhagodi (Mochudi), BPP
Note for Tables 9.4 and 9.5: Names underlined aie MPs mentioned in the
text as representing the villages studied.
Broken underlining indicates MPs otherwise
specially mentioned.
1 Directly elected MPs, that is.
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Table 9.4 demonstrates the wide variations among different Members
of the same party and in particular the impact of the Leaders of the
1
BIP (Mr. Mpho) and the BNF (Mr.Gaseitsiwe, the former Chief Bathoefi II),
who topped the league easily. The BPP Leader (Mr. Matante) by contrast,
appears almost at the bottom of the table. It will also be noted that
the BDP MPs representing the Mahalapye area of the Central District
(Messrs. Koma, Mosinyi and Sebeso) were reasonably active at Question
2
time.
The level of activity at Question Time does not, of course, of
itself indicate the number of constituency matters raised. Table 9.5
brings this out clearly.
TABLE 9.5
Constituency Questions: Descending order of activity
Republic of Botswana: Second Parliament
Government:BDP Opposition
Rank

























Nkhwa (Tati W.), BPP
tswa)
Yane (Kanye N„), BNF
Ga^eitsiwe__(Karrye_ S_. ), BNF
Tshane (Ngwaketse/Kgalagadi), BNF
Matante (Francistown & Tati E.), BPP
Motlhagodi (Mochudi), BPP
1 Chief Bathoefi was by far the most active questioner in the House of
Chiefs.
2 As Deputy Speaker, G. G„ Sebeso had adopted a fairly low profile in
the first Parliament.
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Thus the most active constituency MP is revealed as the MP for
Ghanzi - made famous in Kuper's book* as the archetypal "new man" -
and he is followed by his neighbour, MP for Kgalagadi, one of the most
silent Members of the National Assembly. And while Mpho appears next,
Gaseitsiwe is well down the list. It is possible to see an echo of
the interests of the more remote Central and Southern District
2
councillors in local questions. But it is most evident that the
individual is a highly important factor here, as elsewhere in the
polity of Botswana.
This data ties in with the breakdown of questions as between
3
constituency and general (national and international) matters in
Table 9.1, where it is shown that the BDP backbenchers were interested
more in constituency than in general questions. And while this is a
post-1969 phenomenon, the relatively greater interest in constituency
questions shown by Government as against Opposition backbenchers -
4
which has been noted elsewhere - has been consistently true from the
days of the Protectorate's legislative Assembly and the First
Parliament of the Republic (Tables 9.2 and 9.3). A possible
5
explanation is that "general" questions are more likely to be critical
of government policy than "constituency" ones.
1 A. Kuper, Kalahari Village Politics (1970), especially Chapter 3.
2 See Table 2.14, pp. 79-80
3 General questions as well as raising points about Government
Departmenls ranged over a wide field including allegations of racial
discrimination (especially on the notorious Rhodesian Railways),
citizenship/refugees and foreign affairs. Typical constituency
questions concerned water (boreholes/dams), communications and
transport, and the distribution of medical and veterinary supplies.
4 Macartney, "African Westminster? The Parliament of Lesotho,"
Parliamentary Affairs, "XXIII, 2 (Spring 1970).
5 Ibid.; cf. inter alia W. Tordoff, Government & Politics in Tanzania
(1967), Ch. II; and Kjekshus, "Question Hour in the Bunge," African
Review, II, 3 (1972)).
379
Parliamentary questions are only one method of raising constituency
problems. Adjournment motions are another, while private Members'
motions and contributions to general debates (e.g. on the Presidential
Address or the Appropriation Bill) provide other opportunities. All of
these have been utilized by the more active MPs, including some of
1
those selected for special study. For instance, the (BDP) MP for
Shoshong, G. S. Mosinyi, raised the problem of boreholes for two
villages in the western part of his constituency in a private Member's
motion in 1970, followed up with a question the following year, and took
2
it up as the subject of an Adjournment debate early in 1972. A
similar campaign was waged by P. M. Tshane, BNF Member for Ngwaketse/
Kgalagadi, over the borehole for Molapowabojang. Over a period of
two-and-a-half years he asked four questions and adjourned the House
3
once on the subject. In the latter case an interesting point is the
MP's concentration on this village in particular; it ties in with the
probability that the water syndicate membership was predominantly BNF
4
in its sympathies.
The BDP MP for Mahalapye, G. K. Koma, was one of the most prominent
backbenchers. In his frequent contribution to debates he never tired
of utilising constituency examples, and bringing up constituency
problems, earning the accolade from the Minister of Finance & Development
Planning (and Vice-President) of a veiled rebuke aimed at Members from
that area who allowed "parochial interests" to take precedence over
5
the national interest. The same MP used the adjournment motion to
1 I.e. those representing the nine villages studied in Chapter 6.
2 Hansard references : No 33, p. 106 (3 JUL70); No 37, p. 2 (22 JUN 71);
No 40, p. 174 (16 MAR 72)
3 Hansard references; No 31, p. 638 (7APR70); No 33, p. 106 (3 JUL 70);
Ibid., p. 46 (7 JUL 70); No 36, p. 6 (S MAR 71); No 41, p. 366, (18 SEP 72).
4 See p. 309. (Note that the constituency is a large one with many
villages in a similar predicament.
5 Hansard, 31, p. 133 (19 MAR 70)
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good effect, citing prior consultations he had held with the chief
1
and local district councillors, and was able to secure redress of an
2
injustice involving compensation for a railway worker; this last is
an example of a surprisingly infrequent activity.
The MPs for the Mahalapye area were more active individually than
the average backbencher and form an unusual example of geographical
group activity in Parliament. An example of successful pressure was a
series of complaints about a veterinary officer, leading to a Ministerial
assurance that the officer had been warned as a result of the MPs'
3
complaints, and would be disciplined if no improvement was forthcoming.
It is clear that some ministers resented this sort of activity by MPs -
witness a remark by the Minister of Health, Labour & Home Affairs
criticising the bad relations of the MP for Shoshong with various public
4
employees in Mahalapye. Coincidentally or not, the Minister concerned
CM. P. K. Nwako) represented a nearby constituency (Tswapong North), and
one can discern a certain degree of impatience or jealousy at the role
of constituency or people's champion performed so assiduously by these
backbenchers. Ministers were denied the opportunity to make the same
Parliamentary impact, and this may account for the compensating
activities characteristic of Ministers (mentioned below), and Nwako's
particularly active extra-Parliamentary role.
A rather different pattern characterised the two MPs from the
North East, both of them People's Party Members. K. M. Nkhwa was
noted particularly for his persistent advocacy of the use of the
1 Hansard, 28, p. 478 (31 MAR 69)
2 Ibid., No. 39, p. 194 (9 DEC 71)
3 Ibid., No. 46, p. 300 (15 AUG 73)
4 Ibid., No. 38, p. 221 (21 SEP 71)
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1
Kalanga language on Radio Botswana. While this was not strictly a
constituency matter - Kalanga is widely spoken in the northern part of
2
the Central District - nor Nkhwa the only MP to raise the question,
it was undoubtedly a popular stance to adopt in the Tati West heartland
of Kalanga. NKhwa's leader, P. G. Matante, cultivated the public
gallery of the National Assembly with speeches timed for the influx of
civil servants at 5 p.m„ and did the same thing nationally with a
series of no confidence motions in various Ministries. His finest
achievement was the setting up by the Government of a commission of
3
enquiry into medical services, resulting from one of these motions.
Even after losing his official title of Leader of the Opposition in
4
1969 Matante continued to behave in the same way, covering the national
5
scene, rather than acting as a rather embattled constituency MP might
have been expected to do, ostentatiously voicing constituency problems.
MPS AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM
By and large the institution of local government attracted little
interest from MPs in the First Parliament.^ By contrast, when changes
in the system were introduced, the whole question became a live party-
political issue in the Second Parliament. A precursor of such argument
was criticism from K„ M. Nkhwa of the strengthening of the District
1 E.g. ibid., No. 33, p. 45 (2 JUL 70); the Minister's reply was to
refer the MP to previous (negative) replies to his questions (Hansard,
22, p. 11 and 23, p. 78).
2 Others who occasionally raised it were the northern BDP MP Chilume,
and BPP Leader P„ G. Matante.
3 Hansard, 26, pp. 208-228 (13 DEC 68)
4 Following the 1969 General Election, when three BNF, three BPP and
one BIP Members failed to agree on a Leader of the Opposition.
5 Bathoefi Gaseitsiwe adopted a similar approach as BNF Leader.
6 A typical contribution was a plea (from the MP for Boteti) for
Local Government auditors; the reply was that there was already such a
department in existence.* (Hansard, 24, pp. 203, 211 [29 MAR 68])
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Commissioner's role vis-a-vis local councils which he saw as a
1
euphemism for dictatorship.
The arguments between the Government and Opposition sides (and
this was one issue where there was a definite cleavage between the two
sides of the House) became heated as a result of the Government's
decision to add extra nominated members to a number of councils where
2
the BDP had lost seats to various opposition candidates. The
immediate reaction was a private Member's motion (tabled by the BPP
Deputy Leader) calling for the withdrawal of the relevant Statutory
3 4
Instruments; it was defeated after an acrimonious debate. A
similar fate met a motion tabled by BPP Leader Matante (Francistown &
Tati East) calling for the repeal of Section 15 of the Local Government
g
(Amendment) Act. A notable feature of the debate was the absence of
any criticism of Government policy by the otherwise independent-minded
6
BDP backbenchers, and the Opposition solidarity with the motion.
The increased bureaucratisation of district government was likewise
the target of Opposition criticism, spearheaded by Southern District BNF
MPs. Bathoefi Gaseitsiwe made the point that the introduction of a
further enhanced role for District Commissioners as chairmen of the
District Development Committees indicated the failure of the Government's
prior introduction of expatriate volunteer Council Advisers, the justifi¬
cation for which had been the need to prepare Councils for increased
7
responsibilities. In similar vein P„ M„ Tshane (BNF Ngwaketse/Kgalagadi)
1 Ibid., p. 430 (31 MAR 68)
2 See Appendix A
3 Government Gazette, VII, 59 (7 NOV 69)
4 Hansard, 30, pp. 377 ff. (27 NOV 69)
5 Ibid., No. 36, pp.667 ff. (2 APR 71)
6 Instead BDP backbenchers called for more money for the Councils - e.g.
G„ S„ Mosinyi (Shoshong) in Hansard, 49, p. 35 (13 MAR 74)
7 Ibid., No. 35, p. 72 (16 DEC 70)
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asked pointedly if the introduction of greater responsibilities for the
District Commissioner was a tacit admission of the disappointing performance
of the Government-nominated councillors, who had been supposed to add
1
competence to the councils. In reply the Government repeated that all
those moves had as their objective nothing other than the strengthening
2
of local authorities and the improvement of their performance.
MPs AND LOCAL COUNCILS
Instances of MPs acting as Parliamentary spokesmen for their local
councils exist but are far from numerous. Sometimes a general complaint
was raised - for example the failure of the Ministries to reply to
correspondence from District Councils, mentioned by a EDP backbencher
3
from the North West District, echoing similar complaints about MPs'
4
own failure to get replies from central Government departments. The
latter led to a reliance on formal methods of articulating grievances
but the Councils seem to have resorted rarely to contacting their MPs
with a view to having something taken up in the National Assembly.
After the period covered by this study one Council - the Kgatleng
District Council - sent an official delegate to lobby one of their MPs
(and a former Chairman of the Council), but this was so novel as to
g
merit special mention in the Daily News ; other cases of Councils'
resolving to make contact with a Parliamentary representative or chief
0
are documented elsewhere. Occasionally the Council Secretary would
1 Hansard, 37, p. 25 (22 JUN 71)
2 Ibid., p. 29 (22 JUN 71)
3 Ibid., No. 48, p. 34 (28 NOV 73)
4 E.g. from the BDP member for Kanye North, B. R. Chibana, Hansard, 24,
p. 196 (29 MAR 68)
5 BDN, 26 MAR 75
6 See pp. 188 and 242
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copy a letter to an MP.1 At other times when backbenchers appeared to
be acting- as a spokesman for the Council the initiative came from the
MPs - who asked, for instance, why the position on boreholes had not
2
been explained to the Central District Council, or why a lock had not
3
been supplied for a Council office.
In some cases it is difficult to know whether ostensible pleas on
behalf of Councils are in reality veiled criticism of the local authority:
instances are a sugg-estion that each Council should have its own drilling
4
rig, or a statement that the MP had "tried to speak to the Central
5
District Council but they are not in a position to do anything."
Overt criticism there certainly was. The Southern District
Council's handling of its responsibilities for education and water were
criticised from both sides of the House.6 The three EDP MPs from the
Mahalapye area all commented adversely on the Central District Council's
7 8
performance with respect to matimela, assistance for self-help projects,
9
and the mass transfer of teachers. Furthermore three powerful Council
Secretaries were the target of criticism in the National Assembly. The
Central District Council Secretary was criticised by the HDP MP for
1 This was done by the Central District Council Secretary to the MP for
Mahalapye. Hansard, 33, p. 55 (3 JUL 70)
2 Asked by the MP for Shoshong. Hansard, 35, p. 66 (16 DEC 70)
3 The Member for Mahalapye, who asked the question, stated that he had
been in telephone contact with the Central District Council on the
matter. Hansard, 39, p. 92 (9 DEC 71)
4 Ibid., No. 27, p. 304, (27 MAR 69); asked by a Southern District MP.
5 Hansard, No. 31, p. 115 (19 MAR 70)
6 Respectively by Chibana (Kanye North) for the BDP and Tshane (Ngwaketse/
Kgalagadi) for the BNF. Hansard references: No. 27, p. 410 (29 MAR 69)
and No. 41, p. 366 (18 SEP 72).
7 Ibid., No. 24, p. 149 (29 MAR 68); No. 26, p. 202 (13 DEC 68); No. 31
p. 141 (20 MAR 70)
8 Ibid., No. 36, p. 314 (23 MAR 71)
9 Ibid., No. 44, p. 6 (12 MAR 73). See also above, p„ 189.
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Mahalapye for his handling of the meeting attended (as an observer) by
1
Mr. Koma; as has been seen the councillors closed ranks behind the
2
Secretary in reaction. In similar vein the Southern District Council
Secretary was criticised by the BNF' MP for Kanye North for allegedly
3
submitting his own motions to the Council - an allegation repeated by
4
the BNF in the Council Chamber, and a rare example of party co-ordination
between the district and national institutions. The BPP Member for Tati
West also queried a circular issued by the newly appointed North East
District Council Secretary and had the satisfaction of seeing his
5
complaint upheld by the Minister of Local Government &, In.nds. A
certain rivalry between MP and Council Secretary can be clearly discerned.
A degree of ambiguity surrounded the constitutional position of the
local authorities vis-k-vis MPs : in other words the application of the
doctrine of ministerial responsibility. This arose from a number of
questions brought up by MPs (concerning Food-for-Work projects and
water supplies). The answer from the Minister concerned was to the
effect that these were either the direct responsibility of the relevant
Council,6 or that the determination of priorities for applications for
7
Government assistance lay with the local authority. Backbenchers on
both sides were dissatisfied, however, and insisted that the Government
accept responsibility. The following extract from a debate on a private
Member's motion by G. S. Mosinyi (BDP, Shoshong), asking the Government
1 Hansard. 24, p. 422 (31 MAR 68)
2 See above, p. 156
3 Hansard, 38, p. 203 (21 SEP 71)
4 See above, p. 107
5 Hansard. 36, p. 183 (17 MAR 71)
6 Ibid,, No. 25, p. 2 (8 AUG 68); No. 28, p. 32 (13 MAY 69)
7 Ibid., No. 31, p. 638 ( 7 APR 70). The questioner was Tshane, the
subject the Molapowabojang borehole.
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to drill boreholes in his constituency, illustrates the different
interpretations:
MINISTER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LANDS (MR. KGABO):. . . .
My advice to Members of Parliament is please always
participate in planning by Councils. They can do so, Mr.
Speaker, by always writing to Councils every year and
bring to their attention any projects which they feel
must be attended to.
. . . . I had to advise Members that it is not wise to
come to this House and tell a Minister to treat a matter
seriously, but failing to advise the Council at the local
level how best they can plan their development.
MR. KOMA: Mr. Speaker, this afternoon we have been shocked
by the Minister of Local Government and Lands in the way
he treats the matter put before this House. Mr. Speaker,
we are not Councillors, we are Parliamentarians. We have
a place where we can come and speak for our constituents,
and that place is in this House. (Mr. Matante: Hear! Hear!)
Mr. Speaker, there is no reason for a Member of Parliament
to be referred to a District Council which has no machinery
and manpower. We were elected by the people to come and
speak for them. Those people were promised that if you
elected this Government conditions would be better.
(Mr. Matante: But the Government doesn't do anything.)
We cannot under any circumstances, Mr. Speaker, accept
1
what has been said by the Minister.
Later in the same Meeting, when the BNF Member for Ngwaketse/
Kgalagadi adjourned the House on the subject of boreholes, similar
arguments were rehearsed with another Cabinet Minister, as this passage
shows :
MR. TSHANE: Mr. Speaker, 1 think that the argument that it
is not the responsibility of Government to maintain the rural
or the village water supply cannot be accepted and must be
discouraged altogether. ... 1 say this, Mr. Speaker,
because arguments have been brought to this National Assembly
to the effect that the matters which concern the problems
of water supply to the people in the areas where there are
District Councils cannot be dealt with in the National
Assembly. Mr. Speaker, sir, 1 think the hon. Minister of
Local Government and Lands if he is a link between the
central and Local Governments he is of course responsible
for seeing that the Councils do really cater for the
people in needy cases. . . .
1 Hansard, 33, pp. 54-55 (3JUL 70)
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MINISTER OF COMMERCE, INDUSTRY AND WATER AFFAIRS
(MR. SEGOKGO): I have also taken the point raised
by the hon. Member about perhaps informing the Councils
about their responsibilities. I have personally spoken
to a few District Councils and in fact I have written to all
District Councils asking them to discuss this very same
problem, drawing their attention to the fact that the village
water supply is part of their responsibility and that they
are expected to do their best. And I am prepared to give
technical assistance and knowledge to District Councils if
they ask for it. . . . *
From the above debates, and others germane to the "pyramid" theory,
it is clear that backbenchers jealously guard their status as represent¬
atives of the people and are much less interested in institutions than
in issues.
A number of other issues pursued by backbenchers were related to
local government. Several BDP MPs from the Central District raised
2 3
the decentralisation question, alleging Serowe domination, while
4
there were repeated criticisms of the Ngwato land Board and land
boards in general, including allegations of corruption in land
5
allocation. Such criticism may simply reflect MPs* watchdog role, or
may be a manifestation of an attempt at asserting a leadership role in
the district.
MPs AND OTHER LOCAL INSTITUTIONS
6
As has been noted, MPs on the whole had relatively little contact
with the Councils, whether by correspondence with officials, visits to
Council offices or attendance at Council meetings. There are exceptions
1 Ibid., pp. 146-148 (7 JUL 70)
2 See above, pp. 190-193
3 Hansard, 24, pp. 418-422 (31 MAR 68); 31, pp. 301-305, 306 (24 MAR 70)
4 By G. G. Sebeso (BDP, Tswapong South): Hansard, 40, p. 152 (8 SEP 72);
44, p. 144 (15 MAR 73); 45, p. 85 (25 MAY 73); 48, p. 159 (4 DEC 73)
5 By Bathoefi Gaseitsiwe (Hansard, 49, p. 256 [l9 MAR 74]) and Sebeso
(note "4" above). It is worth noting that both those MPs were former
members of the traditional administration.
6 Above, pp. 187-188 and 242. (In the Southern District, any such
contact was conspicuous by its absence until the Council Chairman was
co-opted to the National Assembly.)
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to this pattern. The obvious one is those MPs who were simultaneously
councillors - e.g. Southern District Council Chairman Chibana (Specially
1
Elected mid-way through the Second Parliament). Others active in this
respect included ex-Councillor Jankie (BDP, Ghanzi), and in the Central
District the MPs for Bobirwa (Sikunyana, from 1969) and Tswapong North.
The last mentioned, Cabinet Minister Nwako, was rivalled only by the




What was true of the Councils was true a fortiori for the District
Development committees. Chambers & Feldman record only one known case
O
of an MP's attendance at a DDC. Mr. Sikunyana has taken an active
interest in the workings of the Central DDC, visiting the office of the
District Officer (Development) and tabling a Parliamentary question
4
asking for constituency representation on the Committee. But MPs
were not invited to meetings of the DDC and in general lacked
information about its modus operandi.
Village Development Committees
As has been stated in Chapter 6, most MPs were not especially
interested in the VDCs, as opposed to other organisations, in their
constituencies. The main exception was the VDC of the village where
the MP actually resided, particularly in the case of Mahalapye and
Kalamare. A further indication of the importance of residence was
provided by the assertion by the BNF Member for Ngwaketse/Kgalagadi
1 See Chapter 3, passim
2 See R. Vengroff, "Local-Central Linkages and Political Development
in Botswana," (1972), especially pp. 186-195.
3 Op. cit., p. 211
4 Hansard, 49, p. 126 (15 MAR 74)
5 See especially pp. 291-292.
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that he was actively involved in a VDC, not in his constituency but in
1
Kanye. But the number of VDCs which were the subject of Parliamentary
comment was tiny, the main one being Palapye where the BIP-BDP clash
2
led to two Parliamentary questions from the Independence Party Leader
3
and a Daily News report. In general, however, MPs' interest in VDCs
was most likely to be sparked by the prospect of an opening ceremony
for a completed VDC project.
Political Parties
MPs1 involvement with their extra-Parliamentary party organisation
has two dimensions. In the first place parties can be seen in terms of
policy, and ought to provide a link between the activities of the
Parliamentarians on the one hand and the Councillors and other rural
party activists on the other. It is a reflection on the lack of
ideological content in the Batswana parties that there should be so
little evidence of a co-ordinated approach to questions of policy. Thus
the unambiguous denunciation by the BPP MP for Tati West of the plan
4
for regrouping villages in the North East was at odds with the position
adopted (gradually and cautiously, it is true) by the BPP Councillor N.
Gunda, the unofficial leader of the Opposition on the North East
5
District Council, in favour of village grouping. Against this can be
set the unusual tie-up between BNF councillors and the MP for
Ngwaketse/Kgalagadi on the question of appeals against corporal
punishment in Customary Courts: Tshane claimed that the Government's
1 Hansard, 34, p. 168 (4 NOV 70)
2 Ibid., No. 50, pp. 1-2 (24 JUN 74) and p. 67 (27 JUN 74)
3 See above, p. 338
4 BDN, 11 MAY 77
5 Kgotla meeting, Mapoka 3 JUL 74 (eyewitness account); see also
p. 250 above. The BPP were united in rejecting compulsory grouping.
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Customary Courts (Amendment) Bill was derived from the initiative of
1
BNF councillors in the Southern District. The BDP alone made visible,
if sporadic, efforts at political education for councillors in which
2
MPs were involved.
Indicative of the fact that parties were more electoral machines
than ideologically-united bodies is the fact that the only demonstrations
to be organised by the BNF and BPP were in late 1969 to protest against
the packing of Councils with extra Government nominees and the
subsequent Council committee elections rather than on matters of
general policy. These involved walkouts from the Southern, Kgatleng
and North East District Councils and the Francistown Town Council, and
3
a BPP protest march through the streets of Francistown.
Kgotla and Freedom Square
A main form of extra-Parliamentary political activity to occupy
MPs was undoubtedly public meetings, often organised in tours which
were quite commonly announced in advance, and reported afterwards, by
Radio Botswana and the Daily News. Tours of constituencies were
certainly undertaken by backbenchers, but they paled into insignificance -
even allowing for the disproportionate media coverage - compared with
the extensive tours undertaken by Ministers, especially during the dry
winter months (when travelling was easier). Such Ministerial tours
4
often included the Minister's own constituency, and this arguably was
1 Hansard, 40, p. 12 (6 MAR 72); see above, p. 147
2 E.g. report in BDN, 17 APR 69, of a seminar for party activists to
elucidate Government policy. Such events usually followed some occasion
such as an Annual Conference.
3 References: BDN, 20 NOV 69; ibid.; p. 241 above; Francistown Town
Council Minutes, 28 NOV 69; BDN, 24 DEC 69.
4 The Daily News abounds in such reports. E.g. Minister of Education
B. C. Thema touring his Lobatse/Barolong constituency, BDN, 23 JUN 67,
21 JUL 71.
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aimed at counterbalancing- the limited Parliamentary chances for
Ministers to shine as constituency champions. From the BDP point of
view, too, the greater coverage given Ministerial tours by the Daily
News redressed the advantage afforded by the Daily News and radio
1
reporting of Question Time, which was fairly full.
Ministers in particular, but also some backbenchers of all parties,
not infrequently combined trips to hold "official" kgotla meetings to
explain Government policies and report on Parliamentary business with
2
separate "Freedom Square" party political meetings and meetings with
3
party members - the last-mentioned often in connection with a forth-
4 5
coming party conference or party elections. As has been noted in
Chapter 7, MPs jealously guarded their role as constituency party boss,
and this is true for some whose voices were seldom heard in the
National Assembly but who made their mark with many constituency
questions.
CONCLUSION
The performance of MPs - their level of activity, the matters
which interested them, the extent of their preoccupation with their
constituents' problems - varied considerably, and virtually independently
of their party affiliation. But what is very clear is that MPs generally
acted independently from the local authorities and prized their status
as constituency representatives, seeing themselves as deriving a
1 This was partly for the pragmatic reason that the script of questions
and answers was made available to reporters at the beginning of the daily
sitting.
2 E.g. BDN, 28 APR 69, 25 JUL 69
3 E.g. ibid., 30 APR 73
4 E.g. ibid., 14 JAN 71, 18 FEB 71
5 E.g. ibid., 27 JAN 70
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mandate from the people, which entitled them to criticise both central
and local government rather than act as go-betweens or even Council
spokesmen. The "pyramid" theory in this aspect does not hold; in




This chapter brings out for discussion a number of themes and prob¬
lems which have recurred at various points in the study. They refer to
the internal workings of the institution of Local Government and to the
place of Local Government in the political system, with particular ref¬
erence to the task of "development".
The first question to be raised concerns the problem of distinguish¬
ing the particular from the general. The detailed examination of the
proceedings of the three Councils, selected to provide as representative
a sample as possible, has thrown some light on the hitherto rather opaque
nature of party differences in particular, and Councillors' behaviour as
representatives of the people in general. Chapter 2 went in depth into
a number of aspects, and some configurations, however fuzzy, did emerge
from the mass of aggregate data. This has to be balanced against the
particular ecology of each of the three Districts (explored in Chapters
3-5> and it can be seen how the factors peculiar to one District impart
a different flavour to each Council. The diversity encountered in Local
Government in Botswana stands out plainly; a relevant question is the
extent to which generalisations can be made which are strongly enough
rooted to have predictive force.
Three factors must be noted in answering this question. The first
is size. Some of the Councils are small bodies and it is worth recalling
that the thirteen Councils between them account for a population the size
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of Edinburgh but scattered over a territory as big as France. The smaller
the Council, the less confident the researcher can be that the particular
is not stronger than the general. Moreover the length of time the system
has been in operation makes firm conclusions about Council behaviour
difficult.
This is most clearly seen in the second factor, the impact of indiv¬
iduals. Certain Councillors, for different reasons, made a strong impact
on their Councils. In some cases the influence could be ascribed to
education or status otherwise acquired; in others it was more a question
of a developed political sense and a speedy realisation of how the admin¬
istrative process operated and could be affected by individual initiative.
In the Southern District, for instance, an interviewee commented that
only three people (apart from himself) really understood what was going
1
on in the Council - the Chairman, the Secretary, and one BDP Councillor.
The third factor has been referred to at various points in the
study, namely the time factor. District Councils have each passed
through various phases, just as the system in general has changed.
Clearly Local Government in Botswana is still in transition.
"DEMOCRATIC LOCAL GOVERNMENT"
The Framework
Before commenting on the nature of Botswana's local government
system - with special reference to the elected District Councils - it is
worth recalling some of the official statements made at the time when the
2
system was introduced.
The Local Government Committee, set up to advise the then colonial
government in 1964 and consisting of politicians of three parties, Chiefs,
1 Who held the record for the number of questions and motions tabled -
and thus brought the BDP average up significantly.
2 In the quotations which follow, emphasis has been added.
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and civil servants,
agreed that provision should be made for a non-racial,
representative and responsible system of local government
in Bechuanaland. The system should as far as possible be
a natural development from the existing system of tribal
administration.*
Accepting the report in its essentials, the Protectorate Government
went rather further in its explicit espousal of democracy as the basis
for the new local government system, as the following extracts from the
Legislative Council Paper show:
(i) The policy of Her Majesty's Government and the desires
of the people of Bechuanaland today are in essentials
the same: . . . that Bechuanaland should be governed
democratically - and this means that administration at
every level should be non-racial, representative and
responsible.2
(ii) It is essential that constitutional development at the
centre should be balanced by the growth of democratic
institutions throughout the country. Freedom and
responsibility in thought and action must be stimulated
at every level if they are to be fully understood and
given effective expression, and one of the best checks
to any tendency to authoritarianism is a widespread
cultivation of these habits of mind and the readiness
of people at every level of society to play their part
in the conduct of local affairs.3
(iii> The Committee advocates the creation of a non-racial
representative system. . . . District Councils should
have a substantial majority of elected members.4
(ivj It is a matter of great importance and urgency that
the Territory's rapid constitutional advance should
be matched by an efficient and democratic system of
local government.®
1 Bechuanaland Protectorate, Report of Local Government Committee/Mafoko
a Komiti ka ga Puso ya mo gae (1964J, p. 1
2 Bechuanaland Protectorate, Legislative Council, Local Government in
the Bechuanaland Protectorate (1964J, p. 3
3 Ibid., p. 4
4 Ibid. , P. 7
5 Ibid., p. 12
396
These principles, enunciated by the colonial Government, were
accepted by the incoming BDP administration under the Internal Self-
Government constitution of 1965, as the first Minister of Local Govern¬
ment, Tsheko Tsheko, made clear in his speech to the Legislative Assembly
on the Second Reading of the Local Government Bill:
As much as the people demanded a democratic form of govern¬
ment at the centre, they demanded the same at Local Govern¬
ment level.
Ihis Bill, Mr. Speaker, meets this pressing need and
demand for participation by the people in the management of
their own affairs. The principle involved is to establish
non-racial, democratic and representative Local Councils
with full executive powers to replace the present Advisory
Councils....
May I conclude by emphasising that the idea is to
establish throughout the country a democratic Local Govern¬
ment where the substantial majority of members would be
elected members even if there are a few nominated members as
the need may arise. This should go a long way towards ful¬
filling the requirements of democracy which in our case is
the government of the people, for the people, by the elected
people, not as before.*
In the short debate which followed, one of the BDP backbenchers
supported the Bill in the following words:
Mr. Speaker, I am sure the establishment of these Councils
will . . . show the world that our Government is democratic
2 ■
in setting up District Councils.
Finally the Minister of Local Government and Lands (still Mr. Tsheko), in
his first annual report after the establishment of the system, confirmed
that
The successful introduction and maintenance of a modern and
democratic form of Local Government is an essential feature
" ' 1 " ' O
of the Botswana Government's plan for this country.
1 Hansard, 15, pp. 29-30 (7 DEC 65i
2 Ibid., p. 32 (7 DEC 65)
3 Republic of Botswana, Annual Report of the Ministry of Local Government
&. Lands for the Year 1966, p. 1
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The above statements leave little doubt that the reform was seen as
the implementation of democratic ideology at the local level. Neverthe¬
less the term democracy in this context is relative, and not only in the
sense that British-style local government is a compromise between the
local self-government ideal and the fact that the powers delegated to
local authorities can be varied and taken away by the same central
government and legislature that granted them in the first place. Democracy
in the context of the Bechuanaland Protectorate meant essentially one-man-
one-vote, i.e. an end to the previous racial segregation in political
institutions (hence the repeated references to non-racialism) and, more
important, an end to the old traditional system whereby the Chief of each
clan was the Local Authority, advised by a council elected in most cases
by acclamation.
These two features taken together go far towards explaining both
the provision for nominated members of the Councils and why there was no
fuss from the Opposition in the Legislative Assembly before Independence
about the provision: it seemed irrelevant to the objectives of achieving
a non-racial institution to replace the power of the Chiefs. Indeed the
desire to include both the Chiefs and Europeans was manifested in the
nominations made in 1966.
A further relevant factor is the history of the proposal for adding
non-elected members. As it originated in the Report of the Local
Government Committee in 1964, the proposal was for the power of co-
option by the elected members of the Council together with the Chairman
of the Council (i.e. in most cases the local Paramount Chief), with the
1
latter intimating his nominations first - a system very reminiscent of
2
the procedure for electing "Specially Elected" Members of Parliament.
1 Report of the Local Government Committee, op. cit., p. 2
2 Constitution. Schedule
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When the Bill came to the House of Chiefs for consideration, the
Chiefs recommended that the power of co-option envisaged by the Local
Government Committee be replaced by the power of nomination by the Chair¬
man of each Council of a number of members "in order to ensure adequate
representation . . . of . . . traditional interests and other non-partisan
1
interests." The Minister of Local Government implicitly accepted the
idea but in fact the statute as eventually passed left the power in the
2
hands of the Government, and it was thus an easy matter for the Office
3
of the President to issue amending Statutory Instruments in 1969 increas¬
ing the number of political appointees and, ironically perhaps, removing
the Chiefs from their ex officio positions as Council Chairmen. The
objective, of reducing the influence of the Chiefs having thus been
achieved, the aim now became the creation of politically compliant
4
Councils.
The implications of this are discussed below, but it should be seen
in connexion with two other linked changes - the stress on Councils as
development agencies, and the creation of a new non-elected district-
level structure involving District Commissioners as key figures (at least
on paper]); these aspects are also explored below.
Council and People
One of the main interests in studying local government lay in their
status as representative bodies, an interest heightened by the continuing
1 House of Chiefs, Minutes of the Second Meeting, p. 6 (17 NOV 65), cited
in J. H. Proctor, "The House of Chiefs and the Political Development of
Botswana," Journal of Modern African Studies, VI, 1 (1968) p. 71
2 But suggestions from Preparatory Commissions were sent to the Ministry;
many were accepted but not all. See for instance Minutes of the Final
Meeting of the Preparatory Commission, Central District Council, Serowe,
20-21 JUN 66.
3 S.I. Nos 102-111, Government Gazette, VII, 59 (7 NOV 69)
4 See Appendix "A" for the Government's defence of its action.
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lack of reliable information about the aspirations of rural Batswana.
It was for this reason that the main issues raised by Councillors in the
three District Councils studied have been described and analysed in such
depth. Still the question remains: how representative are Councillors?
It is clear that they are not typical of a cross-section of their elect¬
orate, but if socio-economic cleavages are in fact little developed (an
assumption which itself deserves close analysis) the main indicators of
their representativeness, and hence the faithfulness with which they
reflect the aspirations of the people, are, firstly, electoral part¬
icipation and, secondly, the degree of consultation undertaken by
Councillors once elected.
In analysing the degree of electoral participation it is easy to
detect the decreasing percentage turnout of voters in local, as in
national, elections. Thus at the last Local Government elections the
District turnout (in contested seatsJ ranged from 22.3% in the Kgalagadi
District to 41.2% in the Southern District.
FIGURE 10.1





















LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION RESULTS
1966 1969 1974
Cands. Cllrs. Unopp. Cands. Cllrs. Unopp. Cands. Cllrs Unopp.
BDP 163 136 81 165 112 46 176 149 66
BIP 21 5 16 6 15 4 —
BNF 7 0 73 23 58 12 —
BPP 49 21 44 23 46 11 —
End 18 3* 1»» 3 1 1 0 —
Total 258 165+ 82 301 165+ 46+ 296 176 66
Turnout (overall) 45.5% 51.9% 30.3%
Lowest (Dist. ) 15.2% 27.2% 11.2%
Highest (Dist . ) 81.3% 78.5% 52.2%
Highest (Town) 83.8% 78.6% 43.0%
* 2 Independents with BDP support
** 1 Independent with BDP support
+ 1 Vacancy filled in subsequent by-election
From Fig. 10.1 and Table 10.2 it can be seen how the turnout in
contested seats has dropped. The other factor (also illustrated in the
table) of importance is party. Obviously it depends largely on the
Opposition parties as to whether the people are given a choice; the
1
nomination procedures are generally conducted privately by the parties.
The people of course cannot since 1969 be certain of unseating a
Councillor (if he adheres to the BDP), since rejection at the polls is
liable to be rewarded by a Government nomination. Moreover this applies
equally to candidates who have crossed the carpet to the BDP and those
who have never been elected in the first place. The a priori effect of
this is to devalue the whole electoral process - and incidentally
transfers the power of patronage from the strictly Party organisation to
Ministerial level (the President and the Minister of Local Government &
1 The "Kuli primary" system notwithstanding. See A. Kuper, Kalahari
Village Politics (1970), pp. 56-59
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Lands in particular). From the point of view of the ordinary voter,
the most that can be achieved by voting in a Local Government election
is the return of an Opposition candidate who will be part of the minority
1
on the Council. It is pointless to vote for a programme other than that
of the BDP when it is known that the Government will frustrate the wishes
of the local electorate.
Thus the Government's policy institutionalises the various
Opposition parties as parties of dissent on the Councils, while the
Opposition parties themselves seem to have accepted such a role in the
National Assembly for the foreseeable future. This situation - the
universal application of the one-party-dominant system - is then
described as "participation" by Government spokesmen. It is noticeable
that the words "participation" and "consultation" are increasingly used
instead of, or qualifying, the more unambiguous term "democracy". This
is true of references to other institutions too, such as VDCs.
For participation to have substance it is important for Councillors
- whether elected or appointed - to communicate with the people. The
weaknesses in the system of popular consultation are easy to see, and
have been frequently commented upon in conferences, seminars and training
sessions on local government. Usually the question is divided into two
elements, those of prior consultation before a Council meeting, and of
subsequent reporting back, the assumption being that Councillors should
do both through the medium of the kgotla - which should entail at least
eight kgotla meetings per village per annum. Not surprisingly this level
of activity has proved an unattainable ideal and the falling attendances
at kgotla meetings is commented upon below.
1 Ironically, the return of an Opposition Councillor may effectively
double the representation of the ward if the Government oblige by
appointing the defeated BDP candidate to the Council. It is doubtful if
this is appreciated by the local electorate however.
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An alternative approach however is to look at the problem in terms
of individual and corporate contact and it is in the light of the latter
that the more obvious opportunities are being missed. Thus the public's
1
right of access to Council meetings is hardly ever brought to the
attention of the public. Outside the towns, attendance in the public
gallery is minimal and epitomised by the position in some District
Councils whereby one or two chairs can be brought into the chamber if
anyone wants to sit in on the meeting - apart from the phalanx of
officials (of central and local government) who are normally in attend¬
ance. Even here the vagaries of the application of Standing Orders,
2
which provide that a Council may resolve to "sit in committee" or "go
3
into Committee", sometimes mean that the public (and the press, and
sometimes even council officials.') are excluded because the Council are
discussing a committee's report; in other Councils the real reason for
resolving to "go into committee" is to allow members to smoke.'
Given that most members of the public are unlikely to know of a
Council meeting, and/or that it may be a long distance to travel, the
onus would seem reasonably to rest on the Government Department of
Information to inform the public at least about Council decisions and
activities. Information Assistants however are grossly underutilised
and spend much of their time sitting in an office issuing the Daily News
free to callers. Moreover the suggestion that Council minutes should be
posted up in all villages was greeted with amazement at a conference of
local councillors and staff, who stressed the cost and logistical
1 Model Standing Order 16, in Republic of Botswana, Ministry of Local
Government & Lands, Handbook for Chairmen, Secretaries and Members of
District (and Town) Councils
2 Ibid.. S.O. 56 (f)
3 Ibid., Appendix "A", para. 16
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1
problems of doing- this, even where Setswana minutes were available.
Radio Botswana and the Daily News however could cover council meetings
2
in much greater detail than they do and Councillors would welcome this;
the hurdle is the distaste of many of the Information Department's staff
for this sort of role.
Most Councillors would accept that the public are ignorant of
Council business, and see themselves as engaged in an uphill struggle
to keep the people informed, the problem being compounded of two elements;
the general problem of attracting attendance at kgotla meetings and the
problem of distance for Councillors with large wards to cover (in the
Central District some wards are half the size of a Parliamentary con¬
stituency 5>. But Councillors, like MPs, tend to see themselves as
effective representatives of the people, firstly by definition, because
they are "the people's choice," and secondly because they rely
principally upon informal contacts to keep themselves informed. Many
of these elected representatives in fact adopt a Bagehotesque position
in the debating chamber and a dignified one (in which ritual plays an
important part, e.g. speeches at opening ceremonies) outside it.
If such an informal approach to consultation provides no safeguards
against complacency, can one look to Village Development Committees, as
the "lowest tier of democracy", to provide rather more systematic inputs
of demands? Here the problem, as has been shown, is one of communication
in two directions: vertically to the district headquarters, and
horizontally to the people of the village. As regards the former, it
is clear that the mere constitutional device of ex officio VDC membership
1 Model Standing Order 74 states that minutes are to be kept in English
(ibid.)
2 A request for this to be done was made by Councillors in 1975. BDN,
14 FEB 75.
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for Councillors does not guarantee anything, particularly if the
Councillor concerned does not actually have his home in the village in
question. Instead communication between the centre and the periphery
of the district has become increasingly dominated by correspondence and
field trips by officials. A rather different centre-periphery problem
obtains within the "village", where the movement of people to the fields,
and even cattle posts, formerly seasonal in nature, has acquired an
increasingly permanent look. Even when people are within easy distance
of the kgotla they have to be convinced that a meeting is worthwhile,
since the coinage has been debased by over-frequent use (by itinerant
civil servants from many Departments, as well as others). Finally there
is the question of the representativeness of the VDCs, which are elected,
it is true; but elections in some villages are very infrequent and the
amount of choice varies considerably, with acclamation used in some
places instead of actual voting. Moreover VDCs tend to be easily
dominated by the resident, ex officio members and reflect their
professional interests and those of the central village, while women in
particular are under-represented. This problem is inextricably bound
up with the question of the real purpose of VDCs and whether they are
to be essentially village councils or voluntary development committees.
Parties, Policies and Configurations
Almost all Councillors sought election on a party ticket; the
number of Independent candidates dropped from 18 in 1965 through three
in 1969 to only one in 1974. Independents have defeated BDP official
1
candidates only three times. Moreover a number of Councillors officially
crossed the carpet (in the three Councils studied, the BDP gained one
each from the BPP, BNF and Independent; elsewhere there was a spate of
1 In 1965 in Lobatse Town Council and the North East District Council;
in 1969 in Kgalagadi District. Two of these victors subsequently joined
the BDP group.
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resignations from the BNF in 1970 in the wake of the party split).
Party adherence is then of some importance for Councillors. When it
comes to the behaviour of Councillors, however, as a factor party
affiliation has very limited analytical application. It does assist in
explaining the pattern of committee elections, and elections to the post
of Chairman and Vice-Chairman - although even here the impact of party
caucussing has to be studied in the particular context of the Council
studied. Thus in the Southern District in 1969 the BNF members refused
to participate in committee elections Cas a protest against the Govern¬
ments nomination of defeated BDP candidates> and found themselves with
no committee representation. In similar circumstances in the North
East the BDP group proceeded to elect BPP councillors, in absentia, in
roughly the same proportions as they had held in the previous session.
Likewise the support attracted by formal motions debated by the
same Councils bore some relation to party but solidarity fell far short
of maximum. Informality and a tendency to follow the kgotla norm of
debating tended to mean that issues were treated on their merits. Had
parties had a definite ideology, applicable to local government issues,
the position could have been very different; and if especially parties
had represented clear-cut socio-economic or communal interests the enigma
could have been unravelled. But certainly for the BNF in the Southern
District there was no clear policy line to distinguish it from the
majority party; and the identification of the BNF with the nuclear
Bangwaketse clan was weakened by the Government's policy of appointing
1
defeated Bangwaketse candidates. In the North East, ethnic minorities
were so small as to be unrepresented. Here, however, certain differences
1 The result was a certain amount of grumbling by the Barolong minority
(all of whom in fact were BDP) against the rest (rather than a BNF
versus BDP cleavage with ethnic overtones).
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of policy and socio-economic interest did distinguish the BPP from the
BDP. The BPP did try to behave as the "people's party", challenging
the commercial interests of their opponents and making much of the running.
Nevertheless, informality and consensualism exercised a strong influence
in the Council chamber in Tatitown too, and this allowed Councillors of
both parties to achieve success with various initiatives.
In summary, party affiliations are an unreliable guide to policy¬
making, and, while the "ins versus outs" syndrome has a certain force,*
this must be tempered by an appreciation of the differences (however
elusive} between the two Opposition parties studied. It must however be
noted that on average Opposition councillors have been more active in
the Council in formal initiatives - questions and motions - than their
elected BDP counterparts, who in turn have been more active than their
nominated colleagues, and that this pattern was consistently found.
An alternative explanation of Councillors' aggregate behaviour
was sought in the geographical factor. In particular two points
2
emerged. One was the existence of a broad centre-periphery dichotomy
3
whereby the more central Councillors were overrepresented on Committees,
while the tendency to raise local ward problems was more marked amongst
Councillors from outlying parts of the Districts concerned (Central and
Southern}. But Councillors did not commonly combine along geographical
1 In the South East District Council, which had three parties represented
on it, the situation was described thus: "The BPP tend to argue with the
BDP and the BNF tag along with the BPP. But the BDP want to be seen to
be the boss."
2 Wiseman found this phenomenon in the Kgatleng District but attributed
it to the party cleavage between Mochudi and the rest of the District.
J. A. Wiseman, "The Organisation of Political Conflict in Botswana 1966-
1973" (1976), p. 296*
3 The explanation that this was for reasons of convenience does not deny
the validity of the syndrome but simply indicates that it was not a
deliberate centralist ploy.
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lines in pursuit of local interests, and when they did so in an obvious
way it tended to be self-defeating. Thus the geographical factor
exerted some influence, but even less than party.
As a final comment on configurations of Councillors• activities
it has to be admitted that the search for a neat pattern is doomed to
failure. This has something to do with the nature of the parties - their
lack of a clear programme, and their complacency, in particular - but
this could change, for instance as a result of the advent of a new
educated generation of politically conscious younger people. What is
lacking at present is a sufficiently large political class to fill the
vacuum, given the physical problems of communication in Botswana, though
the limit to the amount of patronage available is bound to lead to
1
continuing Opposition candidature for election. Another important
feature is the small size of most Councils, which militates against the
expression of a hard doctrinaire party line. This too could change if
serious conflicts of interest came to be expressed openly; at present the
level of expectations is fairly low.
The Traditional System
Since a major objective of, and justification for the new system
of local government was the curbing of the power of the Chiefs, it was
only to be expected that the chieftainship in general should view the
new system and everything connected with it with an attitude ranging
from reluctant acceptance through suspicion to downright resentment.
Certainly the Government did not mince its words in countless addresses
to the traditional rulers, particularly the (Paramount ) Chiefs of the
eight Tswana clans. Two extracts from the proceedings of the House of
1 An indication of this is one Southern District Councillor, who, after
his defeat in 1969 on the BDP ticket, joined the BNF and won a seat at
the 1974 election. (He had not been nominated by the Government to the
Council). A further factor in some cases is a genuine conservative worry
about the pace of change, particularly as it affects the traditional
system.
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Chiefs illustrate this. The Minister of Local Government & Lands
stated:
I do not see what there is for the Chiefs to complain about
because the Government have already committed themselves in
this country to protecting' chieftainship.
. . . Chiefs and all the people of Botswana should realise
that we have taken a step forward. We are no longer separate
tribes under separate Chiefs, but a nation. When we accepted
Independence, we chose a Republican Constitution, and when
that Constitution was made we knew that meant giving repre¬
sentatives of the people more power and not an individual.
. . . The foundation of our Constitution is democratic and
that means the people have a say in the affairs of the
country.1
The culmination of the clash of views between the Government and the
2
House of Chiefs however came in a major statement made by the President
warning the Chiefs to keep out of party politics. It included the
following passage:
As Members of the House of Chiefs, you have an important
role to play in the development of this country and its
people, and it always pleases Government to learn that
some of you are striving hard to achieve this great goal,
which we, the people of Botswana, have set ourselves.
It is unfortunate and, indeed, regrettable, that this
cannot be said of all of you.3
The reaction of the Chiefs was to pass a motion, proposed by Chief
Bathoen:
That this Honourable House view with concern the remarks
made to it in November, 1968, by His Excellency the President,
on the subject of Chiefs' participation in politics.4
The suspicious attitude adopted by the Paramount Chiefs resulted not
only from Ministerial speeches about democratisation but also from the
transfer of certain powers away from the Chiefs. It did not matter
1 House of Chiefs, Official Report, Eighth Meeting, p. 20 (12 DEC 67)
2 Reproduced in full in Appendix "J"
3 House of Chiefs, Official Report, Tenth Meeting, p. 4 (25 NOV 68)
4 House of Chiefs, Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting, p. 4 (19 FEB 69)
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greatly to them - however germane it may be to this study - whether
1
the powers they lost were given to elected or nominated bodies, but
the ambiguities of the position of the "non-political" hereditary ruler
2
as Chairman of a District Council, and the nature of the District
Commissioner's relationship with the Council and the traditional
3
administration were probed by the Chiefs, albeit with indifferent
success. The bitterness felt by the Chiefs was epitomised by Chief
Bathoen when he remarked:
The Government does not want to say explicitly that chief¬
tainship has come to an end. What is being done now is to
have a Chief just as a nominal figure. Ihere is only one
Proclamation left now for the Government to make, and that
is about kgotla cases [i.e. Chiefs' judicial functions].
After that the next Proclamation will be the last one.
It is clear then that the Paramount Chiefs were unhappy about their new
role, despite their initial ex officio position as Council Chairmen in
most Districts and their continuing position as ex officio members of
Councils. Indeed it was his experience of the new system that finally
precipitated Bathoefi's decision to resign and seek election to
Parliament, successfully, on the BNF ticket. The attitude of the lower
ranks of the traditional administration is much less easy to summarise.
A general lack of trust is widely reported between District Councillors
and Headmen: hardly a conference (of either or both groups) passed
without a fairly standard call for "more explanation" of the respective
roles to correct the "misunderstandings" which exist. The language
used here is in part to be taken literally, but in many instances is a
1 See Proctor, op. cit.. for a good summary of the Chiefs' rearguard
action.
2 Motion by Mr. L. T. Khama [of the Bangwato], House of Chiefs, Official
Record, Ninth Meeting, p. 5 (22 JUL 68)
3 Questions by Chief Bathoen, ibid., Seventh Meeting, pp. 2-4 (24 JUL 67)
4 Ibid. , Eighth Meeting, p. 17 (11 DEC 67)
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kgotla-style euphemistic admission of the persistence of friction
between the elected and hereditary elements at the village level.
In particular situations, however, wide variations occur in the
degree of integration of individuals in the two spheres - Holm's
1
syncretistic model. Some sub-Chiefs or Headmen were simultaneously
also MPs or District Councillors (the President's warning notwithstanding
or VDC officebearers, and some have stood for election on Opposition
platforms, including that of the BNF which aims to give a new lease of
life to bogosi (chieftainship). Others have distanced themselves as
far as possible from the new-fangled elected systems, distrusting all
politicians.
There are still arguably two trump cards up the sleeves of the
traditional authorities. One is the undisputed role of the Chief or
Headman in officially convening kgotla meetings: as the (then) Chief of
the Bakwena remarked:
. . . even if the Government would take away all the powers
from Chiefs, it will have a difficulty in working with the
people, because they still want to get their information
through their Chief. They still accept whole-heartedly
what they are told by their Chiefs, which does not make it
quite clear how the Government thinks they can take away
the powers of the Chiefs and have them themselves.3
The other is more debatable and refers to the key relationship
4
between clan membership and land. So long as membership of a clan is
a prerequisite for the use of land over most of the country and the
Paramount Chief of the clan symbolises that relationship, it is difficult
to see how the position of Chief could be abolished. The judicial
1 J. D. Holm, Dimensions of Mass Involvement in Botswana Politics C1974)
2 See Appendix "J"
3 House of Chiefs, Official Report, Eighth Meeting, p. 18 (11 DEC 67)
4 See BDN, 29 JIJN 76, for a discussion of the problem of "landless"
clans.
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function of Chiefs, by contrast, could be transferred to Customary
Magistrates if plans made long ago in the Attorney General's Department
were implemented. Although it has just been argued that public attach¬
ment to the institution of bogosi is the main factor restraining the
Government from further eroding it, this does not mean that this
attachment has been unaffected by the changes occurring over the past
twelve years; quite the reverse is the case. This can be seen most
clearly in the dramatic drop in the population of the clan capitals, a
1
process which has come in for recent study. In part this is due, it
2
is true, to the drift to the towns - especially the new capital, Gaborone,
and the brand-new mining town of Selebi-Phikwe - but it is also evident
that the well-known phenomenon of the phaladi (scattering) from the
village to the arable fields ("Lands") is acquiring momentum and
permanency. As Silitshena puts it,
It has been argued that the main reason why some people are
abandoning the traditional towns is because they want to be
near their lands; and that this movement has been stimulated
by two factors, the provision of water and social facilities
at the lands areas, and the curbing of the powers of the
Chiefs by the modern government of Botswana.
It will be noted that both factors mentioned by Silitshena are a direct
result of the Local Government reforms of 1965/66.
Since the process of migration operates at the level of the smaller
villages too, it has implications for the efficacy of Village Development
4
Committees, as has been noted.
1 See in particular the pioneering work of R. M. K. Silitshena, notably
in his Conceptual framework for the study of rural-rural migration in
Botswana (1977)
2 Only since independence has there been a national capital within the
country: previously the capital, Mafeking, was in alien territory. See
N. Mitchison, Return to the Fairy Hill (1966) pp. 34-36 for an evocative
description of the treatment given to eminent Batswana in "their" capital
before independence.
3 R. M. K. Silitshena, op. cit.-,, p. 19
4 In Chapter 6, passim.
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An important question therefore for rural Botswana is whether the
problems of authority could be resolved by the wholesale introduction
of an elected chieftainship. It is far from clear in principle that,
for most Batswana, more legitimacy in this context attaches to elected
institutions than to hereditary ones; moreover in practice, despite
some official dismay, most candidates for elections for the position of
1
Headmen have been drawn from the aristocracy.
This attitude is not really surprising, given the colonial experience
of indirect rule, whereby neither type of administration was removable




Reference has been made to the Councils as forums for the airing
of problems arising in the districts. The question to be discussed
here is the efficiency of the system in dealing with the remit of
Councils. Several issues are involved here. One is the practical
question of administrative efficiency. In the early days of the operation
of the system two factors militated against efficiency. In the first
place the bulk of the Council staff had been inherited from the old
traditional administration and were, initially at least, somewhat at
sea in their new roles; gradually a number of the older staff were
retired or superseded. Moreover there was little incentive to self-
betterment when the career opportunities were restricted to the one
(often very small)) Council office. The other, related, factor was the
low priority given to local government by the central Government* in
1 For debate on the subject amongst the Barolong see BDN, 15 OCT 71,
20 OCT 71, 29 FEB 72.
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particular the Ministry of Finance had a low opinion of the capacity of
Councils and therefore - a self-fulfilling- prophecy - were reluctant to
see funds transferred to the Councils. The problem was compounded by
the lower rates of pay due to local government officers compared with
their civil service counterparts. Both of these factors have substant¬
ially altered as the result of, first, the introduction of the Unified
Local Government Service, providing a national career structure for
local government officers (even if the issue of parity of salaries and
conditions with the civil service has not yet been resolved to the
satisfaction of local government employees);1 and, second, the stress
on rural development which has come increasingly to be both emphasised
and institutionalised in Botswana in the 1970s. Both sets of changes
have undoubtedly increased the administrative capacity of the Councils,
but at the expense of their autonomy.
That there was ample room for improvement in efficiency is made
2
plain by the Auditors' reports on the three Councils studied. Detailed
criticisms in particular of tax collection, rent collection, trade
licences, water fees and stores were made concerning the first five
years of the Councils' existence, but in each case the reports included
this section:
SURCHARGE
Regulation 94 of Legal Notice No. 37 of 1966 provides,
amongst other things, for a surcharge to be levied on
Council officials in respect of losses arising from their
wilful, negligent or wrongful acts. During the course of
our audit, irregularities were disclosed which are refer¬
red to in detail elsewhere in this report. In our opinion,
1 BDN, 1 OCT 74
2 Owing to staff shortages, the Ministry of Local Government & Lands
called in outside auditors, Messrs. Price Waterhouse & Co./John Knipe &
Co.. Their reports (and detailed supplementary reports) to the Minister
are referred to hereinafter as "Price Waterhouse, Report ..." etc.
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however, the imposition of surcharges would be inappropriate
in respect of the period under review, because the irregul¬
arities to which we refer can be attributed in the main to
\
the relative inexperience of the Council officials.
Although cases of embezzlement, mainly by revenue collectors, of smallish
sums of money occurred, it must be recorded that the universal view that
local government in Botswana was free of corruption is borne out by all
2
the available evidence. In general the problem was not a lack of
honesty but a lack of training and experience.
Where the Councils* record was weakest was in the sphere where the
institution came into contact with the public. Thus matimela collection
3
turned out to be very costly to administer, tax collection in many areas
was patchy, and Ipelegeng also had a very mixed record. One obvious
explanation is that the people were accustomed to the authority of the
Chief/Headman in these matters and did not readily take to the new
official channels. Councillors were particularly criticised by the
Government - and rightly so - for failing to take an interest in tax
collection. Councillors obviously decided that there was no attraction
in getting involved in the matter and did not perceive a connexion with
the amount of resources (and the degree of autonomy) accruing to their
Council.
The administrative efficiency of Councils is only half of the
picture. The other half is the efficacy of the particular type of
local government wherein elected Councillors, through a committee system
1 Price Waterhouse, Supplementary Reports: on North East District
Council 1966-71, p. 45; on the Southern District Council 1966-71, p. 76;
on the Central District Council 1966-70, p. 77.
2 This was confirmed in an interview by the Senior Local Government
Auditor. But some Southern District Councillors were threatened with
court action for the collection of arrears of local government tax (BDN,
16 MAY 75).
3 One explanation adduced was that the real costs, and benefits, of the
system as run by the traditional administration had been concealed.
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as well as full Council meetings, perform executive as well as deliber¬
ative functions; without them the system would be simply decentralised
administration.
Councillors as decision-makers
Councillors laboured under a number of difficulties at the begin¬
ning. One was simply the problem of understanding the system, and the
early minutes abound in references to the difficulty of defining the
respective roles of the traditional authorities (from the main kgotlas
to village Headmen) and the Councillors. The position was not helped
by the Governments extreme tardiness in making available to all
Councillors Setswana copies of the official Handbook. Language was
indeed a second and formidable barrier - language in the sense not only
of facility in reading English, the language of reports, but in under¬
standing the unfamiliar bureaucratese jargon in which so many documents
were couched. It is small wonder therefore that most Councillors
started off by treating Council meetings like kgotla meetings, expecting
verbal explanations of anything important and being more concerned in
debate with making a contribution than with reaching a firm, operational
decision. It took several years before something akin to professionalism
emerged among Councillors as they realised that they had a managerial
role to perform and not just an advisory function. This growing
competence was however matched by the growing complexity and bureaucrat-
isation of Council affairs (discussed below).
The importance attached to debating helps to explain the relatively
ad hoc approach to the allocation of resources, although another
explanation must be Councillors' failure to perceive their political
future as being tied up with the ability to "deliver the goods" to
their constituents. It might be argued that this is because there
416
were so few resources to allocate, and the argument has some force.
But for instance Councillors' failure to nominate candidates for
destitutes' allowances indicates that it is more than that. Any
evidence for the idea that Councillors corruptly influenced the
selection of casual labour, the award of school bursaries, or the
granting of trading licences certainly is lacking in the three Councils
1
selected for study. In general the "objective" (technocratic) criteria
used by officials in drawing up recommended priority lists were very
infrequently challenged, and where alteration did occur it was the
result of the eloquent pleading of a good case rather than any previously
arranged deal. Certainly in the few instances where Councillors appeared
to be arguing for their own private interests the reaction from their
colleagues was openly critical.
Scope
Lest the picture painted of District politics be too idyllic, it
must be pointed out that the key resource in rural Botswana is land-with-
water; thus ownership of a borehole confers the tangible benefit of
exclusive use of land for grazing cattle, and this power is wielded by
the Land Boards (and in the larger Districts, Subordinate Land Boards).
It has already been noted that MPs and Councillors have been very
critical on occasion of the Land Boards, alleging corruption, inefficiency
and unnecessary expenses.
The Government's decision to confer the power to allocate land not
on the Councils per se but upon the hybrid Land Boards, consisting of
ministerial nominees and representatives of both the District Councils
and the Chiefs, conferred influence on those Councillors who sat on the
1 Hawkers' licences were not uncommonly refused where these conflicted
with existing trade licences but this was a general pattern rather than
a precise reflection of individual Councillors' interests.
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Boards rather than on the Councils, which could discuss the general
policy of Land Boards but could not alter their decisions in detail.
The position of Councillors on the Subordinate Land Boards is even
stronger and indeed has given the Councillors concerned a powerful
position locally.
Councils' relations with the District Development Committees are
a parallel case, in the sense that the Government again decided against
conferring the key district planning function on Councils. Instead a
symbiotic relationship has developed between Council and DDC, each
commenting on the other's plans - which increases the scope of the
Council's influence but at the price of having to submit its own plans
to the DDC for scrutiny. In day to day terms the effect of the DDC
system has been to permit Councils to exert pressure on hitherto
autonomous Government departments "in the field", with some success, to
deal with urgent problems.
A similar ambiguity attended the "one-off" Accelerated Rural
Development Programme. On the one hand the ARDP can be seen as making
nonsense of Councils' elaborately drawn up development plans. But inso¬
far as Councils were made the implementing agencies, wherever possible,
the calculations by the "pro-District" lobby in the central Government
Ministries was that the result would be a permanent increase in the
capacity of Councils for development activity and that they would tend
to attract further development grants thereby.
Finally reference must be made to the Government's far-reaching
1
proposals for a national policy on communal grazing land. This move
came after the period studied, and at the time of writing the implications
were unclear, but it looks as if the proposed new system will bypass the
District Councils as such.
1 Government Paper No 2 of 1975: National policy on Tribal grazing land
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BUREAUCRATIZATION -AND DEVELOPMENT
The lack of familiarity with administrative procedure by Councillors
meant that the Council Secretaries as chief executives were in a strong
position. This was seen with particular clarity in the Central District
where the Council Secretary, who had the additional advantage of an
aristocratic pedigree and a personal relationship with the President,
dominated Councillors, in the first few years, until he came gradually
under increasing challenge as Councillors grew wise to the system. The
importance of personality as a factor is brought out by the contrast
with the other two Councils, where the first Secretary in each case
lacked the personal impact of L. M. Seretse, and it was only later, with
the advent of new Secretaries, that the full potential of the position
was used. But by that time Councillors had become more self-confident
within the system and thus in the Second Session in all three cases
there were periodic, if restrained, clashes. An example of the difficult¬
ies encountered by Councillors in asserting their control was the case
of the Education Secretary in the Central District, who survived protracted
criticism thanks in part to the support he was given by the Council
Secretary. In the Southern District, by contrast, a competent and
energetic Councillor who was elected Chairman of the Education Committee
worked out a good relationship with the Education Secretary and as a
result the Education Committee there was a model of a successful partner¬
ship between elected members and officials.
The appointment of young expatriate volunteers as Council Advisers
had a definite effect on the balance between the two sides, rather more
markedly so than the official powers conferred upon District Commissioners,
although in the North East the latter played an important part in a
number of decisions. District Commissioners however had many matters to
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deal with, whereas the Council Advisers' full attention was given to
"improving" the Councils, and most of them epitomized the overseas
volunteer - keen, dedicated and hardworking (even if inexperienced and
initially inevitably ignorant of Botswana). The Council Advisers affected
procedure and general administrative questions, but their main impact
was on the allocation of resources. For this the Government's growing
stress on planning was in large measure responsible. Someone had to
draw up development plans, often at short notice, just as someone had
to draw up project memoranda. Owing to the acute shortage of qualified
manpower at all levels of Government - a problem with far-reaching
effects on the whole political system - these jobs were usually given
to the Council Advisers, assisted in time by other young expatriates in
posts such as Works Superintendents or Water Advisers, until the planning
function came to be transferred largely to the District Development
Committees - where another expatriate volunteer was usually the District
Officer (Development) and as such full-time Secretary to the DDC.
One factor reducing the influence of individual volunteer advisers
(if not necessarily of the volunteer cadre) was the relatively short
length of their appointment (and this was very often true of the District
Commissioner and his subordinates, who were subject to frequent trans¬
fers). As a result the permanent staff, notably the Council Secretary,
were apparently in a stronger position in the long run. But this was
altered in 1973 by the Government's introduction of the ULGS, as a
result of which Council Secretaries found themselves in the same position
as their opposite numbers across town intiie District Administration,
transferred at short notice to other parts of the Republic. Thus the
ULGS had the paradoxical effect of strengthening the position of
1
elected Councillors vis-h-vis the Council officials but weakening the
1 That is to say, in terms of influence. In formal terms Councillors
had collectively lost the power of appointment over (salaried) officials
in the Councils' employ.
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influence of Councils at the centre where the Council Secretary was an
effective advocate on behalf of his Council.
As new institutions were set up at the District level the inevitable
effect was to increase the bureaucratisation of planning: and resource
allocation and the role of non-elected people generally. At the village
level, however, at first sight it might be thought that the push to
create Village Development Committees was a move in the opposite
direction; and so it was, just as the establishment of District Councils
had given the power to the people for the first time to select their
local rulers. When one refers to bureaucratisation in the context of
VDCs it is a different phenomenon, less the result of deliberate
Government policy and more a tendency which was not universal because
not inevitable. Within the VDC some Community Development Assistants
were observed to play a leading role but this was not a general norm.
The bureaucratisation occurred more in the communication flow between
the village (especially the VDC) and the District headquarters, being
increasingly dominated by direct correspondence between the VDC and
the Council Staff, reinforced by^ growing number of visits paid by
Council employees (and also District Officers [Development]) to villages.
The incorporation of Community Development field staff into the Council
1
staff was a further manifestation of the tendency.
Nevertheless active politicians, of village, district or national
levels, have been able to assert leadership of VDCs - almost always in
the village of their own residence - and in some cases have acted as
2
middlemen. It would still be possible for more middlemen to emerge even
if they have to swim against the tide of bureaucratisation.
1 This transfer of Community Development staff was of course a genuine
strengthening of the Councils.
2 An interesting example from the Central District is given in a recent
article. R. P. Werbner, "Small man Politics and the Rule of Law: centre-
periphery relations in East-Central Botswana," Journal of African Law,
XXI, 1 (1977).
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At the national level Gunderson's description of Botswana as an
1
"administrative state" is persuasive, if oversimplified. Botswana has
become a planner's paradise and the increasing1 sophistication of the
planning machine makes it difficult for politicians to control and
direct the future course of events. It is neatly symbolic that the
central Ministries are airconditioned: the expatriate in the civil
service worked better when protected from the environment. The question
of bureaucratic domination is complicated by and intertwined with the
question of expatriates. The task of localisation of the civil service
has been a difficult one but yet politically urgent. An indication of
2
both is provided by the exhaustive Localisation Report produced in 1973
3
which included the following table:
TABLE 10.3
PROGRESS IN LOCALISATION 1972
MIDDLE AND SENIOR GRADE POSTS BY CADRE
VacanciesClasses of Posts Number Locals Expatriate
Superscale 110 37 53 20
Administrative 65 28 14 23
Professional 203 30 108 65
Executive 406 305 25 76
Technical 454 128 167 159
Secretarial 30 7 20 3
P. Scale - Police 95 61 11 23
P. Scale - Prisons 18 18 - -
Teaching Scale (Hutton) 62 1 33 28
Teaching Scale (Okoh) 134 28 106 -
N. Scale - Nursing Staff 43 39 1 3
Totals 1620 682 538 400
1 G. L. Gunderson, "Nation-building and the Administrative State: the
case of Botswana" (1970>
2 Report of the Presidential Commission on Localisation and Training
in the Botswana Civil Service and the Government Statement on the
Report of the Commission (1973) [colloquially referred to in civil
servant circles as the "Glynn Report," from the Ford Foundation Staff
Development Consultant who was a leading member of the Commission].
3 Ibid., Appendix 2
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1
The Table underestimates the number of expatriates in influential
positions, since those who were appointed to supernumerary posts did
not count in the establishment figure.
Gunderson regarded the presence of expatriates as proof of
continuing British neo-colonial influence. He went further and claimed:
British influence is aimed at constructing within Botswana
a polity which is willing to co-exist with South Africa.
Britain cannot allow a militant anti-apartheid indigenous
element to gain control of Botswana even by a constitutional
election. . . . Great Britain has attempted to preserve her 2
ultimate control over Botswana*s domestic and foreign policies.
The implication that Seretse Khama, of all people, is "soft on apartheid,"
which was improbable anyway, has proved false in recent years. The more
serious misunderstanding concerns the nature of the expatriate influence,
which has changed markedly in quality since Gunderson's study was
completed. Botswana's policy in the sphere of recruitment, as indeed in
foreign policy, has been the diversification of contacts, so that nowadays
American, Canadian, Danish, Swedish, Norwegian, German, Korean, Filipino
and many other nationalities are represented in personnel working in
Botswana, not to mention the important contribution made by United Nations
agencies. Some of the most influential personnel, nevertheless, have been
UK citizens, but supplied not only by the British Government but by quasi-
3
independent agencies like the Ford and Ariel Foundation.
1 The latest unofficial estimate is around 800 expatriates in the public
sector. Official figures are due to be revealed shortly when the latest
report of the Localisation Commission is published. In addition somewhat
less that 200 Europeans have naturalised since Independence and naturally
they are counted as locals. Some are senior civil servants, but by no
means all. For a BPP attack on the influence of white citizens in the
civil service see BDN, 23 AUG 77.
2 Gunderson, op. cit., p. 398
3 The latter, like the German equivalent, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation,
has supplied aid to the ruling Democratic Party. The party manifestoes,




The importance of expatriate personnel, many of them liberal/
radical intellectuals, cannot be gainsaid. Their presence has the
effect of obscuring the eventual shape of politics in Botswana, but at
the same time some of their ideas have already been institutionalised
and will thus exert a continuing influence.
Development
In this study the term "development" has been applied, as in the
Government's rhetoric, to mean physical and economic change: in partic¬
ular the improvement of infrastructure and services. After the hesitant
beginnings of the local government system, when its main function was
to replace the administration of the Chiefs, the Government has laid
increasing stress on District Councils' developmental function. As
early as 1967 the Minister of Local Government & Lands (by then Mr. Kgabo)
2
was beginning to emphasise this role. By the same token Councils were
judged to be failing in their responsibilities and this feeling, strong
in the Government Mall in Gaborone, where Councils in general were held
3 4
in scant respect, led to the appointment of Council Advisers, the
enhancement of the District Commissioner's role, and above all the
appointment of the Tordoff Committee and the subsequent implementation
of its recommendations to set up the District Development Committee
1 It is an apt semantic point that most Batswana fail to distinguish
between the pronunciation of "expat" and "expert".
2 See Republic of Botswana, Ministry of Local Government &. Lands, Annual
Report for the Year 1967, p. 1
3 Wass reports an unnamed Permanent Secretary as stating: "In my view
the machinery of local government is too democratic and there is not
sufficient direct intervention by central government." (Wass, op. cit.,
pp. 321-322).
4 In one District where the Council was sitting on substantial inherited
reserves one of the tasks tackled by the new appointee was that of getting
Council committees to embark on a spending programme to use these funds
for development. The resentment expressed by the Treasurer was a mark
of the former's success. (See p. 184 above.)
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1
structure. As has been noted, the DDCs and the crash Accelerated
Rural Development Programme were at the same time recognitions of the
need to involve District Councils in development and expressions of a
lack of confidence in their capacity to undertake it without supervision.
A genuine dilemma concerns the really major developmental problems
of Botswana. Above all there is the precarious nature of agriculture.
Drought is endemic in the area, and at its worst can kill off half the
cattle in the country and leave a third of the people starving. In
good years these problems can be shelved; in catastrophic years they
make efforts to improve schools, roads and clinics look puny and almost
2
irrelevant to the pressing necessities of life. Hence the World Food
3
Programme, which has come to Botswana's rescue several times, could
dictate conditions of acceptance of aid - the Food-for-Work idea - which
had serious implications for the Government's cherished principle of
"self-reliance". An extract from a national conference, on Self Help
and Village Development, brings out the point plainly;
A suggestion by the World Food Programme Project Officer,
Mr. Jobber, that WFP would in certain circumstances be
prepared to provide a food contribution toward VDC projects
was discussed at length. Fears were expressed that such a
measure would tend to undermine the self-help spirit and it
would be impossible to distinguish in the public mind from
a return to Food-for-Work. The factor was also mentioned
that WFP could give no long-term guarantee of the continu¬
ation of this type of aid, whereas its withdrawal once
established would have a serious effect on all future
attempts to institute a genuine self-help development
1 It is interesting to note the influence of the experience of countries
to the North, commencing with the use of the Malawi Local Government Law
as the basis for the Botswana Legislation, to the Tordoff Committee's
recommendations to try the Zambia/Tanzanian models.
2 For a vivid, indeed poignant, account of the difficulties encountered
in one scheme, to introduce fruit trees Clinked with primary schools),
see J. Flood, Reports on Development Projects Supported by Botswana
Christian Council (1974) pp. 272-276
3 A good idea of the problems inherent in the Drought Relief and related
programmes can be derived from World Food Programme, Botswana, Project 995
(Drought Relief), Quarterly Progress Reports.
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programme. It was therefore RESOLVED that because of the
difficulties outlined above no programme of food aid should
be linked with the VDC system and the self-help programme.
Conference was in favour of a food programme to relieve the
genuinely destitute; Mr. Jobber stated, however, that WFP
could not provide food on these terms. . . .
Ihus major decisions on development priorities and strategies have
been imposed on the Government as much as on the Councils by external
influences. The latest instance is the Government's reluctant decision
to divert funds to build up a small Defence Force to counter the recent
2
raids across the border by the armed forces of the Smith regime; the
money to pay for this comes partly at the expense of the national
development programme.
At the Council level the impact of aid agencies - a welcome altern¬
ative to the central government as a source of funds - affected the type
3
of projects selected and the need for other criteria to be met, not
least the requirement of a "local contribution". In an extreme case,
differences of opinion between the officer responsible for aid channelled
through the Christian Council and the North East District Council Secretary
4
led to the suspension of aid to that Council. In sum, the amount of
discretion left to Councillors in the selection of development projects
and priorities was severely limited.
An important question to be determined is the impact on development
of democratic institutions at the grassroots. The optimistic model
envisages popular village level choice of projects, as much as personnel,
which are next referred (via the elected Councillor) to the Council for
1 Minutes of the First National Conference of DDCs, Gaborone, 4-7 DEC 72
p. 3.
2 Foreseen as long ago as 1969. See J. E. Spence, "The Implication of
the Rhodesia Issue for the Former High Commission Territories," Journal
of Commonwealth Political Studies, VII, No.2 (July 1969)
3 See Appendix "B" for one example
4 See Flood, op. cit., p. 241; and p. 244 above.
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decision, and then implemented by the same people who chose the project
in the first place. (Equally if a project were turned down this would
be accepted if the reasons were explained.) The reality is, not
surprisingly, much less clear cut than this ideal model would suggest.
The two major reasons why mobilisation has been disappointing are
firstly, the confusion in the public mind over Food-for-Work and Self-
1
Help projects, both referred to popularly as Ipelegeng, and the frequent
changes in the policies, personnel and procedures with which villages
have had to deal. Here much can be done by Community Development
Assistants and Councillors (as was demonstrated in a number of villages)
but a crucial constraint is the physical problem of communication.
The second reason is that the waning authority of the Headman has
not been replaced by the Village Development Committees, which as
voluntary bodies, have to rely on the persuasive power of the kgotla
ideal. The fact that sanctions cannot now legally be enforced by
Headmen has sunk in rather more generally than the idea of village self-
determination or self-government. Given the Government's commitment to
democratising the traditional system, it would appear that the only
alternative to a continued reliance on exhortation is the conferral of
limited powers of compulsion on elected village councils. Even this
solution would run the risk of widespread evasion as people migrate away
from the central kgotlas.
THE FUTURE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT; SOME SPECULATIONS
The Problem
In the aftermath of the 1974 elections, a nagging worry affected
some members of the Democratic Party Government. The problem was not the
1 The source of confusion can be traced back to official ambiguities as
long ago as 1966. See Wass, op. cit., esp. pp. 210-211 and 215-216; and
p. 39 above.
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Opposition, which lost ground everywhere in 1974; the problem lies with
the people of Botswana. It is reassuring- for the Government to know
that the "Five National Principles" are accepted by virtually everyone,
including- the three Opposition parties, and that stability seems to be
assured as the BDP - with or without Sir Seretse - looks like continuing
to be the ruling party for the foreseeable future. But increasingly
apathy has come to predominate and participation in public affairs has
dropped to a low level. Deference to the "Government" prevails, but
does not necessarily lead to positive participation, far less mobilisation
for development. Hie crisis is seen clearly in local government, which
is in a way the Achilles' heel of Botswana's democracy.
The Trend
The decision to pack the Councils in 1969 can be seen with hindsight
to have been an important step, negating the popular will in two cases in
practice and potentially everywhere, and carried a logical step further
1
by interference with one or two VDCs. The result is to force Opposition
parties into a literally irresponsible position in local government.
In addition to interference with the local political process, the
Government has, as has been noted, increasingly resorted to non-elected
bodies to tackle problems at the district level, even if some elected
Councillors sit on these bodies.
If further developments along these lines are to be contemplated in
an attempt to achieve greater mobilisation, the only possibilities
remaining are the strengthening of the staff and technical capacity of
the District Councils and giving them more influence with, or control over,
the other and newer district-level institutions. This would help to
restore some meaning to the electoral process.
1 Apart from the Palapye case mentioned earlier, two cases from the North
West have been reported where the District Commissioner intervened, BDN,
1 MAY 74 and 16 JAN 75.
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One reason why the Government hesitates to confer a greater degree
of popular control over developmental matters, and resources in general,
is the conviction that Botswana is entering a testing period in which
certain hard and unpalatable decisions have to be taken, since the
pressure of population on a fragile ecology makes delay in tackling
problems irresponsible.
Political Alternatives
It is partly this consideration which makes the possibility of a
one-party state sound attractive to some BDP members. Ihe siren voices
of UNIP* (and to a lesser extent TANU), who as fraternal parties send
delegates to the BDP annual conference, exert some influence, stressing
as they have done the threat to "nation-building" of "particularist"
opposition parties. Another advocate of turning Botswana into a one
party state has been an American political scientist, Dr. Richard
2
Vengroff, who argues in a peculiar logic from the weakness of the BDP
that it deserves to be strengthened by an official identification with
the state and hence transformed, Cinderella-like, into a mobilising
agency. The possibility was mentioned but implicitly ruled out by other
3 4
foreign experts, Tordoff and Sarpong and Chambers and Feldman. Still,
5
despite the explicit rejection of the idea by the President, the idea
continues to exert a certain fascination in some BDP circles, probably
born of a romanticised idea of what has been happening in Tanzania and
_____________________ I
1 See Speech by Hon A. J. Soko, M.P., Minister of Trade and Industry
[of Zambia (UNIP delegate)J, at the annual conference of the Botswana
Democratic Party held in Francistown from 1st to 3rd April 1972
(mimeo), especially p. 2.
2 R. Vengroff, "Local-Central Linkages and Political Development in
Botswana," (1972), particularly Abstract, third page.
3 Tordoff, Pilane & Sarpong, Report of the Local Government Study Group
(1970), p. 59.
4 Chambers & Feldman, Report on Rural Development (1973J, pp. 180-185
5 E.g. in an important interview prior to the 1974 General Election, BDN,
23 AUG 74.
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Zambia. The debate within the BDP about its future centres around the
choice between being the Democratic Party or the Development Party.
This assumes that a choice has to be made between the two. This
is not necessarily the case. Instead an alternative strategy could be
employed which would resolve to revive the democratic ideal behind local
government. It would entail an end to the addition of any non-elected
voting members to Councils, and a similar self-denying policy with
respect to VDCs. Moreover the already visible transfer of resources
and capacity to the districts could be placed at the disposal of the
elected Councils, which could be allowed more autonomy in general; there
could remain ample safeguards, through inspection and audit, against
corruption or abuse of office. At the village level, where the problem
of popular participation is marked, a more difficult reform could be
attempted in the form of a statutory framework for elected village or
community councils, possibly synchronised on a district or national basis.
Hie advantages of this alternative approach to reform is that it
would allow for the emergence of a new generation of political leaders,
drawn largely from the younger, educated people and especially women,
who are barely represented at any level at present. A portent of the
potential for participation and the feasibility of this strategy is the
1
interest shown by both the public and the Government in the mass education
2
campaign conducted on the National Development Plan.
Were such a plan carried out it would throw an onus not only on the
ruling party but also on opposition parties, existing or future, to produce
programmes and justify their record to the electorate at every level.
1 Especially the Vice-President, who is also Minister of Finance &
Development Planning.
2 A notable feature of which was the majority of women leaders of the
Radio Listening Groups. See M. Colclough, An Analysis of Participant
Feedback (forthcoming) (Vol. Ill of Colclough & Crowley, The People and
the Plan),
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In conclusion, it is argued that Local Government as an
institution is facing a crossroads. Unless steps are taken to
strengthen the role of elections and elected Councils, one casualty of




MINISTERIAL BROADCAST BY THE MINISTER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LANDS
MONDAY, 10TH NOVEMBER, 1969
Today's Daily News announces decisions which will influence our progress
towards an effective local government system throughout the country.
These concern the nominations which the President is empowered to make
to augment the elected membership of the District and Town Councils.
Full details of these nominations are given in the Daily News.
Ihe purpose of these nominations is to give Councils the benefit of the
experience and ability of citizens who for one reason or another have
not been elected, or have not sought election. Government has in order
to strengthen a number of Councils decided to appoint more nominated
Councillors than were appointed in 1966. In most cases these extra
nominations do not affect the control of the Council. In two cases
they do. I refer to Francistown and the North East District Council.
I feel that the Government's decision in these two cases does require
some explanation.
The BDP's Election Manifesto has been endorsed by the people of Botswana.
It is now the policy of our elected Government. In it the BDP pledged
itself to a programme of resettlement in the rural areas taken over from
the Tati Company. Another commitment of crucial importance is the BDP's
pledge to make a fresh start with the development of Francistown as a
healthy, balanced, properly planned, non-racial community.
For some time it has been clear that the problem of the Tati Company
was not simply a local issue, but a national one. The land we purchased
from the Tati Company was paid for from development funds. Our purpose
in taking it over was to release undeveloped land and natural resources
for productive activity to be undertaken by Government and by private
enterprise on an orderly basis.
Furthermore, as we explained in our Manifesto, and as the President
explained in his Francistown Speech in September, the acquisition of
land would not by itself solve the economic and social problems of the
area. But we do now have the opportunity to tackle these problems.
This opportunity can only be grasped if the Councils in the area are
manned by able and dedicated councillors who are determined to implement
the policy which has been endorsed by the people of Botswana as a whole.
For it is the resources of the nation as a whole which have been and
will be devoted to making a new start in the Tati Area.
Thus your BDP Government could not allow the wishes of the people to be
frustrated by a situation which would allow control of both the
Francistown and North East Councils to be determined by a mere toss of
a coin. This is how the Mayor of Francistown and the Chairman of the
North East District Council would be selected, if the number of BDP
nominated councillors are not increased.
Rather than leave the future of this important area to the toss of a
coin, the Government recognises a clear duty to achieve its development
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objectives in the interests of Botswana as a whole. This means that we
must prevent a situation arising- in which the Francistown Town Council
and the North East District Council are controlled by a Party whose
representatives have shown themselves barren of constructive proposals
for improving our future.
Above all the development of Francistown which will, with the mining
development, become our largest urban centre the nation as a whole
would suffer [sic]. For all these reasons the BDP Government has decided
to nominate enough councillors to ensure that we have, both in Francistown
and the North East, Councils which will work for the planned development
of their respective areas.
It is, of course, regrettable that we have been obliged to make a decision
which falls short of the ideals we have set ourselves to achieve in
promoting local democracy. The choice of councillors made by voters in
one area clashes with the expressed desire of the nation as a whole. In
such a situation the national interest must prevail, and powers which
are provided for by law, duly exercised.
But the wishes of the local people will not be ignored. We recognise
that the developments which the BDP is planning for Francistown and the
Tati can only be achieved on a basis of consent. We are not going to
violate the President's dictum that "development is not achieved by
pushing people in directions they do not wish to go, for reasons they do
not understand". All elected councillors will have every opportunity to
express their views in a constructive manner, and the BDP Councillors,
whether elected or nominated, will concern themselves continuously with
local needs and the wishes of the people on the spot.
The other important announcement to which I wish to draw your attention
concerns the Chairmanship of District Councils. In the past in a number
of Councils, chiefs have been ex-officio Chairman. That is to say chiefs
have occupied the position of Chairman, simply because they were chiefs.
In future this will not necessarily be the case. All Councils will from
henceforth have the opportunity of electing their own Chairman. This does
not mean that Chiefs will be excluded from the Councils. Far from it.
We recognise that traditional authority has still an important contribution
to make to our development and social cohesion. Chiefs will continue to
be ex-officio members of District Councils.
Nor will chiefs necessarily be excluded from the Chairmanship. A number
of Chiefs who have shown responsibility and leadership capacity will
certainly be elected as Council Chairmen by the new majorities. In other
cases a Chief may not wish to assume, or may not be qualified to assume,
the Chairman's role. Again there are cases where the Council Area
embraces more than one tribal group and hence more than one Chief. This
is true of the South East District Council and of the Ngwaketse-Barolong
District. Faced with this situation Government has decided to permit the
majority groups in all District Councils to elect their own Chairmen.
They will thus be able to express their confidence in a Chief as Chairman
where such confidence is justified. Where it is not, they will be free
to with-hold their endorsement and select a suitable Chairman from among
their number.
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This change is a development which follows naturally from the first
successful phase in the introduction of democratic local government
in Botswana. It is in conformity with the pledge contained in the
BDP Manifesto to examine the role of traditional authority, in order
to devise a system more compatible with popular aspirations and the
demands of good government. We must now work to resolve other problems,
and in particular seek ways of rationalising the present wasteful
duplication which still exists in certain areas between District
Councils and the surviving remnants of the traditional administration.
This decision on Council Chairmen is one more step towards the
achievement of a fully representative system of local government,
geared to Botswana's urgent development priorities. This BDP
Government will also, as promised in its Manifesto, redouble its
efforts to promote participatory democracy at grass roots level. The
role of Village Development Committees and other agencies of participation
and social and economic progress will become increasingly important.
Finally, the BDP Government will fulfil its promise to review progress
in local government and to examine central-local government relations
so as to improve efficiency, increase local participation, and further
promote development.
I hope I have said enough to you tonight to reassure you that these
decisions have not been made out of any spirit of personal or political
vindictiveness on the part of the governing party. Rather our reasons
for taking these actions stem from a concern to see that our efforts
as a Government and your own efforts as a people to build Botswana are
not in any way unnecessarily frustrated.
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APPENDIX B
SCHOOL PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMME PROPOSAL
To: Director, School Partnership Programme
From: District/Town Council Secretary to be Responsible
for Project Name
Address
Through: (Name of Village Development
Committee)




C District , Republic of Botswana
D Major Source of Income
3. SCHOOL
A. Operated by: District Council
Other (specify) _______________________________
B. Support requested from SPP Rand ( US Dollars)
C. Total cost of project including village contribution but
excluding labour cost Rand ( US Dollars)
D. Construction target dates : Start Completion
E. Number of Classrooms (or other) to be built For Standards
(Grades)
F. Number of students last year: When completed
G. Standards (Grades) taught
H„ Ages of students to
I. Number of classrooms at present
J. Number of classes
K. Number of teachers
(SPP Co-ordinator)
4. CRITERIA
(This section to be completed by SPP Co-ordinator after
ensuring that all criteria have been met)
Yes No
A. Approved by District Council
B. Approved by District Development Committee
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Yes No
C. Community has reasonably exhausted other
possible sources of local and national assistance
D. Suitable lot and clear land title
E. Sound construction plans
F. Community providing 25% of material cost
and volunteer labour
G. SPP funds for materials only
H. After approval is given, foundation will be
begun prior to release of funds to community
I. Teacher available
J. Community will establish and maintain contract
with sponsor
K. Community understands that there is no further
financial obligation on the part of the sponsor
5. SUPPORTING DATA (Attach or describe the following on a separate
sheet.) All are necessary for approval.
A. The need for the school/classroom;
B. Local interest in and efforts for the school;
C. Construction plans or drawing of the school/classrooms;
D. General description of the community and surrounding area;
E. Cost breakdown for total project, indicating amount of
community contribution, either in cash or in value of
materials;
F. Outline map of country showing location of school.
6. SUGGESTED U.S. SCHOOL CONTACT; "
7. APPROVAL SIGNATURES
Village Development Committee Chairman
District Council Secretary








ELECTION OF VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE AT MPSOJANE
(NORTH EAST DISTRICT) 1973
MINUTES of Public Meeting held at Mosojane, 8 AUG 73
(Language - Kalanga)
PRESENT: a) Platform party, consisting of the North East District Council
Development Officer (Chairman); the Assistant Community
Development Officer (ACDO), Francistown; Chief Mosojane
(Village Headman); the North East District Council Secretary;
the Community Development Assistant; the writer.
b) At commencement 42 people (25 men and 17 women), at the close
33 men and 27 women, i.e. 60 people (not including the
platform party). 74 people participated in the election?
The meeting commenced with a prayer.
SPEAKERS
Chief Moso.jane Opening the meeting, remarks on small attendance.
Chairman Introduces platform party. Emphasises the importance of the
meeting and talks of non-cooperation by the public at Mosojane.
Asks everyone, including the Women's Club, to cooperate for
the goal of village development. Asks the people to tell
the visitors their problems and discuss possible solutions.
ACDO Repeats same points as Chairman and stresses importance of
development. Asks the people to make their complaints known.
Urges formation of VDC and PTA and explains their roles.
Goes into relationship between VDC, PTA, Councillor and
Headman, People should analyse their own problems, not
outsiders.
Council Secretary Stresses that the Botswana Government is interested
in developing the whole of Botswana, including the North East
District. Talks of a chain of communication for solving
problems: public-VDC-District Council-Government-Parliament.
Four aspects concern of Council: Roads, Health, Education,
Water - the requirements of a human being. The role of the
VDC and Council (councillor): problems cropping up in the
village should be given to the Councillor to convey to the
Council. "Mr. A. here was my principal. When a school head
comes to my office I must listen with respect." [laughter -
reference to Head Teacher, present, wearing a bizarre jersey.]
Councillors must be involved in all village problems, not
just villagers, so that he can express needs of village more
effectively at District Council. Proposals must come through
the Councillor to the Council. [Provokes more laughter,
thumps table, more smiles] Councillors report nothing - they
say the people of Mosojane not willing to work. "When I
talked to the VDC Chairman he said 'No, I have long resigned'
(* Note: Population of Enumerator Area, 1971 census, 905)
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[Much laughter] Importance of democracy. Local patriotism
important - "people won't come from the Transvaal to do the
work for you. "
Chairman Asks the public for comments.
Mr. A. (Head Teacher) Complains at inactivity of present VDC. Poor
attendance at kgotla meetings. Asks about relationship
between village and District Council; says Chief and
Councillor not interested in development.
Chairman
Mr. B. (Ex-teacher; PTA Chairman; ex-Treasurer, VDC) Greets visitors.
Says visit will change the attitude of the people. Poor
relationship between Chief and VDC (and younger progressive
elements) - e.g. concerning the move to form a Co-op, Chief
opposed/reluctant and remained unconvinced despite hearing
the benefits explained to him. "When it comes to elections,
let us mix young and old - young can advise older members,
who also have advantages." Appeals for co-operation from
public.
Mrs„ M. (Chief's wife) Complains that the Women's Club have no club
house.
Chairman Replies
Mr, C'. (Ex-teacher) Complains vehemently at the way the previous VDC
was formed - alleges that the former ACDO simply hand-picked
rather than by public election. Welcomes visit - chance for
a fresh start.
Chief Mo Says too much gossip amongst the people around.
Mr. D. (Farmer, ex-VDC Chairman) [Some laughter as he stands up to speak]
Says he was elected for one year and complains that noone
else has been elected since his time was up. Tired of being
a one man committee.
Mr, E. (Teacher) Compares VDC to a tree under which people sit for
shade. Interest in VDC stimulated by visitors but up to
village. Once the VDC had been elected, people told them to
go ahead and develop the village themselves.
Chief M. Expresses surprise that it takes a visit before people can
elect a VDC.
Chairman Advice can be got from extension workers, including CDA.
Council Secretary Expatiates on the theme; explains job of CDA et al.
vis-A-vis Council. The installation of a chief depends on
lineage, totem.
Mr. F. (Very old man, retired farmer) Poor attendance normally -
surprised to see so many people.
Mr, G. (Farmer) Reacting to words of Messrs. B. and E.: if they knew the
answers, why didn't they tell the people? [Speaks heatedly]
Chairman Replies to Mr. G. Election not by wards but by kgotla -
the most able people for each position on the VDC.
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Chief M.
Chairman Talks about District and National Development Plans.
Mr. B. Asks re proper relationship between District Council,
Community Development Department, Councillor, VDC.
Council Secretary
Mr. E.
Chief M. More about relationship between various bodies.
Chairman
Mr. C. [Vehemently] Comments on what has been said.
Council Secretary Comments on public indifference and clash of
personalities. "Don't let our grievances overshadow our
oppor tunities."
Chief M. Comments.
Mr, C. Suggests another date to form VDC.
Chairman Complains at poor attendance, wonders if it could be remedied.
Mr. B. Suggests election proceed today.
Mr. A.
ACDO Supports Mr. B.'s suggestion.
[tea break]
Chief M. Suggests electing a number (11-12), who could then select
their own officebearers.
Mr. G. Objects that they might all be PTA members.
Chairman Asks if the people want to vote.
Miss H. (Teacher) (and others) Yes.
Mr. I. (Trader) Asks about Chief's position.
Chairman Explains that he is an ex officio member.
ACDO Asks for three nominees for Chairman.




Assistant Secretary Mrs. K. (Housewife)
Treasurer Mr. D.
Ordinary Members Mr. G.
Mr. I.
(The Chairman once elected was refused the right to nominate
for other positions. During a recount for the position of
Chairman the three candidates withdrew.)
>
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Chairman General pep talk. Explains about co-operation and
ex officio members.
Council Secretary Mobilising- men and enthusiasm to work for an ideal
based on the common g-ood should be the fundamental basis
of any plan for development.
ACDO Pep talk.
New VDC Chairman (Mr. E.) Emphasises need for proper book-keeping.
Council Secretary Refers to the relationship between VDC and other
associations.







































































Notes ; a) Most of those who spoke at the kgotla meeting beforehand
were elected while only one who did not speak was
successful.
b) Only one woman was elected out of two nominated (the
Chief's wife being unsuccessful); but voting was not
along lines of gender (nor did teachers vote as a block).
Four women nominated candidates for election (out of
twelve nominations). Women barely participated in the
discussion preceding the election.
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APPENDrX D
BACKGROUND DATA ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT CANDIDATES, 1974
Introductory Notes
The tables that follow have been generously made available by the
writer's former colleagues, Jack Parson and Denis Cohen, in Department
of Government & Administration, the University of Botswana, Lesotho &
Swaziland, who compiled them as part of the UBIS (Gaborone) Study of
the Botswana General Election of 1974. They are reproduced without
alteration except for the table numbers and a footnote. This data has
not so far been published; some related figures were due to appear in
an article by J. D. Parson in the Journal of Modern African Studies
later in 1977.
The questionnaire was sent to all Local Government candidates (296,
who contested the 176 Polling Districts but note that 66 BDP candidates
were returned unopposed)). Ignoring one or two which failed to reach
their intended recipients, this gives a response rate to the questionnaire
as follows: BDP: 55.7%; BIP: 40%; BNF: 46.6%; BPP: 34.8%; Overall: 49.7%.
BDP BIP BNF BPP ALL












none 1 1.0 1 0.7
less than 20 acres 41 41.8 2 33.3 13 48.2 7 43.7 63 42.9
20 acres and more 46 46.9 3 50.0 9 33.3 8 50.0 66 44.8

























BDP BIP BNF BPP ALL




No formal education 9 9.2 1 16.7 5 18.5 15 10.2
Primary only 58 59.2 4 66.7 13 48.1 11 68.7 86 58.5
Secondary 27 27.5 1 16.7 6 22.2 4 25.0 38 25.9
University 1 1.0 2 7.5 3 2.0






1 District Councillor 47 49.0 3 50. 0 3 11.1 1 6.3 54 37.2
2 Businessman/Shop¬
keeper/Manager
18 18.8 1 16.7 6 22.2 6 37.4 31 21.4




4 4.1 6 22.2 2 12.4 12 8.3
Guide/Foreman
_ Skilled &, Semiskilled
excluding agric.
3 3.1 1 6.3 4 2.8
(a) Politician 3 11.1 3 2.1
(b) Minister of
Religion
2 2.1 1 3.7 3 2.1




1.0 1 3.7 1 6.3 3 2.1
Barman/Storeman
7 Unemployed 1 1.0 1 6.3 2 1.4
(a) Shop Assistant/
Salesman
1 1.0 1 0.7
8 (b) White collar
(private Co.) 1 6.3 1 0.7
(c) Land Board Member. 1 1.0 1 0.7
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TABLE D„5
OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUND * OF COUNCIL CANDIDATES
Type of occupation BIP ENF BPP AT.T.









42 43.0 1 16.7 6 22.2 7 43.8 56 38.1




23 23.5 1 16.7 1 3.7 5 CO >-* • CO 30 20.4
5 Shop assistant/
Salesman
18 18.4 1 16.7 7 26.0 3 18.8 29 19.2













9 9.2 4 66.7 2 7.4 15 10.2
(b )Miner/Mines 8 8.2 2 33.3 3 11.1 2 12.5 15 10.2




4 4.1 1 16.7 1 3.7 6 4.1
(b) Soldier 3 3.1 3 18.3 6 4.1
12 Minister of Religion 3 3.1 2 7.4 5 3.4
13
White collar
1.0 Ct Q o 1 A
(Private company)










* I.e. previous occupation(s)
TABLE D.6
AGE OF COUNCIL CANDIDATES
Party BDP BIP BNF BPP ALL
Average age 50.4 47.8 49.5 44.9 49.5
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APPENDIX E
RECORD OF ATTENDANCE AT GENERAL MEETINGS BY
NORTH EAST DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE NOMINATED AND CO-OPTED MEMBERS
FOR THE 6 MONTH PERIOD FROM N0V./72 to JUNE /73
Member % of Possible Attendance
1. District Commissioner [Chairman] 100
2. District Officer (Development) [Secretary] 100
3. Community Development Officer 100
4. Council Secretary 90
5. Regional Agricultural Officer 90
6. Council Chairman 80
7. Chairman Tati Land Board 80
8. Roads Engineer (North) 50
9. Town Clerk Francistown 50
10. Senior Medical Officer 40
11. Area 4 Superintendent [Water] 30
12. Officer Commanding No. 1 [Police] 25
13. Education Officer 10
14. Senior Veterinary Officer 10
Note: 1. If a member has sent an officer to represent him at a meeting,
he has been recorded as present, at this meeting.
2. The Officer Commanding No. 1 District was co-opted as from
April /73.




2ND NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF DDCs
GABORONE. 4TH-7TH DECEMBER, 1973
Summary of Follow-up Action required:
1. Land Use Planning: 1.1 MOA to issue plans and, with Ministry
of Local Government and Lands, to arrange
tour of DDC's in February
1.2 DDC's to consider preparing land use
plans
1.3 MOA to work out guidelines to guide
Land Boards
1.4 Ministry of Local Government and Lands
to arrange for MQA officials to advise
Land Boards
2. Dams; 2.1 District Councils, with help from
DDC's, to work out how to apply in their
areas the Presidential Directive on
operational responsibilities
2.2 MOA in consultation with DDC's and
District Councils to organise syndicates
and select the first 20 sites
3. Rural Industries: 3.1 District Production Development
Sub-Committees of DDC's to be established
to work with Mr. Bayliss in developing
action on this front as appropriate to
each District
4.1 1974/75 Recurrent Estimates proposal
to be reexamined in order to justify
increases to Government Estimates
Committee
4.2 Ministry of Local Government and Lands
to introduce improved procedures for
estimates submissions by Councils
4.3 Ministry of Local Government and Lands
to recommend removal of lowest level of
Local Government Tax
Staff 4.4 Council to post counterparts to
Volunteers and suitable training to be
arranged
Construction Program 4.5 Ministry of Local Government and Lands
directive LG. 19/1 of 3rd Dec 73 to be
implemented forthwith including action




4.6 Consultation essential: C.D. staff
to be mobilised for smaller villages
4.7 Builders' Brigades to be aided, in
order to make their contribution
4.8 Ministry of Local Government and Lands
to consider how to retain artisans employed
with development grants in 1974
5. Community Development: 5.1 DC's requested to comment on Director's
instructions
6. V.D.C.'s: 6.1 DC's and others requested to comment
on BEC Paper and Draft Handbook
6.2 Ministry of Local Government and Lands
to process DEMS Survey proposal
7.1 DDC's to be aware of new structure and
capability in Ministry of Local Government
and Lands to coordinate infrastructure
construction in the Large Villages
7.2 DDC's to consider preparing plans for
rural industrial areas, utilising the
Pilane experience
7.3 Ministry of Local Government and Lands
to work out relationships between Land
Boards and Physical Planning Committees
and DTP to organise training/education of
Land Board members in physical planning
7.4 DTP should be fully involved in the
preparation of Land Use Plans (see para 1.2)
8. Agricultural Extension: 8.1 MQA to note arrangements agreed for
representation of MDA officials on DDC's
8.2 MQA and RDU to pursue funding of small
scale local agricultural projects
9. Primary Education: 9.1 MOE to ensure that E.O.'s carry out
regular inspections
9.2 Ministry of Local Government and Lands
to appoint a full time officer to be
responsible for Primary Education
9.3 Councils and DDC's should be consulted
about any proposal to alter ministerial
responsibility for Primary education
9.4 E.O.'s should be appointed ex-officio
members of Council Education Committees




10.2 D„C.'s should keep in touch with
the RDU
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11. Roads : 11.1 Councils are free to attempt to
build up a Road Department if they wish
11.2 MWC to negotiate Grader hire
contracts for Councils
11.3 MWC to post an officer to advise
Councils on road problems
12. Water:
13. Poverty and Development:
12.1 Coordination required on the siting
of livestock watering points (boreholes
and stock dams) between MRWA, MOA, and
Ministry of Local Government and Lands
12.2 DDC's to complete action requested
by Ministry of Mineral Resources and Water
Affairs of future plans for boreholes and
rural village supplies
12.3 MRWA to make plans, in consultation
with MLGL and DDC's, for the construction
of Village dams for human consumption,
where boreholes are unsuitable and there
is no other water source
13.1 There should be more specific planning
for the poverty group of the population
both by national planners and by field staff
!4. Rural Income Survey:
15. Livestock Marketing:
MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
AND LANDS - GABORONE
File LG. 19/1/3
14.1 D.C.'s will be requested to introduce
the survey at Kgotla meetings
15.1 BMC should establish a quarterly floor
price
15.2 Consultants should study the
possibility of expanding access of cattle
owners to the BMC
15.3 Field Staff should publicise auctions




DDC District Development Committee
MQA Ministry of Agriculture
CD Community Development
DC District Commissioner
VDC Village Development Committee
BEC Botswana Extension College
DEMS (University) Division of Extra-Mural Services
DTP Department of Town Planning
RDU Rural Development Unit
MOE Ministry of Education
EO Education Officer
MWC Ministry of Works & Communications
MRWA Ministry of Mineral Resources &, Water Affairs
MIGL Ministry of Local Government & Lands
BMC Botswana Meat Commission
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APPENDIX G




NUMBER OF WEALTHY CM VDC:-
























































Notes : 1. The villages are not identified here by name for
obvious reasons of confidentiality.
2. "Wealth" defined as paying maximum rate of Local
Government Tax, and/or holding cattle above the figure
generally regarded in each district as making someone
"wealthy".
3 The catchment area for the first column varies some¬
what from district to district depending on the settle¬
ment pattern and the definition of "village"
4 Q.M. = Ordinary Member
5 O.B. = Office-bearer = held more than one office
6 Eosition in brackets indicates held for only part
of the period
7 Last column excludes purely ex officio position,
but includes ex officio member elected to office.
ELECTION MATERIALAPPENDIX H
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House of Chiefs 25 November 1968
Mr. Chairman and Members. The last time 1 attended your meeting-
was early in 1966, when I, as Prime Minister, my colleagues and this
House were actively engaged in the considerations for the Independence
Constitution. I have not since then had the opportunity to attend your
meetings or to talk to you, but I have followed the reports of your
deliberations here, and your activities in and out of this House, with
a great deal of interest.
As Members of the House of Chiefs, you have an important role to
play in the development of this country and its people, and it always
pleases Government to learn that some of you are striving hard to achieve
this great goal, which we, the people of Botswana, have set ourselves.
It is unfortunate, and, indeed, regrettable, that this cannot be
said of all of you. For this reason, I had occasion in March of this
year during the debate on the Appropriation Bill to express clearly to
the National Assembly my views on the position and responsibilities of
Chiefs in a democratic Botswana. For this reason also, I have decided
to come and talk to you on the participation of Chiefs in politics.
The present constitutional position of Chiefs, as well as their
position under the Chieftainship Law and the Local Government (District
Councils) Law, has been established on the basis the Chiefs would play
a non-partisan role in the national life of Botswana. It is quite clear
from paragraph 4 of the Report of the 1963 Constitutional Conference
(the conclusions of which were endorsed, on behalf of the Chiefs of
Botswana, by Kgosi Bathoen II, Kgosi Mokgosi III and Kgosi Linchwe II)
that the House of Chiefs was constituted and given its present functions
in order to facilitate the establishment of a harmonious relationship
between non-political, traditional institutions and a developing political
government.
The House of Chiefs endorsed the proposals for the independence
constitution subject to a number of changes relating to the House. These
changes were agreed at the Independence Conference at Marlborough House
in London in 1966, and the representative of the House of Chiefs, Kgosi
Bathoen, accepted the conclusions of the Conference on behalf of the
House. If the Chiefs now, by their conduct, depart from the basis on
which their position in the body politic was established, they will throw
into issue the whole question of whether these institutions should be
maintained.
One of the most important considerations, which will go to enhance
the Chieftainship in present times, is the full confidence which the
people will have in Chiefs. Any Chief or hereditary authority who
identifies himself with one particular political party naturally estranges
himself from those of his subjects who support or are members of another
political party. The odium does not just end there. An hereditary
authority who takes an active part in politics immediately ceases to be
regarded in his community as the impartial arbitrator in people's affairs.
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This concept of impartiality, it is suggested, is probably the basis
from which stems the respect and authority which Chiefs command from
their subjects. The question of impartiality applies with particular
force to Chiefs as Presidents of the highest Courts in the tribal set-up
and one would not normally expect to see any impartial judge taking active
part in politics. Once all these aspects of the chiefly position outlined
above are destroyed, it is obvious that the need to keep the institution
in being, would disappear.
However, these are considerations for hereditary authorities to think
about. Government's position in circumstances where Chiefs take an active
part in politics must be explained. It is maintained that Chiefs hold
positions which require non-alignment in the sphere of politics. By
engaging in politics they immediately change the nature of their office.
If the character of the Chieftainship office changed then the principles
upon which the Constitution is based, in so far as the position of Chiefs
was concerned, would have to be reviewed and some amendments made in the
laws of the country or new legislation enacted to regulate the changed
position of hereditary authorities.
It is to be emphasised that unless the present trend where Chiefs
freely engage in politics was to cease forthwith, the need will arise
for the Constitution to be amended to cover the situation. Chiefs, of
course, have a choice even under present arrangements. Although there
is no express prohibition on the Chiefs to take part in politics in our
laws, Government takes the view that any Chief or traditional authority
who wants to engage in politics must first resign his Chiefly office.
It is to be noted that Government does not support the present practice
whereby Chiefs participate in politics whilst holding office and would
consider taking appropriate steps to control the situation if this
continued hereafter.
No doubt, honourable Members would like to consider this. Copies
of my statement will be distributed and, should the Members wish to ask
any questions or make any comments, the Minister of State will be
available.
House of Chiefs












SOUTHERN DISTRICT - NGWAKETSE AREA
OCCUPATIONS OF CASH
FIGURE K.4





CENTRAL DISTRICT COUNCIL DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE
FIGURE K.6
NORTH EAST DISTRICT COUNCIL DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE
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FIGURE K. 7
SOUTHERN DISTRICT COUNCIL DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE
SOURCE FOR APPENDIX K: Republic of Botswana, National Development




LOCAL GOVERNMENT STATISTICS, 1966
TABLE L.1
GENERAL INFORMATION
Areas: Pop. : No of Total Poll 13 June 1966 No of
square Census Mem¬ Elect¬ Electorate Votes Empl¬
miles 1964 bers * orate (seats) cast % oyees
1 Francistown 6 9479 12 3482 3482( 8) 2747 78.9 59+
2 Lobatsi 6 7604 12 2398 1920( 5) 1183 61.6 25+
3 Gaberones 6 3849 12 2162 417( 2) 222 53.2 61 +
ALL 12 COUNCILS 220000 542072 210 187881 103555(82) 46947 45.3 634+
ALL DISTRICTS 219982 521140 174 179839 97736(67) 42795 43.8 489+
1 Central 56070 207913 38** 80291 47230(17) 20723 43.9 256+
2 Ngwaketse 10518 81951 29** 27141 6529( 6) 2342 35.9 58+
3 Kweneng 14719 73088 21 23215 8468( 5) 4180 49.4 85+
4 North West 50212 47500 17** 17618 16649(12) 4589 27.6 34+
5 Kgatleng 2798 32118 19** 8755 7464(12) 4128 55.3 16+
6 North East 2056 25206 10 7872 7872( 7) 4350 55.3 7+
7 South East 785 20649 15** 5720 3524( 8) 2483 70.5 20+
8 Kgalagadi 42381 16407 13 5889 Nil Nil Nil 9+
9 Ghanzi 40443 16308 12 3338 Nil Nil Nil 4+
* Includes both elected and nominated Councillors
+ Excludes about 1700 teachers and casuals




Income NET COST OF SERVICES
Total from Total
Sal. , gross specific net General Educ¬
Wages ex^. services cost Admin. ation Health
1 Francistown 25112 130247 69961 60286 11024 29455 2982
2 Lobatsi 13017 64772 11760 53012 12814 26548 2835
3 Gaberones 25206 100064 13260 87309 27575 23653 8999
ALL COUNCILS 215083 1197320 173620 1023700 216700 611500 29300
12 months
ALL DISTRICTS 75343 515068 33271 472797 76718 318146 6761
6 months
1 Central 34301 197104 10555 186549 26444 119401 5708
2 Ngwaketse 10608 72078 4525 67553 8786 53687 55
3 Kweneng 9816 69010 6750 53260 8653 32161 343
4 North West 8100 52335 2010 50325 14217 26796 110
5 Kgatleng 4092 37093 1600 35493 5718 29675 —
6 North East 1380 26541 2530 24011 3848 17993 —
7 South East 3092 17115 1180 15935 2330 10466 545
8 Kgalagadi 3114 28272 4000 24272 4122 16468 —
9 Ghanzi 840 15520 121 15399 2600 11499 —
NET COST OF SERVICES (cont. )
Other
Comm. Dest. Works, New New
Water 1Pe1' Dev. Relief Transp. Vehicles Bldgs,
1 Francistown 200 Cr.197 7422 __ 9400
2 Lobatsi — — Cr.360 — 5175 3000 3000
3 Gaberones — — 332 — 24250 2500 —
ALL COUNCILS 40000 16850 6000 700 69300 9850 23500
12 months
ALL DISTRICTS 19992 16650 3195 340 15371 4350 11274
6 months
1 Central 10424 7000 1274 100 10598 2000 3600
2 Ngwaketse 2576 1000 230 20 1199 — —
3 Kweneng 4105 3250 1056 75 617 — 3000
4 North West 371 1750 500 75 1932 — 4574
5 Kgatleng — — — — — — 100
6 North East 535 1500 135 — — — —
7 South East 1109 1000 — 20 465 — —
8 Kgalagadi 272 450 — 50 560 2350 —
9 Ghanzi 600 700 — — — — —
Note; Above figures given in Rands. At the time R2 = £1 Stgr.
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TABLE L. 3
HQW "NET COST OF SERVICES" (TABLE L.2) IS MET
Non¬ Local Central
Rates specific Govt. Govt. Balances
income Tax Grant
R R R R R
1 Francistown 5 1120 51000 8161
2 Lobatsi 3700 1640 37500 12500 Cr.2328
3 Gaberones 14700 800 45000 12500 14239
ALL COUNCILS 18500 143560 630000 130000 101640
12 months 1023700
ALL DISTRICTS 90568 316000 52500 13729
6 months 472797
1 Central 35500 140000 10000 1049
2 Ngwaketse — 4110 50000 5000 8443
3 Kweneng — 14225 40000 5500 Cr.6465
4 North West — 29555 23000 — Cr .2230
5 Kgatleng — 3350 20000 6000 6143
6 North East — 170 10000 13500 341
7 South Eas t — 778 11000 2500 1657
8 Kgalagadi — 2480 14000 5000 2792
9 Ghanzi — 400 8000 5000 1999
Source for Appendix L: Bechuanaland Protectorate, Ministry
of Local Government, Aide-M^moire to
Local Government Finance in Bechuanaland.
United Nations Economic Commission
for Africa, collaborating with the
German Foundation for Developing
Countries. Seminar in Local Government




It should be noted that, in addition to the items listed below, an
important source was what are termed fugitive publications,
i.e. documents (generally cyclostyled)) which were public documents in
the sense of being available on request from the relevant department,
council, party, committee etc. (and this is true of many of the
"official and semi-official publications" listed hereinafter) but were
not published in the normal sense of the word. They include conference
papers, background documents, draft District Development Plans, etc.
A number of such documents, including in particular the constitutions
and manifestoes of the Democratic Party, the National Front and the
People's Party, are reproduced in W. J. A. Macartney, Readings in Boleswa
Government, Vol. I (1971).
ARCHIVES
Various files in Ministry of Local Government 86 Lands, Gaborone.
Various files in District Councils, Community Development Department
and District Administration (District Development Committee), in
Francistown, Kanye and Serowe.
University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, Division of Extra Mural





Botswana Daily News (formerly Bechuanaland Daily News)
Botswana Notes and Records (Botswana Society) [Gaborone] (annual)
Botswana Weekly News (now defunct)
Kutlwano (monthly)
Mafeking Mail & Botswana Guardian (formerly Mafeking Mail &, Protectorate
Guardian) (weekly)
Masa (Botswana People's Party, formerly Bechuanaland People's Party)
(Francistown) (irregular; defunct?)
Mmegi wa Dikgang [Serowe] (now defunct)
The Parliamentarian [London]: quarterly Parliamentary reports
Puisano [Selebi-PhikweJ (now defunct)
Pud Phaa (Botswana National Front) (Mahalapye) (irregular; defunct?)
Rand Daily Mail [Johannesburg]
Therisanyo/Consultation (Botswana Democratic Party, formerly
Bechuanaland Democratic Party) (Gaborone) (Ceased regular publication)
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Comaroff, J. L., "Competition for Office and Political Processes
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Africa Borderland." Ph.D., London University, 1973
Curtis, D., "Ideology and the Impact of Development Agency Activity."
Ph.D., University of Kent, 1977
Fig, D. , "The Rise and Demise of a Traditional PSlite: a political
history of the role and impact of the Botswana Chiefs."
Undergraduate dissertation (Comparative African
Government & Law II), Cape Town University, 1972
Frank, L. P., "Khama and Jonathan: a study of authority and leadership
in southern Africa." Ph.D., Columbia University, 1974
Gunderson, G. L., "Nation-Building and the Administrative State: the
case of Botswana." Ph.D., University of California at
Berkeley, 1970
Mushi, S. S., "Revolution by Evolution: the Tanzanian road to
socialism." Ph.D., Yale University, 1974
Osborne, A., "Rural Development in Botswana: a qualitative view."
York University (England), n.d.
Parsons, Q. N., "Khama III, the Bamangwato and the British, with
special reference to 1895-1923." Ph.D., Edinburgh
University, 1973
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Sussex University, 1976
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464
BOOKS, PAMPHLETS AND ARTICLES
Almond, G. A., "Determinacy-Choice, Stability-Change: some thoughts on
a contemporary polemic in political theory," Government
& Opposition, V, 1 (1970)
Apter, D., Ghana in Transition. New York, 1963
, The Political Kingdom in Uganda: a study of bureaucratic
nationalism. Princeton, 1961
Bailey, F. G., Stratagems and Spoils: a social anthropology of politics.
Oxford, 1969
Barber, J. P., Imperial Frontier. Nairobi, 1968
Bauer, C. &. Licke, J., Local government in Kgatleng and Kweneng District
Councils (August 1968 - November 1970). [unpublished 197lj
Benson, M. , Tshekedi Khama. London, 1960
Bienen, H. , Tanzania: party transformation and economic development.
Princeton, 1970
Blaut, J. M., "The Theory of Development," Antipode, V, 2 (1973)
Boissevain, J., "The Place of Non-Groups in the Social Sciences," Man,
111, 4 (1968)
Botswana Democratic Party, Beware of wolves in sheepskins/Maloma tsebe
a Domkrag kgori e bonye mae lorapo ga e lo bone. n.d.
Botswana Independence Party, Constitution. [Palapye], n.d.
Botswana National Front, Pamphlet No. 1: the Botswana National Front,
its character and tasks. n.d.
, Statement issued by the Central Committee of the Botswana
National Front party in December, 1967, to the Botswana
nation and to the peoples of the world.
Brown, J. T., Setswana Dictionary C3rd edition, reprinted).
Gaberones, 1968
Butler, J. & Castagno, A. A. (Eds.),. Boston University Papers on Africa:
transition in African politics. New York, 1967
Carter, G. &, O'Meara, P. (Eds.), Southern Africa in Crisis. Indiana
University Press, 1977
Charlesworth, J. C. (Ed.), Contemporary Political Analysis. New York,
1968
Cohen, D. L. &, Parson, J. D. (Eds.), Politics and Society in Botswana.
University of Botswana & Swaziland, Department of Political
& Administrative Studies, Gaborone, 1976
5
465
Coleman, J. S., Nigeria: background to nationalism. Berkeley, 1960
Dale, R., Botswana and its Southern neighbor. Ohio University,
1970
Davis, J. M. (Ed.), Modern Industry and the African. London, 1933
Deutsch, K. W., "On communication models in the Social Sciences,"
Public Opinion Quarterly, XVI (1952)
Ettinger, S. J., "South Africa's Weight Restrictions on Cattle Exports
from Bechuanaland, 1924-1941," Botswana Notes and
Records, IV (1972)
Finer, S„ E., "Almond's Concept of 'The Political System': a textual
critique," Government 86 Opposition, V, 1 (1970)
Flood, J. , Reports on Development Pro.jects supported by Botswana
Christian Council. Christian Aid, London, n.d. j_l974J
Foltz, W., From French West Africa to Mali Federation. Newhaven,
1965
Fortes, M. & Evans-Pritchard, E. E„ (Eds.), African Political Systems.
London, 1940
, & Patterson, S. C. P., (Eds.), Studies in African Sociology:
essays presented to I. Schapera. London, 1975
FUrnivall, J„ S., Colonial Policy and Practice: a comparative study of
Burma and Netherlands India. Cambridge (England), 1948
Gabatshwane, S. M., Introduction to the Bechuanaland Protectorate
History and Administration. S. M. Gabatshwane, Kanye, 1957
, Seretse Khama and Botswana. J. G. Mmusi & S. M. Gabatshwane,
Kanye, 1966
, Tshekedi Khama of Bechuanaland: great statesman and
politician. Cape Town, 1961
Gillett, S., "The Survival of Chieftaincy in Botswana," African
Affairs, LXXII, 287 (1973)
Giniewski, P., "Deux nouvelles indSpendances africaines: Lesotho et
Botswana," Politique etrangfere, XXXI, 4 (1966)
Griffiths, J. E. S., "A Note on Local Government," Botswana Notes and
Records, II (1970)
Gutkind, P. C. W. & Wallerstein, I. (Eds.), The Political Economy of
Contemporary Africa. Beverley Hills, 1976
Hailey, The Republic of South Africa and the High Commission
Territories. London, 1963
466
Halpern, J., South Africa's Hostages. Penguin Books, 1965
Heeger, G. A., The Politics of Underdevelopment. London, 1974
Hermans, Q., "A Review of Botswana's Financial History, 1900-1973,"
Botswana Notes and Records, VI (1974))
Hodgkin, T., African Political Parties: an introductory guide.
Penguin Books, 1961
Hodson, A. W., Trekking the Great Thirst (2nd edition). London, 1914
Holm, J. D., Dimensions of mass involvement in Botswana politics; a
test of alternative theories. Sage Professional Paper,
Beverley Hills, 1974
"Rural Development in Botswana: three basic political
trends," Rural Africana, Fall 72
Political Development in Rural Tanzania: TANU ya.jenga nchi.
Nairobi, 1969
Johnson, H. G. (Ed.), Economic Nationalism in Old and New States.
London, 1968
Kerven, C., Migration to Francistown and effects on the urban and
rural community: some preliminary observations, paper
for Workshop on Rural Environment and Development Planning
in Southern Africa, organised by the United Nations
African Institute for Economic Development and Planning,
Gaborone, 1976
, Report on Tsamaya village. Rural Sociology Report No. 1,
Ministry of Agriculture, Gaborone, 1976
Khama, Sir Seretse, Kagisano - a policy for harmony. Presidential
address, BDP Annual Conference, Francistown, 1 April 1972
Kilson, M. , Political Change in a West African State: a study of the
modernization process in Sierra Leone. Cambridge (Mass. ),
1966
Kjekshus, H. , "Question Hour in the Bunge," African Review, II, 3
CI 972)
Kuper, A., Kalahari Village Politics: an African democracy. Cambridge
CEngland), 1970
Lamb, G., Peasant Politics. Lewes, 1974
Landell-Mills, P. M., "The 1969 Southern African Customs Union




LaPalombara, J. G„ (Ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development.
Princeton, 1967
467
Lever, B. G., Agricultural Extension in Botswana. Reading1 University,
Department of Agricultural Economics, 1970
Leys, C., Politicians and Policies; an essay on politics in Acholi,
Uganda, 1962-1965. Nairobi, 1967
, (Ed.), Politics and Change in Developing Countries. Cambridge
(England), 1969
Lyon, P., Neutralism. Leicester, 1967
Macartney, W. J. A., "African Westminster? The Parliament of Lesotho,"
Parliamentary Affairs, 2X1II, 2 CSpring 1970)
, "Botswana Goes to the Polls," Africa Report, XIV, 8
(December 1969); also XVI, 2 (February 1971)
, "The General Election of 1969," Botswana Notes and
Records, III (1971)
," "The Success of Seretse," Africa Report, XIX, 6 (November-
December 1974)
, (Ed.), Readings in Boleswa Government; select documents on
the government and politics of Botswana, Lesotho and
Swaziland, Vol I. U.B.L.S. Printing Unit, Roma, Lesotho,
1971
Mallet, V. (Ed.), Life with Queen Victoria. London, 1968
Mat^heng, J. S., "The Community Approach to Rural Development."
Botswana Notes and Records, III (1971)
Merriweather, A. M., Desert Doctor. London, 1969
Mitchison, N., Return to the Fairy Hill. London, 1966
, "African Lesson in Local Initiative," The Scotsman,
16 December 1976
Munger, E. S., Bechuanaland; Pan-African outpost or Bantu Homeland?
London, 1965
Myrdal, G., Asian Drama: an inquiry into the poverty of nations.
London,. 1968
, Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions. London,
1957
Nettl, P., Political Mobilisation: a sociological analysis of
methods and concepts. London, 1967
Osborne, A., "Rural Development in Botswana: a qualitative view,"
Journal of Southern African Studies, II, 2 (1976)
468
Parson, J. D., "A note on the 1974 General Election in Botswana,"
Botswana Notes and Records, VII (1975)
, Aspects of political culture in Botswana; results of an
exploratory survey. (unpublished))
Proctor, S. H., "The House of Chiefs and the Political Development of
Botswana," Journal of Modern African Studies, VI, 1
(1968)
Ranger, T. 0., Dance and Society in Eastern Africa. London, 1975
Republic of Zambia, Village Productivity and Ward Development
Committees. Lusaka, 1971
Riggs, F. W., Administration in Developing Countries; the theory of
the prismatic society. Boston, 1964
Robins, E., White Queen in Africa: the story of Ruth and Seretse.
London, 1967
Rollings, P. J., An introduction to Botswana; and Village Development
Committees in Totome. Sociology Department, Reading
University, 1974
Schapera, I., The Ethnic Composition of Tswana Tribes. London, 1952
, A Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom. (2nd edition)
London, 1970
, Tribal Innovators: Tswana Chiefs and social change
1795-1940. London, 1970
Sheffield, J. R.,(Ed.), Road to the Village: case studies in African
community development. African-American Institute,
New York, 1974
Shivji, I. G., Class Struggles in Tanzania. London, 1976
Silitshena, R. M. K., A conceptual framework for the study of rural-
rural migration in Botswana, paper read at Workshop in
Issues in Rural Transformation, Arusha, 1977
, Preliminary notes on some characteristics of households
and population that is settled permanently at the lands
in the Kweneng District, paper prepared for the Workshop
on the National Migration Study at University of Botswana
and Swaziland, Gaborone, 1977
Sillery, A., The Bechuanaland Protectorate. Cape Town, 1952
, Botswana: a short political history. London, 1974
Founding a Protectorate. The Hague, 1965
<5
469
Sklar, R., "Political Science and National Integration," Journal
of Modern African Studies, V, 1 (1967)
Smit, P., Botswana: Resources and Development. Pretoria, 1970
Speed, J. & Stevens, C., "Multipartyism in Africa: the case of
Botswana Revisited," African Affairs, LXXVI, 304 (1977)
Spence, J. E., "British Policy towards the High Commission Territories,"
Journal of Modern African Studies, II, 2 (1964)
"The Implications of the Phodesia Issue for the Former
High Commission Territories," Journal of Commonwealth
Political Studies, VII, 2, (1969)
Staniland, M. , "The Rhetoric of Centre-Periphery Relations," Journal
of Modern African Studies, VIII, 4 (1970)
Swartz, M„ J. (Ed.), Local-level Politics: social and cultural
perspectives. London, 1969
Tlou, T., "The Nature of Batswana States: towards a theory of
Batswana traditional government - the Batawana case,"
Botswana Notes and Records, VI (1974)
Tomlinson, R. W., "Botswana - from Dust to Diamonds," Geography, L2,
4, (1975) """""""
Tordoff, W. , Government and Politics in Tanzania. Nairobi, 1967
, "Local Administration in Botswana," (Parts I and II),
Journal of Administration Overseas, XII, 4 (1973) and
XIII, 1 (1974)
Vengroff, R., "Networks and Leadership in a Development Institution:
the district council in Botswana," Political Anthropology
[Assen, the Netherlands], I, 2, (1975)
Werbner, R. P., "Small Man Politics and the Rule of Law: centre-
periphery relations in East-Central Botswana," Journal
of African Law, XXI, 1, (1977)
Wiseman, J. A., "Multipartyism in Africa: the case of Botswana,"
African Affairs, LXXVI, 302 (1977)
Young, B. A., Bechuanaland. London, 1966
Zolberg, A., Creating Political Order; the party-states of West
Africa. Chicago, 1966
"The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States
of Tropical Africa," American Political Science Review,
LXII, 1 (1968)
470
OFFICIAL AND SEMI-OFFICIAL PERIODICAL PUBLICATIONS
Bechuanaland Protectorate, Bechuanaland Annual Reports. London (HMSO)
Central District Preparatory Commission Minutes
Central Statistics Office, Ministry of Finance [&, Development Planning-]
Statistical Abstract Cannual)
Council Minutes and supporting papers and also Committee minutes for
Central District Council, North East District Council, Southern
(Ngwaketse) District Council, and Francistown Town Council
Department of Community Development, Annual Reports
High Commission of the Republic of Botswana, London, Monthly Newsletter;
irregular (press releases)
House of Chiefs, Official Report
Ministry of Local Government & Lands, Annual Reports
Ministry of Local Government & Lands, Minutes and Supporting Papers,
Annual National Conference of District Development Committees 1972-
National Assembly, Hansard: Official Report. (prior to 30 September 1966:
Hansard: Official Report of the Legislative Assembly, unbroken series)
Price Waterhouse &. Co./John Knipe &, Co., Auditors' Reports and
Supplementary Reports on Central, North East and Southern District
Councils to Minister of Local Government &. Lands
Republic of Botswana, The Government Gazette
Republic of Botswana, National Development Plan
OFFICIAL AND SEMI-OFFICIAL NON-PERIODICAL PUBLICATIONS
471
Bechuanaland Protectorate, Report of the Local Government Committee/
Mafoko a Komiti ka ga puso ya mo gae. 1964
Beeby, A. J., et al., Report on the structure and conditions of service
of Tribal Administrations in the Bechuanaland Protectorate.n.d.[1963J
Botswana Extension College, The training of Village Development
Committees. 1976
Botswana Extension College, VDC's in the North East District: a summary
of results of a small survey"n.d. [l974J
Botswana Extension College, Village Development Committee handbook
(three drafts; final version 1974)
Central Statistics Office, Ministry of Finance &, Development Planning,
Guide to the Villages of Botswana. 1973
Central Statistics Office, Report on the Population Census 1971. 1972
Central Statistics Office, Ministry of Finance & Development Planning,
The Rural Income Distribution Survey in Botswana, 1974/75. 1976
Chambers, R. & Feldman, D., Report on Rural Development. Ministry of
Finance & Development Planning, 1973
Colclough, M. & Crowley, W. D., Hie People and the Plan (3 vols,). 1974
and forthcoming
Egner, E. B., (Administrator, Tati Settlement Project), Interim Report
of the Tati Settlement Project. 1971
Etherington, A., Villagers as developers - Parts I, II and III, Botswana
Extension College^ 1974/1975
Information Services, Census 1971. n.d.
Information Services, Our National Development Plan. n.d.
Legislative Council, Bechuanaland Protectorate, Local Government in the
Bechuanaland Protectorate. 1964
Ministry of Local Government, Bechuanaland Protectorate, Aide-Mgmoire
to Local Government Finance in Bechuanaland. United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa, collaborating with the German Foundation for
Developing Countries. Seminar in Local Government Finances, Addis Ababa,
5th-17th September, 1966
Ministry of Local Government &, Lands, District Councillors handbook.
1966
Ministry of Local Government &, Lands, Handbook for Chairmen, Secretaries
and Members of District (and Town)) Councils. Several editions
472
National Assembly, Standing orders. CSeveral editions)
Republic of Botswana, Constitution of Botswana fBotswana Independence
Act 1966 cap. 23]. 1966
Republic of Botswana, Government Paper No. 1Rural development in
Botswana. 1972
Republic of Botswana, Government Paper No. 2 of 1973: national policy
for rural development: the Government's decisions on the Report on
Rural Development by Dr. R. Chambers and D. Feldman.
Republic of Botswana, Government Paper No. 2 of 1975: National policy
on Tribal grazing land.
Republic of Botswana, Report of the Presidential Commission on
Localisation and Training in the Botswana Civil Service and the
Government Statement on the Report of the Commission. 1973
Schapera, I., The Native Land Problem in the Tati District: report
and recommendations submitted to the Bechuanaland Protectorate
Administration. 1943
Supervisor of Elections, Report on the General Election 1969. 1970
Supervisor of Elections, Report to the Minister of State on the General
Election 1974. n.d.
Tennent, S. J., Report on Community Development. n.d. [1974]
Tordoff, W., Sarpong, M. A. B., & Pilane, D., Report of the Local
Government Study Group. ["The Tordoff Report"J unpublished, 1970
University of Botswana Lesotho & Swaziland [Kidd, R.J, Report of the
Town and District Councillors' seminar held on Sunday 8th April 1973 at
the Francistown Teacher Training College. UBLS/DEMS, Northern Office,
Francistown, 1973
University of Botswana, Lesotho & Swaziland, Councillors' Seminar:
report on the second seminar for councillors from the Francistown Town
Council and the North East District Council. UBLS/DEMS Northern Office,
Francistown. 1974
World Food Programme, Botswana; Project 995 (Drought Relief), Quarterly
Progress Reports.
MISCELLANEOUS
African Review: a monthly survey of trends and developments in
Africa^(n.p.[London])
In the Subordinate Court of the First Class for the Central
District held in Mahalapye: charge sheet.n.d.[for court
appearance commencing' 18 December 1967], Mahalapye (Central
District))
Mpho, M. K., Open letter to the Secretary-General, Organisation
of African Unity, 4 June 1972.
Soko, A. J., Speech at the annual conference of the Botswana
Democratic Party held in Francistown from 1st to 3rd April 1972
Village Development Committee Minutes (holograph: Digawana, Good
Hope, Kalamare, Mahalapye Central, Mahalapye South, Makwate,
Mapoka, Masunga, Molapowabojang and Tsamaya.
